Mind The World Order

119229

MIND AND
THE WORLD-ORDER

MIND AND
THE WORLD -ORDER

OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

BY

CLARENCE IRVING LEWIS

ASSOCIATE PBOFESSOR OF PHIIXDSOPHY
HABVABD UNIVERSITY

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

NEW YOBK CHICAGO BOSTON

COPYRIGHT, 1929, BY
CHARLES SCJUBNER'S SONS

Printed in the United States of America

TO
M. M. L.

PREFACE

The conceptions presented in this book have
grown out of investigations which began in the
field of exact logic and its application to mathe-
matics. The historic connection which exists be-
tween mathematics and exact science on the one
hand and conceptions of knowledge on the other,
needs no emphasis : from Plato to the present day,
all the major epistemological theories have been
dominated by, or formulated in the light of, ac-
companying conceptions of mathematics. Nor is
the reason for this connection far to seek ; mathe-
matics, of all human affairs, most clearly exhibits
certitude and precision. If only one could come
at the basis of this ideal character, the key-con-
ceptions of epistemology might be disclosed- Thus
every major discovery of theoretical mathematics,
and every fundamental change in the manner in
which this subject is conceived, is sure to find its
sequel, sooner or later, in epistemology* Who-
ever has followed the developments in logistic and
mathematical theory in the last quarter-century
can hardly fail to be convinced that the conse-
quences of these must be revolutionary. It has
been demonstrated, with a degree of precision and
finality seldom attained, that the certitude of
mathematics results from its purely analytic char-
acter and its independence of any necessary con-
nection with empirical fact. Its first premises are

vii

viii PREFACE

neither those self-evident truths of reason which
inspired the continental rationalists to imitate the
geometric method nor the principles of intuitive
construction which, for Kant, assured a basis of
application to all possible experience ; they are not
even empirical generalizations, as Mill and other
empiricists have thought. Rather, they are defini-
tions and postulates which exhibit abstract con-
cepts more or less arbitrarily chosen for the pur-
poses of the system in question. Intrinsic connec-
tion with experience is tenuous or lacking.

Concurrently, developments in physical science,
such as the theory of relativity, have emphasized
the fact that, here too, abstractness and system-
atic precision go together, and that exact deduc-
tive procedures may give rise to no corresponding
certainty about empirical nature. Logical integ-
rity and concrete applicability are quite separate
matters. The empirical truth of geometry even is
not assured by its absolute validity as a deductive
system, nor by any intuition of space, but de-
pends upon further considerations. The nature of
these is not wholly clear, but it is evident that ob-
servation and the results of experiment must play
some part in the determination of them. Thus the
analytic character and abstractness of exact sys-
tems, which assure to them that kind of certainty
which they have, tend to divorce them from that
empirical truth which is the object of natural
science and the content of our possible knowledge
of nature.

PREFACE

IX

We stand to-day so close to these developments
that the far-reaching consequences of them may
fail to impress us. It is not merely a change in one
or two narrowly restricted disciplines at the far-
thest remove from direct study of natural phe-
nomena : whatever affects the basic subjects, such
as mathematics and physics, is bound to be re-
flected eventually throughout the whole of science*
As a fact, this altered point of view is rapidly ex-
tending to other branches, and the independence
of the conceptual and the empirical is coming to
be accepted as a commonplace. It is not too much
to say, I think, that it becomes a matter of doubt
whether the structure science builds is solidly
based upon the earth, or is a mansion in some Pla-
tonic heaven, or is only a kind of castle in the air.
At least it appears that we must accept a kind of
double-truth: there are the certainties, such as
those of mathematics, which concern directly only
what is abstract; and there are the presentations
of our sense-experience to which we seek to apply
them, but with a resultant empirical truth which
may be no more than probable. The nature and
validity of such empirical knowledge becomes the
crucial issue. Traditional grounds of a priori
truth have been, perforce, abandoned. What other
grounds there may be; or whether without the a
priori there can be any truth at all, must consti-
tute our problem.

So far as this is the case, the outstanding ques-

x PREFACE

tions concern the nature of our abstract concepts,
such as those which figure in mathematics and
theoretical physics, and the relation of them to
concrete experience and to reality. Upon these
points, the implications of current scientific de-
velopments are nothing like so clear. If I could
hope that I read these aright, and that something
is here done toward rendering them explicit and
consistent, I should, of course, be more than satis-
fied.

The construction here attempted turns princi-
pally upon three theses: (1) A priori truth is
definitive in nature and rises exclusively from the
analysis of concepts. That reality may be de-
limited a priori, is due, not to forms of intuition or
categories which confine the content of experience,
but simply to the fact that whatever is denomi-
nated "real" must be something discriminated in
experience by criteria which are antecedently de-
termined. () While the delineation of concepts
is a priori, the application of any particular con-
cept to particular given experience is hypotheti-
cal; the choice of conceptual systems for such
application is instrumental or pragmatic, and em-
pirical truth is never more than probable. (3)
That experience in general is such as to be capable
of conceptual interpretation, requires no peculiar
and metaphysical assumption about the conform-
ity of experience to the mind or its categories ; it
could not conceivably be otherwise. If this last

PREFACE

XI

statement is a tautology, then at least it must be
true, and the assertion of a tautology is significant
if it is supposed that it can be significantly denied.
The development of these three theses will be
found principally in Chapters III, VTII, and XI.

Since this point of view will be likely to acquire
some sort of label in any case, I shall venture to
give it one myself and call it "conceptualistic
pragmatism." Without the earlier conceptions of
Peirce, James, and Dewey especially Peirce it
would probably not have been developed. But these
more orthodox pragmatists should not, of course,
be made responsible for this view as a whole nor,
particularly, for the doctrine of a priori truth
which is included.

In writing the book, I encountered a consider-
able difficulty of exposition : with whatever one of
its theses I should begin, the others would be more
or less anticipated. In view of this difficulty, I
have endeavored to keep the presentation as com-
pact and swift as was compatible with clearness
and proper emphasis. Controversial issues have
been neglected except so far as discussion of them
would contribute to the main development. And
matters which lay to one side of the central theme
but were still too important to be omitted alto-
gether, have been covered briefly in appendices.

To the graduate students in my seminary in
the theory of knowledge in the last six years, my
thanks are due for their critical discussion of these

xii PREFACE

views, which have served both to bring out crucial
points and to clarify my own conceptions* Even
more important help of this sort came from dis-
cussion with my colleagues of the Department of
Philosophy in the University of California in the
summer of 1926. To the officers of the Philosophi-
cal Union there and of the University of Cali-
fornia Press, I am indebted for permission to use
again in these pages the materials which entered
into the Howison Lecture for 1926, "The Prag-
matic Element in Knowledge/' I am likewise in-
debted to the editors of the Journal of Philosophy
for permission to reprint brief excerpts from two
articles, "The Structure of Logic and Its Rela-
tion to Other Systems," and "A Pragmatic Con-
ception of the A Priori. 5 * My friend and col-
league, Professor E. G. Boring, has given me as-
sistance of a kind most difficult to get by his
critical appraisal of an earlier draft of the first
four chapters and Appendix D. If these portions
still leave much to be desired, at least they have
been considerably improved as a result of his sug-
gestions. Professor S. L. Quimby, of Columbia
University, has assisted me with one of the illus-
trations in Chapter VL As always, a principal
stimulus and source of encouragement has been the
association with my colleagues of the Harvard De-
partment.

C/ I. L.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION: ABOUT PHILOSOPHY IN
GENERAL AND METAPHYSICS IN PAR-
TICULAR. THE PROPER METHOD OF
PHILOSOPHY 1

II. THE GIVEN ELEMENT IN EXPERIENCE . 36

III. THE PURE CONCEPT 67

IV. COMMON CONCEPTS AND OUR COMMON

WORLD 90

V. THE KNOWLEDGE OF OBJECTS .... 117

VI. THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE AND

THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE REAL . . 154

VII. THE A PRIORI TRADITIONAL CONCEP-
TIONS 195

VIII. THE NATURE OF THE A PRIORI, AND THE

PRAGMATIC ELEMENT IN KNOWLEDGE . 230

IX. THE A PRIORI AND THE EMPIRICAL . . 274

X. THE EMPIRICAL AND PROBABLE . . . 309

XI. EXPERIENCE AND ORDER 345

APPENDICES:

A. NATURAL SCIENCE AND ABSTRACT CONCEPTS 393

B. ESTHESIS AND ESTHETICS 402

C. CONCEPTS AND " IDEAS " 407

xiii

xiv CONTENTS

PAGE

D. MIND*S KNOWLEDGE OF ITSELF .... 412

B. THE APPLICABILITY OF ABSTRACT CONCEP-
TUAL SYSTEMS TO EXPERIENCE . . . 428

F. THE LOGICAL CORRELATES OF THE A PRIORI

AND THE A POSTERIORI 433

INDEX 441

MIND AND
THE WORLD-ORDER

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

ABOUT PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL AND META-
PHYSICS IN PARTICULAR. THE PROPER
METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY

The general character of any philosophy is
likely to be determined by its initial assumptions
and its method. When Descartes proposed to
sweep the boards clean by doubting everything
which admitted of doubt and announced the initial
criterion of certainty to be the inner light of hu-
man reason, the distinguishing characteristics of
the philosophic movement which resulted were
thereby fixed* In similar fashion, the development
from Locke to Hume is, for the most part, the
logical consequence of the doctrine that the mind
is a blank tablet on which experience writes. And
when Kant proposed to inquire, not whether sci-
ence is possible, but how it is possible, and identi-
fied the possibility of science with the validity of
synthetic judgments a priori, the successive at-
tempts of the nineteenth century to deduce the
major philosophic truths as presuppositions of
experience was foreordained.

Because method has this peculiar importance
in philosophy, I believe that the reader of any

2 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

philosophic book is entitled to know in advance
what are the underlying convictions of this sort
with which the writer sets out. It is right and
proper that one should begin with some statement
of program and method.

It is I take it a distinguishing character of
philosophy that it is everybody's business. The
man who is his own lawyer or physician, will be
poorly served; but everyone both can and must
be his own philosopher. He must be, because phi-
losophy deals with ends, not means. It includes
the questions, What is good? What is right? What
is valid? Since finally the responsibility for his
own life must rest squarely upon the shoulder/* of
each, no one can delegate the business of answer-
ing such questions to another. Concerning the
means whereby the valid ends of life may be at-
tained, we seek expert advice. The natural sciences
and the techniques to which they give rise, though
they may serve some other interests also, are pri-
marily directed to the discovery of such means.
But the question of the ultimately valuable ends
which shall be served, remains at once the most
personal, and the most general of all questions.

And everyone can be his own philosopher, be-
cause in philosophy we investigate what we al-
ready know. It is not the business of philosophy,
as it is of the natural sciences, to add to the sum
total of phenomena with which men are ac-
quainted. Philosophy is concerned with what is

THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY 3

already familiar. To know in the sense of fa-
miliarity and to comprehend in clear ideas are,
of course, quite different matters. Action precedes
reflection and even precision of behavior com-
monly outruns precision of thought fortunately
for us. If it were not for this, naive common-
sense and philosophy would coincide, and there
would be no problem. Just this business of bring-
ing to clear consciousness and expressing coher-
ently the principles which are implicitly intended
in our dealing with the familiar, is the distinctively
philosophic enterprise.

For instance, everybody knows the difference
between right and wrong; if we had no moral
sense, philosophy would not give us one. But who
can state, with complete satisfaction to himself,
the adequate and consistent grounds of moral
judgment? Likewise, everyone knows the distinc-
tion of cogent reasoning from fallacy. The study
of logic appeals to no criterion not already pres-
ent in the learner's mind. That logical error is, in
the last analysis some sort of inadvertance, is an
indispensable assumption of the study. Even if
it should be in some part an unwarranted assump-
tion, we could not escape it, for the very business
of learning through reflection or discussion pre-
sumes our logical sense as a trustworthy guide.

That the knowledge sought in ethics and in
logic is, thus, something already implicit in our
commerce with the familiar, has usually been rec-

4 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

ognized. But that the same is true in metaphysics,
has not been equally clear. Metaphysics studies
the nature of reality in general. Reality is pre-
sumably independent of any principles of ours,
in a sense in which the right and the valid may
not be. At least initial presumption to the con-
trary might be hopelessly prejudicial. Moreover,
reality forever runs beyond the restricted field of
familiar experience. What hope that cosmic rid-
dles can be solved by self -interrogation ! The se-
cret which we seek may be in some field which is
not yet adequately explored or even opened to
investigation. Or it may be forever beyond the
reach of human senses.

But it is not the business of philosophy to go
adventuring beyond space and time. And so far
as a true knowledge of the nature of reality de-
pends on determining questions of phenomenal
fact which are not yet settled, the philosopher has
no special insight which enables him to pose as a
prophet. We can do nothing but wait upon the
progress of the special sciences. Or if speculate
we must, at least such speculation is in no special
sense the philosopher's affair. It is true that meta-
physics has always been the dumping ground for
problems which are only partly philosophic.
Questions of the nature of life and mind, for ex-
ample, are of this mixed sort. In part such issues
wait upon further data from the sciences, from
biology and physical-chemistry and psychology;

THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY 5

in part they are truly philosophic, since they
turn upon questions of the fundamental criteria
of classification and principles of interpretation.
No amassing of scientific data can determine these.

If, for example, the extreme behaviorists in
psychology deny the existence of consciousness on
the ground that analysis of the "mental" must
always be eventually in terms of bodily behavior,
then it is the business of philosophy to correct
their error, because it consists simply in a fallacy
of logical analysis. The analysis of any immedi-
ately presented X must always interpret this X
in terms of its constant relations to other things
to Y and Z. Such end-terms of analysis the
Y and Z will not in general be temporal or spa-
tial constituents of X 9 but may be anything which
bears a constant correlation with it. It is as if one
should deny the existence of colors because, for
purposes of exact investigation, the colors must
be defined as frequencies of vibratory motion. In
general terms, if such analysis concludes by stat-
ing "X is a certain kind of Y Z complex, hence
X does not exist as a distinct reality ," the error
lies in overlooking a general characteristic of
logical analysis that it does not discover the
"substance" or cosmic constituents of the phe-
nomenon whose nature is analyzed but only the
constant context of experience in which it will be
found.

So far, then, as the divergence of psychological

6 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

theories, from behaviorism which interprets mind
in terms of physical behavior to theories of the
subconscious which assimilate much of physiolog-
ical activity to mind, represents no dispute about
experimental fact but only disparity of definition
and methodological criteria, psychology and meta-
physics have a common ground. The delineation
of the fundamental concepts "mind" and "men-
tal" is a truly philosophic enterprise. A similar
thing might be discovered in the case of other
sciences.

Newly discovered scientific data might make
such problems of fundamental concepts and classi-
fication easier or more difficult but of itself it
cannot solve them because, in the nature of the
case, they are antecedent to the investigation.
Such concepts are not simply dictated by the
findings of the laboratory, or by any sort of sense-
experience. Their origin is social and historical
and represents some enduring human interest. It
is the human mind itself which brings them to
experience, though the mind does not invent them
in a vacuum or cut them from whole cloth. The
tendency to forget that initial concepts are never
merely dictated by empirical findings is precisely
what accounts for the absurd prejudice now hap-
pily obsolescent that science is "just the report
of facts." And this likewise helps to explain the
common failure to distinguish between those cos-
mological speculations which are not philosophic

THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY 7

at all, because they are merely guesses at what
future observation or experiment may reveal,
from the legitimate and necessary philosophic
question of a coherent set of fundamental cate-
gories, such as "life" and "mind" and "matter,"
in terms of which experience may consistently and
helpfully be interpreted.

It would, of course, be captious to reserve this
problem of initial concepts to philosophers, even
though we should remember that, since everybody
is to be his own philosopher, this merely means
reserving them as general problems. The expert
in the scientific field will have his special com-
petence with respect to them; but they are not
his exclusive property, because they are to be re-
solved as much by criticism and reflection as by
empirical investigation. Conversely, it would be
pedantic if we should forbid the philosophic stu-
dent to speculate concerning undetermined scien-
tific fact. It is even questionable to deny the cap-
tion "metaphysics" to those cosmological and
ontological problems which have this partly specu-
lative and partly critical or reflective character.
Historically their title to the name is fairly good.
All I wish to point out is that there is a real dis-
tinction here between the speculative and the
reflective elements; that this distinction coincides
with a difference in the method by which resolu-
tion of the problem is to be sought ; and that it is
only the reflective element in such "metaphysical"

8 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

problems which coincides in its nature and in the
method of its solution with the problems of ethics
and logic.

With this explanation, I hope I shall cause no
confusion if I say that it is only so far as they
are thus critical and reflective that the problems
of ontology and cosmology are truly philosophic ;
and that metaphysics as a philosophic discipline
is concerned with the nature of the real only so
far as that problem is amenable to the reflective
method and does not trench upon the field where
only scientific investigation can achieve success.
There are such reflective problems within any
special science, and these may be said to consti-
tute the philosophy of that science. There are also
those problems of initial principle and criteria
which are common to all the sciences and to the
general business of life. These last are the prob-
lems of philosophy proper.

There is another sense in which metaphysics
has often been speculative and departed from its
proper philosophic business and method; that is,
not by seeking to anticipate the science of the fu-
ture, but through attempting by sheer force of ra-
tional reflection to transcend experience altogether.
Dogmatism is out of fashion since Kant.* But

*Perhaps I should say, "has been out of fashion,** since just now
we are being treated to various new forms of dogmatism* But this,
I take it, comes partly as a counsel of despair, and partly it represents
a reaction against the often exaggerated claims of "idealism" and
post-Kantian "criticism" to be able to proceed a priori without refer-
ence to particular results of the empirical sciences.

THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY 9

that philosophic legerdemain which, with only ex-
perience for its datum, would condemn this expe-
rience to the status of appearance and disclose
a reality more edifying, is still with us. The mo-
tives of this attitude are, indeed, ingrained in
human nature, and I am reluctant to lay hands
on that idealism which has played the role of
Father Parmenides to all the present generation
of philosophers. But at least we must observe that
such metaphysics turns away from one type of
problem which is real and soluble to another which
may not be. Even if all experience be appearance,
and all every-day thought and truth infected with
contradiction, at least it must be admitted that
some appearances are better than others. The
mundane distinction of real and unreal within ex-
perience has its importance and calls for formu-
lation of its criteria. It may be that Reality, with,
a capital R, the concrete-universal Reality which
transcends all particular phenomena and under-
lies them, is a kind of philosophical ignis fatuus.
Perhaps the idea of "whole" applies only within
experience, and no whole can validly be conceived
except such as stands in contrast with something
else and has concrete bounds. Perhaps the whole
of Reality is, as Kant thought, an inevitable idea
but also a necessarily empty one, to remind us
forever of the more which is to be learned and
connected with our previous knowledge. But
whether this be so or not, there is the less ambitious

10 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

and more important problem of determining the
criteria by which the adjective "real" is correctly
applied the problem of the abstract universal.
And if any be inclined to think that this question
is too simple or too meager for a philosophic dis-
cipline, I shall hope to indicate his error.

A metaphysics which takes this as its problem
will remain strictly within the reflective method.
It will seek to determine the nature of the real, as
ethics seeks to determine the good, and logic, the
valid, purely by critical consideration of what
does not transcend ordinary experience. That is,
it will seek to define "reality," not to triangulate
the universe. It will be concerned with the formu^
lation of principles, but of principles already im-
manent in intelligent practice. A person with no
sense of reality (other-worldly philosophers, for
example) will not acquire one by the study of
metaphysics. And by no possibility can such in-
vestigation reveal reality as something esoteric
and edifying and transcendent of ordinary ex-
perience. Any metaphysics which portrays reality
as something strangely unfamiliar or beyond the
ordinary grasp, stamps itself as thaumaturgy,
and is false upon the face of it.

The problem of 'a correctly conceived meta-
physics, like the problem of ethics and of logic, is
one to be resolved by attaining to clear and co-
gent self -consciousness. As it turns out, the prob-
lem of metaphysics is "the problem of the cate-

INTRODUCTION 11

gories,"* The reason for this lies in a curious
complexity of the meaning of "reality. 9 * Logical
validity is at bottom of one single type. And per-
haps the good and the right are relatively simple
in their ultimate nature. But the adjective "real"
is systematically ambiguous and can have a sin-
gle meaning only in a special sense. The ascrip-
tion of reality to the content of any particular ex-
perience is always eliptical: some qualification
material reality, psychic reality, mathematical
reality is always understood. And whatever is
real in one such sense will be unreal in others.
Conversely, every given content of experience is
a reality of some sort or other ; so that the prob-
lem of distinguishing real from unreal, the prin-
ciples of which metaphysics seeks to formulate, is
always a problem of right understanding, of re-
ferring the given experience to its proper cate-
gory. The mirage, for example, though not real
trees and water, is a real state of atmosphere
and light ; to relegate it to the limbo of nothing-
ness would be to obliterate a genuine item of the
objective world. A dream is illusory because the
dreamer takes its images for physical things;
but to the psychologist, interested in the scien-
tific study of the mental, just these experienced
images, occurring in just this context of other cir-
cumstance, constitute a reality to be embraced

*A more logical terminology would qualify this as the "categories
of reality/' and would distinguish these from the "categories of
of value.**

12 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

under law and having its own indisputable place
in the realm of fact. The content of every experi-
ence is real when it is correctly understood, and
is that kind of reality which it is then interpreted
to be. Metaphysics is concerned to reveal just
that set of major classifications of phenomena,
and just those precise criteria of valid understand-
ing, by which the whole array of given experience
may be set in order and each item (ideally) as-
signed its intelligible and unambiguous place.

So understood, the principles of the categories,
which metaphysics seeks, stand, on the one side,
in close relation to experience and can not mean-
ingfully transcend it. But on the other side or
in a different sense they stand above or before
experience, and are definitive or prescriptive, and
hence a priori.

Whatever principles apply to experience must
be phrased in terms of experience. The clues to
the categorial* interpretation the correct under-
standing of any presentation of sense must be
empirical clues. If they are not contained within
that segment of experience which constitutes the
phenomenon itself, then they must be discover-
able in its relation to other empirical fact. If
the dream or illusion is not betrayed by inter-
nal evidence, then its true nature must be dis-
closed by the conjunction with what precedes or

* M Categorial " is used throughout with the meaning ** pertaining
to the categories." This avoids possible confusion wiih "categorical,"
meaning specifically "unconditional, not hypothetical."

THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY 13

follows. But while the distinguishing marks of
reality of any particular sort are thus experi-
mental, the principles by which the interpretation
or classification is made are prior to the experi-
ence in question. It is only because the mind is
prepared to judge it real or unreal according as
it bears or fails to bear certain marks, that inter-
pretation of the given is possible at all, and that
experience can be understood.

It is through reflective examination of expe-
rience (more particularly of our own part in it or
attitude toward it) that we may correctly formu-
late these principles of the categories, since they
are implicit in our practical dealings with the em-
pirically given. But they are not empirical gen-
eralizations in the sense that some later experience
may prove an exception and thus invalidate them.
They formulate an attitude of interpretation or
discrimination by which what would be excep-
tional is at once thrown out of court. For exam-
ple, no experience of the physical can fail to bear
those marks the absence of which would bar the
given content of experience from interpretation
as physical reality. The formulation of our de-
liberately taken, and consistently adhered to, at-
titude of interpretation constitutes a categorial
definition of "the physical/ 5 Such a categorial
definitive principle forbids nothing in the way of
experience ; it prohibits neither illusion nor sense-
less dream. Thus such principles are not mate-

14 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

rial truths : they can be a priori knowable with
certainty in advance of experience precisely be-
cause they impose no limitation upon the given
but, as principles of interpretation, nevertheless
condition it as a constituent of reality. It will be
the thesis of a later chapter that the a priori has
in general this same character of definitive prin-
ciple, which does not limit the content of the given,
We shall find in this nature of the a priori the
solution of many traditional problems of the the-
ory of knowledge.

So conceived, the principles which formulate
criteria of the real, in its various types, are a
priori in precisely the same sense as are the can-
ons of ethics and of logic. Experience does not
itself determine what is good or bad, or the na-
ture of goodness, nor does it determine what is
valid or invalid, or the nature of logical validity.
Equally it does not determine what is real or un-
real (in any particular sense), or the nature "of
reality. Experience does not categorize itself. The
criteria of interpretation are of the mind; they
are imposed upon the given by our active attitude.

The main business of a sound metaphysics is,
thus, with the problem of the categories; the
formulation of the criteria of reality, in its vari-
ous types. It is to the shame of philosophy that
these problems, which by their nature must be ca-
pable of precise solution since they require only
persistent regard for fact and self-conscious ex-

THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY 15

amination of our own grounds of judgment, have
been so generally neglected. Just this common dis-
regard of verifiable fact and mundane criteria of
the real is largely responsible for that quagmire
of incertitude and welter of the irrelevant and
vague which at present bears the name of meta-
physics. The problems of the categories admit of
as much real progress as those of logic; in fact,
they are problems of the same general type- We
may congratulate ourselves, I think, that a grow-
ing interest in such study, in this reflective or
phenomenalistic or critical spirit, is one of the
characteristic of the present period in philoso-
phy.*

The definition of the real in general, and the
picturing of reality as a whole, are subordinate
matters ; and perhaps, as has been suggested, the
second of these is not possible. The word "real"
has a single meaning, of course, in the same sense
that "useful 5 ' or any other such elliptical term has
a single meaning. Nothing is useful for every pur-
pose, and perhaps everything is useful for some
purpose. A definition of "usef ul" in general would
not divide things into two classes, the useful and
the useless. Nor could we arrive at such a defini-
tion by attempting to collect all useful things into
a class and remark their common characters, since
we should probably have everything in the class

*I have in mind, as examples, Whitehead*s ** Concept of Nature"
and "Principles of Natural Knowledge," Russell's "Analysis of
Mind," and Broad's "Scientific Thought/'

16 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

and nothing outside it to represent the useless.
Instead, we should first have to consider the dif-
ferent types of usefulness or of useful things and
then discover, if possible, what it is that charac-
terizes the useful as contrasted with the useless in
all these different cases. We should find, of course,
that it was not some sense-quality but a relation
to an end which was the universal mark of useful-
ness. Similarly, to arrive at a general definition
of "the real" it would not do to lump together all
sorts of realities in one class and seek directly for
their common character* Everything in this class
would be at once real, in some category, and un-
real in others. And nothing would be left outside
it. The subject of our generalization must be, in-
stead, the distinction real-unreal in all the differ-
ent categories. What definition of reality in gen-
eral we might thus arrive at, we need not pause to
inquire. Obviously it would be found to embrace
some relation to empirical givenness in general or
to our interpreting attitude, or to something in-
volving both of these, rather than any particular
and distinguishing empirical characteristics.

That in any case a successful definition of the
real in general would not carry us far in any cos-
mological attempt to plumb the deeps of the uni-
verse, is evident from the fact that it would de-
limit reality in intension only, and would leave
quite undetermined the particular content of real-
ity in extenso. The total picture of reality can be

THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY IT

drawn only when the last experience of the last
man, and the final facts of science, are summed
up. Why cosmology in this sense should be sup-
posed to be the business of the philosopher or of
anyone else I cannot see. In the nature of the
case, it must be a cooperative enterprise, and pre-
sumably one that is always incomplete.

What we have here seen concerning the sig-
nificance of "the real" will have its importance
for certain topics discussed in later chapters* But
our immediate interest in it lies in the fact that it
brings metaphysics which threatened to prove
an exception back into line with other branches
of philosophy with respect to the method by which
it should be pursued. It is only in and through the
general course of human experience that we have
a content for our philosophic thinking, and the
significance of philosophic truth lies always in its
application to experience. But it is experience
from a certain point of view, or a certain aspect
of it, with which we are concerned. Ethics cannot
tell us how much of life is good, what particular
sins are committed, or what proportion of men
are moral; nor does metaphysics describe the
course of the universe or determine the extent and
the particulars of the real. It is the logical es-
sence of goodness, the canons of validity, the cri-
teria of the beautiful, and likewise, the principles
of the distinction of real from unreal, that phi-
losophy may hope to formulate. These criteria

18 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

and principles, the mind itself brings to experi-
ence in its interpretation, its discriminations, and
its evaluation of what is given. Thus philosophy
is, so to speak, the mind's own study of itself in
action; and the method of it is simply reflective*
It seeks to formulate explicitly what from the be-
ginning is our own creation and possession.

However, I should not like to appear to defend
the notion that such analysis is a simple matter or
that it requires only to express in precise terms
the principles of common-sense. As has often
enough been emphasized, common-sense is itself a
naive metaphysics and one which frequently
breaks down on examination. Just as naive moral-
ity may become confused before the dialectical at-
tack, so common-sense categories of reality fail in
crucial cases to meet the tests of consistency and
accord with intelligent practice. It is true in meta-
physics, as it is in ethics and in logic, that while
valid principles must be supposed somehow im-
plicit in the ordinary intercourse of mind with
reality, they are not present in the sense of being
fatally adhered to. If they were, the philosophic
enterprise would have no practical value. Self-
consciousness may be an end in itself, but if it
did not have eventual influence upon human ac-
tion it would be a luxury which humanity could
not afford. That we coincide in our logical sense,
does not make logic a work of supererogation.
No more does coincidence in our ultimate sense of

THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY 19

reality and in our categories render metaphysical
discussion nugatory. Just as the study of logic
may conduce to cogency of thought, and ethics
contribute to greater clarity and consistency in
moral judgment, so too the elucidation of meta-
physical problems may contribute to the precision
and adequacy of our interpretation of the real ; it
may even serve, on occasion, to work improvement
in the concepts of the special sciences. Philosophy
cannot be merely a verbally more precise render-
ing of common-sense, nor a direct generalization
from actual practice. Though it rises from what
is implicit in experience, its procedure must be
critical, not descriptive. So far as it is to be of
use, it must assume the function of sharpening
and correcting an interpretation which has al-
ready entered into the fabric of that experience
which is its datum. Logical principles aim to re-
place the uncritical moral sense, ethics, our naive
morality, and metaphysics, our unreflective on-
tological judgments. Such an enterprise is no sim-
ple matter of formulating the obvious.

The reflective method must, or course, be dia-
lectical in the Socratic-Platonic, not the Hegel-
ian, sense. It accords with the Socratic presump-
tion that the truth which is sought is already im-
plicit in the mind which seeks it, and needs only
to be elicited and brought to clear expression. It
accords, further, in the recognition that it is defi-
nitions or "essences" which are the philosophic

20 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

goal. And it likewise recognizes that the hope of
agreement between minds, to be reached by philo-
sophic discussion, must rest upon the presump-
tion that this accord somehow exists already.

Historically, however, the dialectical method
has been overlaid with all sorts of addenda, and
perverted by extraneous assumptions which are
fallacious. So that I should choose the name "re-
flective" as less liably to unwarranted interpreta-
tion. It does not follow from the dialectical method
that the basis of the accord between minds repre-
sents some universal pattern of human reason,
apart from the world of sense in which we live;
nor that the mind has access to some realm of
transcendent concepts which it recovers, of its
own powers, at the instigation of experience ; nor
that agreement of minds presumes initial princi-
ples which are self-evident. It does not even follow
that the agreement which we seek is already im-
plicity complete in all respects. To all such no-
tions there is an alternative, to account for this
agreement between minds, which is simple and
even obvious. The coincidence of our fundamental
criteria and principles is the combined result of
the similarity of human animals, and of their pri-
mal interests, and the similarities of the experience
with which they have to deal. More explicitly, it
represents one result of the interplay between
these two ; the coincidence of human modes of be-
havior, particularly when the interests which such
behavior serves involve cooperation.

THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY 21

Our categories are guides to action. Those atti-
tudes which survive the test of practice will reflect
not only the nature of the active creature but the
general character of the experience he confronts.
Thus, indirectly, even what is a priori may not be
an exclusive product of "reason," or made in
Plato's heaven in utter independence of the world
we live in. Moreover, the fact that man survives
and prospers by his social habits serves to ac-
centuate and perfect agreement in our basic at-
titudes. Our common understanding and our com-
mon world may be, in part, created in response to
our need to act together and to comprehend one
another. Critical discussion is but a prolongation
of that effort which we make to extend the bounds
of successful human cooperation. It is no more
necessary to suppose that agreement in funda-
mental principles is completely ready-made than
it is to suppose that infants must already have
precisely those ideas which later they find words
to express. Indeed our categories are almost as
much a social product as is language, and in
something like the same sense. It is only the pos-
sibility of agreement which must be antecedently
presumed. The "human mind" is a coincidence of
individual minds which partly, no doubt, must be
native, but partly is itself created by the social
process. Even that likeness which is native would
seem to consist in capacities and tendencies to ac-
tion, not in mental content or explicit modes of
thought. That the categories are fundamental in

m MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

such wise that the social process can neither cre-
ate nor alter them, is a rationalistic prejudice
without foundation. There is much which is pro-
found and true in traditional conceptions of the
a priori. But equally it should be clear that there
is much in such conceptions which smacks of magic
and superstitious nonsense. Particularly it is im-
plausible that what is a priori can be rooted in a
"rational nature of man" which is sometimes mi-
raculous and beyond the bounds of psychological
analysis and genetic explanation-
It may be pointed out also that if we recognize
critical reflection or dialectic as the only method
which holds promise in philosophy, we do not
thereby commit ourselves to the assumption that
coherence or internal consistency is the only test,
or a sufficient test, of philosophic truth* In phi-
losophy, as elsewhere, consistency is only a nega-
tive test of truth : it is possible, however unlikely,
to be consistently in error. Consistency would be
a sufficient test only if we should suppose that
there is nothing external to our logic which we
must be true to. The reflective method does not
take it for granted that all fact follows, Hegelian-
fashion, from the logical structure of thought
itself. As has been suggested, it does not even pre-
suppose that what is a priori and of the mind
our categorial attitude of interpretation is com-
pletely independent of the general character of
experience.

THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY 3

It is of the essence of the dialectical or reflec-
tive method that we should recognize that proof,
in philosophy, can be nothing more at bottom
than persuasion. It makes no difference what the
manner of presentation should be, whether de-
ductive from initial assumptions, or inductive
from example, or merely following the order dic-
tated by clarity of exposition. If it be deductive,
then the initial assumptions cannot coerce the
mind. There are no propositions which are self-
evident in isolation. So far as the deductive pres-
entation hopes to convince of what was not pre-
viously believed, it must either seek out initial
agreements from which it may proceed, or as is
more frequently the case the deductively first
propositions must be rendered significant and ac-
ceptable by exhibiting the cogency and general
consonance with experience of their consequences.
If the method be inductive from example, then
the principles to be proved are implicit in the as-
sumption that cited examples are veridical and
typical and genuinely fall under the category to
be investigated. There can be no Archimedean
point for the philosopher. Proof, he can offer only
in the sense of so connecting his theses as to ex-
hibit their mutual support, and only through ap-
peal to other minds to reflect upon their experi-
ence and their own attitudes and perceive that he
correctly portrays them. If there be those minds
which find no alternatives save certainty, apart

24 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

from all appeal to prior f act, or skepticism, then
to skepticism they are self-condemned. And much
good may it do them! As philosophers, we have
something we must be faithful to, even if that
something be ourselves. If we are perverse, it is
possible that our philosophy will consist of lies.

Already this introductory analysis of method is
too long. But the conception of the a priori here
suggested is a novel one: a little further discus-
sion may have its value by way of anticipating
briefly what is to follow.

If Philosophy is the study of the a priori, and
is thus the mind's formulation of its own active
attitudes, still the attitude which is the object of
such study is one taken toward the content of an
experience in some sense independent of and
bound to be reflected in the attitude itself. What
is a priori it will be maintained is prior to ex-
perience in almost the same sense that purpose is.
Purposes are not dictated by the content of the
given; they are our own. Yet purposes must take
their shape and have their realization in terms of
experience ; the content of the given is not irrele-
vant to them. And purposes which can find no ap-
plication will disappear. In somewhat the same
fashion what is a priori and of the mind is prior
to the content of the given, yet in another sense
not altogether independent of experience in gen-
eral.

It is an error common to rationalism and to

THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY 25

pure empiricism that both attempt an impossible
separation of something called the mind from
something else called experience. Likewise both
treat of knowledge as if it were a relation of the
individual mind to external object in such wise
that the existence of other minds is irrelevant;
they do not sufficiently recognize the sense in
which our truth is social. Traditional rational-
ism,* observing that any principles which should
serve as ultimate criterion or determine cate-
gorial interpretation must be prior to and inde-
pendent of the experience to which it applies, has
supposed that such principles must be innate and
so discoverable by some sort of direct inspection.
If a canon of their truth is requisite, this must be
supplied by something of a higher order than ex-
perience, such as self -evidence or the natural light
of reason. The mistakes of this point of view are
two. In the first place, it assumes that mind is im-
mediate to itself in a sense in which the object of
experience is not. But what other means have we
of discovering the mind save that same experi-
ence in which also external objects are presented?
And if the object transcends the experience of it,
is not this equally true of the mind? The single
experience exhausts the reality of neither. Any
particular experience is a whole within which that
part or aspect which represents the legislative or

The rationalism (if that term is justified) of post-Kantian ideal-
ism rests upon different assumptions and proceeds by different
methods. It is not here in point.

26 3VOND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

categorial activity of mind and that which is
given content, independent of the mind's inter-
pretation, are separable only by analysis. We have
no higher faculty or more esoteric experience
through which the mind discovers itself. And sec-
ond, rationalism fallaciously assumes that what is
prior to, or legislative for, the particular experi-
ence must be likewise independent of experience
in general. Though categorial principle must, in
the nature of the case, be prior to the particular
experience, it nevertheless represents an attitude
which the mind has taken in the light of past ex-
perience as a whole, and one which would even be
susceptible of change if confronted with some
pervasive alteration in the general character of
what is presented. An example here may be of
service: It is an a priori principle that physical
things must have mass. By this criterion, they are
distinguished from mirror-images and illusion.
Since this is so, no particular experience could
upset this principle, because any experience in
which it should be violated would be repudiated
as non-veridical or "not correctly understood."
That is, by the principle itself, the phenomenon
must be referred to some other category than the
physical. In that sense, the truth of the princi-
ple is independent of the particular phenomenon.
But a world in which we should experience phe-
nomena having a persistence and independence
not characteristic of imagination, and a coherence

THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY 27

not characteristic of our dreams, but things which
would still not be amenable to any gravitational
generalizations, is entirely conceivable. In such a
world our a priori principle would not be ren-
dered false since it is definitive of the physical;
but the category "physical" might well be useless.
(Incidentally it may be pointed out that this cri-
terion of the physical is a historical and social
product. Aristotle and the ancients knew it not.)

Though we bring the a priori principle, as cri-
terion, to any particular experience, yet this legis-
lative attitude of mind is clearly one which is
taken because, our experience on the whole being
what it is, this principle helps to render it intel-
ligible, and behavior in accord with it is normally
successful. The mind must bring to experience
whatever serve as the criteria of interpretation
of the real, as of the right, the beautiful, and the
valid. The content of experience cannot evaluate
or interpret itself. Nevertheless the validity of
such interpretation must reflect the character of
experience in general, and meet the pragmatic test
of value as a guide to action.

The fallacy of pure empiricism is the converse
of that which rationalism commits. In seeking to
identify the real with what is given in experience,
apart from construction or interpretation by the
mind, and to elicit general principles directly
from the content of experience, empiricism con-
demns itself to a vicious circle. Experience as it

28 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

comes to us contains not only the real but all the
content of illusion, dream, hallucination, and mis-
apprehension. When the empiricist supposes that
laws or principles can be derived simply by gen-
eralization from experience, he means to refer
only to veridical experience, forgetting that with-
out the criterion of legislative principle experi-
ence cannot first be sorted into veridical and
illusory.

It is this vicious circle which makes inevitable
the historical denouement of empiricism in Hume's
skepticism. Berkeley pointed out that the real
cannot be distinguished from the unreal by any
relation between the idea in the mind and an in-
dependent object, but only by some relation within
experience itself. In this, of course, he is right,
whether we agree with his idealism or not: mind
cannot transcend itself and discover a relation of
what is in experience to what is not. Berkeley
then seeks to indicate our actual empirical cri-
teria: the real in experience is distinguished (1)
by that independence of the will which is exhib-
ited in the content of perception as contrasted
with imagination, (2) by the greater liveliness of
perception, (3) by the interconnection of verid-
ical perceptions according to the "laws of na-
ture." Obviously only the last of these is sufficient
in critical cases such as hallucination and errors
of observation. Hume wrecks the empiricist struc-
ture when he points out that such "laws of na-

THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY 29

ture" cannot be derived by generalization from
experience. For this, the distinction of necessary
from contingent would be requisite. The basis of
this distinction is not to be found in the content
of experience; it is of the mind* Generalization
from experience always presumes that the cate-
gorial interpretation already has been made.
Laws which characterize all experience, of real
and unreal both, are non-existent, and would in
any case be worthless.

It is obvious that similar considerations hold
for the other problems of philosophy. The nature
of the good can be learned from experience only
if the content of experience be first classified into
good and bad, or grades of better and worse.
Such classification or grading already involves
the legislative application of the same principle
which is sought. In logic, principles can be elicited
by generalization from examples only if cases of
valid reasoning have first been segregated by some
criterion. It is this criterion which the generaliza-
tion is required to disclose. In esthetics, the laws
of the beautiful may be derived from experience
only if the criteria of beauty have first been cor-
rectly applied.

The world of experience is not given in experi-
ence: it is constructed by thought from the data
of sense. This reality which everybody knows re-
flects the structure of human intelligence as much
as it does the nature of the independently given

30 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

sensory content. It is a whole in which mind and
what is given to mind already meet and are inter-
woven* The datum of our philosophic study is not
the "buzzing, blooming confusion" on which the
infant first opens his eyes, not the thin experience
of immediate sensation, but the thick experience
of every-day life.

This experience of reality exists only because
the mind of man takes attitudes and makes inter-
pretations. The buzzing, blooming confusion
could not become reality for an oyster. A purely
passive consciousness, if such can be conceived,
would find no use for the concept of reality, be-
cause it would find none for the idea of the ^?ireal ;
because it would take no attitude that could be
balked, and make no interpretation which conceiv-
ably could be mistaken.

On the other hand, we can discover mind and
its principles only by analysis in this experience
which we have. We cannot, unless dogmatically,
construct experience from a hypothetical and
transcendent mind working upon a material which
likewise is something beyond experience. We can
only discover mind and what is independently
given to it by an analysis within experience itself.
And it is only because mind has entered into the
structure of the real world which we know and the
experience of everyday, that analysis, or any at-
tempted knowledge, may discover it.

In finding thus that the principles and criteria

THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY 31

which philosophy seeks to formulate must be sig-
nificant at once of experience and of our active
attitudes, the reflective method inevitably is prag-
matic also. Concepts and principles reveal them-
selves as instruments of interpretation; their
meaning lies in the empirical consequences of the
active attitude* The categories are ways of deal-
ing with what is given to the mind, and if they had
no practical consequences, the mind would never
use them. Since philosophy seeks to formulate
what is implicit in mind's every-day interpreta-
tions, we may test the significance of any philo-
sophic principle, and pave the way for determin-
ing its truth, if we ask : How would experience be
different if this should be correct than if it should
be false? or, How differently should we orient our-
selves to experience and deal with it if this should
be so than if it should be not so?

Metaphysical issues which supposedly concern
what is transcendent of experience altogether,
must inevitably turn out to be issues wrongly
taken. For example, if one say as Mr* Broad has
recently said* that scientific reality of perdur-
ing electrons or what not, is something which at
best is probable only, since it does not enter our
direct experience of "sensa," then I think we may
justly challenge him as Berkeley challenged
Locke: Why not a world of sensa with nothmg
behind them? What makes "scientific reality" even
*" Scientific Thought," see esp. pp. 268 ff.

32 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

probable if direct experience could be the same
without its existence? Unless the modern physicist
hopelessly deludes himself, does not the existence
of electrons mean something verifiable in the
laboratory? Otherwise, would he not be con-
strained to answer any question about electrons as
Laplace is reputed to have answered Napoleon's
question about G-od that he had no need of this
hypothesis? But if the existence or non-existence
of "scientific reality" makes certain verifiable dif-
ferences in experience, then these empirical cri-
teria are the marks of the kind of reality which
can be predicated of it. They are the "cash-value"
of the category ; they constitute what it means to
be real in just the way that electrons can be real.
"Scientific reality" is either an interpretation of
certain parts and aspects of experience or it is a
noise, signifying nothing.

The totality of the possible experiences in
which any interpretation would be verified the
completest possible empirical verification which is
conceivable constitutes the entire meaning which
that interpretation has. A predication of reality
to what transcends experience completely and in
every sense, is not problematic ; it is nonsense.

Perhaps another illustration may make the
point more clear. Occasionally philosophers amuse
themselves by suggesting that the existences of
things are intermittent ; that they go out when we
cease to notice them and come into being again at

THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY 33

the moment of rediscovery. The answer is not
given by any question-begging reference to the
independent object or to the conservation of mat-
ter. What we need to inquire is why this notion of
permanent objects was ever invented. If nothing
in experience would be different whether the ex-
istence of things should be intermittent or con-
tinuous, what character of experience is predi-
cated by their "permanence 93 ? When we have an-
swered to such questions, we have discovered the
whole meaning of "permanent existence 59 and
nothing further, unless paradox of language, re-
mains to be discussed. Reflection upon experience
and our attitude to what is given cannot discover
what is not implicitly already there and there is
nothing else which philosophic reflection can hope
to disclose.

To sum up, then: The reflective method is em-
pirical and analytic in that it recognizes experi-
ence in general as the datum of philosophy. But
it is not empirical in the sense of taking this ex-
perience to coincide with data of sense which are
merely given to the mind. Nor is it analytic in the
sense of supposing that experience is complete and
ready-made.

Rather, it finds that philosophy is particularly
concerned with that part or aspect of experience
which the mind contributes by its attitude of in-
terpretation. In thus recognizing that the prin-
ciples which are sought are in some sense a priori,
it is rationalistic.

34 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

It is not rationalistic, however, in the sense of
presuming the mind as a Procrustean bed into
which experience is forced, or as an initial datum
which can be assumed or its findings known apart
from sense-experience. Nor does it presume the
"rational human mind" as something completely
identical in and native to all human beings, or as
a transcendent entity which, even if it lived in
some other world of sense, would still possess pre-
cisely the same categories and pattern of intelli-
gence.

The reflective method is pragmatic in the same
sense that it is empirical and analytic. It supposes
that the categories and principles which it seeks
must already be implicit in human experience and
human attitude. The significance of such funda-
mental conceptions must always be practical be-
cause thought and action are continuous, and be-
cause no other origin of them can be plausible
than an origin which reflects their bearing on ex-
perience. Further, it claims for philosophy itself
the pragmatic sanction that reflection is but a
further stretch of that critical examination of our
own constructions and interpretations by which
we free them from inconsistency and render them
more useful. Since experience is not just given
but is in part a product of the mind, philosophy
itself may work some alteration of the active atti-
tude by which the given in experience is met and
moulded. But the reflective method is not a or need

THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY 35

not be, pragmatic in the sense of supposing, as
current pragmatism sometimes seems to do, that
the categories of biology and psychophysics have
some peculiar advantage for the interpretation of
the practical attitudes of thought.

The reflective method necessarily leads to the
repudiation of any reality supposed to be trans-
cendent of experience altogether. A true philo-
sophic interpretation must always follow the clues
of the practical reasons for our predications. A
philosophy which relegates any object of human
thought to the transcendent, is false to the human
interests which have created that thought, and to
the experience which gives it meaning. Philosophic
truth, like knowledge in general, is about experi-
ence, and not about something strangely beyond
the ken of man, open only to the seer and the
prophet. We all know the nature of life and of the
real, though only with exquisite care can we tell
the truth about them.

CHAPTER II

THE GIVEN ELEMENT IN EXPERI-
ENCE

The presumption from which we set out is that
it is the business of philosophy to analyze and in-
terpret our common experience, and by reflection,
to bring to clear and cogent expression those prin-
ciples which are implicit because they are brought
to experience by the mind itself. Philosophy is the
study of the a priori. It seeks to reveal those cate-
gorial criteria which the mind applies to what is
given to it, and by correct delineation of those
criteria to define the good, the right, the valid,
and the real.

The attempt, however, so to approach the prob-
lems of philosophy leads at once to outstanding
questions concerning the nature of knowledge,
solution of which seems prerequisite. The distinc-
tion between what is a priori and what is not, is
here presumed; as is also the correlative distinc-
tion between mind, or what mind brings to experi-
ence, and some other element, presumably inde-
pendent of the mind's activity and responsible for
other parts or aspects of experience. Have we a
right to these distinctions? What are the grounds
on which they can be drawn? How, in these terms,

36

THE GIVEN IN EXPERIENCE 37

are knowledge and experience constituted? It is
with such questions that the remainder of this book
is concerned.

Its principal theses are the following: (1) The
two elements to be distinguished in knowledge are
the concept, which is the product of the activity
of thought, and the sensuously given, which is in-
dependent of such activity. (2) The concept gives
rise to the a priori ; all a priori truth is definitive,
or explicative of concepts. (3) The pure concept
and the content of the given are mutually inde-
pendent; neither limits the other. (4) Empirical
truth, or knowledge of the objective, arises
through conceptual interpretation of the given.
(5) The empirical object, denoted by a concept,
is never a momentarily given as such, but is some
temporally-extended pattern of actual and pos-
sible experience. (6) Hence the assignment of any
concept to the momentarily given (which is char-
acteristic of perceptual knowledge) is essentially
predictive and only partially verified. There is no
knowledge merely by direct awareness. (7) Actual
experience can never be exhaustive of that pat-
tern, projected in the interpretation of the given,
which constitutes the real object. Hence all em-
pirical knowledge is probable only. (8) The mu-
tual independence of the concept and the given,
and the merely probable character of empirical
truth, are entirely compatible with the validity of
cognition. The problem of the "deduction of the

38 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

categories" can be met without any metaphysical
assumption of a preestablished amenability to
categorial order in what is independent of the
mind. (9) More explicitly, any conceivable ex-
perience will be such that it can be subsumed un-
der concepts, and also such that predictive judg-
ments which are genuinely probable will hold of it.
This chapter and the next are devoted to the
distinction of the two elements in experience, and
to the defense of this distinction from various
common misinterpretations.

There are, in our cognitive experience, two ele-
ments ; the immediate data, such as those of sense,
which are presented or given to the mind, and a
form, construction, or interpretation, which rep-
resents the activity of thought. Recognition of this
fact is one of the oldest and most universal of
philosophic insights. However, the manner in
which these elements, and their relation to one an-
other, are conceived, varies in the widest possible
manner, and divergence on this point marks a
principal distinction amongst theories of knowl-
edge. As a result, even the most general attempt
to designate these two elements as by the terms
used above is likely to be objected to. Neverthe-
less this distinction, in some terms or other, is ad-
mitted to a place in almost every philosophy. To
suppress it altogether, would be to betray obvious
and fundamental characteristics of experience. If

THE GIVEN IN EXPERIENCE 39

there be no datum given to the mind, then knowl-
edge must be contentless and arbitrary; there
would be nothing which it must be true to. And
if there be no interpretation or construction which
the mind itself imposes, then thought is rendered
superfluous, the possibility of error becomes in-
explicable, and the distinction of true and false is
in danger of becoming meaningless. If the sig-
nificance of knowledge should lie in the data of
sense alone, without interpretation, then this sig-
nificance would be assured by the mere presence
of such data to the mind, and every cognitive ex-
perience must be veracious.

There are, to be sure, theories which emphasize
one of these two elements almost to the exclusion
of the other. Such theories are of both sorts
those which emphasize what is given and those
which emphasize the active mind. Immediacy is
thus emphasized by the mystics generally, by
Bergson, and by the American new-realists to
mention only those examples which will come at
once to the reader's mind. The idealists, on the
other hand (empirical idealists, like Berkeley, ex-
cepted), may seem to include the content as well
as the form of knowledge in what the activity of
thought creates. However, a closer examination of
such theories, of both sorts, will usually reveal that
the distinction is still recognized ; it is merely ob-
scured by preoccupation with other issues.

In theories of the first type, which identify

40 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

knowledge with some state of pure Immediacy, the
description or analysis of the cognitive experience
is subordinated to the attempt to establish the
superior value of some one type of experience as
compared with others. The mystic, for example,
values preeminently that experience which he in-
terprets as being the immediate presence to, and
coalescence with, his own mind of the transcendent
object which he seeks. But he will readily grant
the presence and determining character of con-
ceptual interpretation in ordinary non-mystical
experience. Only he condemns the object of such
experience as illusion or mere appearance. The
world of every-day is not, for him, ultimately real ;
or at least its true nature is not revealed in ordi-
nary experience. The moment of true insight is
that in which the distinctions and relations which
discursive thought creates are shorn away and
reality stands forth, in luminous immediacy, as it
truly is. Now all men restrict the word "knowl-
edge" to the apprehension of the real. Hence the
mystic's metaphysical conception, which leads him
to use the word "real 55 differently than other men,
likewise moves him to restrict the term "knowl-
edge" to the peculiar experience in which this
"reality" is apprehended. That in the ordinary
experience which other men trust as truly cogni-
tive, the element of interpretation is present, he
fully recognizes and even insists upon. He recog-
nizes also that this conceptual element represents

THE GIVEN IN EXPERIENCE 41

something induced by the construction or attitude
of the mind itself.*

The reason why Bergson identifies the truest
knowledge with "intuition" is similarly rooted in
metaphysical theory and not in any divergent
reading of our ordinary experience. For him, the
ultimate reality is life, or the inwardly grasped
"real duration.* 5 For each mind, this is something
which is immediate, in his own case, and is to be
apprehended in its other manifestations only by
empathy or einfuhlung. The world of science and
common sense Bergson recognizes to be construc-
tion or interpretation which the mind imposes
upon the data of immediacy. Also, he is explicit
that this construction is dominated by interests of
action and of social cooperation. But the space-
world which results from such interpretation, he
regards as not an ultimate reality ; hence the cog-
nitive experience which includes this interpretive
element is not a theoretically adequate knowledge.
In short, with Bergson as with the mystics, identi-
fication of knowledge with intuitive apprehension

*Often the mystic, inheriting his terminology from Aristotle^ in-
terprets the attitude of mind in every-day experience as passivity
rather than activity, reserving the latter term for his own kind of
absorbed concentration. For him, the interpretation which charac-
terizes ordinary thought is at the behest of enslaving "passions.'*
That such construction is significant of ordinary and mundane in-
terests, he fully understands. But such interests are, for him, to be
avoided and quelled. Here again, his use of terms, reversing the usual
one, is governed by metaphysical and ethical preoccupation which
is irrelevant to the just analysis of mundane experience. He reservee
the laudatory term "active" for the ethical attitude which he seeks
to inculcate.

It is thus that in philosophy we give over the accurate report of
fact to quarrel for exclusive possession of honorific terms.

42 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

of the immediate reflects no basic difference in the
analysis of ordinary experience but rather a dif-
ference in the denotation given to the phrase "true
knowledge" because of a metaphysical theory
which denies ultimate reality to what is cognized
by science and common sense.

Of all the current theories in which knowledge
is portrayed in terms of receptivity alone, the new
realism would seem to be the only one in which
this predilection for the given does not reflect a
metaphysical preoccupation. Here the activity of
thought (or attention) is represented as selective
only; it may determine what is included in or ex-
cluded from perception, but it does not supple-
ment or modify the given data. Mind, so far as
mind is just now a knowing of this object, and the
object, so far as it is just now known by this
mind, are represented as coinciding.*

Any such theory must reveal its inadequacy by
failure to account satisfactorily for the possibility
of error. So far as knowledge is pure receptivity,
that with which the mind coincides in cognition
must in all cases have the same objectivity. Or at
least, no ground is here provided for the distinc-
tion between veridical and illusory apprehension.
Thus we have the question whether mirror-images
are truly located in the space to which they are

*It would seem that most, or all, of those who cooperated in the
volume, "The New Realism," have since abandoned or considerably
modified the positions there taken, so that what is here said may be
a discussion of nobody's present conception. But the theory is of in-
terest on its own account.

THE GIVEN IN EXPERIENCE 43

referred, the difficulty about the star seen now,
though it may have ceased to send its light-rays
from that point a thousand years ago, and a num-
ber of like problems. The new realist may go the
whole length, as Mr* Holt did, and hold that con-
tradictories and incompatibles can be objectively
real.* But in that case he ceases, for most of us to
be plausible. Or he may, as Mr. Montague did,
introduce some theory of a plurality of causes
which can produce the same brain-state, and ex-
plain error through the ambiguity thus intro-
duced. But it would appear that, apart from any
question about indentifying brain-states with
perceptions, or any question about the propriety
of the element of representationalisni thus intro-
duced into what is otherwise a purely "presenta-
tion" theory of knowledge, it will be impossible,
on this account, to escape the admission of an ele-
ment of interpretation in cognition. So long as
the content of knowledge merely coincides with
what is presented, knowledge must still be always
veridical, because the brain-state (or perception)
will contain only so much of the plurality of
causes which may give rise to it as will in all cases
coincide. The brain-state can be identical only
with what is identical in the plurality of its causes
unless we wish to abandon the principle that
things identical with the same thing are identical
with each other. If a single brain-state, or modi-
*"The Concept of Consciousness/* 1914.

44 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

fication of perceptive consciousness, is taken as
meaning one thing when its veridical significance
is of another, then some interpretation which goes
beyond the content of this given state itself is the
only conceivable basis of the error.

Furthermore, it is impossible to escape the fact
that knowledge has, in some fashion and to some
degree, the significance of prediction. As Berkeley
put it, one idea or presentation is sign of an-
other which is to be expected. So far as this is
true, the cognitive significance may attach to the
data of sense but cannot simply coincide with such
given data. To know is to find what is presented
significant of what is not, just now, so presented.
It is because Berkeley failed to follow out the im-
plications of his own theory and to examine the
validity of this relation, by thought, of what is
given to what is not thus immediate, that the way
lay open to Hume's skepticism.

Failure to recognize and consider this element
of construction or interpretation by the mind, will
wreck any theory of knowledge. Failure to ac-
knowledge its existence will make it impossible to
account for error. And failure to find the ground
of its validity will lead inevitably to skepticism;
if not to skepticism ordinarily so-called, at least
to that skepticism of every-day cognition which is
involved in immediacy theories such as mysticism.

With theories of the opposite sort, which em-
phasize the constructive mind and seem to exclude

THE GIVEN IN EXPERIENCE 45

any independent given such as sense-data, the
explanation may similarly be found in a meta-
physical preoccupation* This is obviously the case
with Plato.* The data of sense are, for him, not
relevant to true knowledge because only the tran-
scendent ideas are fully real. In that mixed sort
of apprehension by which the physical external
world is grasped, the place of sense-data, on his
account, is evident.

Post-Kantian idealism also may seem to con-
tend for the identification of knowledge with what
the activity of thought alone produces. But ideal-
ism can hardly mean to deny that the fact of my
seeing at this moment a sheet of white paper in-
stead of a green tree is a datum which it is beyond
the power of my thought to alter. It can hardly
mean to deny the given in every sense. As a fact,
idealists of this school seldom speak directly to
the question : "Does the activity of thinking create
what would ordinarily be called the data of sense ?"
This question may not seem to them important
because their metaphysical thesis does not turn
upon it, but rather upon two somewhat different
issues : "Can there be any apprehension of a real
object without the active construction of the
mind?" and, "Is the existence of sense-data, as
such, evidence of a reality which is independent of
mind?"f

*It is not dear that Plato is activist, rather than intuitionist, in
his conception of noesis, but at least sense-data have no part in this
highest kind of knowledge.

(See, for example, Green: ** Prolegomena to Ethics,** chap. I, sees.
13 and 13.

46 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

The first of these questions is answered to their
satisfaction if it can be shown that the objectivity
of the real requires always construction by the
mind. This thesis does not imply any denial that
the given is independent of the activity of thought
in the sense explained above- It requires only the
denial that the presentation of sense-data can by
itself constitute valid knowledge- That I credit
this presentation, or attribute to it objectivity, is
a judgment, and as such an act of thought. (It
would equally be an interpretation to discredit
the presentation as merely subjective). This in-
terpretive fiat is what Fichte stresses as the posit-
ing of the "not-me." The data of sense, apart
from such positing, are neither external reality
nor explicit self. In immediacy, there is no separa-
tion of subject and object. The givenness of im-
mediate data is, thus, not the givenness of reality,
and is not knowledge. Hence the idealist may in-
sist that there is no (real) object without the
creative activity of thought, without in the least
meaning to deny that there is a datum prior to
its being posited as real, a content judged which
is given to the judgment. As a fact, however, he
often slights this point in his anxiety to pass on
and refute the implications, contrary to his meta-
physical thesis, which are frequently drawn from
it.

Also it may seem to the idealist more important
to point out that given data are already in mind

THE GIVEN IN EXPERIENCE 47

than to inquire whether such data are created by
thought. If both the data interpreted and the in-
terpretation put upon them belong to the mind,
then the real object, as cognized, may be repre-
sented as in both its aspects mind-dependent ; and
no argument to an independent reality can be
drawn from the analysis of knowledge. Thus the
idealist may fail to admit, or even to recognize
explicitly, that there are given data of experience
which, merely as such and not as objective reality
or unreality, the activity of thought can neither
create nor alter*

It is also characteristic of idealism to point out
that the moment of pure givenness is a fiction, and
its data an "unreal abstraction. 55 There is no ap-
prehension he will insist without construction;
hence the distinction of subject and object, act
and given, must be within thought, not between
thought and an independent something thought
about. This consideration is of more importance
for us, and will be discussed in the next chapter,
But it implies no denial of the givenness of sense-
data. It contends only that the mental state which
should be purely receptive and coincide with the
given is a fiction an observation which is unac-
ceptable only to the mystic and other protagonists
of pure intuition. Whether there is the beginning
of a fallacious train of reasoning in this stretch-
ing of the term "thought 55 to cover the cognitive
experience as a whole, we need not pause to in-

48 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

quire. At least, the denial of the given is not ob-
viously necessary to any of the characteristic
theses of idealism. Indeed, an unqualified denial
of this element in ordinary cognition is sufficient
to put any theory beyond the pale of plausi-
bility*

We may, then, fairly take it for granted, as
something generally recognized, that there are in
experience these two elements, something given
and the interpretation or construction put upon
it. But the very fact that the recognition of this
is so general and of such long standing enforces
the necessity of considering the distinction with
care. Different significances have been assigned to
it, both historically and in contemporary thought.
Moreover, various metaphysical issues gather
about it: What is the relation between the given
and the real? How does mind construct or inter-
pret? What is this mind which can interpret : does
it transcend experience? If so, how can it be
known? If not, how can it condition experience in
general by its interpretation? Confronted with
such a tangle of problems, we shall do best, I
think, if first we can catch our facts. If we can
identify the thing to be discussed, a certain degree
of clarity will accrue simply by telling the truth
about it, if we can.

There is, in all experience, that element which
we are aware that we do not create by thinking
and cannot, in general, displace or alter* As a first

THE GIVEN IN EXPERIENCE 49

approximation, we may designate it as "the sensu-

At the moment, I have a fountain pen in my
hand. When I so describe this item of my present
experience, I make use of terms whose meaning
I have learned. Correlatively I abstract this item
from the total field of my present consciousness
and relate it to what is not just now present in
ways which I have learned and which reflect modes
of action which I have acquired. It might happen
that I remember my first experience of such a
thing. If so, I should find that this sort of pres-
entation did not then mean "fountain pen 35 to me*
I bring to the present moment something which I
did not then bring ; a relation of this to other ac-
tual and possible experiences, and a classification
of what is here presented with things which I did
not then include in the same group. This present
classification depends on that learned relation of
this experience to other possible experience and
to my action, which the shape, size, etc., of this
object was not then a sign of. A savage in New
Guinea, lacking certain interests and habits of
action which are mine, would not so classify it.
There is, to be sure, something in the character
of this thing as a merely presented colligation of
sense-qualities which is for me the clue to this
classification or meaning; but that just this com-
plex of qualities should be due to a **pen" char-
acter of the object is something which has been

50 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

acquired. Yet what I refer to as "the given" in
this experience is, in broad terms, qualitatively no
different than it would be if I were an infant or
an ignorant savage.

Again, suppose my present interest to be
slightly altered. I might then describe this object
which is in my hand as "a cylinder" or "hard
rubber" or "a poor buy." In each case the thing
is somewhat differently related in my mind, and
the connoted modes of my possible behavior to-
ward it, and my further experience of it, are dif-
ferent. Something called "given" remains con-
stant, but its character as sign, its classification,
and its relation to other things and to action are
differently taken.

In whatever terms I describe this item of my
experience, I shall not convey it merely as given,
but shall supplement this by a meaning which has
to do with relations, and particularly with rela-
tion to other experiences which I regard as pos-
sible but which are not just now actual. The man-
ner of this supplementation reflects my habitual
interests and modes of activity, the nature of my
mind. The infant may see it much as I do, but
still it will mean to him none of these things I
have described it as being, but merely "play-
thing" or "smooth biteable." But for any mind
whatever, it will be more than what is merely
given if it be noted at all. Some meaning of it also
will be contained in the experience. All that comes

THE GIVEN IN EXPERIENCE 51

under this broad term "meaning" (unless immedi-
ate value or the specificity of sense-quality should
be included) is brought to this experience by the
mind, as is evidenced by the fact that in this re-
spect the experience is alterable to my interest and
my will.

This meaning or interpretation or construction
which is attached to the given is significant in two
directions, connected but different. The one is the
relation of this which is immediately presented to
further actual and possible experience ; the other
is its relation of my interest and action. The rela-
tion to other experience, is something which is
brought to the present by a selective memory. As
applied to this present given, however, it is sig-
nificant, not of the past, but of an actual or pos-
sible future, continuous with this present moment.
Thus this given is set in a relation with a to-be-
given or could-be-given, and this setting is an in-
terpretation of it which the temporal process of
experience may verify or prove erroneous. The
other relation of the given to present interest or
attitude connotes an interplay between the tem-
poral process of further possible experience and
my own purposes and behavior. Since I not only
think but physically act, I enter into the temporal
process of the future as a factor which determines,
in some part, what it shall present. Thus my in-
terpretation is predictive of my own physical be-
havior as forecast by my present interested atti-

52 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

tude, and of further experience as affected by
that behavior. In all those ways in which my in-
terpretation could be phrased as predictive not
of future actual but only of possible experience,
it very likely has reference to ways of acting
which I know I might adopt at will and the future
experience which I should then expect.

My designation of this thing as "pen" reflects
my purpose to write; as "cylinder" my desire to
explain a problem in geometry or mechanics; as
"a poor buy 55 my resolution to be more careful
hereafter in my expenditures. These divergent
purposes are anticipatory of certain different fu-
ture contingencies which are expected to accrue,
in each case, partly as a result of my own action.

The distinction between this element of inter-
pretation and the given is emphasized by the fact
that the latter is what remains unaltered, no mat-
ter what our interests, no matter how we think or
conceive. I can apprehend this thing as pen or
rubber or cylinder, but I cannot, by taking
thought, discover it as paper or soft or cubical.

While we can thus isolate the element of the
given by these criteria of its unalterability and
its character as sensuous feel or quality, we cannot
describe any particular given as such, because in
describing it, in whatever fashion, we qualify it by
bringing it under some category or other, select
from it, emphasize aspects of it, and relate it in
particular and avoidable ways. If there be states

THE GIVEN IN EXPERIENCE 53

of pure esthesis, in violent emotion or in the pres-
ence of great art, which are unqualified by
thought, even these can be conveyed and perhaps
even retained in memory only when they have
been rendered articulate by thought. So that in
a sense the given is ineffable, always. It is that
which remains untouched and unaltered, however
it is construed by thought. Yet no one but a phi-
losopher could for a moment deny this immediate
presence in consciousness of that which no activity
of thought can create or alter.

If now we have fastened upon the fact of ex-
perience which we wish to discuss as the given
element in it, it is time that we proceed to clarify
this conception and guard against various pos-
sible misinterpretations.

An initial difficulty may arise from ambiguity
of the word "given." This term has most fre-
quently been used in philosophy in meanings at
least close to the one here intended. But on occa-
sion it has the widely different significance of de-
noting those data which philosophy in general
finds or takes for granted at the beginning of its
study. And occasionally those who use the term in
this second meaning make it carry something of
methodological polemic against any notion that
*'the immediate" or "sense-data" are allowable
categories of explanation in epistemology.

What I should have to say on this point is, in
part at least, already clear from the preceding

54 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

chapter. It is indeed the thick experience of the
world of things, not the thin given of immediacy,
which constitutes the datum for philosophic re-
flection. We do not see patches of color, but trees
and houses ; we hear, not indescribable sound, but
voices and violins. What we most certainly know
are objects and full-bodied facts about them
which could be stated in propositions. Such initial
data of object and fact set the problem in phi-
losophy and are, in a measure, the criteria of its
solution, since any philosophic theory will right-
fully be rejected as inaccurate or inadequate if it
does not measure up to, or account for, experience
in this broad sense*

But the acceptance of such preanalytic data*
as an ultimate epistemological category would, if
really adhered to, put an end to all worthwhile
investigation of the nature of knowledge or to
any other intellectual enterprise. What lies on the
surface can be taken as ultimate only so long as
there is no problem to be solved, or else no solu-
tion to be hoped for. Without analysis, there can
be no advance of understanding.

The given, as here conceived, is certainly an ab-
straction. Unless there be such a thing as pure
esthesis (and I should join with the critic in
doubting this), the given never exists in isolation
in any experience or state of consciousness. Any

*I borrow this useful pBrase from Professor Loewenberg; see has
article, "Preanalytic and Postanalytic Data," The Journal of Philos-
ophy, vol. 24 (1927), pp. 5 Jf.

THE GIVEN IN EXPERIENCE 55

Kantian "manifold' 3 as a psychic datum or mo-
ment of experience, is probably a fiction, and the
assumption of it as such is a methodological error.
The given is in, not before, experience. But the
condemnation of abstractions is the condemnation
of thought itself. Nothing that thought can ever
comprise is other than some abstraction which
cannot exist in isolation. Everything mentionable
is an abstraction except the concrete universal;
and the concrete universal is a myth. Thought
can do just two things : it can separate, by analy-
sis, entities which in their temporal or spatial ex-
istence are not separated, and it can conjoin, by
synthesis, entities which in their existence are dis-
joined. Only the mystic or those who conceive that
man would be better off without an upper-brain,
have ground for objection to analysis and abstrac-
tions. The only important question is whether this
abstracted element, the "given," is genuinely to
be discovered in experience. On this point I can,
of course, only appeal to the reader. I shall hope
that he has already identified provisionally what
the word intends, and proceed upon that basis.

Assuming, however, such provisional identifica-
tion, there are still ambiguities of language to be
avoided. I have so far spoken of "the given" and
"data of sense" as roughly synonymous, but the
latter phrase has connotations which are slightly
inappropriate. In the first place, "sense-data," as
a psychological category, may be distinguished

56 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

from other mental content by their correlation
with the processes in the afferent nerves. A dis-
tinction made by the criterion of such correlation
with nervous processes is open to two objections
in epistemology. In the first place, the thing or
mental state itself must first be accurately iden-
tifiable before such correlation can be established.
If it is thus identifiable, the correlation is not es-
sential and is, in fact, superfluous in discussions
of epistemology by the method of reflection and
analysis. Second, there is the more general objec-
tion that the theory of knowledge is a subject too
fundamental to rest upon distinctions drawn from
the particular sciences. Basic problems of cate-
gory and of the general nature of knowledge are
antecedent to the special sciences and cannot,
therefore, legitimately depend upon their particu-
lar findings. Especially is this important as re-
gards psychology, a valid method for which is, at
the present moment, a serious problem. The man-
ner in which my own body is known to me, the
subjectivity or objectivity of pleasantness or emo-
tional tone, the validity of the correlation between
mental states which I inspect directly only in my
own case (if such is the fact) and nervous proc-
esses which I can observe only in another organ-
ism ; these are themselves problems which have at
least an epistemological side.

Also, the particular purposes which the psy-
chologist has in mind in making his analysis of

THE GIVEN IN EXPERIENCE 57

mental states may be out of place in epistemology.
"Sense-datum" may connote relation to particu-
lar sense-organs (as in the distinction between
taste and odor), and hence mark a division where
none can be drawn by direct inspection. Also
other qualities than the strictly sensory may be
as truly given ; the pleasantness or f earf ulness of
a thing may be as un-get-overable as its bright-
ness or loudness that question, at least, must not
be prejudiced. Hence "sense-data," defined by
correlation with nervous processes, should have
no place in our program. It is the brute-fact ele-
ment in perception, illusion and dream (without
antecedent distinction) which is intended.

However, if it be understood that the methodo-
logical connotation of psychological categories is
not here in point, it will cause no confusion if I
continue to refer to the "sensuous" or the "feel-
ing" character of the given: the element in ex-
perience which is intended is difficult to designate
in any terms which are not thus preempted to
slightly different uses. It seems better to use lan-
guage which is familiar, even at some risk of am-
biguity, than to invent a technical jargon which
would, after all, be no less ambiguous until its
precise connotation could be discovered from its
use.

There is also another and different kind of am-
biguity which must be avoided* Obviously, we must
distinguish the given from the object which is

58 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

given. The given is presentation of something
real, in the normal case at least; what is given
(given in part) is this real object. But the what-
ness of this object involves its categorial inter-
pretation; the real object, as known, is a con-
struction put upon this experience of it, and
includes much which is not, at the moment, given
in the presentation.

Still further comment is required in view of
contemporary theories which deal with the con-
tent of immediacy in a different fashion.*

When we remember that even the delimitation
of that in which we are interested, the singling
out of the presentation of our object from other
accompanying consciousness is, in some part at
least, a work of excision or abstraction wrought
by the mind, we may be led to remark that there
is, in all strictness, only one given, the Bergson-
ian real duration or the stream of consciousness.
This, I take it, is at least approximately correct.
The absolutely given is a specious present, fading
into the past and growing into the future with no
genuine boundaries. The breaking of this up into
the presentation of things marks already the ac-
tivity of an interested mind. On the other hand,
we should beware of conceiving the given as a
smooth undifferentiated flux; that would be wholly

*Extended discussion of such theories cannot be included here;
the object of the discussion is merely that of clarifying, by contrast,
the terminology and procedure here adopted. Though criticisms will
be ventured, it is recognized that the discussion is not sufficient fully
to substantiate these.

THE GIVEN IN EXPERIENCE 59

fictitious. Experience, when it comes, contains
within it just those disjunctions which, when they
are made explicit by our attention, mark the boun-
daries of events, "experiences" and things* The
manner in which a field of vision or a duration
breaks into parts reflects our interested attitudes,
but attention cannot mark disjunctions in an un-
differentiated field*

The interruptions and differences which form
the boundaries of events and things are both given
and constituted by interpretation. That the rug is
on the floor or the thunder follows the flash, is as
much given as the color of the rag or the loudness
of the crash. But that I find this disjunction of
rug and floor possessed of a meaning which the
wrinkles in the rug do not have, reflects my past
experience to taking up and putting down rugs.
The cognitively significant on-the-floorness of the
rug requires both the given break in the field of
vision and the interpretation of it as the boundary
between manipulable object and unyielding sup-
port.

Even in that sense in which the given is always
one whole, it is not important f ot our purpose of
analyzing knowledge that we should dwell upon
this integrality of it. Our interest is, rather, in the
element of givenness in what we may, for usual and
commonplace reasons, mark off as "an experience"
or "an object*' 5 This given element in a single ex-
perience of an object is what will be meant by "a

60 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

presentation/' Such a presentation is, obviously,
an event and historically unique. But for most of
the purposes of analyzing knowledge one presenta-
tion of a half-dollar held at right angles to the line
of vision, etc., will be as good as another. If, then,
I speak of "the presentation" of this or that, it
will be on the supposition that the reader can pro-
vide his own illustration. No identification of the
event itself with the repeatable content of it is in-
tended.

In any presentation, this content is either a spe-
cific quale (such as the immediacy of redness or
loudness) or something analyzable into a complex
of such. The presentation as an event is, of course,
unique, but the qualia which make it up are not.
They are recognizable from one to another expe-
rience* Such specific qualia and repeatable com-
plexes of them are nowadays sometimes designated
as "essences/ 5 This term, with such a meaning, will
here be avoided ; the liability to confuse such qualia
with universal concepts makes this imperative.

It is at once the plausibility and the fatal error
of "critical realism" that it commits this confusion
of the logical universal with given qualia of sense
by denominating both of these "essences." As will
be pointed out later, what any concept denotes
or any adjective such as "red" or "round" is
something more complex than an identifiable sense-
quale. In particular, the object of the concept must
always have a time-span which extends beyond the

THE GIVEN IN EXPERIENCE 61

specious present ; this is essential to the cognitive
significance of concepts. The qualia of sense as
something given do not, in the nature of the case,
have such temporal spread. Moreover, such qualia,
though repeatable in experience and intrinsically
recognizable, have no names. They are fundamen-
tally different from the "universals" of logic and
of traditional problems concerning these. Eluci-
dation of this point must wait upon the sequel.

The somewhat similar use of the terms "sensa"
and "sense-data" is also likely to prove preju-
dicial. Mr. Broad in particular has used these
terms in a fashion which gives what is denoted by
them a dubious metaphysical status. He says, for
example:* "We agreed that, if they (sensa) are
states of mind at all, they must be presentations.
But we find no reason for thinking that they are
states of mind, and much the same reasons against
that view as led us to hold that sensations are
analyzable into act and sensum. * . . We saw no
intrinsic reason why coloured patches or noises
should not be capable of existing unsensed." And
elsewhere :f "A sense-datum with which I am ac-
quainted may perfectly well have parts with which
I am not acquainted. If therefore I say that a
given sense-datum has no parts except those which
I have noticed and mentioned I may quite well be
wrong. Similarly there may well be differences of

*" Scientific Thought," p. 265.

t" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society," supp. vol. IE, p. 18.

62 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

quality which. I cannot detect. If I say : This sense-
datum with which I am acquainted is coloured all
over with a uniform shade of red, this statement
may be false/ 5

Now it is indeed obvious that I may make
erroneous report of the given, because I can make
no report at all except by the use of language,
which imports concepts which are not given. The
sensum-theory, like the essence-theory, fails to go
deep enough and to distinguish what is really
given from what is imported by interpretation.
There is interpretation involved in calling the
sensum "elliptical" as much as in calling the
penny "round" It means, for example, to assert
something about the motion one must make with
one's finger in order to hide successively the dif-
ferent portions of the periphery. Also it is true,
of course, that if I report the given as "red," I
may convey an erroneous impression because I am
heedless of color-meanings, and another observer
who should have an experience qualitatively the
same might report "orange" or "violet." Similarly
I may report "round" when an artist would re-
port "elliptical," because I am not used to pro-
jecting things on a plane. All those difficulties
which the psychologist encounters in dealing with
reports of introspection may be sources of error
in any report of the given. It may require care-
ful self -questioning, or questioning by another, to
elicit the full and correct account of a given ex-

THE GIVEN IN EXPERIENCE 63

perience. But Mr. Broad seems here to assert an
entirely different ground of possible mistake. He
seems to mean that with the same sensum before
me I may at one moment see it red and at a later
moment somewhat mottled or more deeply shaded
at the center, and so forth.

Now if I look fixedly at a card and see it first
uniform and then mottled, I shall very likely and
quite properly report that the color of the sur-
face has a quality which I did not at first see. But
the subject of this statement is the real color of
the real card, and the statement itself is not a re-
port of the content of sense but an interpretation
put upon my succession of sensory experience. It
imports a distinction between the subjective and
the objective which is irrelevant to givenness as
such. There certainly is such a thing as the shape
of a penny or the color of a card which can exist
unnoticed while I am looking at it or when I am
not. This is because the shape of the penny has
the same kind of enduring reality as the penny,
and a quite different kind of reality from the in-
termittent presentation of the penny in my con-
sciousness. But I thought it was the initial point
of the sensum-theory to provide a name if not a
local habitation for what I see as opposed to
what I see, the elliplicity of the appearance as
against the real roundness of the penny. As such,
it should be of the essence of the sensum to be
sensed ; the sensum which is neither the real shape

64 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

of the real penny nor the appearance of it in a
mind is neither fish, flesh nor good red herring. A
sensum which is not sensed, or a sense-datum
which continues unaltered while consciousness of
it changes, is merely a new kind of ding an $ic~h 9
which is none the better for being inappropriately
named so as to suggest its phenomenological char-
acter.

What is given may exist outside the mind
that question should not be prejudiced. But in or-
der that we may meaningfully assert such exist-
ence, it is essential that there be an answer to the
questions: What would it mean if that which is
given has such independent existence? In what re-
spect would experience in general be different if it
had no such independent reality? For a sensum
which is not sensed, it is difficult to see what an-
swer there can be to such questions.* The main
objection to the sensum-theory is that it leaves at

*I am never quite sure that I may not be misunderstanding Mr.
Broad on this point. (I might say the same thing about Mr. Russell's
"perspectives.") It may be that he means only that when no eye
is situated at a certain angle from the penny, it is still true that if
there were a normal observer there, he would observe this elliptical
appearance* and that the appearance is there whether the observer
is or not. To this I can give real meaning: the last part of the state-
ment mptang the first part that the appearance is there when not
observed, means that if any observer were there he would observe it.
Or it means that other effects of the penny are there, such as an
image registered on a camera-plate, and that these may be verified
by the same methods as the existence of physical objects when not
observed. But if what Mr. Broad means to call to our attention is
the fact that the truth of the statement, "If an observer were there,
he would observe so and so," can not be tested when no observer is
there; and if its being thus true when not verified is what is meant
by the existence of unsensed sensa; then I am compelled to say that
the hypothesis is merely verbal nonsense. A hypothesis which in the
nature of the case is incapable of any conceivable test is the hypothe-

THE GIVEN IN EXPERIENCE 65

once the ground of the analysis of experience and
plunges into metaphysics* It would explain the
immediate and indubitable by something intrin-
sically unverifiable and highly dubious.

It is of the essence of what will here be meant
by "the given 5 ' that it should be given. We need
not say that what is given is a "mental state" or
even "in the mind" in any more explicit sense
than is itself implied in such givenness. Nor should
it be presumed that what is thus in mind is e&-
clusvvely mental. The nature of that interpreta-
tion or construction by which we come to know ob-
jects suggests that the given must be, in some
sense or other, a constituent of objective reality
as well. All such questions are simply later ques-
tions. If there should be metaphysical problems
concerning the kind of reality which what is "in
mind" may have, it is not necessary to anticipate
the solution of these beyond what may be verified
in the discovery that certain items or aspects of

sis of nothing. What is normally meant by saying, "If an observer
were there he would observe so and so," is verifiable by the fact that,
other conditions being altered at will, whenever an observer is there
he does see this. As will be pointed out later, the attribution of prop-
erties to objects and of existence to objects, consists, from the point
of view of cognition, precisely in the truth of such hypothetical propo-
sitions. And these are held to be true when the hypothesis is contrary
to fact. But what we mean by the truth of such propositions is pre-
cisely the sort of thing set forth above: the hjnpothetical, "If X were,
then Y would be," means, "However other conditions be varied,
and condition X being similarly supplied at will, whenever X is, Y
is." If the existence of an appearance or sensum when it is not sensed
means its observability at will, then it means its existence whenever
it i$ sensed. So far as I can see, there is nothing else which such ex-
istence reasonably could mean. In this, of course, I am merely ar-
guing for the indispensability to meaning of the "pragmatic test"
of Peirce and James.

66 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

the content of experience satisfy the criteria of
givenness. These are, first, its specific sensuous or
feeling-character, and second, that the mode of
thought can neither create nor alter it that it
remains unaffected by any change of mental atti-
tude or interest. It is the second of these criteria
which is definitive ; the first alone is not sufficient,
for reasons which will appear.

This given element is never, presumably, to be
discovered in isolation. If the content of percep-
tion is first given and then, in a later moment, in-
terpreted, we have no consciousness of such a first
state of intuition unqualified by thought, though
we do observe alteration and extension of inter-
pretation of given content as a psychological tem-
poral process. A state of intuition utterly unquali-
fied by thought is a figment of the metaphysical
imagination, satisfactory only to those who are
willing to substitute a dubious hypothesis for the
analysis of knowledge as we find it. The given is
admittedly an excised element or abstraction; all
that is here claimed is that it is not an "unreal"
abstraction, but an identifiable constituent in ex-
perience.

CHAPTER III
THE PURE CONCEPT

We have so far been concerned mainly with the
distinction between the two elements in knowl-
edge, the given and the construction or interpreta-
tion put upon it, and particularly with the criteria
of the given. We turn now to consideration of the
conceptual or interpretational element.

The word "concept" is used, in philosophic dis-
cussion, in many different senses, three of which
it is particularly important to distinguish. It may
signify (1) the psychological state of mind when
one uses a word or phrase to designate some indi-
vidual thing or some class of objects. Or (2) it
may refer to the meaning of a word or phrase
throughout some period of the development of the
individual's thought, or some period of the devel-
opment of a science, of a given culture, or even
of humanity altogether. Or, (3) it may signify
the logical intension or connotation of a term.
This third meaning is exemplified by dictionary
definitions where these are satisfactory and is the
usual signification of "concept** in the study of
logic.

The use of any substantive phrase or term or-
dinarily undergoes a process of development, both
in the history of society and in the history of any

67

68 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

individual who uses it. Usually, though not al-
ways, the denotation of the term remains un-
changed throughout this process; we apply it to
the same class of objects, but our realization of
what is essential to these things reflects a process
of learning. Such learning may consist in an en-
largement of our experience of the class of things
in question, or it may occasionally represent sim-
ply our more accurate apprehension of what are
the universal properties and relations of the fa-
miliar objects thus classified. But if the meaning
of a word or phrase undergo evolution, then, how-
ever normal or inevitable or commendable this
process may be, we must, for the sake of clarity,
recognize that this meaning is one unitary entity
only in some generic and genetic sense, and that
logically what we have is a succession of different
meanings, related in ways which may be impor-
tant. The recognition of their historical conti-
nuity must not obscure the fact of their logical
distinctness.

The problem of the developing adequacy of
thought is an interesting and important one; it
requires as one of its fundamental categories the
notion of just such historical and psychological
continuities; and the selection of the word "con-
cept" to designate this category is natural. No
criticism of such genetic study or of this use of
the term is intended. But this psychological and
educational category must not be confused with

THE PURE CONCEPT 69

"meaning 55 in the sense in which logic, for in-
stance, requires that term. Here a meaning must
be precise and clear, or be capable of being made
so, and must remain unaltered throughout any
discussion in which it occurs. No psychological or
historical process is legislated out of existence by
this restriction in the use of the word, but if there
should be development or learning which affects
the connotation of a term, then, from this point of
view, we have another meaning; that is all.

Again, the psychological state is not the object
in which we are here primarily interested. If a
psychologist, thinking in terms of a context-the-
ory of meaning, says, "Infinity means to me the
image of the blue-black, dense, arched sky,' 5 * then
we must observe that such a psychologist blurs
over the distinction between what is essential and
what is non-essential in meaning. He is in no dan-
ger of misunderstanding one who talks about
what the symbol CO denotes to be referring to the
heavens, nor does he, even in his own thinking,
suppose that infinity is blue-black. To use "con-
cept 55 to designate such a psychological state or
association-complex, is to fail to mark the dis-
tinction between what is objective in meaning and
what is adventitious or purely personal. Indeed,
the question how meaning can be objective and
shared, when the psychological states which are
bearers of this meaning are separate existences

*The reference is, of course, to Titchener.

70 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

and not even identical in their qualitative content,
is one of the important problems of meaning.

Because it is our main interest here to isolate
that element in knowledge which we can with cer-
tainty maintain to be objective and impersonal,
we shall define the pure concept as "that meaning
which must be common to two minds when they
understand each other by the use of a substantive
or its equivalent/ 5 (For brevity, the qualification
"pure" will be omitted throughout the remainder
of this chapter.) However, this designation of
community of meaning as the distinguishing mark
of the concept is, in part, merely an expository
device for singling out that element in knowledge
which, for reasons which will appear, I wish here
to discuss.

That meanings may have this sort of objectiv-
ity, is a fundamental assumption of science or of
any other intellectual enterprise. If there is noth-
ing objective about propositions and concepts,
then there is no such thing as truth and there can
be no serious purpose in reflection or discussion.
There must be meanings which are common to
minds when they cooperate in scientific or even in
merely practical endeavors. Otherwise the cooper-
ation is illusory; and one cannot escape the ques-
tion how such common meaning stands related to
different minds or psychological states which
mean. One may follow Plato and cut the Gordian
knot by removing these precise and logically mean-

THE PURE CONCEPT 71

ings beyond our earthly sphere and establishing
them as transcendent ideas or eternal objects.
This reflects a judgment of their value but leaves
our commerce with them a miracle ; it substitutes
adoration of a mystery for explanation of a fact.
A similar remark would apply to any doctrine like
that of the new realism, so far as this doctrine
hypostatizes conceptual realities, such as those of
mathematics, setting them up as objective reali-
ties without further ado and then explaining our
apprehension of them as coincidence of mind and
object. One does not answer the numerous objec-
tions which the nominalists and conceptualists in
logic have urged and very plausibly urged by
first setting up what they claim can exist only in
a mind as something outside it and then offering
coincidence of mind and object as explanation of
the fact that these conceptual objects are also m
minds. The new realist here follows the obvious
analogy of the common-sense view concerning
knowledge of the physical. There is the brick out
there; we both see the brick, hence we have an
idea in common. So the new realist seems to say
there is the mathematical entity out there; we
both apprehend this mathematical entity, hence
we have an abstract mathematical concept in com-
mon. Even in the case of the physical object there
are all sorts of difficulties to be met before com-
munity of knowledge can be understood. And in
the case of the purely abstract or conceptual (if

72 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

there be any purely conceptual entities) we have
the added difficulty that such an object cannot
arouse sensation. Undoubtedly the conceptual has
its own appropriate kind of reality ; but what that
kind of reality is, is precisely the problem. It is
not to be resolved by a phrase such as "neutral
entity/ 5 or "eternal object," or "essence/' We
must assume the objectivity of conceptual mean-
ing. But if in order to philosophize sensibly we
must assume something to be true when we do not
understand how it can be true, then our philoso-
phy is, so far, a failure.

On the other hand, I see no necessity for resign-
ing the problem of common meanings to the psy-
chologist as his exclusive affair, especially since he,
like the rest of us, must begin by assuming their
existence* The meaning must be somehow identi-
fied before it can be correlated with behavior or
motor-set or context or anything else. And it
must be identified as somehow common to two
minds before individual psychological differences
will be pertinent to it ; if what they are pertinent
to is not somehow identical, but A*s state is per-
tinent of sc and J5's to #, then there is no basis
for comparison by which individual differences
could be discovered as such.

Psychological differences of individuals are in-
deed impressive. Long before scientific psychology
was thought of, the skeptic appealed to them to
prove the impossibility of knowledge or the com-

THE PURE CONCEPT 73

munication of ideas. For imagery and feeling, and
even to some extent for sensation, idiosyncrasy is
the rule. Furthermore, as the ancient skeptic was
fond of pointing out, there can be no final veri-
fication of any community in these respects. The
sense-quality of green cannot be conveyed to the
congenitally blind; and if I suppose some idio-
syncrasy of sense which makes my perception of
green unique, I shall never discover that peculiar-
ity provided it does not impair my powers to dis-
criminate and relate as others do. In brief, there
can be no verification of community between minds
so far as it is a question of the feeling side of ex-
perience, though the assumption that there is no
community here seems fantastic.

However, it is obvious that common meanings
do transcend such individual differences of per-
ception and imagery. We use language to convey
thought. If language really conveys anything,
then there must be something which is identical in
your mind and in mine when we understand each
other* And if our thought is objective and not
merely a report of introspection, then what is
identical in our two minds must also be somehow
germane to that objective reality as we know it*

Suppose we talk of physical things in physical
terms, and our discussion involves physical mea-
surement. Presumably we have the same ideas of
feet and pounds and seconds* If not, the thing is
hopeless. But in psychological terms, my notion of

74 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

a foot goes back to some immediate image of
visual so-long-ness, or the movements which I
make when I put my hands so far apart, or a rela-
tion between these two. Distances in general mean
quite complex relationships between such visual
images, muscle and contact-sensations, the feeling
of fatigue, and so on. Weight goes back to muscle-
sensations, the "heft" of the thing. And our direct
apprehension of time is that feeling of duration
which is so familiar but so difficult to describe.

Now in such terms, will your sensory image of
a foot or a pound coincide with mine? I am near-
sighted; your eyes are good. My arms are long;
yours are short. If we lift a weight, there is the
difference in strength between us to take into ac-
count* So it is with everything. In acuity of per-
ception and power to discriminate, there is almost
always some small difference between the senses
of two individuals, and frequently these discrep-
ancies are marked. It is only in rough and ready
terms that we can reasonably suppose that our di-
rect intuitions and images are alike. That so often
theories of knowledge have ignored such differ-
ences, which are the rule and not the exception, or
have proceeded as if our common and supposedly
veridical knowledge depended on coincidence of
such sensory content, is really a frightful scandal.

Even for the large and crude distinctions, what
assurance is there that our impressions coincide?
Suppose it should be a fact that I get the sensa-

THE PURE CONCEPT 75

tion you signalize by saying "red" whenever I
look at what you call "green" and vice versa.
Suppose that in the matter of immediate sense-
qualities my whole spectrum should be exactly the
reverse of yours. Suppose even that what are for
you sensations of pitch, mediated by the ear, were
identical with my feelings of color-quality, medi-
ated by the eye. Since no one can look directly
into another's mind, and the immediate feeling of
red or of the middle C can never be conveyed,
how should we find it out if such personal pecu-
liarities should exist? We could never discover
them so long as they did not impair the power to
discriminate and relate as others do.

Furthermore, what difference to our common
knowledge would it make? That is precisely the
first point which needs to be emphasized: idio-
syncrasy of intuition need not make any differ-
ence, except in the esthetic quality of the experi-
ence of one as compared with that of another. Let
us take it for granted (it seems fairly sensible)
that the sense-data of one are seldom precisely
those of the other when we address ourselves to
the same object. That, by itself, will in no way
impede our common knowledge or the conveying
of ideas. Why? Because we shall still agree that
there are three feet to the yard; that yellow is
lighter than blue; and that middle C means a
vibration of 256 per second. In other words, if we
define any one of the unit-ideas or concepts which

76 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

enter into the expression of our thought, we shall
define it in the same or equivalent fashion, and we
shall apply the same substantives and adjectives
to the same objects. So far as we fail in these two
things, our knowledge will be really different and
the attempt to convey our thought will break
down. These, then, are the only practical and ap-
plicable criteria of common knowledge; that we
should share common definitions of the terms we
use, and that we should apply these terms iden-
tically to what is presented.

I am not, of course, trying to argue that indi-
vidual feelings are thus unique. Some differences
of subjective experience are attested by the inabil-
ity of one person to discriminate where another
can. For the rest, the question of such identity is,
in the end, mere idle speculation because we have
no possible means of investigating it. What I
would point out is, rather, that in the determina-
tion of common concepts, the conveying of ideas,
such possible idiosyncrasy in the correlated sense-
feelings is entirely negligible. You and I mean
the same by "red" if we both define it as the first
band in the sun's spectrum, and if we both pro-
nounce the same presented objects to be red. It
does not matter if neither the red rug nor the
first band of the spectrum give to the two of us
identical sensations so long as we individually dis-
cover that same sense-quality in each thing which
we agree in describing as "red."

THE PURE CONCEPT 77

Moreover, it is obvious that unless one have
some peculiarity which both he and others will
learn to recognize as a defect of his sense-percep-
tions, the very manner in which we learn the
names of things will secure such unanimity in the
ascription of terms, regardless of any idiosyncrasy
of purely inner sense feelings.

Even those individual peculiarities which be-
come recognized as inability to discriminate, limi-
tation of the range of sensation, and so on, do not
prevent us from sharing and conveying ideas,
though they may impede the process of learning.
We talk together and cooperate successfully about
the vibration of 19,000 per second in the vacuum-
tube, though for one of us this vibration is evi-
denced by a note and for the other it never can
be. We both have a perfectly good concept of
ultra-violet, though neither of us will ever see it,
just as we know well enough what we mean by the
other side of the moon. To be sure, no such con-
cept would have a meaning if we could not,
through the terms in which that meaning is ex-
plicated, get back eventually to concepts which
are correlated for us with specific and identifiable
qualities of sense. It is thus that we surmount our
individual limitations. The pitch which is beyond
my auditory range, I understand through the no-
tion "vibration of 19,000," which is definitive both
for me and for those who hear it as a note. This
process of leading back, by which we understand

78 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

what we can not directly perceive, may be quite
complex and prolonged without defeating the pur-
pose of sharing ideas and conveying thought* It
is the same sort of process by which we must all of
us understand what we mean by "ultr a- violet" or
"electron," and its objectivity is not affected by
the fact that such indirection of understanding is,
in this case of limitations of perception, necessary
for some of us only.

The methods of verifying community of mean-
ing are principally two, neither of which depends
on any supposed community of feeling or imagery.
Either we define our terms or, by our behavior,,
we exhibit their denotation. The second proce-
dure is less conclusive for reasons which are fairly
obvious. No collection of cases, or examples
pointed to, is ever sufficient to determine uniquely
the denotation of a term to determine what other
cases, not so far examined, would be included and
what excluded. The meaning of the term will be
what is common to the various examples pointed
out as meant by it. In general, the larger the num-
ber of things so indicated, the smaller the chance
that these will have in common other properties
than those which are essential or comprehended
within the conceptual meaning of the term. But
that possibility can never be ruled out. Moreover,
the exhibition of meaning in this way depends for
success upon the ability of the person to whom the
meaning is conveyed to make the analysis which

THE PURE CONCEPT 79

will isolate correctly just tliat totality of proper-
ties which is common to the things indicated, not
omitting to remark any which are essential. This
is an important consideration, because concepts
which stand in any need of being learned will rep-
resent analyses which are matters of some diffi-
culty. On account of these shortcomings of it, the
actual use of this method of indicating a mean-
ing by exemplifying its denotation is confined
almost exclusively to conveying the meaning of a
word where the concept itself is already something
shared ; as, for instance, where teacher and taught
have no language in common*

The method of definition specifies a meaning
directly* In defining, we refer one concept to oth-
ers; the typical definition equates the term de-
fined with a complex of other terms in definite
relations. To be sure, it may not be sufficient that
you and I both define A in terms of B and C, since
B and C may have for us different significations.
But if B also is defined by both in the same or
equivalent fashion, and C 5 and so on, that is suffi-
cient to assure common meaning, regardless of all
differences of imagery or any idiosyncrasy of
sense. Such verification of community of meaning
by comparison of definitions is obviously a proc-
ess which must be incomplete^ but it makes clear
precisely what is essential to a genuine identity
of meaning in two minds.

Speaking in terms of logic, these facts may be

80 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

expressed by saying that sensation and imagery
are essentially individual, and do not possess
meaning in the sense in which meanings are com-
mon and shareable and expressible. The concept,
which is the common, shareable and expressible
meaning, must be distinguished from such feel-
ings ; it is constituted by that pattern which is set
up by the expression of one concept in terms of
others. These patterns must be identical and
shared by all who really possess ideas in common
and are capable of conveying them to one another.
Psychologically, this conceptual pattern of re-
lations is, of course, an abstraction; no such con-
cept ever existed, apart from imagery and sensory
material, in any human mind. For each individual
there must be a correlation of concept with spe-
cific sense-quality. But this correlation of con-
cept and sense is intrinsically individual; if it,
too, should be shared, we could not verify that
fact, and it is not in the least essential to com 1
mon understanding that it should be. The con-
cept, so defined, is precisely that abstraction which
it is necessary to make if we are to discover the
basis of our common understanding of that reality
which we all know. On a day which is terribly long
to me and abominably short to you, we meet, by
agreement, at three o'clock, and thus demonstrate
that we have a world in common. An "hour" is not
a feeling of tedium or vivacity, but sixty minutes,
one round of the clock, a pattern of relations

THE PURE CONCEPT 81

which we have established between chronometers
and distances and rates of movement, and so on.

Defining, like logical analysis in general, sets
up a pattern of relationships. We are all of us
fond of what Bosanquet called the "linear" mode
of thinking in such matters, and we might easily
suppose that definition chases a conceptual mean-
ing back into other such concepts, and these into
still others, until finally it is brought to bay in
some first (or last) identity of meaning which is
identity of sensation or imagery. So far as mean-
ing within the individual mind is concerned, I
should suppose this is precisely what takes place ;
we analyze the meaning back until we come to rest
in familiar imagery. But the end-terms, which for
us are thus understood directly by reference to
sense and feeling, have still a conceptual meaning;
they are not indefinable. This conceptual mean-
ing is shareable; our imagery essentially not*
Thus the end-terms of such analysis are no dif-
ferent than the beginning terms ; they have mean-
ing in two senses the logical, shareable meaning
of further conceptual relations, and the direct,
non-shareable meaning of reference to some com-
plex of sense-qualities.

The notion that the analysis of meaning must,
in linear fashion, go back eventually to ultimate
constituents whose meaning cannot in turn be
thus relational, is a prejudice which is very largely
due to a false metaphor. Logical analysis is con-

82 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

ceived after the fashion of the physical dissection
of a whole into parts, or the chemical analysis of
a compound into elements* But it will not escape
the thoughtful reader that all definition is eventu-
ally circular. It is often the case that A can be
defined in terms of B and C 9 B in terms of A and
C, or C in terms of A and B. Where the circle is
so small, and the defined meaning so promptly re-
turns upon itself, the analysis is likely to be in-
adequate. But this circularity would never be pos-
sible at all, if the relation of defining to defined
were that of part to whole* Moreover, the differ-
ence between a good and a bad definition, on this
point, is only, so to speak, in the diameter of the
circle. All the terms in the dictionary, however
ideal its definitions, will be themselves defined.

Logical analysis is not dissection but relation;
the analysis of A into B and C does not divide A
into constituents B and C but merely traces a pat-
tern of relations connecting A with B and C. As
regards their conceptual meaning, terms are very
closely analogous to points in space. A point is
nothing whatever apart from its relation to other
points ; its very essence is relational. Likewise the
conceptual meaning of a term is nothing whatever
apart from other such meanings. Also it is true
that if point A is located by reference to B and
C, B and C in turn, and the other points in any
spatial array, have their position eventually, in
circularwise, in their relation to A and to one

THE PURE CONCEPT 83

another. The positional relationships of any point
are internal to its nature and constitute that na-
ture. Likewise, the definitive relations of a term,
signifying a concept, are internal to the meaning
of that term and constitute it. The nature of a
concept as such is its internal (essential or defini-
tive) relationships with other concepts. All points
have their positions eventually in terms of the
array of all space: no point or set of points has
any primal position in any other fashion; we
merely choose as an arbitary basis of reference
some set which is convenient or marks the place
where we happen to be. All terms or concepts
similarly have their meaning eventually in the
array of all meanings, and no member of this
array is intrinsically primal or privileged*

Concerning this interpretation of the concept
as consisting in relational structures of meaning,
there can be two doubts. We seldom "have in
mind" any such conceptual pattern of definition.
When we reflect upon the manner in which coin-
cidence in the meaning of one term involves coin-
cidence in the meaning of others, we see that such
an ideal pattern of meaning goes far beyond what
anyone could consciously have in mind at any one
time. Again, we often coincide in our use of terms,
and thus seem to possess meanings in common,
when the definition of our terms would be a mat-
ter of some doubt and one holding possibility of
disagreement.

84 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

Three points are here pertinent: First, that
over and above the ambiguities of language com-
monly recognized, the same word may convey dif-
ferent concepts on different occasions ; in particu-
lar, that it may convey a meaning which is more
or less restricted. Second, when the denotation of
a word rules, there are degrees of clearness about
its meaning. Third, identity of meaning consists
practically in implicit modes of behavior, and what
is involved in these always runs beyond what can
be explicit in consciousness at any one time.

If I talk with a chemist about helium or with a
biologist about cells, we may understand each
other perfectly. But without recourse to some ref-
erence book, I could not define "helium" or "cell"
in a fashion which the specialist would accept as
adequate. To me "helium" means "a non-inflam-
mable gas a little lighter than hydrogen (or a lit-
tle heavier I forget which) , produced in the dis-
integration of alpha-particles and found in the
sun." I could not specify either atomic-weight or
spectrum characteristics, one or other of which
the chemist will regard as essential to a sufficiently
guarded definition. But as long as we converse to-
gether without misunderstanding, the common
meaning of "helium" is just what is set down
above. This is a less specific meaning than the
chemist's, but included in it, and sufficient for our
present purposes. If our discussion should touch
upon more recondite matters, he might need to in-

THE PUKE CONCEPT 85

struct me about helium, and thus establish a more
specific common concept, before we could go on* I
recognize his authority to do so, and should accept
his definition (which I cannot now give) as the
"true" meaning of the word "helium." But this
does not alter the fact that, for the time being, the
common concept which serves our purposes is my
looser understanding of the term. Such is quite
commonly the case. Our actual meanings, the con-
cepts we are concerned to convey, are more re-
stricted than the true or full or dictionary mean-
ings of the terms we use. Most words may convey
any one of a whole range of more or less full and
accurate meanings. It Is, thus 5 quite possible that
we may understand each other perfectly even when
we should disagree about the definition of our
terms, because only some restricted meaning, cov-
ered in both our definitions, is required by our
discussion.

Second, it is obvious that in some sense or other
we may have a meaning in mind when we could
not state it without further thought. Any true ac-
count of thought and speech must recognize this.
The ruling interest in knowledge is the practical
interest of action. A meaning may be implicitly
present in the consistency of behavior when con-
fronted with experience of a certain type without
the explicit recognition of what this behavior im-
plies having come Into consciousness or even been
brought in question. Such we must suppose to be

86 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

the child's early use of language. And in this sense*
we may perhaps say that meanings must be im-
plicit in the mind before they can become con-
scious. In fact, we may doubt whether any mean-
ing would ever become conscious if it were not for
the practical difficulties which arise when meanings
are not thus explicit the difficulties of hesitant
or inconsistent behavior in border-line cases, and
the social difficulty of misunderstanding, that is,
of incongruous behavior when the same term has
been used with apparently the same meaning.

Josiah Royce used to speak to his classes of the
three grades of clearness about the meanings of
terms.* We have the first grade of clearness when
we are able appropriately to accept or reject any
object of our acquaintance as belonging or not
belonging to the class in question. The second
grade of clearness involves, further, the prepared-
ness to classify correctly objects not precisely like
those with which we have previously been ac-
quainted; that is, to make the dichotomy, X or
not--3T, not only for familiar but also for unfa-
miliar things, not only for all actual but also for
all conceivable objects. The third grade of clear-
ness consists in the ability to specify the criteria
by which such classification is determined. This
last, of course, is equivalent to definition, the ex-
plicit possession of the concept. That the mind

m *He used to attribute this to Charles Peirce, but Peirce's discus-
sion m "How to Make Our Ideas Clear/* does not so precisely cover
the point.

THE PURE CONCEPT 87

may have the first or second grade of clearness
without the third, is obvious. It is also evident
without discussion, that even when we have, in the
ordinary sense, this highest grade of clearness, we
do not have this definition explicitly in mind when-
ever we use a term with understanding.

Any controversy as to whether a mind possesses
a meaning whenever a term is used intelligently,
would be useless because it would be verbal. The
pertinent facts are sufficiently clear; that it may
possess meaning in the sense of determining a con-
sistent mode of behavior (such as the consistent
use of a term) without our being able out of hand
to specify the ground of our own discrimination,
we can all of us testify* The psychology of this is
doubtless a difficult and important topic ; but with
that we are not concerned. It would be an anoma-
lous use of language to deny meaning to terms
which are used without this explicit consciousness
of what is essential, especially since the use of
terms, like other modes of deliberate behavior, is
most frequently a matter of habit, reflecting pre-
vious experience in which the mode of action was
determined by clearer consciousness. It would also
be anomalous to deny meaning where there is con-
sistency of behavior or of consciously determined
attitude which does not directly concern the use of
language. In such cases the meaning is possessed
by the mind both in the sense of this consistently
determined attitude and in the further sense that

88 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

Jiow this meaning should become explicit and what
would be recognized as essential, when the attitude
became self-conscious, is already implicit in the
attitude itself* There is such a thing as confusion
of attitude, reflected in hesitation of behavior and
self-frustration, just as there may be inconsis-
tency in the use of terms and in our explicit con-
cepts. It is such hesitation and dubiety which
provides the spur to that self -consciousness and
self-criticism which renders meanings explicit. If
meanings could not be present and determined in
the attitude and behavior itself, there would be
nothing to become conscious of. Objects do not
classify themselves and come into experience with
their tickets on them. The classifying attitude or
mode of behavior which the mind brings to the
given experience and which represents its mean-
ing, dictates the explicit concept and implicitly
possesses it already.

If, however, in the light of this, it should be
charged that I have used the phrase "common to
two minds' 5 in a figurative and Pickwickian sense
in the definition of "the concept," I shall plead
guilty. I shall urge in extenuation that to begin
the discussion by introducing all the qualifica-
tion and explanation required for strict accuracy
would have been cpnf using and impossible. I have
but followed the custom to attributing to mind
what is ideally determined by conscious attitude
even though it is not explicitly present in con-

THE PURE CONCEPT 89

sciousness. Whatever is merely convenient fiction
in this can now be withdrawn in favor of an ac-
curate equivalent. The concept is a definitive struc-
ture of meanings, which is what would verify com-
pletely the coincidence of two rm-nrfs when they
understand each other by the use of language.
Such ideal community requires coincidence of a
pattern of interrelated connotations, projected by
and necessary to cooperative, purposeful behavior.
It does <not require coincidence of imagery or sen-
sory apprehension. The concept is, thus, psycho-
logically both an abstraction and an ideality,
though in no greater degree or different sense than
are most of things which are commonly attributed
to mind. Both community of meaning and genuine
understanding of reality are projected ideals more
truly than realized actualities. \Ve study them as
what our purposes intend and as that the approxi-
mation to which gives value to our practice. It
is concepts, as precisely such ideal abstractions,
which must be implicity present in our practice,
which constitute the element of interpretation
which underlies our common understanding of our
common world. To that topic, -we may now pro-
ceed.

CHAPTER IV

COMMON CONCEPTS AND OUR COMMON

WORLD*

The significance of conception is for knowledge.
The significance of all knowledge is for possible
action* And the significance of common conception
is for community of action. Congruity of behavior
is the ultimate practical test of common under-
taking. Speech is only that part of behavior which
is most significant of meanings and most useful
for securing human cooperation.

Common meaning may override all idiosyncrasy
of feeling or sense, so far as such idiosyncrasy
does not prevent congruous distinction and rela-
tions. It may even override differences which are
reflected in failure of discrimination and relation,
in ways which have already been commented on.
In fact, I think we may fairly be impressed with
the tremendous achievement which our common
meanings and our intellectual cooperation repre-
sent in the life of the race. Community of meaning
may also override much idiosyncrasy of behavior.

*This chapter consists mainly of an elaboration and defense of con-
ceptions put forward in the preceding one. It may be omitted, by any
reader who chooses to do so, without prejudice to the understanding
of later chapters.

90

OUR COMMON WORLD 91

But eventually the very purposes for which com-
munication exists insure a certain congruity of
behavior when meanings are the same.

Berkeley pointed out that we can never test the
validity of knowledge by comparing an idea in
the mind with an object outside the mind. We can
only compare ideas among themselves. This is a
pertinent consideration about the criteria of
knowledge, whether one agrees with Berkeley's
idealism or not. What I would here point out
about the concept has a certain similarity. We
cannot test community of meaning, even eventu-
ally, by comparing the immediate experience in
our own mind with the immediate experience in
another mind, nor by comparing another's con-
cepts, conveyed to us, with his immediate feelings
and sensations. We can only compare meanings
among themselves, as purely conceptual and ab-
stracted from the character of any experience be-
yond our own. We can only grasp another's mean-
ings by observing the relation of his meanings to
one another and to his behavior.

In the end it can hardly fail to be the case that
the possibility of our having concepts in common
is conditioned by two things ; first, by the fact that
we are creatures fundamentally alike, having in
the large the same needs and interests and powers
of discrimination and relation; and second, that
we are confronted by a common reality, mediated
to us in sense-experience which is comparable.

9 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

Seeing that, in the large, such conclusions are
indicated, there is a tendency to jump to them at
the start on the part of rationalists to assume
an ideal and complete agreement in an iron-clad
and immutable set of categories, hypostatizing
these as "human reason"; on the part of empiri-
cists to presume that our common world is ex-
hibited to all of us (that is, to all "normal" per-
sons, the others being simply left out of account)
in a common sensory experience. Theories of both
these types are based on nothing more nor less than
a beautiful myth.

With the topic of the categories we are not just
now concerned except for one point. Coincidence
of categories may be interpreted to mean a neces-
sary psychological coincidence of a certain aspect
of experience, the formal or relational. Now I
feel quite sure that something of this sort is true.
My conviction is that one kind of likeness which
is essential to our common understanding consists
in certain very fundamental tendencies to action,
growing out of basic similarity of needs and of
physical structure ; these tendencies to action will,
of course, be reflected in some aspect of experi-
ence. But it is of some importance to see that even
such fundamental tendencies in which we coincide
need not necessarily be mediated by any direct
psychological identity of experience. There seems
to be the same possibility of systematic difference
here that there is among our intuitions of length

OUR COMMON WORLD 93

or of weight if one of us is tall and strong and the
other short and weak. I should not stress this
otherwise trivial point if it were not that a theory
which, admitting divergence of experience at the
level of ordinary perception, still bases itself upon
a psychological identity of an esoteric and rec-
ondite "human reason, 55 seems to me just the re-
verse of what a sensible account of the common
aspects of our common experience should be. Psy-
chologically "human reason" is a very remote ab-
straction; if the conception is to be retained, its
aura of the transcendental needs to be removed.

As for that other presumption, that our com-
mon understanding is based upon the presence to
us of a common world, it too is unduly simple. Our
common world is very largely a social achievement
an achievement in which we triumph over a
good deal of diversity in sense-experience. Com-
mon understanding would become progressively
more difficult as community in what is given in ex-
perience should become more meager; so much,
the example of intelligent persons with defects of
sense makes evident. But if we inquire at what
point the limit may be set, or just what items of
sense are absolutely requisite, we shall see, I think,
that there is nothing of which we can say abso-
lutely, "Unless this much were common in what is
given to us, we could not understand each other
at all."

For these reasons, the problem of the genesis

94 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

of common concepts will bear a little further con-
sideration.

In the first place, it may be pointed out that
an initial community between "likeminded" indi-
viduals is capable of enormous expansion, and that
the manner of such expansion is familiar.

Suppose two men speaking different languages
but having a few words in common to be chained
to the opposite walls of a dark cell, so that the
possibility of establishing common meanings by
such methods as pointing and naming would be
at a minimum. With good luck in the initial com-
mon concepts, and with a high enough order of
intelligence, they might eventually establish a very
large range of common notions by methods which
the reader can imagine for himself.

The actual case of Miss Helen Keller, in which
a normal range of understanding has been de-
veloped from original coincidence in kinesthetic
and contact-sensation {absolute coincidence even
in these being somewhat doubtful) need only be
mentioned.

Or suppose there should be creatures on Mars
of a high order of mentality. They might be psy-
chologically rather different from ourselves and
have senses and experience largely incomparable
with our own. Yet if we could establish some
initial common understanding (say if we should

signal to them in light-flashes ~, - -, , and they

should eventually respond with , ,

OUR COMMON WORLD 95

) ? then in spite of our differences from

them, it would be hard to set a limit beyond which

/

it could be said with certainty that our common
understanding could not go.

In fact, it is just this indefinite extensibility of
conceptual understanding which is exhibited by
abstract mathematical systems. To take the best
illustration ; by a miracle of patience and insight,
Mr. Russell and Mr. Whitehead have achieved, in
"Principia Mathematical such an analysis of va-
rious branches that the whole field of this subject
(excepting the geometrical, so far omitted) can
be developed from seven initial concepts. These
undefined ideas are of such a sort that they must
almost inevitably belong to any creature which
should be conscious of its own ways of acting and
should possess the habit of communication ideas
such as "proposition" and "either-or." Suppos-
ing these notions to be common to two minds in
any terms you please these two minds could, if
their patience and intelligence should be sufficient,
arrive eventually at a common understanding of
the whole of mathematics.

So far, I am only concerned to point out that
an initial community could extend itself extraordi-
narily. The exigencies of common life, the need
of cooperation, the tendency to imitation in be-
havior, and the enormously developed institution
of human education using the term in its widest
meaning all go to enforce just this sort of elab-

96 MINI) AND THE WORLD-ORDER

oration and extension of any initial mutuality of
human understanding. Idiosyncrasy is pretty sys-
tematically suppressed. And what cannot be sup-
pressed (abnormalities and deficiencies) we go
about it most earnestly and ingeniously to get
around. A relatively meager mutuality of con-
cepts, given human powers of discrimination, ab-
straction and relation, and our human social hab-
its, would be sufficient as the initial foundation
for our actual and most elaborate mutual under-
standing. I am not trying to argue that ft is from
such a meager basis of initial mutuality that the
community of understanding actually develops,
though obviously one could make out a pretty
good case from the manner in which the infant
acquires his social inheritance of ideas. I wish only
to point out the fact that, given such a meager
mutuality, elaborate common understanding could
develop; and that to argue straight from our
elaborate common understanding to an equally
extended coincidence of felt qualities or given ex-
perience, is unnecessary and fallacious.

The same considerations are pertinent as against
those who would hold that an initial community
of categories, as a psychologically identical and
miraculous endowment, is necessarily presumed.
Any who hold this doctrine are likely to argue
against the view here presented something as fol-
lows :*

*I am not imagining what such critics might say but reporting
what, in substance, some of them have said.

OUR COMMON WORLD 97

It is possible that you can escape postulating
psychological identity of sensuous content at the
first stage, in the analysis of meaning, by resolv-
ing the content of the concept into relations, but
you will be forced to come back to it in the sec-
ond, or some later stage, because the apprehen-
sion of relations must be common. It may be true
that "red" or "an hour" is conceptually the same
for A and B, not because felt red or felt duration
is sensuously identical in the two minds but be-
cause both define red as the first band of the
spectrum and an hour as sixty minutes. But
the critic continues relations themselves must be
discoverable in experience in a manner not essen-
tially different from that in which substantive
terms are given. That X is bigger than Y, or is
to the left of, or better than, or stands in any
other relation to Y, is something which must be
disclosed by some sort of felt, empirical quale of
the X Y complex. Otherwise experience could
never determine for us whether X is better than
Y or stands in any other relation to !F; and ex-
perience would in fact be irrelevant to the truth
of judgments of relation which means, of course,
all judgments.

So far, the critic's point is well taken. As was
indicated in Chapter II, relations in general are
given in very much the same sense that other
properties of objects are given. However, it is
equally true that relations, as cognized, are the

08 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

result of conceptual abstraction and of a setting
in connection with what is not given, just as prop-
erties in general are. That is, I should wish only
to file an exception, or a caution, that just as the
predication of let us say roundness is not
merely a direct report of sense-content, so the
predication of "greater than" or "predecessor of"
involves something more than the given. Though
relations in general are given in experience like
other properties, and though the applicability to
experience of the predication of any particular
relation depends, for any individual, upon the
possibility of that relation's being given to him
in some experience, still exactly those relations
which constitute the interpretation of what is
given are such as are not, just now, given in the
experience which is the subject of such conceptual
interpretation.

The critic continues: If, however, the presence
or absence of certain relations between X and Y
is revealed to the mind by the presence or ab-
sence of some identifiable characteristic of experi-
ence, and if identical concepts in two minds means
the coincidence of a certain pattern of relation-
ships, then the assumption that two minds have a
concept in common is an assumption of some iden-
tity of the order of psychological content. Rela-
tions are, of course, definable in general. So it is
conceivable that if substantive concepts are ana-
lyzable into relations, relations may be analyzable

OUR COMMON WORLD 99

into relations of relations as we see in mathe-
matics sometimes. But and now the critic reaches
the point of his argument unless you are to have
an infinite regress, somewhere you must come to
an end in a psychological identity which is abso-
lute, in what I should think of as the categories.
These will have to be at once the underlying pat-
tern of all human experience and the elemental
structure of human reason.

Now I am not specially anxious to controvert
anything which such a critic has to urge. I should
wish merely to make two points against him which
must greatly qualify the force of his argument.
If conceptual analysis discovers the meaning of
substantive terms in definitive relations, and con-
sonantly, the meaning of relations in relations of
relations, it does not in the least follow that there
is a regress here which must either be infinite or
come to some absolute end-terms. And second, the
kind of psychological identity which most plausi-
bly belongs to common concepts of the basic sort
meant by "categories" is not at all of the type
most frequently contemplated by those who talk,
in capitals, about "Human Reason."

To take the last point first; whether we take
our examples of "the categories' 5 supposed to rep-
resent the structure of human reason, from the
traditional historical sources, or take them with
much better reason from those scientific analyses
which reveal basic concepts of mathematics, phys-

100 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

ics, and so on, in either case our categorial con-
cepts, "substance and accident," "cause and ef-
fect," "different from," "either or," are certain
to be such as are exemplified in experience by a
very wide range of heterogeneous sensory con-
tent. If, for example, the category "different
from" must be common to two minds before they
could even begin to create a common understand-
ing, then it must at once suggest itself that what
empirically exemplifies this category will be itself
most markedly divergent in particular cases. If
we must seek some psychological identity which is
the vehicle of the category "different from," then
about the only plausible place to look for it will
jbe in our own activity of distinguishing. Any
'reasonably conceived set of categories will exhibit
these as a very high order of abstractions, and
abstractions most unlikely to be identifiable by
any simple coincidence of empirical quale in what
is brought under them. Psychologically they will
reflect much more directly our ways of acting than
they will the character of that upon which these
acts are directed.

Apart from a prepossession in favor of some
transcendental and miraculous status for "the
categories," I suspect that the point which such a
critic seeks to make against the view here pre-
sented, is that human experience, at the lowest
level at which it can be discerned the level here
indicated by "givenness" already possesses a

OUR COMMON WORLD 101

structure which reflects the nature of "human
reason. 5 ' This, I take it, is entirely erroneous.
Though doubtless the general character of sen-
sory content reflects the nature of the animal, it
is not such differences which are attributable to
human reason or categories; it is precisely such
divergence which community of thought and con-
cept may triumph over. If, for example, one ex-
amines such a list of basic concepts as the primi-
ti% r e ideas of "Principia Mathematical one may
see, I think, that the reason I cannot teach my
dog the calculus is not because empirical exempli-
fications of these primitive concepts are not pos-
sible, or even familiar, to him, but because he is
not capable of making an abstraction which is
not dictated directly by instinctive interest and
because a structure of relations must be either
very simple or strongly enforced by repetition
without exception in order for him to hold it in
his mind* There is no reason to think that the ab-
sence of human categories affects the content of
his given experience in the least.

Other considerations, pertinent to this topic,
will be set forth in Chapter VII and Till. But
already it may be clear that the sense in which
the categories "inform" experience is not any
sense in which different sets of categories (for
different kinds of creatures) would presume any
corresponding difference in experience as given.
As Royce was fond of insisting, the categories are

102 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

our ways of acting. What we can distinguish as
attributable to our own acts are not, and can not
be, limitations in the content of the immediate
experience which is acted on.

If, then, what the critic means to urge is that
we must have identical feelings of the relation of
substance and accident or of "if then,' 5 etc., I
can only say that I still do not see the neces-
sity of this; that I regard the point as rather
tenuous for argument; and that in any case I do
not see its importance for the theory of concepts
in general which is here presented. It has been
admitted that within the individual mind every
concept must have its correlation, directly or
eventually, with specific sensory content. If it
should be the case that this specific sense-content,
in different minds, is, for all our basic concepts,
Identical, it would still be true that this sense-
content can never be conveyed. We are concerned
with two things in our practical understanding
of each other with communication and with be-
havior. My concepts are, from the outside view
of me which you have, revealed as modes of my
behavior, including speech. My words must main-
tain a certain relation to other words which I use
and to the things I do. It is necessary that we
should act alike, in fundamental and important
ways, if we are to have a possible basis for under-
standing one another. But it is not necessary that
when we act alike we should feel alike, however

OUR COMMON WORLD 103

The eventual aim of communication is the co-
ordination of behavior; it is essential that we
should have purposes in common. But I can un-
derstand the purposes of another without pre-
suming that he feels just as I do when he has
them. The psychology of purpose is an especially
difficult topic, but it would seem that what is most
essential is a certain relation between anticipation
and realization. If, in another mind, both what is
anticipated and what is realized should be, in
terms of immediacy, different than for me, I could
still attribute this relation between the two to him
when I observe him to behave as I do* In other
words, I correctly attribute a certain purpose, like
mine, to another if I observe that he performs an
act like mine and suppose correctly that it is the
result of an intention involving the same congru-
ence between anticipation and result which I find
in my own case. I do not need to suppose that
either purposes in general or the content of this
act in particular are, as items of immediate ex-
perience, identical in his case and in mine, in
order to "understand his purposes.* 5

Let us return now to the second point which
we have supposed to be urged by our critic that
the notion of the concept as a relational pattern
of meanings among themselves must eventually
break down because the analysis of substantive
terms into relations presumes a similar analysis of
relational terms into relations of relations, and so
on ; that hence we shall be confronted either with

104 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

an infinite regress of a hopeless sort or with the
necessity that there should be some end-terms of
such analysis which are absolute and have their
meaning exclusively in some different fashion,
such as imagery, which must therefore be identi-
cal in two minds which understand each other.

One might indulge in a great deal of loose talk
about such an issue without reaching any real
clarity. But as it happens there are excellent ex-
amples to which the discussion can be tied, and
these examples show that our critic is entirely
wrong* I refer to the systems of pure mathematics,
in their modern form. Such a system is generated
deductively from certain primitive ideas which are
taken for granted* All other concepts in the sys-
tem are defined in terms of these. Unless these
primitive ideas possess meaning it may be said
the whole system would be meaningless; they
are the end-terms of that particular analysis of
the field in question which the system represents.
Now let us imagine for a moment that this branch
of mathematics should be a closed field; that if,
for example, it is arithmetic which we are consid-
ering, then no concept which occurs in arithmetic
has any meaning outside arithmetic or other than
an arithmetical application. This is not, of course,
true; and it is for this reason that the ordinary
"linear 55 method of developing mathematical sys-
tems can work so well. These initial notions really
would be and usually are clear before one un-

OUR COMMON WORLD 105

derstands just what the system is to develop, be-
cause these concepts have an application and a
meaning outside arithmetic. But suppose this were
not the case; would it then be true that all the
concepts of the system must remain forever mean-
ingless? I think we can see that this would not
be so,

In the first place, we may remark that there
are entirely different sets of undefined concepts
which would serve equally well as a basis. It is
quite generally true that the same deductive sys-
tem can be developed in a number of different
ways, the only limit to this number of alternative
developments being the practical difficulty of find-
ing alternative sets of initial notions which are
sufficiently clear and are economical as to the
number of required postulates. If we take two
different sets of undefined ideas (and of corre-
spondingly different assumptions in terms of
them) from which the same system may be devel-
oped, then all the undefined ideas of the one set
may be defined in the other; they are defined in
terms of ideas which, in the other case, they them-
selves serve to define. In other words, we can enter
into the complex network of mathematical mean-
ings in a number of different ways, from different
points of departure.

Since this is so, it is quite obvious that there is
no inherent simplicity in either set of undefined
ideas, and that the comparison of terms to points

106 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

in a spatial pattern, and of definitions to the
tracing out of such patterns of relationship, is
much more apt than that other metaphor which
represents logical analysis as physical dissection.
If the undefined idea is "simple" and the predicate
which defines it "a complex," then what is to be
taken as simple and what as complex, is merely
a matter of convenience and in no wise a logical
necessity.

Furthermore, some of the undefined notions in
any deductive development of a mathematical sys-
tem are pretty sure to be relations or "opera-
tions." There is the same possibility of choice here
that there is for the "substantive" notions. That
is to say, relations are not necessarily defined by
relations of relations but in a manner essentially
the same as substantive terms. The supposition on
which our critic charges our conception with re-
quiring either an infinite regress or some absolute
end-terms, is a natural one but quite erroneous.
It is based upon the false analogy of logical to
physical analysis. To discuss the logic of relations
and of substantives so as to disclose general prin-
ciples in precise language, would take us too far
afield. Briefly, we may observe that it is as easy
to define relations by the terms they connect as
to define substantive terms by other substantives
related to them. There is a certain analogy here
to the fact that lines may be defined by the points
they connect or points defined by the intersection

OUR COMMON WORLD 107

If it should be said that this range of choice
amongst the concepts of mathematics is due to the
fact that all mathematical concepts are complex,
and that every mathematical system presumes no-
tions of a more fundamental sort which are used
in it without explicit mention, then we may point
out that in "Principia Mathematical 3 where aU
the concepts of mathematics are defined or ana-
lyzed, they are generated from the basis of con-
cepts of logic ; and that the deductive development
of logic itself presents exactly the same picture
as here outlined. There is here the same range of
choice as to undefined notions and postulates. In
fact, the most economical development of logic
yet discovered requiring only three symbolic
postulates is in terms of an undefined idea so
unob\ious that most people misinterpret it until
they see precisely how it is related to other notions
in the development based upon it.

Now mathematical systems are by far the most
extended and exact examples of logical analysis
that we have. All such examples illustrate the
fact that there is no such tiling as intrinsic sim-
plicity or indefinability. All meaning is relational.
Deductive order is, to a considerable extent, a
matter of choice and is, in fact, usually determined
by practical considerations of economy of assump-
tion and the like. The mathematician does not
choose his undefined ideas with any thought that
they must be better understood than those which

108 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

he intends to define, any more than he chooses his
initial postulates in terms of them on the ground
that these assumptions will be readily agreed to
while the theorems he intends to prove might not.
Often, in fact, the mathematician does not tell us
explicifclv what things he is talking about but
assumes "A class K of terms a, 6, c, * . . and a
relation R or an operation such that . . , ," and
leaves it to the postulated relations and the de-
velopment of the system itself to identify his
meanings* In general the theorems are no more
"proved true 55 by the postulates than the postu-
lates are by the fact that they lead to the theo-
rems, and the terms defined are no more made
clear by their definitions than the undefined terms
are by the definitions into which they enter. What
is, in fact, essentially demonstrated in a deductive
system is the total fact of the order and connected-
ness which is exhibited by the system as a whole.
Even if the undefined ideas do happen to be clear
initially, while those defined are not, nevertheless
the development of the system serves to enrich and
explicate those original meanings. The signifi-
cance of the original notions is made clear by the
relationships into which they enter, much as the
significance of an hypothesis is increasingly ob-
vious in any considerable survey of its conse-
quences.

To bring this discussion back to its connection
with the earlier point: If the mathematical sys-

OUR COMMON WORLD 109

tern were a closed field, then the originally unde-
fined concepts would of necessity possess the whole
of their meaning in the extended order and inter-
relationships of the system itself* The concepts of
a particular mathematical system do not, of
course, represent such a closed field. But the field
of our concepts altogether is, and must be, closed
in this sense. It is this fact which has been re-
ferred to as the inevitable eventual circularity of
definition and illustrated by the example of the
ideal dictionary. Relations, we may further note,
would be defined in such a dictionary as well as
substantives. The conceptual meaning of terms is
to be found in the array of their definitive or de-
ductive relations to one another. That the rela-
tions themselves are definable, does not lead to any
regress.

Very likely it will be urged that, so far, I have
ignored the large and important part which is
played in the identification of meanings by the
common reality which is presented. I have so far
ignored it for the reason obvious to the reader, I
hope that this "common reality 55 is precisely one
of the things which needs to be accounted for, in
the face of the fact that we cannot reasonably
suppose that presented or immediate experience is
actually common to the degree that reality is.

Meanings are identified by the relational pat-
terns which speech and behavior in general are
capable of conveying. The sensuous content of

110 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

experience in one mind cannot be conveyed to an-
other, but the characteristic order of some set of
items in the experience of A can be identified by
B as belonging exclusively to some set of things in
his own experience. The presence of like interests,
if such may be presumed, will narrow the field
within which search for such conceptual identity
of order is to be made, and assist identification.
Most such identifications of meaning will, of
course, be based upon previous identification of
other and related meanings. But the higher the
order of intelligence, the greater the capacity to
identify concepts simply and directly by their
logical structure. A mathematician, for example,
confronted by a system in entirely novel notation
or in a language strange to him, might identify
it in just this way. The complex numbers he
might say are the only things in mathematics
which have just that type of order. It is thus that
we may imagine that intelligent Martians might
catch our meaning in sending successively larger
numbers of light-flashes. It is in such fashion
that the meaning concealed in a cipher is finally
disclosed by finding that rule which turns it into
something which makes sense.

In general, we are able to understand one an-
other because for one reason a common real-
ity is presented to us. But so to put it is to re-
verse the order of knowledge. We have a common
reality because or in so far as we are able to

OUR COMMON WORLD 111

identify, each in his own experience, those sys-
tems of orderly relation indicated by behavior, and
particularly by that part of behavior which serves
the ends of cooperation. What this primarily re-
quires is that, in general, we be able to discrimi-
nate and relate as others do, when confronted by
the same situation.

Although different individuals may, and to a
certain extent verifiably do, intuite tilings differ-
ently, still the basic discriminations which one can
make can also be made by another. Especially
those distinctions and relations which concern our
major purposes and hence are such as it is prac-
tically most important for us to discern in our ad-
justment of behavior to environment, will be made
by different individuals in comparable ways. Or
to put it the other way about, we are "like crea-
tures" and capable of understanding one another
if, regardless of the sense-quality of what we in-
tuite, we make the major discriminations and rela-
tions concerned by the adjustment of behavior to
environment in comparable ways.

The "common reality" projected by such un-
derstanding of each other is, to an extent not usu-
ally remarked, a social achievement. It triumphs
over a good deal of verifiable difference in the
power of individuals to discriminate and relate in
the presence of the same situation. The need to
cooperate is always there. This being so, the im-
portance of those concepts which are framed in

112 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

terms of distinctions and relations which are com-
mon, is enhanced, and of those which should be in
terms of what some only can discriminate, is di-
minished. If these distinctions which only some
can make directly in the content of their experi-
ence, do not concern what is important for behavior
adjustment, then very likely no socially current
concept will be framed in terms of them. There
will be no language to describe these personal and
peculiar phases of experience. And remembering
how largely our thought is informed by social re-
lationships it is likely that these phases of ex-
perience will largely pass unnoticed by the indi-
vidual himself. Again, even if they are noted, their
significance will be regarded as "subjective"
rather than of objective reality.*

However, if, or in so far as, those distinctions
and relations which can be made by some only are

*In the end, the supposition of a difference in immediate experi-
ence which is not to be detected through divergence in discrimination
and relation, is a notion very difficult to handle. Because such dif-
ference would, ex hypothesi 9 be ineffable. We can have no language
for discussing what no language or behavior could discriminate. And
a difference which no language or behavior could convey is, for pur-
poses of communication., as good as non-existent. But this considera-
tion only serves to enforce the fact that the assumption of qualita-
tively identical immediate experience is unnecessary for community
of knowledge that it is germane at all only so far as it affects that
pattern of relationships here called the concept.

The only reason that the possibility of such ineffable individual
difference of immediacy is not altogether meaningless, is that we have
interests which pass beyond those of cognition. Interests such as
those of appreciation, sympathy, love, concern the absolute identity
and quality as immediate of other experience than our own. Esthetics,
ethics, and religion are concerned with such interests, which tran-
scend those of action and of knowledge, as that term has here been
used.

OUR COMMON WORLD 113

important for survival or for the behavior-ad-
justment required for the satisfaction of impor-
tant needs, then like the blind man following his
companion who sees we shall interpret "reality"
in terms of the more differentiated experience of
the better discriminator. Others will attach to con-
cepts so framed some indirect meaning in terms
of other aspects of their own experience; if in no
other way, then in terms of the observed behavior
of other persons.

That we like-minded creatures have presented
to us a common reality might seem to be, like the
preestablished harmony of Leibnitz, simply a ma-
jor miracle which must be accepted as a fact,
whether we forthwith hypostatize that fact as "in-
dependent reality" or not. But this miracle is in
some part only the result of looking at the situa-
tion wrong way to. We do not expect to have a
common reality with an insect or an imbecile.
"Like-mindedness" consists primarily of three
things; the possession of like needs and of like
modes of behavior in satisfying them, second, the
possession of common concepts, represented in be-
havior by discrimination and relation, and third,
the capacity (evoked particularly when commu-
nity in the other two respects threatens to fail)
of transcending our individual limitations of dis-
crimination by indirect methods. This last is a
considerable item in what is meant by "intelli-
gence." In short, the power to attain, directly or

114 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

indirectly, to common concepts, applicable in com-
mon ways, is itself the criterion of like-minded-
ness. Such like-mindedness requires either a con-
siderable community of order directly identifiable
in experience or a considerable degree of intelli-
gence by which disparity in the first respect may
be compensated for. A Martian might be like-
minded with ourselves in spite of quite different
immediate experience. But, if so, he must be very
intelligent. And such like-mindedness is pre-
requisite to having a reality in common.

When we remember that amongst "normal" in-
dividuals there is very considerable variation in
the acuity of perception, revealed in individual
differences of discrimination, and when we remem-
ber how plausible it is that other individual dif-
ferences in presented experience exist but escape
notice because of their small importance to our
major needs, or because we learn our conceptual
interpretations largely through imitation and co-
operation, it becomes evident that the significance
of the above considerations is by no means con-
fined to the situation as between "normal" and
"def ective" perceivers.

The eliciting of "reality" from that presented
experience in which the subjective and the ob-
jective are jumbled up together, is an achieve-
ment of intelligence expressed in our categorial
distinctions. Our common reality reflects our com-
mon categories. But it is both unnecessary and

OUR COMMON WORLD 115

implausible to assume this fundamental commu-
nity to be simply ready-made and miraculous. It
seems much more reasonable to allow that this
major outline of common reality reflects, in some
degree, our common needs, our social organization
for fulfilling them, and our learning from social
example. Thus even our common categories may
be, in part, a social achievement of like-minded-
ness. The sharing of a common "reality" is, in
some part, the aim and the result of social cooper-
ation, not an initial social datum, prerequisite to
common knowledge.

To sum up, then: The purely conceptual ele-
ment in knowledge is, psychologically, an abstrac-
tion. It is a pattern of relation which, in the in-
dividual mind, is conjoined with some definite
complex of sense qualia which is the referent or
denotation of this concept and the clue to its ap-
plication in presented experience. These two to-
gether, the concept and its sensory correlate,
constitute some total meaning or idea for the indi-
vidual mind. As between different minds, the
assumption that a concept which is common is cor-
related with sensory contents which are qualita-
tively identical, is to an extent verifiably false, is
implausible to a further extent, and in the nature
of the case can never be verified as holding even
when it may reasonably be presumed. Neverthe-
less, community of meaning is secured if each dis-
cover, within his own experience, that complex of

116 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

content which this common concept will fit. When
the behavior of each, guided by this common con-
cept, is comparable or congruous, we have, so far,
a reality in common. The traditional argument of
the skeptic, that knowledge or the communication
of ideas is dubious or impossible in the light of
the subjectivity of sense, is without valid foun-
dation. That our possession of any considerable
array of common concepts depends upon the pres-
ence to our minds of a common reality is or
should be a commonplace. But both our com-
mon concepts and our common reality are in part
a social achievement, directed by the community
of needs and interests and fostered in the interest
of cooperation. Even our categories may be, to a
degree, such social products; and so far as the
dichotomy of subjective and objective is governed
by consideration of community, reality itself re-
flects criteria which are social in their nature.

CHAPTER V
THE KNOWLEDGE OF OBJECTS

We have so far taken the clue of common
meaning of what can be conveyed from one
mind to another as the criterion of the concept.
But, as has been noted, this was in part merely
an expository device. However much our concepts
are shaped by social intercourse and borrowed
ready-made by the individual, a human being
without fellows (if such can be imagined) "would
still frame concepts In terms of the relation be-
tween his own behavior and his environment.
Knowledge must always concern principally the
relations which obtain between one experience and
another, particularly those relations into which
the knower himself may enter as an active factor.
It is the given as thus conceptually interpreted
which is envisaged as the real object.

It is also true that exclusive emphasis upon the
social, or the talcing of language as a point of
departure, might easily lead to an oversimplifica-
tion of our notions of conceptual interpretation.
TVords represent rather large and ready-made
wholes relatively stable and relatively simple
concepts which are a somewhat loose fit for the
precise and complex knowledge of perceived ob-

117

118 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

jects. In a glance of the eye, so to speak, we ap-
prehend what whole paragraphs will do no more
than suggest. Language is primarily useful for
conveying generalizations or else very specific ab-
stracted items of experience. Not only is that
knowledge of an object which is mediated by per-
ception something which is usually difficult to con-
vey precisely in words but usually it is not im-
portant to convey it in more than very partial
fashion, since those who are required to act di-
rectly toward what is presented to us are usually
those who are also present to it themselves.

In fact, this difference between what words con-
vey and what perception mediates is so marlfed
that it may suggest a distinction of two kinds of
knowledge; direct knowledge of objects (ac-
quaintance with), gained by the presentation of
them in experience and immediately verifiable, and
propositional knowledge or generalization (knowl-
edge about) which concerns more than can be
given at one time and thus requires some mental
synthesis of what is temporally disjoined*

Such a dichotomy, however, would be falsely
taken. It is the first thesis of this chapter that
there is no knowledge merely by acquaintance;
that knowledge always transcends the immedi-
ately given. The merely contemplated or enjoyed
may possess esthetic significance, but if it is to have
cognitive meaning this immediacy must become
the subject of an interpretation which transcends

THE KNOWLEDGE OF OBJECTS 119

it; we must take toward the given some attitude
which serves practical action and relates it to what
is not given. Let us first briefly illustrate the na-
ture of such conceptual interpretation. We may
then turn to the special problems which are in-
volved.

At the moment, a certain "that" which I can
only describe (in terms of concepts) as a round,
ruddy, tangy-smelling somewhat, means to me
"edible apple. 55 Now my ultimate purpose toward
it may be the enjoyment of an ineffable taste. But
that taste not being given, I need a conceptual go-
cart to get me over the interval between this
round, ruddy presentation and the end projected
by my purpose. Life is full of such undesirable
interstices; in fact just so far as it needs to be
earnest and active, it is made up of them. It is the
function of mind to bridge these by assigning to
the present given an interpretation through which
it becomes related to, or a sign of, a correlation
between certain behavior of my own and the real-
ization of my purpose. This interpretation has
the character of a generalization which has been
learned. I phrase it by saying "That (denoting
the given presentation) is a sweet apple (con-
noting among other things the possible taste)** 5
If I should be completely absorbed in the first
given, as an infant might, then I should frame no
concept, it would have no meaning, and no action,
unless a merely instinctive one, would be evoked.

120 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

An object such as an apple Is never given; be-
tween the real apple in all its complexity and this
fragmentary presentation, lies that interval which
only interpretation can bridge. The "objectivity"
of this experience means the *verifiability of a fur-
ther possible experience which is attributed by this
interpretation.

The notion that there is a simple sort of knowl-
edge, gained by direct apprehension alone, has
two major sources. In the first place it is falsely
supposed that there are some concepts at least
which denote "simple qualities" something which
can be directly exhibited in a single experience.
And second, the word "knowledge" is sometimes
used for that enjoyment or contemplation which
projects no purposes but is completely absorbed
in the given as an esthetic object. (Whether there
are any experiences which have exclusively this
character is open to doubt, but at least experi-
ence may have this ingredient or this aspect.)
Putting these two together, it is easy to arrive at
the erroneous conclusion that there is a kind of
cognitive apprehension of simple qualities or es-
sences which terminates directly in the given ; it
may even be supposed that other knowledge rises
out of this by some kind of complication and thus
that direct awareness is the simplest and the basic
type of knowledge.

That there is direct apprehension of the imme-
diate, it would be absurd to deny ; but confusion is

THE KNOWLEDGE OF OBJECTS 121

likely to arise if we call it "knowledge." There are
no "simple qualities 5 ' which are named by any
name ; there is no concept the denotation of which
does not extend beyond the immediately given, and
beyond what could be immediately given. And
without concepts, there is no knowledge.

There are recognizable qualitative characters
of the given, which may be repeated in different
experiences, and are thus a sort of universals; I
call these "qualia." But although such qualia are
universals, in the sense of being recognized from
one to another experience, they must be distin-
guished from the properties of objects. Confusion
of these two is characteristic of many historical
conceptions, as well as of current essence-theories.
The quale is directly intuited, given, and is not
the subject of any possible error because it is
purely subjective. The property of an object is
objective ; the ascription of it is a judgment which
may be mistaken; and what the predication of it
asserts is something which transcends what could
be given in any single experience.

Consider such a property as "round" or "blue."
The real roundness of the real penny is seen as all
degrees of elliptical appearance; the blueness of
the blotter may be seen as any one of a whole
range of color-qualia, depending on the illumina-
tion. The judgment that the penny is round may
be made because it "looks round" or it may be
made because, under given conditions which are

122 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

understood, it "looks elliptical." But the given-
ness of the appearance is not the givenness of ob-
jective roundness. Given the elliptical appearance,
the judgment "That is round/ 5 may be in error.
Indeed, given the round appearance, the judg-
ment may still be in error, as measurement with
precision instruments might reveal. A thing which
looks blue under a certain light may be blue or it
may be green, and a thing that looks green or
purple may be blue. A penny run over by a rail-
road train will look round when held at a certain
angle, while one which looks elliptical may be
round. In other words, the same quale may be, for
a correct interpretation, the sign of different ob-
jective properties and different qualia may be the
sign of the same objective property.

The confusion of the quale and the objective
property has doubtless come about through a
short-cut in the use of language which is charac-
teristic of common-sense. A thing is said to *%ok
round" when it presents the quale which a really
round object does when held at right angles to the
line of vision; and a thing is said to "look blue"
when it looks the way a really blue thing does un-
der usual or standard illumination. In general,
the name of the property is also assigned to the
appearance of it under certain optimum condi-
tions. The round penny looks round when held
at that angle at which judgment of actual shape
from visual appearance is safest. And an object

THE KNOWLEDGE OF OBJECTS 123

looks the color that it is under that illumination
which is conducive to accurate color discrimina-
tion. A thing looks as big as it is at about that
distance (for objects of its size) at which human
beings make fewest mistakes in judgments of
magnitude. This use of language has its obvious
practical motives, but it would be an extraordi-
narily poor observer who should suppose that
what the name means in ordinary parlance is the
appearance as such and not the objective prop-
erty.

It is not, of course, a philosophic problem to de-
termine how such language should properly be
used. But it is worth remarking that those philoso-
phers who suppose that the names of properties
are first the names of certain given qualia and
therefore of the properties of objects which, un-
der optimum conditions, present them, have
missed something significant which determine the
common-sense use of language.

Qualia are universals, and they are universals
such that without the recognition of them by the
individual nothing presented in experience could
be named or understood or known at all. At this
point it would be very easy to fall into con-
troversy about the use of language which above
all things I wish to avoid. Whether one should say
that there must be concepts of qualia because they
are recognized, or no concepts of qualia because
they are ineffable; whether the immediate appre-

MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

hension of qualia should be called "knowledge"
because of its function in the cognition of objects,
or should not be called "knowledge" because it
neither needs nor can have any verification;
whether this direct awareness should be merely so
designated or should be termed a "judgment" all
this has to do only with the meaning of the terms
"concept," "knowledge," "judgment." What I
wish to point out is the real and important dis-
tinction between qualia and the immediate aware-
ness of them on the one hand and the properties
of objects and our knowledge of them on the other.
Qualia are subjective; they have no names in
ordinary discourse but are indicated by some cir-
cumlocution such as "looks like"; they are in-
effable, since they might be different in two minds
with no possibility of discovering that fact and
no necessary inconvenience to our knowledge of
objects or their properties. All that can be done
to designate a quale is, so to speak, to locate it in
experience, that is, to designate the conditions of
its recurrence or other relations of it. Such loca-
tion does not touch the quale itself; if one such
could be lifted out of the network of its relations,
in the total experience of the individual, and re-
placed by another, no social interest or interest of
action would be affected by such substitution.
What is essential for understanding and for com-
munication is not the quale as such but that pat-
tern of its stable relations in experience which is

THE KNOWLEDGE OF OBJECTS 125

what is implicitly predicated when it is taken as
the sign of an objective property.

Apprehension of the presented quale, heing im-
mediate, stands in no need of verification ; it is im-
possible to be mistaken about it. Awareness of it
is not judgment in any sense in which judgment
may be verified; it is not knowledge in any sense
in which "knowledge 35 connotes the opposite of
error. It may be said that the recognition of the
quale is a judgment of the type, "This is the same
ineffable 'yellow* that I saw yesterday." At the
risk of being boresome, I must point out that
there is room for subtle confusion in interpreting
the meaning of such a statement. If what is meant
by predicating sameness of the quale today and
yesterday should be the immediate comparison of
the given with a memory image, then certainly
there is such comparison and it may be called
"judgment" if one choose; all I would point out
is that, like the awareness of a single presented
quale, such comparison is immediate and indubita-
ble; verification would have no meaning with re-
spect to it. If anyone should suppose that such
direct comparison is what is generally meant by
judgments of qualitative identity between some-
thing experienced yesterday and something pre-
sented now, then obviously he would have a very
poor notion of the complexity of memory as a
means of knowledge. He might be advised to try
buying a spool of thread to match something left

126 MEND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

at home. The usual statement, "This is the same
yellow I saw yesterday, 35 truly represents a judg-
ment because at least one of the things compared
is an objective reality a temporally continuing
entity which retains its identity and character.
This meaning is something which could be veri-
fied, under conditions which are conducive to the
permanence of color, by going back to the object
seen yesterday, or in some other, and perhaps in-
direct, fashion. The judgment is about an ob-
jective property of a thing. To suppose that a
quale itself is such an enduring entity is to work
confusion between what is immediate and some-
thing else which, from the point of view of knowl-
edge, is an intellectual construction of a highly
complex sort.*

An immediate quale apart from some relational
context which "locates" it in experience is intrin-

J*Immediate comparisons are presumably very important in deter-
minations of value. Such determinations of better and worse, as be-
tween immediately presented qualia such as two pleasures or pains,
conjointly experienced, are often called "value-judgments.** Such
comparison is doubtless indispensable to determination of value,
but, here as elsewhere, judgment, in the ordinary sense, does not
concern the immediately presented as such or for its own sake, but
the enduring value of something objective to which this immediate
comparison may be a clue. Here as elsewhere, the immediate com-
parison is indubitable and verification has no meaning for it; what
needs to be verified and is worth judging is the permanent quality of
some object, or type of objects, or some permanent possibilitv of
value-experience. *

It may be further noted that it is this confusion of subjective and
objective, referred to in the text above, which almost inevitably re-
^ te th mte Pokt>? of a "sensum" between the subject and
the object. If a sensum has character which endures and can be

3fm nM^ ?J^ F " not noticed '." the * a ^rge part of the
problem of knowledge concerns our veridical apprehension of sensa;
the supposition that they simply are in mind or identical with the

THE KNOWLEDGE OF OBJECTS 127

sically and absolutely inarticulate. It is inarticu-
late not only in the sense that it cannot be ex-
pressed to another; it would be impossible for it
to be abstracted and envisaged as an object of our
own thought. Imagine a man to suffer all his life
from toothache, but in such wise that no pres-
sure on the jaw, no change of temperature or of
the heart-beat, no behavior of himself or difference
of surroundings would ever alter it. Not only
would a person so afflicted be unaware that he suf-
fered toothache it would not in fact be a tooth-
ache; he could not even become conscious of the
ache as a distinct fact of his experience* He would
be aware of it as the cow is aware of hunger, per-
haps, but it would never become for him an ex-
plicit object of thought. Such an all-pervasive

content of awareness is incompatible with the possibility of erroneous
judgment of their enduring and objective character.

Also, it may be said that the statement St This is the same yellow
that I saw yesterday" has meaning in a sense which does not have to
do with the objective quality of a physical thing. I believe this is cor-
rect; it may intend the assertion of the qualitative identity of two
psychological states. But the statement with this meaning is significant
only in the same sense in which it is verifiable; that is, on the assump-
tion that psychological states are events which modify a substantive
thing, the mind, and that this enduring mind is an organized reality
in which, as in physical things, events are later verifiable by the
effects which they produce. TVhat is not "thing" or objective, in
terms of our knowledge of the physical, may be something objective
in the categories of psychology, Qualia as presentations of external
reality and qualia as states of a mind are quite different matters. In
both cases, they are presentations of objects quite different objects
because the relational context into which the presentation is brought
in being understood is quite different in the two cases. In the one
case, they are presentations of an external reality, a physical thing
or property; In the other, they are presentations of a psychic reality,
a mind. In no case are they objective or the object of knowledge
apart from a relational context of conceptual interpretation. And in
all cases, the judgment or knowledge is about what is objective.

128 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

ingredient of experience could never become ar-
ticulate, because it would lack the ground of any
possible discrimination and relation. No language
could express it ; there would be no thinking to be
done about it; there would be no possibility of
bounding it or eliciting it as a separate fact. For
the person in question, it would be a part of his
life or a coloring of reality but no part of his
knowledge. The concept of a toothache does not
consist of the ache but broadly speaking in the
apprehension of what brought it on and the
formula for getting rid of it. AH that is intel-
ligible about it is the set of relations in which it
stands.

There are no concepts of immediate qualia as
such not because the word "concept" as here
used has any unnecessary connotation of the ver-
bal, but because articulation is the setting of
bounds and establishing of connections; because
what does not affect discrimination and relation
has no handle by which the mind can take hold
of it. It would be erroneous to take this fact to
mean some positive bafflement in the presence of
the immediate, because there is here no question
we can ask which fails to find an answer ; there is
no interest which is baffled. The interest of knowl-
edge is for action, and action proceeds by way of
relation.

If, then, we take "simple ideas" such as "blue"
and "round" as, so to speak, the least concepts

THE KNOWLEDGE OF OBJECTS 129

that there are, we find that what such concepts
embrace Is not an immediate quale as such but
some stable pattern of relations. We have con-
cepts of objective properties these are indicated
by the manner in which we should proceed to
verify the blueness of the blue blotter or the
roundness of the penny. The manner in which such
verification must take place is obvious. To verify
a shape, we walk around the object or manipulate
it. Its successive perspectives and their relation
to our behavior meanwhile, must present a cer-
tain order of temporal relationships. If it is a
small object, we may corroborate the visual by
tactile and kinesthetic impressions. If a large one,
we may measure it. Feeling the roundness of a
marble as we roll it between thumb and fingers,
or measuring a house, is again a temporally ex-
tended and ordered relation of apprehended
qualia. To verify a color, we change the condi-
tions of illumination or alter the angle so as to
get rid of the sheen, or we bring the thing into
juxtaposition with some object whose color has
previously been tested or is accepted as a stan-
dard of comparison. When we thus manipulate the
object or behave toward it, we must know what we
expect if it really is round or blue, or what not.
If what is thus predicted does not supervene, then
our first ascription of the objective property will
be withdrawn as proven false* The objective real-
ity of the property consists, of course, from the

130 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

point of view of knowledge, of what would verify
It, and includes everything the failure of which
would lead to the withdrawal of the judgment as
mistaken. The concept of the blueness or round-
ness of an object which is presented includes all
that is essential to the truth of the predication of
the property. Thus what constitutes the existence
of an objective property and the applicability of
a concept even of the simplest sort is not a
given quale alone but an ordered relation of dif-
ferent qualia, relative to different conditions or
behavior* This pattern or order, which is what the
adjective names, will always be temporally ex-
tended (which is the same as to say that the predi-
cation of the property is something verifiable) ,
and always it will have relation to our own possible
ways of acting toward the presented object.

If then, one approach the problem of our
knowledge of objects as many have done and do
with the notion that the object is "known as"
some complex of presented or presentable quali-
ties, and is thus analyzable into "simple" quali-
ties which are capable of being presented and
identified in a momentary experience and are es-
sences or the denotation of certain simple con-
cepts, I hope the nature of his error will be clear.
If concepts are to be articulate and meaningful,
then the application of them must be something
verifiable; which means that what they denote
must have a temporal spread. Not a momentary

THE KNOWLEDGE OF OBJECTS 131

presented quale but an ordered relationship of
such, is the least that can be meaningfully named.
The predication of a property on the basis of
momentarily presented experience, is in the na-
ture of an hypothesis, which predicts something
definitely specifiable in further possible experi-
ence, and something which such experience may
corroborate or falsify. The identifiable character
of presented qualia is necessary to the predication
of objective properties and to the recognition of
objects, but it is not sufficient for the verification
of what such predication and recognition im-
plicitly assert, both because what is thus asserted
transcends the given and has the significance of
the prediction of further possible experience, and
because the same property may be validly predi-
cated on the basis of different presented qualia,
and different properties may be signalized by the
same presented quale, If the denotation of any
concept were an immediately apprehensible quale
or complex of such, then the ascription of this
concept when such qualia were presented could
not conceivably be in error. That the predication
of a property may be mistaken, or the perception
of it illusory, corroborates the fact that what is
involved in the cognition of the property tran-
scends the given. One cannot be mistaken about
the content of an immediate awareness. If I have
bitten an apple, I cannot be mistaken about the
taste in my mouth. But I may conceivably fall

132 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

into error in predicating sweetness of the apple or
expecting a similar taste from another bite. The
only sense in which apprehension could be illusory
or erroneous is just this sense of including a mean-
ing which is not given but is added to the given
and must be verified, if at all, in some other ex-
perience.

It is evident that the considerations here
brought forward with reference to the knowledge
of objective properties will hold for the knowl-
edge of objects in general* Knowledge always
transcends the immediately given. It begins with
the recognition of a qualitatively specific presen-
tation, but even that mmimum of cognition which
consists in naming is an interpretation which im-
plicitly asserts certain relations between the given
and further experience. The ascription of a sub-
stantive or an adjective is the hypothesis of some
sequence in possible experience or a multiplicity
of such sequences. The verifiability of such is es-
sential to the nature ascribed to the object in rec-
ognition, or even to the acceptance of this experi-
ence of it as presentation of the real. The cri-
terion of the objectivity of what is presented is
always such a relation to further experience. In
the nature of the case, the difference between
veridical perception and an experience which is
genuinely illusory (really deceptive to the indi-
vidual in question) is never to be discovered within
what is strictly given in the presentation. When

THE KNOWLEDGE OF OBJECTS 133

we distinguish one experience as illusory, another
as presentation of the real, we can intend noth-
ing even conceivably verifiable except that, start-
ing from the given experience and proceeding in
certain ways, we reach other experience which is
predictable in the one case and not in the other,
Thus "acquaintance with" tJie recognition of
what is presented as a real object of a certain
Jcindy has already the significance of prediction
and asserts the same general type of temporal
connection as our knowledge of Icew^ tlie "knot&l-
edge about" which is stated in generalizations.
This is merely to reiterate Berkeley's doctrine of
the "idea" as a sign, with the added thought that
what is contained within any one idea or presen-
tation is never more than a fragment of the na-
ture of the real object. The ascription of this
objectivity to the presentation is the conceptual
interpretation of what is presented.

On the other hand, that kind of knowledge
which may strike us as more truly conceptual
must always if it be knowledge of reality come
down to just such interconnectedness of experi-
ence and must be verifiable in the pattern of pre-
sented experiences. It is this which is affirmed in
the dictum of Charles Peirce: "Consider what ef-
fects that might conceivably have practical bear-
ings you conceive the objects of your conception
to have. Then, your conception of those effects is
the whole of your conception of the object." "Ef-

134 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

fects" which are verifiable can, in the end, mean
nothing more than actual or possible presenta-
tions.

The perceptual knowledge of an object is
neither the coincidence of mind and object in the
momentary experience nor any duplication of the
object in the mind. A presentation bespeaks the
activity of the mind, first, in that it means an ab-
straction and a setting of bounds within the total
field of the given. And second, the manner of this
abstraction already reflects a classification which
is the implicit prediction of further experience.
This excision of the presentation is its recogni-
tion as the appearance of a thing its classifica-
tion with other such presentations (of the same
kind of thing)* Such classification reflects a gen-
eralization from experience which predicts cer-
tain orderly and lawful connections of this presen-
tation with further experience. In the absence of
such implicit prediction, the presentation would
be meaningless. Thus the classification of what is
presented and the predicted relationship of it
with further experience are one and the same
thing* This implicit prediction is at once a gen-
eral principle and our concept of the object.

The concept, to be sure, is substantive or ad-
jectival, not prepositional, but the application of
the concept to the presentation is an interpreta-
tion of the same fundamental sort that proposi-
tions express. The validity of such application de-

.THE KNOWLEDGE OF OBJECTS 135

pends on the subsistence of those relations to other
experience which are implicit in the concept. It is
such propositions which we implicitly assert in
naming and recognizing, and do not think to ex-
press. They are the knowledge upon which all
other knowledge of reality is built.

We have knowledge of objects, then, not
through any coincidence of mind and object in
awareness but precisely so far as this is tran-
scended. The merely contemplated or enjoyed
may possess esthetic significance but it has no
cognitive meaning. The dictum of the new real-
ists, that mind and object coincide so far as the
object is just now known by this mind and so far
as the mind is just now a knowing of this ob-
ject, is as wrong as possible. So far as mind and
presentation coincide, the state of mind is not cog-
nition and the presented object Is not known.
Presentative theories of knowledge in general as
well as representative theories commit a similar
error.

For the object presented to be real, there must
be more to it than could be given in any single
experience. The objectivity of the experience Im-
plies this "more." And this cognitively signified
"more," which Is the meaning of the presentation,
must be verifiable. But what does it signify that
there should be verifiably more to any object than
is given in the single experience of it? It can mean
nothing else than the possibility of other expert-

136 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

ences, of a predictable sort, related to this experi-
ence in predictable ways. Any other kind of
"more" attached to the presentation would be un-
verifiable. If some will contend that there can be
any other kind of "more" to the object, they must
tell us how the existence of the unverifiable is to be
known.

To be sure, that "more" which is the verifiable
meaning of the presentation, and our concept of
the object, is normally not verified in any but the
most fragmentary fashion. When I interpret a
certain round ruddy presentation as "sweet ap-
ple/' I implicitly predict that if I should bite,
then I should get a certain taste. But perhaps I
am not hungry now, so I merely file away this
possibility for future reference. The "if " clause of
my prediction is allowed to remain contrary to
fact. Precisely here, in this apparently common-
place fact that the meanings ascribed in our rec-
ognition of objects and predications of properties
must be verifiable, yet are commonly not verified
or only verified in part, is something of great im-
portance both for understanding the relation of
knowledge to our ways of acting and for the na-
ture of objectivity or thinghood.

A mind for which, whatever happened, nothing
could be done about it, could possess no knowl-
edge, either of generalizations or of objects. Not
only would knowledge in such a mind serve no pur-
pose, and thus be a genetic puzzle; it would not

THE KNOWLEDGE OF OBJECTS 137

exist at all. For the merely receptive and passive
mind, there could be no objects and no world.

A thing we may say as a first approximation
is a complex of properties or qualities, recog-
nizable by some uniformity of appearance ; a gen-
eralization or law designates some uniformity of
behavior. But, as we have seen, appearance and
behavior are not wholly separable. An appearance,
if it be that of a recognizable and nameable tiling,
and not merely some meaningless and indescrib-
able cross-section of the flux of experience, must
recur in predictable ways. It must be a subject
about which we can generalize. My desk-chair is
not a universal entity but a unique object ; in my
experience, however, and in that of the household,
it is a reliable uniformity. Every morning I find it
there before my desk. It is this recurrence, and a
hundred other trivial uniformities of its behavior
as a part of my experience, which constitute it a
thing. If we consider some even more stable object
say the vase on the mantel which stands always
in one place and exhibits no alteration whatever
that can be detected then, there would be no be-
havior which is ascribable to the object itself; it
does not change. But it is still because of its re-
currence, in a certain context, in my experience
that I recognize this presentation as a thing. That
change which constitutes the background within
which it persists as an identity, is a charge which
I ascribe to my own behavior, my comings and

138 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

goings. But it Is still true that if this recurrence
in experience did not conform to certain generali-
zations about the process or eventuation of ex-
perience, it would not be a thing but an illusion,
like the quite different object which I saw there
last night in my dream.

There may seem to be a fundamental categorial
distinction between what is thing, designatable by
a substantive, and what is transition, relation,
some connection of things which is designatable
only by a proposition and, when predictable, is
known as generalization or law. It is this dichot-
omy which, by being misunderstood, leads to the
false division of knowledge into immediate "ac-
quaintance with 55 and "knowledge about.' 5 We
might suppose that this dichotomy correlates with
the division of experience into what James called
"flights and perches." An appearance of a thing
is a kind of arrest; relation or the propositions!
signifies the flux. But this, I think we may see, is
false. Experience may be as full of flux as a trip
in a roller-coaster, but if it is a flight which is
repeatable under conditions which can be speci-
fied, it is the appearance of a thing. It is true that
thinghood connotes some stability and persistence,
while "law" designates some uniformity of change
or process* But the true basis of this dichotomy
is not the division into flights and perches in ex-
perience; it is the division between that part of
the faix of experience which I ascribe to myself

THE KNOWLEDGE OF OBJECTS 139

and m,y own activity r , and that change which can-
not be so predicated of myself and is objective.

Both thing and the change described by law be-
long to the objective world. The objective reality
of things is that uniformity I reach by a reorder-
ing of the actual process of experience so as to
subtract, or integrate out, "my own activity" ; ob-
jective change is that part of the process which
remains after such subtraction* That a thing is
always there in the objective world 3 does not mean
that it is always there in experience ; it means that
it is always there when I look for it in the right
place or in the right way. It means that its recur-
rence in experience in uniform ways relative to
my own action is predictable. "Looking for it 5 *
may, of course, mean a quite complex process and,
in certain types of cases, may reach the object
only indirectly; also the kind of "stability'* or
^^persistence** to be expected varies with the type
of object and may be highly complex. But at bot-
tom, when complications and qualifications have
been dealt with, thinghood means a stability or
uniformity of appearance which can be recovered
by certain actions of my own.

This distinction between objective change and
those transitions of experience which are not ob-
jective because attributable to myself, was first
pointed out by Kant. The order of positions of the
boat going down the stream is objective because
by nothing I can do is this order in experience to

140 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

be reversed. But the sides of the house are simul-
taneous and are merely partial presentations of
one stable and unchanging thing because the order
of their succession in experience is due to my own
action. It is obvious that we here confront a fun-
damental consideration of the utmost importance
for the analysis of the categories, for the distinc-
tion of self and external world and for the division
of the flux of experience into time and space. Into
these most difficult matters, we cannot go, but it
may be in point to observe the basic character of
the conception of "activity."

To ascribe an objective quality to a thing means
implicitly the prediction that if I act in certain
ways, specifiable experience will eventuate: if I
should bite this, it would taste sweet; if I should
pinch it, it would feel moderately soft ; if I should
eat it, it would digest and not poison me; if I
should turn it over, I should perceive another
rounded surface much like this ; if I should put it
on the scales, they would register about three
ounces. These and a hundred other such hypo-
thetical propositions constitute my knowledge of
the apple in my hand. These are the meaning which
this presentation 7ias to me now, but it may be
that neither now nor in the immediate future do
I actually verify these possibilities*

It is only because we are active beings that our
world is bigger than the content of our actual ex-
perience. For the active being, reality is as much

THE KNOWLEDGE OF OBJECTS 141

bigger than the content of given experience as is
measured by the totality of all that is related to
what is presented by those propositions of the type
"If I should . . * then . . ." which he takes to be
true- All that "more" which belongs to the objects
presented to him, over and above what is immedi-
ately given, and all the rest of reality, as it stands
related to his object but not presented with it, re-
sides in this potency of possible experience. For
the passive being, the only possible passage of ex-
perience is the actual one : the only continuities of
reality the only relations with any given would
be the actual flux of experience. No object would
be thicker than its presentation. And since all mo-
tive to that analysis which delimits the presenta-
tion would be lost in the lapsing of any manner of
relating it except to the actually antecedent and
consequent items of the given, the distinction of
the given field into presentation and background
would serve no purpose and would presumably fail
to be made. Thus for the passive being the whole
of reality would collapse into the actual proces-
sion of the given ; indeed it must collapse into the
specious present, since the objectivity of memory
and anticipation is a complex interpretation put
upon presented imagery, Even the "stream of
consciousness" itself is a highly conceptual con-
struction, requiring, amongst other items, the cat-
egory of objective time as the order of that change
which is irreversible by the "if" of any altered

MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

mode of action. For the passive being, there would
be no distinction of subjective and objective ; the
given would be both subject and object, and the
whole of both. Nothing would be verifiable save
what was presently verified, and hence nothing
would mean anything. There could be no distinc-
tion between real and illusory. Since nothing given
would transcend its givenness and there would be
no distinction of real from unreal, there would be
no reality.

The whole content of our knowledge of reality
is the truth of such "If then" propositions, in
which the hypothesis is something we conceive
could be made true by our mode of acting and the
consequent presents a content of experience which,
though not actual now and perhaps not to become
actual, is a possible experience connected with the
present. For the active being such hypothetical
propositions can be meaningful and true when the
hypothesis is false.* The attribution to what is
given of connection with such a content of further
possible experience is the conceptual interpreta-

*The significance of knowledge depends upon the significance of
possibility that is not actual. Possibility and impossibility hence
necessity and contingency, consistency and inconsistency, and various

other fundamental notions require that there should be "If

then " propositions whose truth or falsity is independent of the
truth or falsity of the condition stated in their antecedent clauses.
Those readers who happen to be familiar with my doctrine of "strict
implication" will find here a motive for the distinction of "strict"
from " material" implication and for other basic conceptions of the
system of "strict implication." A "material" implication represents
an "If then ** proposition the truth of which is not indepen-
dent of the truth of its antecedent clause.

THE KNOWLEDGE OF OBJECTS 143

tion of the presentation and our knowledge of the
object*

Furthermore, when we distinguish one experi-
ence as illusory, another as presentation of the
real, what we intend can be nothing other than
that those sequences of possible experience which
are implicitly predicted in the concept of the ob-
ject would fail to eventuate in the one case but
would be realized in the other. The difference be-
tween illusion and veridical perception is not in
the given experience (even though its failure to be
found there is due to our own inattentiveness or
other neglect to behave suitably to our interests) ,
else there is not really any illusion. Hence the
real-ity of any object is known, not by its being
presented simply, but by judgment or interpreta-
tion which is predictive.

Knowledge of objects, then, knowledge of the
real, involves always two elements, the element of
given and ineffable presentation, and the element
of conceptual interpretation which represents the
mind^s response. We might say that the concep^
tual is the formal element, of order or relation,
and the given is the material or content element.
But there are here two misunderstandings to be
guarded against.

First, the given is not formless in the sense of
being indefinite. One kind of defimteness which the
given has its qualitative specificity is too ob-
vious to need pointing out. Further, it is not form-

144 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

less in the sense that this qualitative and ineffable
character of it is indifferent for knowledge. If
there were no correlation in the individual mind
between the concept and particular qualia, then
no experience could be the signal of any particular
meaning. It is also to the point that the implicitly
predicted relationships, comprised in the concep-
tual interpretation of what is presented, must be
such that further possible experience could verify
or fail to verify them. Without the correlation of
concept and qualia, no experience could verify or
fail to verify anything. My presently given ex-
perience leads me to say that if I should move ten
feet to the left I should reach the wall. If the
visual presentation interpreted as "wall" were not
identifiable by its sensory qualities, or if stepping
and contact did not have this identifiable qualita-
tive specificity, then my statement could have no
meaning. For another person, the sensory qualia
which would be in point when he saw the wall from
this chair might be different from mine. But for
each of us, within his individual experience, if we
did not correlate certain concepts with certain
identifiable feelings, there could be no knowledge
of objects at all.

The intelligibility of experience consists pre-
cisely in this ; that between the specific quality of
what is given and the pattern of its context in
possible experience there is some degree of stable
correlation. So that the quality is due to the rela-

THE KNOWLEDGE OF OBJECTS 145

tions and the relational pattern is due to the qual-
ity. Such stable correlation is not a universally
discovered fact, all-pervasive in experience. (We
shall return to this topic in a later chapter.*) Ex-
perience is completely intelligible only in the sense
that every experience will exhibit some discover-
able correlation between presented quality and re-
lational context. So far as such correlation is a
fact, it is simply the miracle that an intelligible
world exists.

In saying that knowledge consists of the con-
ceptual element and only points or refers to the
given, there is no intent to deny that the eventual
significance of knowledge may be in the quality of
immediate experience. It is quite possible and
plausible that the direction of our action and the
ultimate significance of our attempts to know are
determined by the value-aspect of experience,
which is a dimension of, or derivative from, felt
quality. Knowledge may be, in general, a means
to some more valuable end which is not knowledge.
Indeed, so far as the nature of the goods of life
admits of any ultimate separation of means and
end, I should suppose this view to be correct-
Knowledge is pragmatic, utilitarian, and its value,
like that of the activity it immediately subserves,
is extrinsic. It has value as an end in itself only
so far as, in life, the activity is the goal, or at
least the two cannot be separated.

*See pp, 348-358.

146 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

Nor do I mean to assert that consciousness is
essentially relational, though I suspect this to be
the case. I assert only that it is relation which
constitutes that intelligibility which is essential to
knowledge. Whether consciousness of pure im-
mediacy without conceptual interpretation would
be below the level of awareness altogether, I hesi-
tate to judge. But if complete absorption in the
immediate is not equivalent to unconsciousness, at
least it is the bourne from which no traveller can
bring back any intelligible report.

As was suggested in Chapter II, the mystic and
the protagonist of "pure perception" will prob-
ably differ with the account here given primarily
by their insistence that such absorption in the in-
expressible immediate is the valuable end. They
tend to reserve the word "knowledge" for this re-
lation of the mind to the given which they thus
esteem it desirable to take. I reserve the word for
that which is articulate and verifiable, and has a
significant opposite, "error." So far, the difference
will be purely verbal. They would agree that ab-
sorption in the immediate transcends conceptual
thinking altogether. The further point, that con-
ceptual thinking, articulation, and the interests of
action go together, they would also admit. To the
mystic, negation of conceptual distinctions and
absorption in the immediate represent the desir-
able attitude because this solves of problems of
action, for his world-weariness, by negating them.

THE KNOWLEDGE OF OBJECTS 147

To say, "The identification of mind with the in-
effable object is the valid end," is the same as to
say, "The interests of action are nil"

The motive from which Bergson, who does not
thus extol the mystic experience, restricts theo-
retically true knowledge to C pure perception" in
which practical interests are transcended, is a mat-
ter which his writings do not make wholly clear.
Indeed I am minded to ask: What difference
would it make if his "scientific constructions" and
"interpretations in the interest of action 9 ' were re-
named "knowledge" and the object of them "real-
ity"; if his "intuition" and "pure perception"
were labelled "esthetic experience" and their ob-
ject "subjective immediacy"? Apart from some
moral or religious interest in setting intuition and
its object higher than science and the scientific
(and social) object, what point in this ascription
of "knowledge" and "reality" to pure intuition
and its object? For Bergson, the scientific (the
social and the common-sense) interpretation is,
theoretically considered, a misinterpretation made
in the interests of practice. But in what sense can
it be misinterpretation if, follow it however far,
one never reaches any undesirable denouement
which could be avoided by refraining? Since con-
ceptual interpretation serves the interests of ac-
tion, why this invidious denial to it of the term
"knowledge" unless action is essentially undesir-
able and its interests are a low sort?

148 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

He also thinks that conceptual interpretation
reveals its inadequacy in the end by disclosing its
internal inconsistency as well as its untruth to the
given. Tliis is the significance of his resuscitation
of Zeno's paradoses and of much else in "Time
and Free Will. 5 ' If he should mean by this that
prevailing scientific conceptions of time, space,
motion, etc. are defective and need to be re-
placed, many will agree with him. But if he means
as seems to be the case that no scientific con-
struction in the interests of action and social co-
operation can escape eventual inconsistency, then
it would appear to be implied that the interests
of action are themselves self-frustrating. If the
significance of conceptual interpretation lies in
action, then the significance of inconsistent inter-
pretation must be in self-defeating action. But if
Bergson should commit himself to the thesis that
practical action is essentially self-defeating, he
will indeed agree with the mystic. So far as his
objection is that scientific conception turns the
flight of pure duration into objects which are
static, it may be suggested that the mistake lies in
supposing that the object denoted by common-
sense and scientific concepts is thus static, instead
of something temporally extended and identified
as a certain predictable flux of experience.

It is a frequent criticism of the type of theory
here outlined that it cannot account for our
knowledge of the past. Knowledge, it is said, is

THE KNOWLEDGE OF OBJECTS 149

here identified with verification, and verification
comes about by some proceeding from the present
into the future* Thus the past, so far as it can be
known, is transformed into something present and
future, and we are presented with the alternatives,
equally impossible, that the past cannot be known
or that it really is not past.

Without a metaphysical analysis of temporal
categories it would be difficult to answer this criti-
cism completely. But I should like to present cer-
tain considerations which may be put forward
briefly.

The first of these is of a general sort which has
much wider application* The philosophic analysis
of any object or content of knowledge is not com-
pletely achieved by even an ideal epistemology.
The theory of knowledge, to be successful, must
disclose, for every major type of object, the ratio
cognoscendL But the achievement of an account
which should accomplish this would still not abol-
ish nor make superfluous analyses of other sorts,
directed to some different problem. In some one
of the innumerable meanings of the word "is" it
must be true that a thing is what it is "known as,"
identifiable with its ratio cognoscendi; but it is
also the effect of its causes, the cause of its effects,
the organized whole of its physical or other con-
stituents, and a hundred other significant things
besides. There has been some tendency in philoso-
phy since Kant, and perhaps particularly amongst

150 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

idealists, to attach to epistemological analyses a
kind of exclusive truth, but to do this is to com-
mit what Professor Perry has called "the fallacy
of initial predication." If, then, we assert that,
from the point of view of knowledge, the past is
so and so, this is not to deny to the past various
types of significance not included in such an epis-
temological account*

It may also be legitimate to observe that the
criticism in question would have greater weight if
in general those who urge it were prepared to tell
us how the past, which is really dead and gone,
can be known. Epistemological analyses of the
past, consistent with theories maintained, are con-
spicuous mainly by their absence. Those who do
not speak in the interest of such an alternative
account should not too hastily reject a theory
which at least begins with an obvious fact (the
verifiability of the past) because it affects them
with a feeling of paradox. Paradox is indeed a
danger-signal, but the trouble it signalizes may be
in the theory which appears paradoxical or it may
be in the relatively inchoate character of common
notions.

In general, the past is verifiable. We are prob-
ably safe in assuming that any satisfactory meta-
physics will hold that there could not be any item
of the past which is intrinsically unverifiable.
Knowledge of the past, like knowledge of any-
thing else, may be verified only in the present and

THE KNOWLEDGE OF OBJECTS 151

future. But if one suppose this to mean that a
past event, verifiable as being so and so by certain
present and future possible experiences, is thereby
transformed into something present or future, the
error he commits is in a failure to understand
what is involved, from the point of view of knowl-
edge, in assigning temporal locus to an object
known. We may remind ourselves of the example,
borrowed from Kant, of the permanent house and
the impermanent position of the boat in the
stream, both **known as 5 * certain types of sequence
in experience, fundamentally alike in their merely
temporal aspects. That a thing endures through
a given period is more or less completely verifi-
able. But if permanence of the thing were justi-
fiably predicated only of what is permanently ex-
perienced, there would be nothing permanent.

The assumption that the past is intrinsically
verifiable means that at any date after the hap-
pening of an event, there is always something,
which at least is conceivably possible of experi-
ence, by means of which it can be known. Let us
call these items its "effects.* 5 The totality of such
effects quite obviously constitute all of the object
that is knowable. To separate the effects from the
object is, thus, to transform it into some incog^
nizable ding an sich. We may then say, from a
certain point of view, that the event is spread
throughout all after time,* much as modern phys-

*We may neglect the question whether all events are intrinsically
predictable and, hence, extend through aH preceding time as well.

152 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

ics may say that the field of an electronic charge
is spread through all space and that this field is
the electron. That the field of a charge is the
charge and is throughout all space, does not abol-
ish the difference between a charge at one point
and a different charge at another; these are dif-
ferent ways of being throughout space, a different
totality of effects. Just so, the conception that an
event is spread throughout the time "after its
occurence" will not abolish the difference between
different events occurring at different times ; these
will be identifiable through a different totality of
effects. We must avoid the fallacy of simple loca-
tion* with respect to temporal as well as spatial
attributes. In so far as an event, or the existence
of a thing at a certain date, is intrinsically veri-
fiable, and is thus spread through all after time
in its effects, what cognition of it apprehends as
its presentation and what historical knowledge
proceeds to verify, is a part of its nature. Or it is
the "appearance" of the event at the time of this
verification, much as a presented surface may
be the appearance of a solid object. Events are
knowable "after they occur" because their ap-
pearances or effects are "there" at the later date
to be experienced.

For a satisfactory account, it would be essen-
tial to reveal, by analysis of experience, those pe-
culiar characteristics by which the pastness of a

*I borrow this phrase, of course, from Professor WMteheacL

THE KNOWLEDGE OF OBJECTS 153

thing is presently identified ; as would also a simi-
lar account of the categories "permanent" and
"future." But for present purposes it will be suf-
ficient to remark that obviously some kind of
identifiable marks in presented experience must
mean the pastness of the thing presented, since
otherwise the past event could not be distinguished
from the present. Doubtless one item would be a
certain kind of unalterability and unresponsive-
ness to desire and purpose in which respect what
is present or future would not be thus unalterable.
This character, like unalterability in general,
would be verified by proceeding from the present
into the future in certain ways. In any case the
past can be known if not completely, at least so
far as it can come in question for a theory of
knowledge and it can be known to be past.
Whatever it is by means of which past fact is
verified, it is something which is capable of pres-
ent and future experience. The past is known
through a correct interpretation of something
given, including certain given characters which
are the marks of pastness. If this be paradox,
then so much the worse for common-sense.

CHAPTER VI

THE RELATIVITY OP KNOWLEDGE

AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF

THE REAL

The history of philosophy since Descartes has
been largely shaped by acceptance of the alterna-
tives; either (1) knowledge is not relative to the
mind, or (2) the content of knowledge is not the
real, or (3) the real is dependent on mind.

Kant, and phenomenalism in general, recog-
nizes the relativity of knowledge, the dependence
of the phenomenal object on the mind, and hence
the impossibility of knowing the real as it is in
itself. Idealism, taking the relativity of knowl-
edge as its main premise, argues to the unquali-
fied dependence of reality upon mind by holding
the alternative that there is no valid knowledge
of the real to be logically impossible. Realists in
general seek to reconcile the possibility of know-
ing reality with its independence of the mind by
one or another attempt to escape the relativity of
knowledge.

However, the alternatives accepted are false
alternatives. This whole historical development,
so far as it turns upon them, is a mistake. There
is no contradiction between the relativity of knowl-

154

THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 155

edge and the independence o its object. If the
real object can be known at all, it can be known
only in its relation to a mind; and if the mind
were different the nature of the object as known
might well be different. Nevertheless the descrip-
tion of the object as known is true description of
an independent reality.

This sounds at first like unintelligible paradox.
But, as I shall hope to convince the reader, rela-
tivity of this sort, which is entirely compatible
with independence, is a commonplace, capable of
illustration for all sorts of relations which have
nothing directly to do with knowledge.

If this position can be successfully maintained,
then the fundamental premises of phenomenalism
and idealism fall to the ground, some of the main
difficulties posed by skepticism are met, and the
general attitude of common-sense realism can be
reinstated without attempting to do the impossible
and avoid the relativity of knowledge.

The question whether we know reality truly, is
often made to turn upon the relation between
presentation, or appearance, and the real object.
The assumption upon which Descartes set out
the assumption of the copy-theory is that knowl-
edge of the external world requires that the sense-
quale we apprehend should be identically present
in the object perceived and in the mind when we
perceive it. Perhaps, remembering the subtleties of
the critical realists, we ought to phrase this more

156 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

sharply : The validity of sense-perception does not
depend upon the numerical identity of, e. g. 9 blue
in the perceiving mind and blue in the object;
state of mind and property of the object may be
separate existences. But it is required that they
be identical in quality ; that the quality perceived
as blue be in the object just as it is perceived.
Failing this, the real object is a ding an sich, a
"something, I know not what."

That the sense-qualities as perceived are rela-
tive to the perceiver, and hence subjective only,
is an old thought. It goes back to Empedocles and
the Sophists, in the earliest theory of sense-per-
ception as something produced by the mingled
motions of the object and of the sense-organ. It
is the main root of ancient skepticism. The rea-
sons for It are pretty obvious and historically
have been well exploited. In the first place, there
are individual differences of perception, and dif-
ferences between our own perceptions under dif-
ferent circumstances. Second, there is the correla-
tion between differences of behavior power to
discriminate and compare with differences of the
receptor organs; from which we conclude a de-
pendence of sensory qualities upon the senses and
the nervous system. And third, there is the dis-
covery of physical phenomena, such as certain
wave-motions, closely analogous to the stimuli of
perception but not affecting human senses at all.
We have, then, good reasons to believe in the

THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 157

relativity o the quality of what is given, and the
limits o what can be given, to the nature and ca-
pacity of the perceiving subject. This being so,
can reality be given to us as it is in itself? Is this
relativity compatible with the truth of immediate
experience to its object?

Whether the character of the given is untrue
to reality in any other sense, it should first be
admitted that certainly it can be, at times, prac-
tically misleading. It can be the occasion of er-
rors of judgment. And the nature and limits of
the mind or sense-organs may be what gives rise
to such errors. If I eannot discriminate what you
discriminate, I may mistake one thing for an-
other in ways which you do not. In general, for
every discoverable peculiarity of the subject which
is reflected in the character of the presented as
such, there is some imaginable or actual mislead-
ing which can result from it. The qualia of the
given are the clue to the applicability or inap-
plicability of concepts, and set the limits of con-
ceptual interpretation. Wrong understanding may
be due to stupidity ; that fact does not here con-
cern us. But also it may be due to the nature of
the given. All illusory experience is thus mislead-
ing. If my poor vision does not enable me to detect
that one wall of the room is a mirror, or if I
merely fail to notice this, then I may walk into
the wall. Even if I do not thus put it to the test,
my perception leads me to predicate a possibility

158 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

of experience which does not in fact obtain. The
given, because of its character as given, means for
me an object which does not in fact exist. With
greater acuity of vision, I should have avoided
this error. The reason for it lies in the character
of presented experience, which is conditioned by
the limitations of my senses.

Entirely similar considerations apply in most
cases of illusion and in all cases of errors of per-
ception due to limitation or peculiarities of sense.
But we have so far told only half the story. Such
errors, we have said, are due to the character of
the given in the particular case. They are also
due to the conceptual interpretation which has
been put upon what is given. In fact they are due
directly to the conceptual interpretation and only
indirectly to the given experience*

The difference between veridical perception on
the one hand, and illusion and error on the other,
is not in the nature of what is given except so far
as this leads to the likelihood of an interpretation
which is invalid. Such interpretation has to do
with the relation between the presentation and
that further possible experience which our classi-
fying or recognizing or understanding of what
is presented implicitly predicts. When this pre-
dicted relation actually obtains, the presented ob-
ject is recognized for what it truly is. When it
does not, our understanding of the object is er-
roneous. Sometimes such mistake amounts to illu-

THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 159

sion ; sometimes not. But this is a comment on our
use of the term "illusion" rather than upon the
relation between presentation and the real. It de-
pends upon the degree and importance of our
failure to apprehend this relation to further ex-
perience, which in turn depends on the breadth
of our knowledge and various other circumstances
affecting our judgment*

Whether a mirror-image is illusory or veridical
depends on our previous experience of mirrors,
or upon the degree of attention which determines
whether we notice the frame, and so forth. A mir-
ror-image recognized as such, is veridical percep-
tion* When I take it for a thing which cas be
grasped by moving in the direction of the mir-
ror, it is illusion. If I recognize it as a mirror-
image but take it as the image of another person
when it is my own reflection, then we have a per-
fectly definite and commonplace experience which
is partly correct and partly erroneous what is
usually called a "mistake. 95 In these three cases,
what is given might be identical. Similarly if I
judge an object ten feet off to be a mile away, it
is illusion; but if I judge it to be fifteen feet off,
it is a "slight error." AH sorts and degrees of mis-
take in the implicit prediction of further experi-
ence are possible, and readily illustrated ; the flat
dichotomy into illusion and veridical perception
ill accords with the facts. In part, this classifica-
tion reflects the importance of certain interests of

160 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

action which the perception serves. When such in-
terests are completely thwarted, we have illusion;
when they are only partly or momentarily
thwarted, the perception is usually classed as in-
accurate, more or less mistaken. And in part, our
use of such terms reflects the fact that the implicit
prediction of further possible experience would
often, if explicitly stated, be quite detailed and
circumstantial, and that such prediction may be
verifiable in part and in part not. The question
of veracity is the question how much and how im-
portant a part of the prediction is valid. There is
no distinct type of cases, classifiable as "illusion/ 5
which are the seeing or feeling what is "not true
to reality 35 as contrasted with normal perception
which is "seeing things as they are."

Furthermore, is illusion ever intrinsic to the
given? Are there cases in which what is presented
is inevitably mistaken? Obviously the answer is
that there is no presentation which it is totally
impossible to mistake and none with reference to
which it is impossible to avoid mistake. Whether
one is deceived depends always on the previous ex-
perience, the breadth of understanding, and the
wit of the perceiver. The classic "illusions," such
as the psychologist uses for illustration, are such
as are pretty sure to deceive us the first time we
experience them unless we are on our guard.
Sometimes the so-called "illusory perception" per-
sists after experience has dispelled our "belief"

THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 161

in it. But it is then no more truly illusory than the
clear and normal visual images which I receive
since I put on spectacles, but never had in all the
years before. Whoever has had such experience
knows that a new correlation of image and dis-
tance has to be learned. Such an example well
illustrates the fact thaiTno appearance is intrin-
sically illusory, because the correlation with ap-
propriate action and further experience is always
something which has to be learned. When the
presentation arouses anticipation or leads to ac-
tion which is instinctive or habitual, but neverthe-
less in this instance proves to be ill-judged, the
perception is classified as illusory or erroneous.
But it is no more intrinsically so than that of the
near-sighted man with his first spectacles, who
misjudges the height of curbings and the distances
of door-knobs.

Not all presentations, of course, are presenta-
tions of real physical objects. There is, however,
something a little arbitrary in this statement, since
it is fairly clear that there is never any presenta-
tion which is not, in one way or another, condi-
tioned by the existence and nature of certain
physical things ; and there is thus never any pres-
entation which is not, for intelligent understand-
ing, a clue to some physical reality. But there are
appearances so closely like normal presentations
of physical things, and so different in their correct
interpretation, that they may seem to be a special

162 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

class. However, there is no important difference,
for the theory of knowledge, between such cases
and those previously mentioned. Only children and
savages are deceived by dreams, and few are in-
capable of intelligent discrimination of the merely
imagined.

The error which is responsible for this persistent
notion that some presentations are intrinsically
illusory, is the prejudice of the copy-theory that
knowledge of objects means qualitative coincidence
of the idea and the real. Such a conception is
meaningless. Knowledge does not copy anything
presented; it proceeds from something given to-
ward something else. When it finds that something
else, the perception is verified. When it fails, or to
the extent that it fails, we have error or illusion.
My visual image of the doorknob is my percep-
tion of its distance, among other things. With my
spectacles on or off, two somewhat different images
are signal for the same successful grasping mo-
tion. If I should try on and become habituated to
various other kinds of lenses, I should find a great
variety of such images, any one of which would,
with experience, signalize the distance to the door-
knob. That man makes glasses and nature makes
eyes, does not mean that images seen without ar-
tificial aid are peculiarly different in their cogni-
tive significance. If one could try on, as one tries
on spectacles, all the different kinds of eyes that
nature has produced, one would find a similar

THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 163

variety of visual images, every one of which would
be, for the owner of those eyes who was accus-
tomed to them, veridical perception. If one could
similarly try on all the different kinds of muscula-
ture and length of arm that nature makes, one
would acquire a whole museum of sensory "dis-
tances of the door-knob." Any one of them would
be perception of reality 3 and none of them would
copy anything.

However, this may not touch the question sup-
posed to be at issue. Are there not presentations
such that within them, merely as given, there is no
clue to a veridical anticipation? As presented, there
is no clue that this is X and not Y. To class it
as X Is to be wrong ; as Y to be right ; but even
the most astute and experienced perceiver could
not find within this momentary experience any re-
liable clue that it is X and not Y. To admit this
unqualifiedly might be to exaggerate; we are all
of us capable of being Sherlock Holmeses about
familiar imagery. But within limits there certainly
are such experiences; in fact, all presentations
have this indecisiveness to a degree. That, how-
ever, has nothing to do with any supposed intrinsic
illusion. At the present moment, nothing in my
perception will enable me to decide whether yonder
tree is fifty or seventy feet away, whether that
bird I hear singing is an oriole or a grosbeak,
whether that weather vane I see is brass or copper,
whether the breeze that has just sprung up is de-

164 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

cidedly cooler or only a little so. There is nothing
illusory in these indecisive aspects of my present
experience, because I have learned not to jump
to conclusions in such matters. Both veridical per-
ception and error are judgmental. An infant who
should see the sights and hear the sounds which
I do could not possibly be deceived. He does not
know enough to be wrong. Where there is no in-
terpretation or anticipation, there can be no error.
Between such commonplace experiences and those
which are illusory, there is no intrinsic difference.
Present experience is a certain clue to very little.
It enables me to anticipate other experience only
within limits (the tree is between forty and eighty
feet away) or with a certain degree of probability
(the grosbeak's song, as I remember it, is less in-
terrupted ; this is probably an oriole) .

All presentation is valid perception when it is
correctly understood. Understanding is not a mat-
ter of the qualitative character of the given but
of the anticipatory attitudes which it arouses.
What these are, in any particular case, depends
partly on the characteristics of the presentation
but equally upon the perceiver, his past experi-
ence, and his judgment. Since there is no experi-
ence which is intrinsically incapable of being cor-
rectly understood and interpreted, there can be
no presentation which is intrinsically illusory. So
to speak, any reality does and must appear in the
way it "ought" to appear to the kind of subject

THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 165

who perceives it under the conditions in which he
perceives it. Between those given experiences which
are most flagrantly likely to mislead and veridical
perception, there are all degrees and kinds of in-
termediaries. No experience can be guaranteed to
be either veridical or illusory unless the mind of
the perceiver can be guaranteed.

In other words, knowledge as valid interpreta-
tion is independent of the question whether pres-
entation and real object coincide in quality (if
that means anything) , because the validity of un-
derstanding does not concern the relation between
experience and what is usually meant by "the in-
dependent object"; it concerns the relation be-
tween this experience and other experiences which
we seek to anticipate with this as a clue. In Berke-
ley's language, this experience is "sign of" other
experience ; it may be such quite without reference
to its "copying reality" or even if there be no
"independent reality" to copy. As the history of
phenomenalism serves to illustrate, conceptual
knowledge may be valid provided only there is
order in experience if experience is lawful quite
without reference to any further question.

This disposes of the first point ; that the given
may be untrue to reality in that it may give rise
to illusion and mistake. Such error consists in mis-
understanding or practical misleading ; this is al-
ways a matter of conceptual interpretation, and
always it is avoidable. However, this does not dis-

166 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

pose of the question of the relation between the
phenomenal and the real. Descartes took this same
position that the content of given experience is
always veridical, and error is always due to in-
ference which outruns the percept. But for Des-
cartes this meant that, when interpretation is
shorn away, the percept matches the independent
reality, concerning which God in His goodness
would not deceive us.

We may note in passing the total impossibility
of this representationalist position. We cannot
both of us see reality as it is when we do not see
it alike ; and differences of discrimination indubi-
tably prove divergence of the given in different
minds. The combination of representationalism
with realism of the Cartesian type inevitably falls
before the attack of the skeptic. Indeed, this com-
bination of doctrines could only survive in an age
when it was possible to believe that there was some
normal content of veridical perception, exactly
shared by the great majority of persons the
others to be somehow dealt with in a foot-note.

The relativity of presentation to the perceiver
can hardly be denied. That this does not affect the
validity of knowledge, can be established, since all
knowledge is conceptual or interpretive. But this
only renders more acute the problem posed by
phenomenalism: How can a knowledge which is
relative to the knower's mind and senses be true to
a reality which is independent? How can the ob-

THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 167

ject of knowledge be identified with the real? This
question resolves itself into two parts; (1) the
bearing of a knowledge which is relative upon an
object which has an independent nature, and (2)
the valid significance of that "independence"
which may be ascribed to reality. It is the first of
these which is particularly in point in the dicus-
sion of phenomenalism; the second has mainly to
do with certain arguments of idealism.

We turn to the thesis with which the chapter
opened* Reality, so far as it can be given in ex-
perience or known, is relative to the knower. It
can be apprehended only as it does or would ap-
pear to some perceiver in some actual or possible
experience. But that the only character which can
be attributed to anything real is a character de-
scribed in relative terms relative to some experi-
ence does not deny to it an independent nature,
and does not deny that this nature can be known.
On the contrary, true knowledge is absolute be-
cause it conveys an absolute truth, though it can
convey such truth only in relative terms.

There is much here that is in no wise peculiar
to knowledge but has to do with the logic of rela-
tivity in general. It is equally true of weight, for
example, that it can only be described in relative
terms, but that the property of the object, so de-
scribed, is independent of the particular standard
in terms of which the description is given. The
situation in which truth can be told only in rela-

168 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

tive terms, is obviously a common one, if not uni-
versal. But this relational truth may nevertheless
be absolute* To put the matter in general terms :
If relative to R 9 A is X> and relative to S, A is
F, neither X nor F is an absolute predicate of A.
But "A is X relative to B" and "A is F rela-
tive to S" are absolute truths. Moreover they may
be truths about the independent nature of A.
Generally speaking, if A had no independent char-
acter, it would not be X relative to R or F rela-
tive to S. These relative (or relational) charac-
ters, X and F, are partial but absolutely valid
revelations of the nature of A. If we should add,
"There is no truth about A which can be told
without reference to its relation to R or S, or some
other such," we should then have a very good
paradigm to the relativity of knowledge.

To make this clear, let us turn to a few simple
examples of relativity, some of which have nothing
specially to do with knowledge.

The size of Caesar's toga is relative to the yard-
stick.* But if we say, "The number of square
yards in the toga is determined by the yardstick,"
the statement is over-simple. Given the toga, its
size in yards is determined by the yardstick ; given
the yardstick, the number of yards in the toga is
determined by the toga itself. If the toga had not
a determinate sizableness independent of the yard-

*I choose this example partly because no yardstick ever was or
will be laid on Csesar's toga. I hope the parallel* mil be drawn in
terms of human minds and past geologic ages.

THE RELATIVITY OP KNOWLEDGE 169

stick, or if the yardstick had no size independent
of the toga, then there would be no such fact as
the number of yards in the toga; the relation
would be utterly indeterminate. This independent
character of the toga, or of the yardstick, is what
we should be likely to call its "absolute" size. This
can only be described in terms of some measure,
though the description will vary according to
what this measure is. The size of the toga in yards
is relative to the yardstick, but it is nevertheless
an independent property of the toga, a true re-
port of which is given by its correct measurement
in yards. Thus what is relative is also independent ;
if it had no "absolute" character, it would have
no character in relative terms.

This example leads naturally to another an-
other sense in which size is relative. One might be
moved to observe that this conceptual relativity of
size is something which goes round in a circle. The
toga is of so many yards ; a yard, so many feet.
But how big is a yard or a foot? Eventually this
goes back to something like the king's foot, which
is a fact of the same order as the toga. A size is
relative to other sizes; but some size must be an
absolute so-bigness, immediately apprehended, or
there is no size at all. This would be to maintain
the eventual reference of the concept to something
immediate. But it is well to note in passing that,
except in precisely such relative terms, the abso-
lute so-bigness of the king's foot is also an absolute
inexpressible.

170 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

Size as an absolute and immediately given so-
bigness Is quite similarly relative when this size
is attributed to the object. As Berkeley put it:
How big is a mite's foot? As big as it looks to the
mite or as big as it looks to us? We here confront
a relativity of sense-experience which concerns its
supposed truth to the real object. Size, as per-
ceived, varies with distance from the perceiver.
And there is no possibility of perceiving size at
all except at some distance. Perceived size is a
function of two terms, distance and X. The dis-
tance being fixed, differences of perceived size are
attributable to differences in X. The perceived
size is, so to speak, the value of the function. This
is a function of two variables ; its value, perceived
size, is not determined by distance alone; it de-
pends also on X. Distance being specified, and the
value of the function, perceived size, being given,
X is thereby determined. Distance being known,
the perceived size is a true revelation of X, which
we may call the independent size of the object.

If it be asked, "But what precisely is this in-
dependent size in any intelligible terms," we can
carry our mathematical analogy one step further.
(It is, in fact, a little more than an analogy, for
the logic of functions is not confined to mathe-
matics,) The independent size, X 3 of the per-
ceived object is the integration of the function, its
perceived size or perceived sizes, over the whole
range of the other variable, distance. That is, all

THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 171

the perceived sizes, at different distances, belong to
or are parts of the objectively real size of the thing
perceived. The analogy holds good, further, in
that from the value of the function, perceived size,
for any given distance, its value for other dis-
tances are predictable. If, now, we remember that
the conceptual interpretation of the immediately
presented as the size of an objectively real thing,
is precisely such implicit prediction, from its per-
ceived size at this distance, of perceived sizes at
other distances (among other things), we shall
observe that the "independent size of the object"
is precisely the content of a correct concept by
which its size as presented is understood. For such
a correct conceptual interpretation, any one of its
perceived sizes is a true revelation of this inde-
pendent property.

If any one ask for an absolute size which per-
ception or knowledge could copy or be true to in
any fundamentally different sense, I can only say
that the meaning of his inquiry escapes me, and
I believe it escapes him also.

It is obvious that what is here pointed out for
size, holds for properties in general. Just as size
may be in terms of the king's foot or the platinum
bar in the Bureau of Standards, so color, for ex-
ample, may be determined by reference to the
sun's spectrum or the color-pyramid. This is con-
ceptual relativity. Thus, in turn, we may seem to
be thrown back on color as perceived, the visual

172 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

quality just as we perceive it. But this, as a prop-
erty of the real thing, is something which can
hardly be supposed to represent simple coinci-
dence of mind and object, because color, as per-
ceived, varies with illumination. Except in light
of some candle-power color cannot be seen at all,
but the perceptual content itself varies with va-
riation of the candle-power. Does this mean that
we never see color as it is? Or that we see it as
it is only at some standard illumination, arbi-
trarily determined? Or that we always see it as it
is, when we see it at all, if what we see enables us
to predict our altered visual experience of the ob-
ject under other conditions?

Similarly for shape. Conceptually a shape is
relative to other shapes. It can be described only
in relation to standard shapes, such as square and
round or by analysis into elements of shape, such
as angles (measured by reference to a standard)
and linear measure (obviously again relative).
And shape as immediately presented configura-
tion, if referred to the object, is relative to per-
spective.

The logic is the same throughout. Relativity is
not incompatible with, but requires, an independent
character in what is thus relative. And second,
though what is thus relative cannot be known
apart from such relation, still the other term or
terms of the relation being given, all such relative
knowledge is true knowledge of that independent

THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 173

character which, together with the other term or
terms of this relationship, determines this content
of our relative knowledge. The concept, or con-
ceptual interpretation, transcends this relativity
precisely because what the concept comprises is
this relational pattern in which the independent
nature of what is apprehended is exhibited in ex-
perience.

This being so, the nature of the fallacy com-
mitted by phenomenalism becomes apparent. From
the relativity of knowledge to the mind, it argues
to the impossibility of knowing the independent
real. This is as if the question about the size of
Caesar's toga were to be answered : "Its size in our
yards is so and so ; in terms of some other measure
which other creatures might apply, it would be
different. Apart from yards or some other mea-
sure, size has no meaning. So you see that the
real toga in itself is something outside the cate-
gory of size. Whether it can have size at all or,
if so, what that size would be> we can never know. w
The premise is correct. The conclusion non

It may seem that our illustrations are not pre-
cisely to the point since neither distance nor de-
gree of illumination nor angle of perspective, etc.,
is a property of the perceiving mind or of the
sense-organs. But such illustrations have the ad-
vantage of making it clear that the logic of rela-
tivity is unaltered whether the object in question

174 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

is an independent real, supposedly beyond or be-
hind its appearances altogether, or is recognized
to be the merely phenomenal object. The penny
whose apparent size and configuration are rela-
tive to distance and perspective is recognized to
be phenomenal and wholly knowable whether it is
admitted to be independently real or not. If the
relativity of its various appearances to perspec-
tive, distance and so on, does not defeat the possi-
bility of our knowing the phenomenal object, how
can relativity to mind, the logic of which is point
for point identical, defeat the possibility of know-
ing the independently real object?

The one ground on which it might be urged
with some show of reason that the relativity of the
content of knowledge to the mind prevents true
knowledge of the real, is that the nature of one
term in this relation the mind itself is not
known. That is, it might be said that we cannot
stand outside ourselves and critically bound our
own limitations. The elliptical appearance of the
penny it may be urged conveys true knowledge
because I know my angle of vision, and know how
this appearance would vary as my perspective
was altered. If all objects were seen from one
angle only as all objects are perpetually viewed
from within the limitations of the human mind
then the relativity of perceived shape to perspec-
tive would lead to a confusion of configuration as
(always) perceived with an absolute shape, which
it is not*

THE RELATIVITY OP KNOWLEDGE 175

There is much here that is worthy of careful
attention, though the point is not sufficient to
establish the phenomenalisms conclusion.

In the first place, it needs to be remarked that
the criticism, as put, overlooks the fact that I can
not know my own angles of vision except through
those same given configurations, and the altera-
tions of them, by which I know the shapes of
things. I learn to understand both objective shape
in general and the phenomenon of perspective in
general when I learn how to introduce order into
the given phenomena of perceived shape by treat-
ing them as functions of two variables, different
perspectives and different objective shapes. And
the analogue holds: I can know my own mind
through its commerce with objects and only so
just as I know objects through their commerce
with mind. I learn to understand both objective
reality in general and the general character of my
own human mind when I learn how to introduce
order into the procession of given presentation by
treating this experience as a function of two vari-
ables, the subject and the object. To revert to the
mathematical terms, the data of appearance are
the values of the function, cognition. This is a
function of two variables, mind and object. I
know the object by an integration of its appear-
ance over the range of the other variable, mind
or "the subjective conditions*" (For example, as
has been pointed out, objective change is divided

176 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

from permanence of the thing by integrating with
respect to those changes, in experience as given,
which are due to "my own activity.") And I know
mind by an integration of this function over its
whole range (or the widest possible range) of
variation in the objective. That the phenomenal-
ist treats mind as transcendent is a fallacy which
is correlative to his treatment of the independent
object as beyond knowledge.

We must, further, distinguish between the no-
tion that unrecognized limitations of the human
mind would mean any deceitfulness or erroneous-
ness of knowledge a failure to accord with the
true nature of the real and the quite different
notion that such limitations would mean a corre-
sponding degree of ignorance of reality. When
this distinction is drawn, the whole point of phe-
nomenalism, as regards the relation of mind to
independent reality, will be found to be lost; be-
cause when we grant to his arguments the utmost
which can be granted, the conclusion to which they
point is that our knowledge of the independent
object is veridical but partial, not that it is un-
true to absolute reality*

Our analogy may be of further assistance here.
It is true that if we were restricted to one angle
of perspective, one distance, etc., this would lead
to limitation of knowledge. If we were restricted
to perception at five feet, whether we knew it or
not, that would mean a real limitation of our

THE RELATIVITY OP KNOWLEDGE 177

knowledge, because we could not understand or
predict the systematic variation of perceived size
with distance, which is an additional insight into
the nature of that independent JST, the size of the
object, which is one term of the relation which
determines size as perceived. Because we are able
to see things at a wide range of distances, we learn
to predict from our image at any one distance
the appearance of the thing at other distances.
Though the momentary perception is limited to
a single distance, the breadth of previous experi-
ence, and knowledge of this momentary condition,
enable us to transcend the momentary limitation.
A permanent limitation could not be thus tran-
scended.

However, we must not confuse limitation of
knowledge with misrepresentation or mistake. Any
sort of limitation of sense-organs or mind which
should be reflected in perception, so far from
meaning that we do not perceive things as they
are, means that in certain respects we are freed
from all possibility of error and are fatally cer-
tain to perceive things as they are, though to per-
ceive and understand only part of what we other-
wise might. The penny which looks elliptical may
deceive us into thinking that it is elliptical, pre-
cisely because we are capable of viewing things
from other angles than the present one. If we
were limited to just one angle of vision, we should
be restricted in our knowledge but we should

178 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

thereby be freed from all possible mistakes of
perspective. Similarly, if the image I have of a
mite's foot should register on the retina of an
intelligent mite, it would lead to error. But the
limitation which prevents him from seeing his
foot as it looks to me, at the same time prevents
him from suffering certain illusions about his feet
which would otherwise be possible.

That we humans do not have senses which reg-
ister directly the whole known range of harmonic
motions, means that there is much of reality which,
until we learned to call upon various indirect
modes of observation, was beyond our knowledge.
And our inability to imagine how certain ranges
of vibration might register upon sense-organs
which should be sensitive to them, is as much a
limitation as the blind man's inability to imagine
color. But just as blindness does not condemn a
man to false perception or even false interpreta-
tion (although it does make it practically neces-
sary to run more risks and hazard judgment in
the absence of desirable clues) , so in general sub-
jective limitations cannot render knowledge un-
true to its object. At most they only mean greater
ignorance and consequently greater likelihood of
false judgment. The exigencies of life to be met
remain just as numerous; the basis of judgment
is more meager ; hence error will probably be more
frequent. Yet it remains true that no experience,
however limited, is or can be intrinsically misrep-
resentative.

THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 179

How much of reality we can grasp, doubtless
depends upon our human limitations. The relativ-
ity of knowledge to the mind means such limita-
tions, but it does not mean that the real object is
a ding an sich. Unless we grossly suppose that
what humans can know is all there is to know, such
limitation can lead to no untruth of our knowl-
edge to reality. In this matter, as in many others,
theory seems to suffer from a tendency to ex-
tremes to hold either that the reality we know is
all there is, or else that we cannot truly know any.
The golden mean seems both modest and sensi-
ble. Knowledge has two opposites, ignorance and
error* The relativity of perception may mean
ignorance or it may not. If I can observe things
from every angle, the restriction to one perspec-
tive at a time will not mean necessary ignorance,
especially since other perspectives can be pre-
dicted from the present one. But if perception
were restricted to a single angle, that relativity
would mean ignorance. This will be true for limi-
tations of the mind in general.

Ignorance of whatever sort increases the likeli-
hood of error, because it means that in practice
we must go forward on grounds of judgment less
sufficient. But the given itself is never misrepre-
sentative ; always it is true revelation of the real,
however partial. The notion that it can be untrue
to the real reflects both a misapprehension of the
significance of the truth of judgment and the old

180 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

and meaningless fallacy that the function of sen-
sory awareness in knowledge is to provide a quali-
tative replica of the independent object. Igno-
rance, however great, cannot make of reality a
ding an slch; it does not vitiate such knowledge as
we have, and that knowledge is of the independent
reality.

Idealists are wont to draw an opposite sort of
conclusion from the same general considerations ;
that is, to urge that the conception of reality be-
yond all human power to know is meaningless,
precisely because of the relativity of knowledge in
general to the mind. It is true and important, that
we can conceive no kind of reality whatever except
in terms of some possible experience; but the
idealist fails to do justice to our human power to
transcend, by indirect methods, limitations of di-
rect experience. He should be careful not to deny,
by implication, that the blind man can believe in
color. In a sense, the blind man does not know
what he believes in ; nevertheless he meaningfully
believes in something that he can neither perceive
nor imagine. It is very likely true that if we con-
jecture that reality has aspects forever beyond
the reach of human beings, we must do so by the
metaphor of some mind differently organized than
our own. But when we know that other humans
have greater auditory range than ourselves, and
can reasonably suppose that insects possess senses
which directly register stimuli which we do not,

THE RELATIVITY OP KNOWLEDGE 181

what prevents us from conceiving that there are
ranges of the real beyond the direct apprehension
of any human, or even of any animal that hap-
pens to exist? It is further true that we must have
some sort of conception in terms of which to as-
scribe reality of any type; otherwise the ascrip-
tion of reality itself means nothing. But if the
idealist puts his challenge in the form, "How can
we know there is a kind of reality we cannot
Jcnow?" the different significance of the word
"know** in its two occurrences needs to be consid-
ered. Mr. Russell has pointed out that we know
there are numbers which nobody will ever count.
To "know" a number is to know whether it is odd
or even, prime or factorable, etc., or at least to
be in position to determine this. To know that
there are numbers not thus known, is to know a
principle of the relation of every number to others,
by which further counting is always possible, and
hence to know that some numbers will always be
uncounted. Similarly we may know (or have good
reason to conjecture) that there are certain sys-
tematic relations in reality by which what is di-
rectly perceptible to us is connected with what is
not. If it is a question how we are to conceive
what should be beyond experience, then we may
warn the idealist that he ought to be careful of
this point lest he spoil his own argument. He has
a final metaphysical interest in the power of hu-
man beings to transcend their own finitude. This

182 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

is a case in point; in fact, it is the general case.
We transcend our own limitations in terms of
what we should or might experience if . That is
the nature of possibility in general. We transcend
actual experience in terms of possible experience.
But we transcend the actually given only as we
abstract from something which is a fact; the na-
ture and extent of such abstraction determines
the degree and kind of possibility which is in
question. There is no limit to the number and kind
of restrictions of human experience which we can
thus speculatively transcend.

Can I see both sides of this coin in my hand?
At this moment when I am looking at the obverse,
I cannot see the reverse side. But if I should turn
it over, I should see the reverse. Seeing both sides
of the coin is both possible and impossible pos-
sible on condition, impossible without that condi-
tion. Taking my limitations severely enough, any
possibility can be ruled out except the actuality.
The meaning of a possibility which transcends the
actual lies in the truth of some "If then" propo-
sition, the hypothesis of which is contrary to fact.
As we progressively transcend the limits of the
actual by our a if" the possibility in question be-
comes a more and more attenuated sort, but at no
point, while our "If then" proposition still has
any meaning, can we say this possibility is not
genuine.

Now, as has been pointed out, the ascription

THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 183

of any reality beyond immediate experience re-
quires and represents such affirmation of the pos-
sible. To repudiate all such transcendence is to
confine reality to the given, to land in solipsism,
and in a solipsism which annihilates both past and
future, and removes the distinction between real
and unreal, by removing all distinction of veridi-
cal and illusory. The ascription of reality is, then,
the affirmation of possibility, and the kind of real-
ity ascribed conforms to the nature of the possi-
bility affirmed. As we progressively transcend our
actual limitations, the reality conceived becomes
more and more abstract and undetermined in its
nature. But at no point, while our hypothetical
statement still retains a vestige of meaning, is the
conception of the corresponding real completely
empty. The conception of other minds, different
from our own, is a perfectly meaningful "if" by
which we go one step beyond the actual situation
of the blind man with respect to color. The reality
thus speculatively affirmed is one degree more
blank and dubious, but the existence of such real-
ity still has meaning.

It is not, however, with the idealist's argument
upon this point that we are principally concerned.
The more important consideration for us is that
meaning of "independence" of the object which
is compatible with the relativity of knowledge.
The idealist argues from this relativity of knowl-
edge to the mind to the conclusion that the object

184 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

is completely mind-dependent. In this, he misin-
terprets the nature of relativity and forgets the
possibility that the object as known may be coin-
cidently determined by two conditions and thus
relative to both.

Since the idealistic argument is different from
the phenomenalisms, let us vary our illustration
of relativity in general.

An alpha-particle is shot out from a radium-
atom, describes a certain path, and is arrested by
a screen. The mass of the particle, its velocity, and
its time of flight, are all such as to be inexpres-
sible except with reference to some observer or
frame of motion. The determination of each of
these properties will vary for different relative
motions of the observer and the system containing
the alpha-particle. But does this variation mean
that velocity and mass are not properties of an
independent reality which can be observed in these
various ways? If that were true, then there would
be no objective physical difference between an
alpha-particle and a beta-particle or a rifle bul-
let. The physical identification of the object would
depend altogether upon the relative motion of it
and the observer. But if the properties were not
in some sense determinate independently of any
frame of motion, then they would not be determi-
nate in relation to the observer. Specify the rela-
tive motion of two systems, and these properties
must have fixed values, representing the physical

THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 185

nature of the object. 3?or any observer, in relative
motion to it such and such, an alpha-particle shot
out by an atom of radium will have a determined
velocity x and mass y.

That is, there are certain properties of the ob-
ject, as an independent reality, which can only be
described in terms of some observer or frame of
motion. But specify this relationship and the true
description is thereby fixed. What is it that de-
termines this? It cannot be the relative motion
already specified. It is fixed by the objective real
character of the thing. If human observers, di-
rectly or indirectly, see the motion of the particle
and measure its mass and velocity, then what they
observe will depend on them (their relative mo-
tion). But this condition in terms of them being
specified, what they observe will depend on what
they observe. This "what 55 is a determinate thing
in some sense independent of the relative motion,
though describable only in terms of some such re-
lation. Under all conditions, this independent
"what," along with the relative motion, enters
into the determination of what is observed.

In other words, the observed mass, velocity, etc.,
of the objectively real thing is a function of two
variables, the relative motion of observer and ob-
served and the independent character of the thing
observed. Specify both of these and the value of
the function, observed mass or observed velocity,
is completely determined. Specify either, and the

186 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

value of this function then depends upon the
other. Specify neither, and the function is then
completely indeterminate.

Say to the physicist : "An alpha-particle is shot
out from a radium-atom. What is its velocity and
mass?" He will reply: "Your question is not
strictly answerable until you specify the relative
motion of the system and the observer. But since
it is an alpha-particle, I can tell you the mass and
velocity for any observer you please. The fact
that it is an alpha-particle determines a series of
velocities and masses relative to observers in all
possible motions relative to the path of it." But
say to him: "The relative motion of two systems,
A and 5, is one hundred thousand miles a second,
directly toward each other. Something moves in
system A. What is its mass and velocity as mea-
sured by an observer on J5?" Obviously he will re-
ply by asking what you are talking about. Or he
might answer : "Until you specify what the thing
and its state are for some other relative motion of
observer and observed (say, rest), I cannot tell
you its mass and velocity relative to the motion
of the two systems which you mention."

Now the objective reality, alpha-particle, is
identified by certain observable properties, mass
and velocity amongst them. Suppose it were not
identifiable by molecular combinations into which
it enters or by any other properties which are not
affected by motion, so that it could be known only

THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 187

through characteristics which are thus relative.
We may then imagine ourselves to make rejoinder
to the physicist: "What I mean is indescribable
except in terms which are relative to the motion
of the observer. How, then, can I tell you the na-
ture and state of the thing I mean in any terms
that are not dependent on the motion of the ob-
server?" He might reply: "There is a systematic
connection between masses, velocities, etc., in
terms of one relative motion and in terms of any
other. So it is unnecessary for you to try to an-
swer in other than relative terms. The description
in terms of amy relative motion, if that motion be
specified, will be a sufficient description of the na-
ture and state of the thing. But surely you do not
expect me to deduce the nature of the thing from
the single condition of its motion relative to the
observer/'

The parallel in the case of the relativity of the
object known to mind is obvious. "Thing as
known" is a function of two variables ; it depends
on the mind, but also it depends on the thing.
This thing can only be described in terms of its
relation to some (actual or hypothetical) mind.
But this does not alter the fact that if "thing as
known" were not determined by a condition which
is independent of the mind, it would not be deter-
mined at all. The parallel holds also in that the
thing as known in one relation to a mind (say,
from one perspective) enables us to predict its

188 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

character as known in other such relations. So far
as this is the case, its (relative) nature as known
is a sufficient determination of its nature in gen-
eral, or independent of any particular relation of
this sort.

The fallacy of idealism lies in arguing: "The
nature of the thing as known always depends on
the nature of the mind. Therefore the object can-
not exist or have character independent of the
mind. 55 This is as if one should argue "The mass
and velocity of an alpha-particle always depends
on its motion relative to the observer. Therefore
it can have no mass and velocity, and cannot ex-
ist, independent of this relative motion." In one
sense of the word "independent" it is true that the
mass and velocity of an alpha-particle has no
meaning independent of its relative motion. And
in a strictly parallel sense, it is true that the na-
ture of the object, independent of the knowing
mind, is undetermined; and independent of any
and every mind, is meaningless. But there is no
need for us to trip over the ambiguities of the
word. The mass and velocity of an alpha-particle
at least has two independent conditions; its mo-
tion relative to the observer is only one of them.
We cannot argue from "dependent on its relative
motion" to "completely determined by its relative
motion." Similarly we cannot argue from the fact
that it is meaningless to try to describe a thing
out of relation to mind to the quite different

THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 189

thesis that the real object known is completely de-
termined by the mind which knows it. If it should
be said that while the object is not determined by
its particular relation to a particular mind, it is
determined by relation to mind in general, we may
revert to the analogy once more. Mass and veloc-
ity apart from relation to some frame of motion
is always undetermined; but it is not determined
by such relation in general (if that means any-
thing).

To revert to a previous illustration, the idealis-
tic argument may be parodied: "The size of Cae-
sar's toga is relative to the yardsick or to some
other standard of measure. No size without a yard-
stick. The size of things is through and through
yardstickian. To be sure, the fallible yardstick in
my hand may not determine size in general, but
the yardstick in the Bureau of Standards deter-
mines both my yardstick and all sizes that there
are. It creates size."

If the mind were the only condition of the thing
as known, then the nature of the mind being speci-
fied, objects in general would be completely de-
termined. One could say, "Given human mind
possessed of such and such organs and interpret-
ing data in such and such categories, what will be
the reality it knows?" And there would be an an-
swer in general and in particular.

Idealism has often boggled over the fact that
it could not deduce the particular content of ex-

190 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

perience and knowledge. The questions, "Why do
I have just this experience? Why do I find just
this reality and no other?" must have an answer*
Either that or it must be recognized that the par-
ticularity of experience is itself an ultimate if
inexplicable datum; that the given is a condi-
tion of reality independent of the mind. Berke-
ley, of course, has his reply to this question: There
is a reality, God, independent of my mind, which
is responsible. The post-Kantian idealists, not
sharing Berkeley's empiricism, have either neg-
lected this problem or, like Pichte, have said that
it is no part of the business of philosophy to de-
duce the particular. But he fails to face the ques-
tion: Granted the idealistic thesis, can the par-
ticular be deduced?* Philosophy, he might rightly
claim, is not interested in the fact that I now see
a blue blotter or that there are elephants in Af-
rica. But his claim is that all the conditions of
experience and reality are contained in mind. Out-
side of minds is nothing which could determine, or
help determine, what minds know. If that be true,
then mind being specified, not only the form or
general character of knowledge but also the con-
tent in all its particularity, must be determined*
It would still not be the business of philosophy to

*ScheIling, however, acknowledges the justice of the challenge and
seeks to meet it with amazing results. Starting from the Fichtean
premise, A = A, he deduces eventually the electrical and magnetic
properties of matter! System, d. transcendentalen Idealismus, sammi.
Werke (1858), Bd. I, 3, pp. 444-450.

THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 191

make the deduction for each particular item, be-
cause the particular items would not be of gen-
eral interest. But it is a matter of general inter-
est that all such items are thus deducible if that
be a fact. We might except some inductive proof
of this deducibility the deduction of the ele-
phants in Africa as an illustration- If the mathe-
matician should tell us, "All the facts of physics
can be deduced from the system of quaternions,"
but should reply to our request for a deduction
of the law of gravitation by saying, "Particular
physical facts are of no interest to the mathema-
tician and no part of his business, 55 we should
draw our own conclusions.

That idealism may argue that reality is ex-
clusively mental or spiritual by maintaining that
the condition of this particularity is another
spiritual being, we are not here concerned. Such
argument (or dogmatic assertion) is metaphysi-
cal and is, or should be, quite distinct from the
argument from the relativity of knowledge.

It is a much more important consideration, I
believe, that unless the content of knowledge is
recognized to have a condition independent of the
mind, the peculiar significance of knowledge is
likely to be lost. For the purpose of knowledge is
to be true to something which is beyond it. Its in*
tent is to be governed and dictated to in certain
respects. It is a real act with a real purpose be-
cause it seeks something which it knows it may

192 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

miss. If knowledge had no condition independent
of the knowing act, would this be so?

It is most important to discover precisely what,
in terms of knowledge, can be meant by "the in-
dependence of the object." Whether the subject-
object relation is universal in reality or not,
clearly the answer must be compatible with its
universality in "knowledge. It must, further, be
independent of any supposed qualitative identity
of the content or perception with the object, since
such identity is probably meaningless and in any
case is unverifiable.

It may be asked, "What would it mean for a
mind to know an object, when the supposition of
the qualitative identity of given content of per-
ception with the object is ruled out?" The an-
swer, in terms of the theory here presented, will
be clear: It means that we are able to interpret
validly certain given items of experience as sign
of other possible experience, the total content of
such further possible experience, related to the
given in certain categorial ways, being attributed
to the object, as constituting what we know of it
and what we mean by attributing reality to it. If
this conception seems to leave us in the air about
the "nature of the object," let us first inquire
what further question it is to which we seek the
answer. We might find that there is no such fur-
ther question which is meaningful.

In terms of experience and knowledge, the in-

THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 193

dependence of reality its independence of the
knowing mind means, first, the givenness of
what is given ; our realization that we do not cre-
ate this content of experience and cannot, by the
activity of thinking, alter it. Second, it means the
truth of those "If then" propositions in which
the process of possible experience, starting from
the given, could be expressed. The "if" here de-
pends upon our own active nature for its mean-
ing, as has been pointed out, but the content of
the "then" clause, and the truth of the proposi-
tion as a whole, are things with respect to which
the knowing mind is not dictator but dictated to.
I may confront the given with different attitudes
and purposes ; I may be differently active toward
it and, starting from it, I may proceed into the
future in different ways. But what I should then
find; what eventuations of experience are gen-
uinely possible ; that is something independent of
any purpose or attitude of mine. These, I seek
correctly to anticipate in my present interpreta-
tion of the given. If they do not obtain in reality,
my present "knowledge" is false* Whether they
obtain or not, is determined independently of my
mind. If not, then it is not determined at all, and
knowledge and error are, both of them, purely
subjective and meaningless.

Third, the independence of reality means the
transcendence by reality of our present knowl-
edge of it; it means that I can ask significant

194 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

questions about ray object which have an answer
when that answer is something which I cannot
give. In terms of experience this means that,
starting from the given in certain ways, I can
safely predict the accrual of something the par-
ticular nature of which I cannot now determine.
For example, if I examine the contents of this
drawer, either I shall find a piece of chalk or I
shall find none. So much I know; but I do not
know now and cannot discover merely by tak-
ing thought which of these alternatives I should
find true. There is that in the object which I do
not now know ; I know something to be determined
in reality which is neither implicitly nor explicitly
determined in my knowledge of it. This, and all
similar questions I could ask and could not now
answer, witness the independence of my object.

If the idealist should find that there is nothing
in such "independence" which is incompatible
with his thesis, then it may be that between a suffi-
ciently critical idealism and a sufficiently critical
realism, there are no issues save false issues which
arise from the insidious fallacies of the copy-the-
ory of knowledge.

CHAPTER VII

THE A PRIORI TRADITIONAL CON-
CEPTIONS

The position so far arrived at emphasizes the
fact that there is no knowledge of external reality
without the anticipation of future experience*
Even that knowledge implied by naming or the
apprehension of anything presented* is implicitly
predictive, because what the concept denotes has
always some temporal spread and must be iden-
tified by some orderly sequence in experience.
Hence we are inevitably confronted as any the-
ory of knowledge must be with the problem of
Hume's skepticism: Are there any necessary con-
nections in experience? Can conceptual order,
which is of the mind, be imposed upon a content
of experience which is independent and not yet
given? This is the problem of the a priori.

There is no knowledge without interpretation.
If interpretation, which represents an activity of
the mind, is always subject to the check of fur-
ther experience, how is knowledge possible at all?
That the interpretation reflects the character of
past experience, will not save its validity. For
what experience establishes, it may destroy; its
evidence is never complete. An argument from

195

196 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

past to future at best is probable only, and even
this probability must rest upon principles which
are themselves more than probable. For the valid-
ity of knowledge, it is requisite that experience in
general shall be in some sense orderly that the
order implicit in conception may be imposed upon
it. And for the validity of particular predica-
tions, it is necessary that a particular order may
be ascribed to experience in advance.

Thus if there is to be any knowledge at all,
some knowledge must be a priori; there must be
some propositions the truth of which is necessary
and is independent of the particular character of
future experience. But traditional conceptions of
the a priori have broken down, largely because
the significance of its necessity and its indepen-
dence have been misconstrued.

"Necessary" is an ambiguous word ; its contra-
dictory is, in one meaning, "contingent," in an-
other "voluntary." The necessary character of
a priori truth, which is genuinely opposed to its
contingency, has been confused with some psy-
chological or other necessity, which the mind is
tinder, of accepting it. What contradicts neces-
sary truth must be genuinely impossible to hap-
pen. But it is not therefore impossible to believe.
What is a priori does not compel the mind's ac-
ceptance. It is given experience, the brute-fact
element in knowledge, which the mind must accept
willy-nilly. The a priori represents the activity of

THE A PRIORI 197

mind itself ; it represents an attitude in some sense
freely taken. That we elicit some formula as a
principle means that we take it as forbidding
something or denying something which in some
sense has significance. That which is utterly inca-
pable of any alternative is utterly devoid of
meaning. The necessity of the a priori is its char-
acter as legislative act. It represents a constraint
imposed by the mind, not a constraint imposed
upon mind by something else.

And the a priori is independent of experience,
not because it prescribes a form which experience
must fit or anticipates some preestablished har-
mony of the given with the categories of the mind,
but precisely because it prescribes nothing to the
content of experience. That only can be a priori
which is true no matter what. What is anticipated
is not the given but our attitude toward it; it
formulates an uncompelled initiative of mind, our
categorial ways of acting. Truth which is a priori
anticipates the character of the red; otherwise, it
would possess no significance whatever. The real,
however, is not the given as such, but the given
categorially interpreted. In determining its own
interpretations and only so the mind legis-
lates for reality, no matter what future experi-
ence may bring.

If we are to understand this nature of the a
priori, traditional misconceptions must first be
cleared away. In general these are three: (1) that

198 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

the a priori is distinguished by some psychologi-
cal criterion such as the "natural light" or some
peculiar mental origin such as innateness; (2)
that it is distinguished by some peculiar mode of
proof , or logical relation to experience in general,
usually called "presupposition" ; (3) that the
a priori legislation of mind can not apply to ex-
perience unless what is given in experience is
already limited or determined in some consonant
fashion; that the validity a priori of our cate-
gorial interpretation requires also a priori modes
of our receptivity or intuition.

The first of these need not detain us long: in-
nate ideas are a dead issue. Psychological tmde-
niability, even if it exist, would not be proof of
truth. It is entirely conceivable that the animal
man should be so organized that certain fallacies
should be peculiarly impelling to his mind. And
historically it is observable that what has ap-
peared undeniable and been accepted as axiomatic
over long periods of time may still be false. Nor
is it implausible that there should be truths which
are a priori, having a warrant not drawn from
the particular character of particular experi-
ences, which nevertheless should be grasped only
with difficulty and not specially impressive to most
men. Moreover, if the criterion of the a priori
were a certain impulsion of the mind, then there
would be no difference amongst truths on this
point. As Bosanquet has pointed out, all discov-

THE A PRIORI 199

ered truth lays upon the mind the same impulsion
to belief; this character belongs to all proposi-
tions once they are established*

The source of this rationalist conviction that
the a priori must have some peculiar psychologi-
cal warrant, is fairly easy to make out. Univer-
sal propositions drawn from experience are con-
tingent and problematic unless they have some
prior warrant* Knowledge which is certain can
not be grounded in the particulars of experience
if it is to apply to particular experiences in ad-
vance; it can only come from the possession of
some universal by which the particular is implied.
Nor can these universals be reached by generaliza-
tion* Hence there must be universal truths which
are known otherwise than through experience.
Such universal propositions cannot be logically
derived unless from other such universals as prem-
ises. Hence there must be some universal truths
which are first premises logically underived and
representing an original knowledge from which we
start. Such propositions must be axiomatic, self-
evident.

However, this notion of innate truth or self-
illuminating propositions is not particularly con-
sonant with rationalistic theory* The essence of
human reason is a mode of thought, not a particu-
lar content; it has to do with the validity of con-
clusions, not with original premises natively pos-
sessed* Post-Kantian rationalism realizes this and,

200 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

influenced no doubt by Kant's deduction of the
categories, turns from psychological compulsion
as the ground of the a priori to a conception of
logical necessity. First, or highest, principles are
no longer regarded as immediately evident, but
are now supposed to be distinguished by a pecu-
liar criterion of proof. They are "necessary pre-
suppositions" of some class of more particular
facts, of science, or of experience in general.

The meaning of "presupposition" here is far
from clear; probably it has no single meaning,
and no discussion could be altogether just to the
variety of its uses. But in general, what seems to
be intended is the designation of certain princi-
ples as logically prior to that which "presupposes"
them, with the added thought that what is thus
prior is thereby proved to have the character of
necessary truth necessary, that is, if facts of
science or experience in general are taken for
granted.

So far as this is what is meant, the fallacy com-
mitted by the notion that principles can be proved
true a priori by being presupposed by science or
experience, is so simple that it is extraordinary
that it could ever have gained currency. Correctly
speaking, what is logically prior to a fact or
proposition will imply that fact or proposition,
but it will not, in general, be implied by it. In the
language of mathematics, if A is logically prior to
S 9 then A must be a sufficient condition of B or

THE A PRIORI 201

at least one of a sufficient set of conditions; but
"sufficient condition" must not be confused with
"necessary condition." Physics presupposes math-
ematics in the sense that it exhibits particular in-
stances of general mathematical principles, while
mathematics contains no necessary reference to
physics. In the same sense, all the special sciences
presuppose logic. But if what is presupposed in
this sense be regarded as thereby established or
proved necessary, the fallacy involved is easily
detected. If I assert that two feet and two feet
are four feet, I do not thereby commit myself
to the proposition 2 + SS = 4. It is required only
that this be true of linear measure. Gases under
pressure or living organisms might for all that
is here in question be governed by very different
laws. The particular fact does not even require
that there should be any general laws of mathe-
matics.

There can be little doubt that this fallacy has
played its part in traditional conceptions of the
a priori* Presuppositions, so called, are always
general in their import. That which presupposes
them is more particular. Now A is not a necessary
condition of B unless "A is false" implies "B is
false," which is the same as to say that B implies
A. Hence no general principle is a necessary con-
dition of any particular fact or proposition un-
less that particular implies the general principle.
And even if this should be the case, it would be the

202 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

particular and not the general which was, so far,
logically prior and the original premise.

If we avoid this fallacy and take "A presup-
poses .B" to mean "A is necessary condition of
B," i. ., "S implies A" then we should be so
cluttered up with presuppositions that the fine
glamor of the word would be lost. Presupposi-
tions would be truly necessary conditions that is,
relatively necessary ; necessary if but the neces-
sary conditions of any proposition are as numer-
ous as the things that it implies. The necessary
conditions of any particular fact of experience
are merely its logical consequences. Obviously, it
is not intended to reduce a priori principle to the
status of one among the numerous consequences
of the particular fact. Furthermore, the only ne-
cessity which could thus be established would be
relative to the fact in question. If that fact be
contingent, as the particular content of experi-
ence is, then its presuppositions will, unless other-
wise supported, share precisely that contingency.

The metaphysical respect in which presuppo-
sitions have been held reflects the vast influence
exercised by the geometry of Euclid upon historic
rationalism. This respect is, of course, entirely
justified; but along with it went a conception of
geometrical method and of deduction in general
which, although perhaps inevitable to an earlier
day, is quite unwarranted. According to this view
the logically first principles, or presuppositions,

THE A PRIORI 203

are self-evident axioms which, through the proc-
ess of deduction, shed the glory of their certainty
on all the propositions deduced from them. But
here it is to be observed that the ground of cer-
tainty of the first principles has nothing to do
with their logical priority. The criterion of their
truth is their self -evidence or undeniability ; they
loan their indisputable character to their conse-
quences instead of deriving it from the fact of
being logical foundation of these consequences.
If they were not self-evident they could derive no
certainty or necessity from the fact of being thus
presupposed. The connotation of the phrase "a
priori" was fixed in terms of this ancient concep-
tion according to which all systematic knowledge
was supposed to find its warrant through deduc-
tive derivation from such self-evident beginnings.
Literally connoting "by deduction" it came to
mean "necessarily true" because only such first
principles of deduction as were taken to be neces-
sary or self -evident were then acceptable.

To-day, however, when this conception of de-
duction has been given up in mathematics and
elsewhere, when "postulate' 5 or the colorless
"primitive proposition" has replaced the self-
evident axiom, when non-Euclidean geometries
have been recognized to have precisely the same
logical structure as Euclid, and when it has been
shown that various sets of postulates may give rise
to the same deductive system, we have less than no

204 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

excuse for retaining the notion that a presupposi-
tion is more certain than its consequences. Where
the body of facts which a deductive first principle
implies is considerable and well-established, and
there are no implications of it which are known to
be false, the presupposition gains that kind of
verification which particulars can give to general
principles that is, the partial and inductive veri-
fication of it as an original hypothesis. But to
regard a presupposition as established by what
presupposes it, except in this inductive sense and
with the same contingency as the consequences of
it, has not even the warrant of historical confu-
sion.

The traditional rationalist conception that
metaphysical first principles can be shown to be
logically indispensable, or that what is logically
prior is thereby proved to be certain or self-evi-
dent, is one to which the actual structure of logical
and mathematical systems lends no support. In
genuinely rigorous deductive systems, as these are
understood today, "logically prior" means only
"deductively more powerful" or "simpler." The
supposed necessity, or logical indispensability, of
presuppositions most frequently turns out to be
nothing more significant than lack of imagination
and ingenuity. The plurality of possible begin-
nings for the same system, and the plurality of
equally cogent systems which may contain the
same body of already verified propositions but dif-

THE A PRIORI 05

f er in what else they include, dispel the notion of
indispensability in what is logically prior,

A less important but equally persistent fallacy
is the notion that at least some necessary truths
can be established by the fact that to deny them
is to reaffirm them that they are implied by their
own contradictories. It is wise to walk cautiously
here, because the logical facts are quite complex.
The most frequently offered illustrations of re-
affirmation through denial are not even good cases
of a proposition implied by its own denial. For
example, the fallacy of arguing from the undeni-
able existence of thinking to the self which does
the thinking vitiates Descartes's use of the "I
think." But quite apart from that, the man who
should assert "I am not thinking," so far from
contradicting himself, would give the best possible
evidence of the truth of his statement. The propo-
sition, "I am not thinking," does not imply, "I am
thinking*" It may be that the attitude of will
which we suppose to underlie the making of any
assertion is such as to be incompatible with the
admission, U I am not thinking," so that we may
be sure that whoever could make such a statement
would find himself at cross purposes. But the rea-
son for this is contained neither in the proposition
nor in any implication of it. There is here no logi-
cal inconsistency whatever.

Other examples of the supposedly self -contra-
dictory the statement of Epimenides the Cretan

206 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

that "All Cretans are liars, 5 * etc* have been so
f requently discussed in current literature that con-
sideration of them may be omitted here* Most of
these commit what Mr. Russell calls a "vicious
circle" fallacy by ignoring the systematic am-
biguity of type which characterizes such proposi-
tions. As a corrolary, the supposed "necessity"
which attaches to their contradictories is equally
fallacious.

However, there are propositions which are genu-
inely implied by their own denial, and hence
propositions whose denial leads to their reaffirma-
tion. And all such belong to the class what may
quite reasonably be called "necessary." (I should
omit further consideration of such logical tech-
nicalities, which must be getting boresome to the
reader, except that this particular point will be
of some importance later on.) The curious fact is,
about such genuine examples of propositions im-
plied by their own denial, that they are not thus
proved true. To see that this is so, we must first
examine the nature of reaffirmation through de-
nial. Whoever asserts a self-contradictory propo-
sition does not in one and the same breath affirm
and deny the content of his assertion. He affirms
it in fact ; he denies it by implication only. Or to
put it otherwise; he affirms it, and the question
whether he also denies it is the question of what
his assertion implies.

Now the most obvious illustrations of such

THE A PRIORI 207

propositions whose denial genuinely implies them
come from the field of logic ; in fact, they all be-
long to logic when that subject is interpreted in
the rational way as including all purely formal
truth. And the content of logic includes all prin-
ciples of inference.

Whoever, then, denies a principle of logic, may
either draw his own inferences according to the
principle he denies, or he may consistently avoid
that principle in deriving his conclusions. If one
deny a principle of inference, but inadvertently
reintroduce it in drawing conclusions from his
statement, he will indeed find that he has contra-
dicted himself and admitted what originally be
denied. But if he denies a principle of inference
and consistently reasons in accordance with his
own statement, he need incur no self-contradiction
whatever.

It is a fact that for one who stands within a
given system of logic, the denial of one of its prin-
ciples will imply the principle itself. But this sig-
nifies nothing more profound than the fact that
deductions in logic are inevitably circular.* In de-
ducing our theorems of logic, we must make use
of the very principles which the deduction is sup-
posed to demonstrate. If then, I use "bad" logical
premises but "good" logical reasoning, I shall

*0mitting from consideration the development of logic, as a purely
abstract system, by the "operational" instead of the "posfrulatory"
method. These omitted considerations serve to strengthen, not to
weaken, what is here set forth.

208 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

contradict myself 3 quite as surely as if I use two
premises which are mutually inconsistent. Perhaps
an example here will be of assistance* Take the
law of contradiction in the form, "That X is A
and X is not A 9 is false." Its contradictory will
be, "X is A and X is not A" Let us take this last
statement as a premise and draw the inference
from it.

(1) "X is A and X is not A" implies its latter
half , "X is not A."

(2) "X is not A" implies "It is false that X
is A."

(3) "It is false that X is A" implies "That X
is A and X is not A y is false." (Just as " 'Today
is Monday' is false" implies "That today is Mon-
day and it is raining, is false.") Thus from the
denial of the law of contradiction we have deduced
the law of contradiction itself. But we have done
so only because, though denying it in the premise,
we have reintroduced it in step (&) of the rea-
soning. If we had, consistently with the premise,
refused to take step (S), we should never have got
any such conclusion.

Every good or correct logic, then, will be such
that its principles are undeniable without contra-
diction; the denial of any one of them leads to
formal inconsistency. But this is true only because
so long as we remain within our system of logic,
we shall use the very principle in question in draw-
ing inferences from the denial of it, and thus beg
the question of its truth.

THE A PRIORI 209

A good logic must be circular. But what should
lead any one to suppose that this character be-
longs exclusively to systems of good logic? Ap-
parently those who set store by the "reaffirmation
through denial" have committed the fallacy of
illicit conversion; they have reasoned: "A logic
whose principles are true will give their reaffirma-
tion through denial. Therefore, whatever princi-
ples meet this test must be true."

All logic and pseudo-logic is similarly circular*
A little ingenuity suffices to construct a bad logic
in which, reasoning badly according to our bad
principles, we always get consistently bad results.
And if we deny one of these principles, still by
sticking to our bad method of reasoning, we can
reaffirm the bad principle in conclusion.* Since

*One family of such systems consistent in their own terms, and
such that the denial of any principle lends to its reaffirm ation as a
consequence is determined by the presence in the system of the
proposition

q<\?<(p<q)l

where p. q, etc. are propositions, and p < 0. represents ^ p implies g,
or "if p is asserted, q may be asserted." This proposition allows of
two distinct meanings of p <q> neither of which coincides with the
usual one; and the properties of this relation may be further speci-
fied in a variety of ways. Some of the systems in this family might
be regarded as "good" logic, but most of them are "bad." Such a
"bad" logic may be developed logistically from the following formal
postulates:

A. ( p) =*p (Def. of p* the denial of p)

B. (p<p)

C. (P<?) <(/7<r<-*9

D. [p -

F. (p <q) <( p < t
Postulate F is obviously false as a general law of implication* It is
interesting that postulate B seems to exclude the possibility that any
proposition should lead to its own denial as a consequence, yet if P
beanyprincipleof thesystem, we can prove that P<( P < P)
Hence the assertion of ( P) leads to the assertion ( P < P ).

210 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

a bad logic, whose principles are false, may still
be such that the denial of any one of these prin-
ciples will lead to its reaffirmation, it follows that
the test of "reaffirmation through denial" does not
in logic prove the truth of the principle thus re-
affirmed.

It should be added, to avoid misunderstanding,
that in spite of what has just been said, the test
of self-criticism or circularity is a valuable test of
any deductive development of logic. That the
principles proved are precisely the principles used
in the demonstration of them, is here a matter for
congratulation. That the method of our proof co-
incides with the result of it, is a test of both method
and result. It is not a test of truth, however ; it is
a test of formal or methodological consistency.
The error of taking self-criticism to be a test of
logical truth lies in overlooking the fact that a
thoroughly false logic may still possess this merely
methodological consistency.

One further hit of explanation seems required
also. I do not mean to say that there are no neces-
sary propositions. Whoever takes a given logic to
be true will find its principles undeniable without
contradiction (L e^ in his logic) and therefore
necessary. Some logic is true, and hence some log-
ical principles are necessary. The point is simply
that the truths of logic are not proved by any
such procedure since, as proof, it always begs
the question.

THE A PRIORI

Precisely the point which. I wish here to make
is that logical "necessity" has here no connotation
of the inescapable. What is a priori is not true
because the mind is so constituted that it finds
such truth unavoidable; however fantastic or
practically negligible any alternative supposition
may be, there still are such alternatives, which
may be self -consistent. Doubtless what is funda-
mental, as logic is fundamental, has its roots in
the nature of the human mind, but not in such
wise as to be either self-evident or the only self-
consistent possibility. If it should be such that it
must be assumed or it cannot be proved, that, so
far from proving truth, would be a character
which it shares with delusions and absurdities.
There will still be alternatives of assumption in
the presence of which the mind is uncompelled.
Whatever was genuinely imposed upon the human
mind would not be a priori; it would have just
that brute-fact character which distinguishes the
given.

It is here that rationalist conceptions, by their
confusion of logical and psychological, fall into
further difficulty. The a priori is recognized as
not being given as the content of experience is
given. But if the a priori have psychological self-
evidence or inescapability of any sort, then it must
be absolute datum in some sense or other. Either
the mind would find these truths belonging to it
as soon as it became conscious, with sufficient clear-

MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

ness, of its own possessions, or it would acquire
them at some particular date in some particular
moment of illumination, and would recognize that
the ground of this new realization was not pre-
viously there in the mind. In the former case, the
a priori would belong to the mind only in the
sense that the individual body does; the infant
would find it as he finds his ears or finds that he
can move his arms. It would be a commonplace of
reality, but it would have no higher character than
that of uniformly evidenced fact. There would be
no guarantee of it beyond the guarantee of uni-
form experience up to date. On the other alterna-
tive, it would have the character which belongs to
such illumination as may be received from an ex-
ternal and authoritative source, and the truth of
it would depend upon some sanction superior to,
or at least independent of, his own mind. Yet it
is of the essence of rationalism to recognize the
a priori as a peculiar possession of the mind itself,
in a sense not compatible with either of these con-
ceptions.

This point of the relation of the a priori to the
mind, is really of prime importance, for upon it
depends that assurance, superior to the assurance
we can have of generalizations from experience,
that nothing future experience can reveal will
falsify it. Whatever experience may bring, the
mind will be there ; whatever belongs to the mind
itself is assured in advance. This is the one point

THE A PRIORI 213

upon which all conceptions which recognize an
a priori have agreed. The conception which re-
tains this significance and avoids the fallacies and
contradictions pointed out above, is one which out-
rages traditional ideas, but at bottom it is simple
and, I think, can be made obvious. The a priori
has its origin in an act of mind; it has in some
sense the character of fiat and is in some respects
like deliberate choice. The a priori is a peculiar
possession of mind because it bears the stamp of
mind's creation. And the criterion of creativity is
not inevitability but exactly its opposite, the ab-
sence of impulsion and the presence of at least
conceivable alternatives. But I dare not press a
point of view so novel until there has been further
consideration of points which historical concep-
tions and problems will serve to exemplify.

In particular, if the a priori is to be thus con-
ceived as made by mind, shall we not fall into an-
other difficulty : How, then, shall we know that it
can be imposed upon a reality which is indepen-
dent? It is here, of course, that we find the grounds
of skepticism in general and of Hume's in par-
ticular. The human mind, by its nature and by
the manner of its activity, imposes certain inter-
pretations upon experience. Every such interpre-
tation would, if valid, limit the character of re-
ality and the possibilities of future experience. We
can have no assurance that such limitations char-
acterize the independent real or bound what future
experience may bring*

214 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

It is for tliis same reason that Kant recognizes,
in addition to the categories, another a priori ele-
ment in knowledge and makes the distinction of
phenomenal and real. The content of experience
is limited by the forms of intuition, which are im-
posed not by the active interpretation of the mind
but by the passive modes of its receptivity.* The
categories are subjective modes of the mind's in-
terpretation or synthesis of the content of intui-
tion. How, then, can we be assured that they will
be valid of experience in general? An indispensable
part of Kant's answer is that the object in ex-
perience must itself be subjective or phenomenal.
It must be limited by the very fact of being ex-
perienced in such wise as to make universally pos-
sible the mind's modes of categorial synthesis.
That which can not validly be thought under the
categories can not be given in intuition. Thus the
objects of knowledge are the objects of experience.
The limitations of thinking are also the limita-
tions of sensing; the possibility of knowledge is
assured by the fact that experience is not of the
independent real but of phenomena already in-
formed by our receptivity.

*It is difficult, of course, to interpret Kant, with any assurance of
accuracy, upon this point. In the Transcendental Aesthetic the distinc-
tion of forms of intuition as modes of our receptivity from any mode
of mind's activity, seems sufficiently clear. In later sections, refer-
ence to the ^'synthesis of apprehension" and such passages as the
one headed, "Of the a priori grounds of the possibility of experience"
raise doubts about the principle of this separation. But certainly the
division between those conditions which the mind actively imposes
on the object and those which it passively imposes in intuition must
be there, else the whole procedure of the Critique falls to the ground.

THE A PRIORI 215

This manner of meeting the skeptical difficulty
is both unnecessary and impossible. It is impos-
sible because if there were conditions imposed upon
experience by our receptivity, mind could not
recognize them as its own. At most it could only
conjecture that they belonged to it and not to the
nature of the independent real, or to that portion
of reality to which experience so far had been con-
fined. Lacking any certain criterion by which the
limitation of the content of experience could be
ascribed to mind, such conditions would appear
simply as limitations of what was given, whose
continuance in all future experience would be as
problematic as any empirical generalization. And
this answer to skepticism is unnecessary, because
mind may limit reality (in the only sense which
the validity of the categories requires) without
thereby limiting experience. The active interpre-
tation by mind imposes upon given experience no
limitation whatever.

Every beginning student of Kant asks sooner
or later, "But how does Kant know that phenomena
are not things in themselves? 55 And the only an-
swer that can be given is that if what could be
experienced were limited only by what existed to
be experienced, then the limits of experience could
be discovered only through experience itself. Any
conclusion rgarding them would then be probable
only, since it would be argument from past to
future. If the limits belong to reality and not to

216 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

the mind, then knowledge of them a priori is not
possible.

Perhaps this answers the question why Kant,
consistently with the rest of his procedure, must
distinguish phenomena from things in themselves.
But it omits the real question how we can know
that the limitations of experience are due to the
mind and are not simply those of an independent
reality which experience reveals. If there are limi-
tations of experience which are imposed not by
the activity of thinking addressed to the given,
but before that given is given, or in its being
given, how shall we distinguish what mind is re-
sponsible for from what independent reality is
responsible for? This can only be done either by
knowing the unknowable reality or by some cri-
terion of what mind is responsible for in given
experience. This must take the form, "Even if it
existed to be experienced, we could never experi-
ence X (let us say, non-Euclidean space )." And
this reminds us of another objection that the be-
ginning student makes: "How do we know that
we shall keep on having the kind of mind we have
and not wake up tomorrow in a noil-Euclidean or
timeless world?" Probably the answer is that we
do not know this; that Kant in fact supposes it
possible (since he believes in immortality) ; but
that it is useless to mix our problems in this way ;
for discussion of the validity of mundane knowl-
edge and of science, the general character of hu-

THE A PRIORI 217

man experience is a datum in the sense of setting
the problem of explanation* But this does not an-
swer the question how, if we should wake up in so
novel a world, we should know that the change was
in us, in the forms of our receptivity, and not
merely in external reality.

We cannot conceive any limits of possible ex-
perience in general. Or to speak more exactly;
the limits of the possibility of experience are the
limits of meaningful conception. "Possibility of
experience" is ambiguous, and "conception" as
that word is ordinarily used, is ambiguous in a
parallel fashion. The sense in which I can con-
ceive a non-Euclidean reality is the sense in which
I can give meaning to an "If then** proposi-
tion in which the "if ** states some intelligible con-
dition and the "then" ascribes some content which
supposedly would be experienced under the con-
ditions of that "if." How abstract and fantastic
such an "if" may become, without losing mean-
ing altogether, and how tenuous the speculatively
conceived reality which is thus ascribed, we have
seen in the previous chapter. But in precisely the
same sense that "reality" is ascribed, in that sense
some possibility of experience is predicated. We
can conceive limits of human experience only by
conceiving the possibility of an experience which
we do not have. When the possibility of experi-
ence is speculative, the reality in question and the
limitations which it transcends are equally specu-

218 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

lative. Where that possibility has some basis in
actual experience, a limitation may be known, but
it is known by generalization from experience and
the prediction of its continuation in all future
experience has precisely and only such assurance
as may attach to empirical generalizations. We
cannot know a priori and with absolute certainty
that any limitation of experience will be perma-
nent. I can and do conceive my individual experi-
ence as limited by certain personal peculiarities
such as near-sightedness and range of auditory
sensibility. But I discover this limitation by com-
parison with other persons and by conceiving
something, which I do not have, as possible experi-
ence intelligibly related to the kind I do have.
Whether such limitation is permanent or tem-
porary, is merely a question for empirical science
to answer; the oculist or aurist may tell me. I
conceive all human experience to be similarly lim-
ited by human sensibility, as compared with that
of some other animal, or perhaps only some
dreamed-of being whose sensibility should be af-
fected by stimuli which affect none of ours. We
cannot literally imagine such experience any
more than the blind man can imagine red ; never-
theless it is not beyond our powers of conception.
It is an identical proposition that no conceivable
experience or reality is beyond our powers of con-
ception.

Let us not forget the issue which is in question.

THE A PRIORI 219

The skeptic asks how we can know that modes of
conception or understanding or interpretation
which are of the mind can be validly imposed upon
an independent reality and all future experience.
The Kantian answer is that the object of knowl-
edge is not independent reality but phenomena,
which are limited by human modes of receptivity,
and that these, in the nature of the case, will hold
for all future experience. This answer is unneces-
sary because we have a much simpler one before
us ; it is an identical proposition that no conceiv-
able experience or reality is beyond our powers of
conception. What is beyond our powers of con-
ception has no meaning; the word which is sup-
posed to denote it is a nonsense syllable. Experi-
ence does not need to be limited in order that we
should be able to understand it ; we can understand
anything in one way or another.

Furthermore, whatever is understood is in some
sense or other conceived as possible of experience.
The very manner in which we attach a meaning,
for example, to "non-Euclidean space" is assur-
ance that if we should experience it we could un-
derstand it. The conception of non-Euclidean
space is a fairly definite one, and the sense in
which it could be understood, if experienced, is
definite in the same measure* Other conceptions of
what transcends actual experience are more tenu-
ous; the ^^possibility 35 of experience which is in
question is more abstract and the meaning of the

220 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

hypothesis is vague in like degree. But what is
absolutely and in every sense beyond the possi-
bility of experience is likewise beyond all mean-
ing. An absolute and a priori limitation of ex-
perience could not be known. The kind of limita-
tions which I attribute to myself or to human
beings in general is the kind which I associate with
sense-organs or some biological characteristic;
and whatever evidence of them there may be is
empirical. We know that we shall never experi-
ence directly certain ranges of vibration because
we have no sense-organs which are affected by
them. But we know this a posteriori only, and with
whatever probability attaches to the continued
correlation between certain sensory apparatus and
certain modes of stimulation, or between our sub-
jective experience and these particular organs.
That our experience will persist in having this
limitation, is probable only, however fantastic the
alternative. If it be asked, "How do we know a
priori that there are certain limits which will
characterize all future experience," the answer is
that we can have no such knowledge. We shall ex-
perience what we shall experience. We might ex-
perience anything you please, imaginable or un-
imaginable, which can be phrased at all. And if
we experienced it, we should proceed to under-
stand it, either by finding a consistent categorial
interpretation or by condemning it as hallucina-
tion (which, after all, would be a categorial un-

THE A PRIORI 221

derstanding of it.) The only limitation which need
be imposed upon possible experience in order that
it may be brought under the categories is the limi-
tation to what can be understood. The alternative
to what can be understood cannot even be phrased.
And what is limited only by nonsense syllables is
not limited at all.

It may be objected: Exactly the contingency
which is supposed to be ruled out by the Kantian
conception is the possibility of a fantastic ex-
perience in which all that order upon which sci-
ence relies, all my knowledge and modes of inter-
pretation, would be worthless. Unless experience
is limited a priori, what rational ground of as-
surance have we that knowledge may not be thus
invalidated? The answer is in part that which the
queen gave in the episode of the wishing carpet:
"If this were real, then it would be a miracle. But
miracles do not happen. Therefore I shall wake
presently. 95 We have no absolute assurance in ad-
vance that our experience at some particular time
in the future will meet the criteria of physical
reality. But we are sure in advance that if it does
not, it will not be experience of the physically real.
Kant creates an artificially difficult problem for
himself by his use of the term "experience" as if
experience and the phenomenally real coincide-
Did the sage of Konigsberg have no dreams 1 In
fact, this procedure is quite usual. We first for-
get all that part of experience which is under-

222 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

stood by being classed as dream or illusion, and
think of "experience 9 ' as something to the content
of which reality must be assigned. We then pro-
ceed when confronted with the skeptic's chal-
lenge to terrify ourselves with the possibility of
an "unintelligible" experience such as any pro-
saically-minded person would immediately dispose
of, if it were reported to him, with the verdict
"dream" or "insane imagination." The categories
are required to cover the totality of experience
only if the categories "dream," "illusion," "hallu-
cination," are included. An a priori principle of
interpretation is not required to bring all experi-
ence within that category whose principle it is.
Precisely what it expresses is the criteria of real-
ity, of a certain type such as the physical. Its
universal applicability to experience is satisfied
if whatever experience does not conform to the
criteria in question can be repudiated as not real
(e. g. 9 not physical reality). Obviously any ex-
perience is intelligible if the absence of certain
types of order mark it as unreal and, therefore,
not in question. And could any one's experience
be understood without repudiating much of it as
non- veridical? A priori principles of categorial
interpretation are required to limit reality; they
are not required to limit experience. The con-
tingency of illusion, dream, or even of insanity
may be real possibilities of future experience ; that
has nothing to do with the validity of the cate-
gories.

THE A PRIORI 223

In this connection, it is also of importance to
raise another and related question: Has it ever
been claimed, or could it reasonably be claimed,
that knowledge of the particular can be a priori?
In the sense that this particular can, and must be,
subsumed under some universal of which knowl-
edge is possible a priori; Yes. But in the sense
that mind, confronted with a given content of
experience, can with absolute certainty refer it to
its proper category, and thus interpret what is
now given in such wise that no further experience
could invalidate that interpretation ; No. The par-
ticular phenomenon may always be non-veridical
or the subject of mistaken apprehension; and
whether it be such, we look to further experience
to reveal. The usual phrasing of our dictum with
respect to the particular might be such as : "This
material object must have mass," or "The sum of
two sides of this triangular plot must be greater
than the third. 55 But the empirical object is al-
ways such that we are capable of being deceived
about its "true nature. 55 This presentation may
not be a real material thing ; the plot may not be
truly triangular. Strictly such knowledge of the
particular is always complex: "This is a material
object and material objects must have mass. 55
"This plot is triangular, and the sum of two sides
of a triangle must be greater than the third. 55 The
first half of these represents the subsumption of
the given under a category ; the last half, a prin-

MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

ciple of that category. Clearly it is the principle
only which is a priori. The interpretation by
which the given is referred to a category is al-
ways such that it may possibly be erroneous; its
validity can never be known with certainty, in-
dependent of all further experience. That the
categories condition experience in the sense of im-
posing on its content an irrevocable order and
connection, or an interpretation not subject to
doubt in the particular case, it is not possible to
believe. The only sense in which categorial in-
terpretation can be a priori is the sense that the
principle of this interpretation is not subject to
recall even if, in the particular case, what is given
should fail to conform. That is a priori which we
can maintain in the face of aU experience no mat-
ter what. In the case of an empirical law, a mere
generalization from experience, if the particular
experience does not fit it, so much the worse for
the "law." But in the case of the categorial prin-
ciple, if experience does not fit it, then so much
the worse for the experience.

The question of the possibility of knowledge a
priori, is not the problem: How can we know in
advance that experience which should not con-
form to our categorial principle is impossible? It
is the problem : How do we know in advance that
if it does not conform to our principle it will not
be veridical, or will not be real in the category
which is in question? The former question can

THE A PRIORI 225

have no answer unless by some impossible dog-
matism about the limitation of experience by a
mind which is itself above or behind experience,
and hence unknowable* And even this hypothesis
of transcendent mind does not assure the perma-
nence of its conditions unless by some further dog-
matism which assumes its continuity unchanged.
The latter question has an obvious answer: We
know that any experience which does not conform
to our categorial principle will not be veridical
because the principle states the criteria of reality
of that categorial type.

If it be asked further: "How do we know, in
these terms, that we may not be presented in ex-
perience with what will not fit into any category
and thus be wholly unintelligible," the answer is
in part by reference to that systematic ambiguity
of the term "reality" which was pointed out in
Chapter I. What is not reality of one sort is
reality of another ; what we do not understand in
one way, we shall understand in another. The
subsumption of the given under the heading
"dream 9 * or "illusion" is itself a categorial inter-
pretation by which we understand certain experi-
ences. Even "the unintelligible" is a sort of cate-
gory, a temporary pigeon-hole in which items are
filed subject to later classification when we have
some further light on them or it becomes more
imperative to understand them. It would be a
hardy soul who would insist that no content of

226 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

experience is unintelligible at the moment when it
is given, or that there is any time-limit on the un-
intelligibility of particular items of experience*
The notion that all content must be immediately
and absolutely intelligible and categorized, in be-
ing admitted to experience, is just one of those
respects in which rationalistic theory is too pretty
to be true.

It might even be suggested, without going be-
yond the bounds of plausibility, that the assump-
tion that nothing can be finally and absolutely
unintelligible, is a sort of ideal of reason, or rep-
resents a willingness to bet on our capacity to
triumph over any apparently chaotic character
of experience and reduce it to some kind of in-
telligible order. Our dictum that no experience
can be intrinsically unintelligible, is saved from
being falsified by experience in general by the
fact that it sets no time-limit on our efforts to
understand, and hence no failure can be final. As
a report of our actual dealings with the given, the
generalization "All experience is understood 55
would be a bit absurd.

It is, however, more important and more just
to observe that intelligibility is always a matter
of degree. Nothing is completely understood. And
some partial interpretation is always possible.
That very repudiation by which the non-veridical
is ruled out from a certain category, is Ttself such
partial interpretation and represents a beginning

THE A PRIORI 227

of our understanding of 'the experience in ques-
tion. Thus the ascription of intelligibility and
unintelligibility is always relative relative to our
present powers and relative to those interests
which make interpretation in some particular way
momentarily important or desirable. With refer-
ence to our present understanding, all experience is
both. The notion that, in categorizing the given,
the mind understands it completely and has done
with it for all time, is an unwarranted assumption
which the Kantian point of view seems to incul-
cate without explicitly making. And it is implausi-
ble as soon as it is mentioned.

Hence if we take the problem of the a priori to
be concerned with our foreknowledge of absolute
limits of the possibilities of all future experience
as such, the question how we can have such knowl-
edge has no valid answer. But if we take it to re-
late to our knowledge in advance of the princi-
ples to which all veridical experience must con-
form, it has an obvious one. The principles of
categorial interpretation are a priori valid of all
possible experience because such principles ex-
press the criteria of the veridical and the real. No
experience could possibly invalidate them, because
any experience not in conformity, which might be
evidence against them, is automatically thrown
out of court as not veridical in that category, and
hence not pertinent to them. Knowledge of such
a priori principles requires only reflective self-

228 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

consciousness because it is simply knowledge of
those criteria which we apply in classifying ex-
perience in one or another fashion, interpreting it
in one or another way. A categorial principle is
a sort of purposive attitude taken in the interests
of understanding and intelligibility with which we
confront the given. It does not preclude any im-
aginable or unimaginable content of experience in
the future, but only precludes our interpreting it
in a fashion contrary to our predetermined atti-
tude or bent.

If any be inclined to press the matter further,
and raise the question how we can be positively
assured that our minds will not alter in these fun-
damental attitudes, I shall reply that we can not
have any such final assurance. And it is not im-
portant that we should. For a theory which re-
fers the a priori to a transcendent, absolute, and
universal mind, this question has its difficulties.
But the theory here presented does not depend on
the hypothesis of such a mind. It is compatible
with the supposition that categorial modes of in-
terpretation may be subject to gradual transition
and even to fairly abrupt alteration. As will be
pointed out in the next chapter, such alteration
in categorial interpretations is a fact of social
history but one which does not have the subver-
sive results which might be imagined. There is no
reason why it may not be a fact of the develop-
ing mind of the individual as well. To be sure, the

THE A PRIORI 229

continuity of fundamental attitudes and purposes
is the core of personality; the supposition that,
without any rationale, these may become altered,
is simply the supposition that a new and abnormal
personality may replace our present one* This is
admittedly possible, but it is not a contingency
against which the theory of knowledge is supposed
to provide*

CHAPTER VIII

THE NATURE OF THE A PRIORI, AND

THE PRAGMATIC ELEMENT IN

KNOWLEDGE

In experience, mind is confronted with the
chaos of the given. In the interest of adaptation
and control, it seeks to discover within or im-
pose upon this chaos some kind of stable order,
through which distinguishable items may become
the signs of future possibilities. Those patterns
of distinction and relationship which we thus seek
to establish are our concepts. These must be de-
termined in advance of the particular experience
to which they apply in order that what is given
may have meaning. Until the criteria of our in-
terpretation have been fixed, no experience could
be the sign of anything or even answer any ques-
tion. Concepts thus represent what mind brings to
experience. That truth which is a priori rises
from the concept itself. This happens in two
ways. In the first place, there is that kind of truth,
exemplified most clearly by pure mathematics,
which represents the elaboration of concepts in
the abstract, without reference to any particular
application to experience. Second, the concept in
its application to the given exhibits the predeter-
mined principles of interpretation, the criteria of

230

THE NATURE OF THE A PRIORI 231

our distinguishing and relating, of classification,
and hence the criteria of reality of any sort. This
is most clearly evident in the case of those basic
concepts, determining major classes of the real,
which may be called the categories, though in less
important ways it holds true of concepts in gen-
eraL

For both these ways in which the truth is fixed,
independently of experience or in advance of it,
it represents the explication or elaboration of the
concept itself. Tlie a priori is not a material truth,
delimiting or delineating tlie content of experience
as such, but is definitive or analytic in its nature.

The a priori as thus definitive or explicative,
representing principles of order and criteria of
the real, meets all the requirements which emerge
from the discussion of the preceding chapter.
Since it is a truth about our own interpretative
attitude, it imposes no limitation upon the future
possibilities of experience; that is a priori which
we can maintain in the face of all experience, come
what will. And although it represents the contri-
bution of the mind itself to knowledge, it does not
require that this mind be universal, absolute, or
a reality of a higher order than the object of its
knowledge. The a priori does not need to be con-
ceived as the inscrutable legislation of a transcen-
dent mind, the objects of which, being limited by
its forms of intuition, are phenomenal only* Hence
the distinction of the legislative mind as ultimate

232 MIND AXD THE WORLD-ORDER

reality from its object which is not thus ultimate,
falls away, and with it the difficulty of knowing the
mind and of recognizing what is a priori as that
which is determined by our own active attitude.
The a priori is knowable simply through the re-
flective and critical formulation of our own prin-
ciples of classification and interpretation. Such
legislation can be recognized as our own act be-
cause the a priori principle which is definitive, and
not a material truth of the content of experience,
lias alternatives. It can be recognized as due to
the mind itself by the ordinary criteria of respon-
sibility in general that a different mode of act-
ing is possible and makes a discoverable difference.
Where there is no possibility of refraining from
our act or acting otherwise, there can be no dis-
coverable activity indeed, there is no act. As
has been pointed out, if what is a priori sprang
from a transcendent mind, acting in unalterable
ways, it never could be known to be our own crea-
tion or distinguished from those facts of life
which are due to the nature of the independent
real. What can be known to be a priori must meet
the apparently contradictory requirements that it
may be known in advance to hold good for all ex-
perience and that it have alternatives. The prin-
ciple of classification or interpretation meets these
requirements, because the alternative to a defini-
tion or a rule is not its falsity but merely its aban-
donment in favor of some other. Thus the deter-

THE NATURE OP THE A PRIORI 233

mination of the a priori is in some sense like free
choice and deliberate action*

This meets also another difficulty which will al-
ready have presented itself to the reader. If the a
priori is something made by mind, mind may also
alter it. There will be no assurance that what is a
priori will remain fixed and absolute throughout
the history of the race or for the developing indi-
vidual. From the point of view here presented,
this is no difficulty at all but the explanation of
an interesting historical fact* The rationalist
prejudice of an absolute human reason, universal
to all men and to all time, has created an artifi-
cially exalted and impossible conception of the
categories as fixed and unalterable modes of mind.
One result has been to limit the usefulness of the
conception, so that what we could call, in ordinary
parlance, "the categories of physics" or "the cate-
gories of biology" would not serve as examples of
4fi the categories" because it is obvious that the
fundamental principles and concepts of any nat-
ural science change progressively with its devel-
opment. This, in turn, has served to obscure the
large and important part played in science by
that element of categorial order which cannot be
determined by merely empirical fact but must be
provided by the scientist himself in his setting of
the problem and fixing the criteria by which the
meaning of experimental findings is to be inter-
preted. Thus the most impressive examples of hu-

234 MIXD A^T) THE WORLD-ORDER

man knowledge have been too little drawn upon
in discussions of epistemology.

The assumption that our categories are fixed
for all time by an original human endowment, is
a superstition comparable to the belief of primi-
tive peoples that the general features of their life
and culture are immemorial and of supernatural
origin. The grand divisions of our thought-world
differ from those of our early ancestors as our
modern machines differ from their primitive
artifacts and our geographical and astronomical
outlook from their world bounded by a distant
mountain range or the pillars of Hercules and
shut up under the bowl of the sky. Certain fun-
damental categories are doubtless very ancient
and permanent: thing and property , cause and
effect, mind and body, and the relations of valid
inference, doubtless have their counterparts wher-
ever and whenever the human mind has existed.
But even here, the supposition of complete iden-
tity and continuity is at variance with facts which
should be obvious.

For all primitive peoples, for example, and for
some who distinctly are not primitive, the prop-
erties of a thing are not localized in time and
space, as for us. Almost anything may be a talis-
man or fetish, whose action takes place (without
intermediaries) at a distance and in a time pos-
terior to its destruction by fire or by being eaten.
Things also have doubles, inscrutably operating

THE NATURE OF THE A PRIORI 235

in that other-world whose influence mysteriously
interpenetrates the realm which we call "nature."
Furthermore, the long-persistent problem in phys-
ics of action at a distance increasingly comes back
to haunt us and to unite with new problems of
physical interpretation which threaten to drive
us once more to dissipate the "material thing"
throughout all time and space; to find its mani-
festation and even its very being in a spatio-tem-
poral spread of events indefinitely extended.

That the present distinction of mind and body
corresponds only roughly with that division in an-
cient thought ; that body of inert matter and mind
which does not occupy space are no older than the
advent of that esoteric doctrine which dawned in
Europe with the Greek mysteries and Christian-
ity this can hardly escape us. This mode of dis-
tinction contrasts with the tripartite division into
body, mind, and spirit, and with the five-fold and
Tfc-fold divisions of more easterly cultures. It is
also obvious that the pressure of modern science
in the field of biology and our present uneasiness
about this twofold nature of the individual, augur
some departure from the clarity of Cartesian
dualism.

The names of our categories may be very old
and stable, but the concepts^ the modes of clas-
sifying and interpreting which they represent,
undergo progressive alteration with the advance
of thought.

236 MISD AXD THE WORLD-ORDER

Probably tliose modes of thought embodied in
logic and in the forms of language are more fun-
damental than others. And very likely what we
recognize as explicit categories are always super-
ficial as compared with more deep-lying forms
which only the persistent and imaginative student
can catch, in some vague and fleeting insight, be-
cause they are so nearly the marrow of our being
and so all-pervasive that they can hardly be
phrased in significant expression. These go back
to the point where mind is continuous with the ob-
jective and indistinguishable from it. For we can
know our own nature only in so far as we com-
prehend or vaguely imagine what it would mean
to be other than we are* We can recognize the
presence of mind only where mind makes a dis-
coverable difference. If we should think of mind
as what the rationalists suppose superimposing
on reality a rigid mask of form outside which
mind itself could never catch a glimpse then this
altogether universal and un-get-overable form
could never become self-conscious. It would re-
main in Fichte's phrase the "Great Thought
which no man has ever thought." It would be not
of mind but of the objective reality; it would be
the Absolute which forever conditions but never
can be known. But the idealistic rationalist can
not eat his cake and have it too ; the mind which
can be recognized as such is ipso facto finite and
limited by discoverable bounds. That mind is thus

THE NATURE OF THE A PRIORI 237

continuous with the finally mysterious the is-ness
of what is we must of course grant; in the con-
templation of mind we contemplate one aspect of
the Great Fact in the presence of wiiich all ex-
plicit thought is silenced. But the categories are
not the form of that which, having no alternative
and no bounds, is formless. They are the explicit
bounds of that which, if it transcend them, must
fall into some other category. They are di-
visions within the comprehensible in general, but
not the shape of comprehensibility itself*

It will be well to make clear that the concep-
tion here presented does not imply that because
the a priori is something made by mind and capa-
ble of alteration, it is therefore arbitrary in the
sense of being capriciously determined. That it is
not, and cannot be, determined by the given,
does not imply that it answers to no criteria what-
ever. That type of a priori truth which pure
mathematics illustrates that is, the elaboration
of concepts in abstraction from all questions of
particular applications answers only to the cri-
teria of self -consistency. Just to the extent that
the development of such a purely analytic sys-
tem is withdrawn from every consideration of use-
ful application, its truth is simply truth to the
original meanings embodied in its basic concepts.
But when concepts are intended to be applied in
experience, and a priori principles are to deter-
mine modes of classification and interpretation.

238 MIND AXD THE WORLD-ORDER

the case is different. Here mind is still uncom-
pelled by any possible content of experience. But
knowledge has a practical business to perform, the
interests of action which it seeks to serve. The
mode of the mind's activity answers to our need
to understand, in the face of an experience al-
ways more or less baffling, and of our need to
control* There is also another factor which helps
to determine what modes of attempted compre-
hension will be most easily and most widely use-
ful. While that absolute human reason which the
rationalist supposes to be completely and univer-
sally possessed by every human is a myth, never-
theless man, being a species of animal, has char-
acteristics which mark him as such, and some of
these at least are reflected in the bent of human
thought. Some modes of thought are simpler and
come more naturally to us than others which still
are possible and which might, indeed, be called
upon if an enlarged experience should sufficiently
alter our problems just as some modes of bodily
translation are more easy and natural, though
these may be somewhat altered when the environ-
ment includes a sufficient number of automobiles
and airplanes. Moreover, the fundamental like-
ness in our modes of thought, which represents
whatever community of nature marks our original
mental endowment, is continually enhanced by the
fact that the needs of individual humans are
mostly served by cooperation with others. "The

THE NATURE OF THE A PRIORI 239

human mind" is distinctly a social product, and
our categories will reflect that fact.

In brief, while the a priori is dictated neither
by what is presented in experience nor by any
transcendent and eternal factor of human nature,
it still answers to criteria of the general type
which may be termed pragmatic. The human ani-
mal with his needs and interests confronts an ex-
perience in which these must be satisfied, if at all.
Both the general character of the experience and
the nature of the animal will be reflected in the
mode of behavior which marks this attempt to
realize his ends. This will be true of the cate-
gories of his thinking as in other things. And
here, as elsewhere, the result will be reached by a
process in which attitudes tentatively assumed,
disappointment in the ends to be realized, and
consequent alteration of behavior will play their
part.

Confirmation of this conception of the a priori
could only come from comprehensive and detailed
examination of at least the major categories of
thought and the underlying principles of com-
mon-sense and scientific explanation. Such a task
cannot be undertaken here; at most only a few
illustrations can be offered with the hope that they
are typical.

The paradigm of the a priori in general is the
definition. It has always been clear that the sim-
plest and most obvious case of truth, which can

240 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

be known in advance of experience is the explica-
tive proposition and those consequences of defini-
tion which can be derived by purely logical analy-
sis. These are necessarily true, true under all
possible circumstances, because definition is legis-
lative. Not only is the meaning assigned to words
more or less a matter of choice that considera-
tion is relatively trivial but the manner in which
the precise classifications which definition embod-
ies shall be affected, is something not dictated by
experience. If experience were other than it is, the
definition and its corresponding classification
might be inconvenient, useless, or fantastic, but
it could not be false. Mind makes classifications
and determiiies meanings; in so doing, it creates
that truth without which there could be no other
truth*

Traditionally propositions which have been
recognized as analytic have often not been classed
with the a priori; they have been regarded as too
unimportant; sometimes they have even been re-
pudiated as not truth at all but merely verbal
statements- The main reasons for this cavalier at-
titude have been two; in the first place, it has
been, overlooked that the real itself is a matter of
definition and that the dichotomy of real and un-
real is that first and basic classification which the
mind confronted with experience must make. And
second, the powerful sweep and consequence of
purely logical analysis has not been understood.

THE NATURE OF THE A PRIORI 241

The clearest example of this power of analysis
is to be found, of course, in mathematics. The his-
torical importance of mathematics as a paradigm
of a priori truth needs no emphasis- Almost one
may say that traditional conceptions of the a
priori are the historical shadow of Euclidean
geometry. But in mathematics much water has
gone under the bridge since the time of Kant, and
in the light of the changes which have come about,
these traditional conceptions are proved totally
impossible. The course of this development will be
familiar to the reader; only the outstanding fea-
tures of it need be mentioned.

Though there are anticipations of current
mathematical conceptions as far back as Plato,
the movement which led to their present accep-
tance dates principally from the discovery of the
non-Euclidean geometries. In developing these
systems, it was obviously impossible to depend on
intuitions of space, either pure or empirical. If
Euclid is true of our space, then no one of these
geometries can be; and if Euclid is not true and
certain, then the main ground of the supposi-
tion that we can rely on intuitions of the spatial
is discredited.* Hence in developing the non-
Euclidean systems, all constructions such as help-
ing-lines, and any step in proof which should de-

*Euclid and a non-Euclidean system cannot both be true of space
while corresponding denotations of terms are maintained. The dis-
covery that they may both become true of space -with systematic
difference in the denotation of terms played its part in the logic of
modern geometry.

242 ^IIXD AND THE WORLD-ORDER

pend not upon pure logic but upon the character
of space must be dispensed with. If a step in proof
cannot be taken by rigorous logic alone, it can-
not be taken at all. When it was found thus pos-
sible to develop the non-Euclidean systems with-
out appeal to any extra-logical aids, a similar re-
vision of Euclid was carried out, eliminating all
explicit or implicit reliance upon constructions,
superpositions or other appeal to spatial intui-
tion. This new method, together with certain in-
dicated generalizations, constituted the so-called
4t modern geometry.' 5

Next it was demonstrated that not only geome-
try but other branches as well can be developed by
the deductive method, from a relatively few as-
sumptions, and likewise without reliance upon
empirical data. As a result all pure mathematics
is found to be abstract, in the sense of being in-
dependent of any particular application. Because
if all the theorems follow logically from the defini-
tions and postulates, then we can alter at will what
we let the terms, such as "point" and "line," de-
note without in the least disturbing any step in
the proofs. Whatever "point" and "line" may
mean, given these assumptions about them, these
consequences the rest of the system must also
hold of them, since the theorems follow from the
assumptions by rigorous and purely logical de-
duction.

The question of the truth of the mathematical

THE NATURE OF THE A PRIORI 243

S3 r stem in application was thus complete!}- sepa-
rated from its mathematical or logical integrity.
Still further changes went along with this. The
"truth'* of initial assumptions lost all meaning in
any other sense than their exhibition of certain
patterns of logical relationship to be adhered to
throughout. The distinguishing assumptions of a
non-Euclidean geometry, for example, so far
from being self-evident, were supposedly mere ar-
bitrary falsehoods with respect to their most ob-
vious empirical denotation. The term "axiom" was
replaced by "postulate" or "primitive proposi-
tion.' 5 In the interest of logical simplicity alterna-
tive sets of assumptions which would give the
same system of propositions were investigated.
What should be initially assumed and what proved
became a question merely of such logical simplic-
ity. It became customary to speak of the truth of
mathematics as hypothetical or to say that what
mathematics asserts is only the relation of impli-
cation between postulates and theorems. It is truth
about certain patterns of logical relationship es-
tablished by initial definition or postulate.

Further, it became clear that the distinction be-
tween those assumptions of the form called "defini-
tions" and those termed "postulates" was relatively
arbitrary and unimportant. Logically it mates
little difference except for simplicity of proced-
ure, how far the order of a system is set up by
propositions in which "is" means logical equiva-

244 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

lence and how far by those in which it means only
the one-way implication of concepts or subsump-
tion of classes. Since the content of the concepts
of pure mathematics is simply that order to which
they give rise, that manner of development in
which essential relationships are exhibited as the
definitive meaning of the concepts is truest to the
nature of the subject.

The completion of this last refinement of math-
ematical method was made by Whitehead and
Russell in "Principia Mathematical* It was here
proved that the initial assumptions of mathe-

"This development is still too recent for the exact bearing of its
consequences to be clear in all respects. Points concerning which there
may be some doubt are as follows:

(1) Can this method, without alteration, be completely carried out
In geometrical branches? Some concepts needed in geometry are
dealt with in volume HI, but volume IV, which was to complete this
subject, has not appeared.

(2) There are certain assumptions, such as the "axion of infinity"
which appear as hypotheses to some theorems which, apparently, re-
quire diem. It is not known whether this procedure is entirely avoid-
able without abandoning certain classes of theorems which have then?
place in usual mathematical developments.

(3) Consistency and independence are of the essence of mathe-
matics, since^they concern its logical integrity, apart from all ques-
tions of application. It is possible to think, in view of usual mathe-
matical procedures, that tests of consistency and independence in-
volve implicit appeal to intuition or to applications. By the method
of "Principia*' it is not clear how it is possible to deal with such
problems. Independence proofs have been applied to logistic systems
by N. Bernays and others, but only by a reversion to those familiar
devices the logic of which is precisely the point in question. Professor
H. M. Sheffer has offered a general method for testing consistency
and independence without reference to any possible application (See
his "General Theory of Notational Relativity," privately circulated).
The method of dealing with usual branches in this way must wait
upon his further publication.

^ W^It is questionable whether logistic methods employed in "Prin-
cipxa" are in all respects acceptable as "proof" and whether they do
not, in certain ways, import illicit assumptions of "existence." But
if there are defects of this sort, it is highly probable that they ate
avoidable.

THE NATURE OF THE A PRIORI 245

matics can all be dispensed with, except the defini-
tions. The truths of mathematics follow merely
from definitions which exhibit the meaning of its
concepts, by purely logical deduction. Judgment
of such mathematical truth is, thus, completely
and exclusively analytic; no synthetic judgment,
a priori or otherwise, is requisite to knowledge of
pure mathematics. The content of the subject con-
sists entirely of the rigorous logical analysis of
abstract concepts, in entire independence of all
data of sense or modes of intuition. The defini-
tions which embody these concepts are not re-
quired to be true in any other sense than that
they should be precise and clear ; the formulation
of them represents an act of mind which is legis-
lative or creative and in some sense arbitrary; it
answers to no criteria save self -consistency and
adequacy to whatever purposes the elaboration of
the system itself may be supposed to satisfy* It
may still be true that "concepts without precepts
are empty,' 5 but it must be granted that there is
a kind of knowledge of "empty" concepts. Or at
least such admission can be avoided only by a re-
striction of the term "knowledge" to exclude pure
mathematics and logic. The importance of such
a priori analytic knowledge is witnessed by the
basic character of these subjects for all other sci-
ences.

Pure mathematics stands between logic on the
one side and the empirical application of mathe-

246 ilEsD AXD THE WORLD-ORDER

matics on the other. Logic is in some respects the
illustration par excellence of the a priori, since its
laws are the most completely general of any. The
laws of logic cannot be proved unless they should
first be taken for granted as the principles of
their own demonstration. They make explicit the
basic principles of all interpretation and of our
general modes of classification. And they impose
no limitation upon the content of experience.
Sometimes we are asked to tremble before the
specter of the "alogical" in order that we may
thereafter rejoice that we are saved from this by
the dependence of reality upon mind. But the
"alogical" is pure bogey, a word without a mean-
ing. What kind of experience could defy the prin-
ciple that everything must either be or not be,
that nothing can both be and not be, or that if
X is Y and Y is Z, then X is Z? If anything im-
aginable or unimaginable could violate such, laws,
then the ever-present fact of change would do it
every day* The laws of logic are purely formal;
they forbid nothing but what concerns the use of
terms and the corresponding modes of classifica-
tion and analysis. The law of contradiction tells
us that nothing can be both white and not white,
but it does not and can not tell us whether black
is not white or soft or square is not white. To dis-
cover what contradicts what we must turn to more
particular considerations. Similarly the law of the
excluded middle formulates our decision that

THE NATURE OF THE A PRIORI 247

whatever is not designated by a certain term shall
be designated by its negative. It declares our pur-
pose to make, for every name, a complete dichot-
omy of experience, instead as we might choose
of classifying on the basis of a tripartite di-
vision into opposites and a middle ground between
the two. Our rejection of such tripartite division
represents only our penchant for simplicity and
similar considerations*

Further laws of logic are of like significance.
They are principles of procedure, the parliamen-
tary rules of intelligent thought and action. Such
laws are independent of the given because they
impose no limitations whatever upon it. They are
legislative because they are addressed to ourselves
because definition, classification, and inference
represent no operation in the world of things, but
only our categorial attitudes of mind.

Furthermore, the ultimate criteria of the laws
of logic are pragmatic. Indeed, how could they
be anything else? The truth of logic is not ma-
terial truth but a truth about the modes of self-
consistency. Since this is so, logic must be the test
of its own consistency, and hence of its own truth,
as well as the test of the consistency of everything
else. But if logic tests its own truth, then what
can be the test of truth in a genuine issue of logic,
which is not a question of mere inadvertance on
one side or the other? Those who suppose that
there is a logic which everyone would agree to if

248 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

he understood it and understood himself, are more
optimistic than those versed in the history of logi-
cal discussion have a right to be. The fact is that,
as was pointed out in the preceding chapter, there
are several logics, markedly different, each self-
consistent in its own terms and such, that who-
ever, using it, avoids false premises, will never
reach a false conclusion, Mr. Russell, for exam-
ple, bases his logic on an implication relation such
that if twenty sentences be cut from a newspaper
and put in a hat, and then two of these be drawn
at random, one of them will certainly imply the
other, and it is an even chance that the implica-
tion will be mutual. Yet upon a foundation so re-
mote from ordinary modes of inference the whole
structure of "Principia Mathematica" is built.
This logic is utterly self -consistent and valid in
its own terms. There are others even more strange
of which the same may be said.* Genuine issues
of logic are those which stand above such ques-
tions of the merely self -critical integrity of the
logical system. There are such issues, and these
cannot be determined nay, cannot even be ar-
gued except on pragmatic grounds of human
bent and intellectual convenience. That we have
been blind to this fact, and that much good paper
and ink has been wasted by logicians who have
tried to argue on some other grounds what are
only questions of convenience or of value, itself

*See p. 209, footnote.

THE NATURE OF THE A PRIORI 249

reflects traditional errors in the conception of the
a priori.

Pure mathematics and logic exemplify that
type of the a priori which have the highest de-
gree of abstraction from experience whose con-
cepts are so general that we may call them
"empty." Concerning these, there may be a ques-
tion whether there will not be issues of an entirely
different sort when we attempt to apply them in
experience. One may say, for example, that when
geometry becomes abstract and freed from all
necessary reference to our intuitions of the spa-
tial, the question of the truth about space be-
comes an entirely separate one, and one with re-
spect to which there must be reference to forms
of intuition or something of the sort, or there will
be nothing which is determinable a priori at all.
Similarly one may say that if arithmetic as a
purely abstract deductive system has no necessary
reference to the character of countable objects,
then its a priori truth is of no value for the an-
ticipation of the behavior of concrete things. This
will be true, of course, and of importance. If
there should be a priori truth only with respect to
concepts in utter abstraction from experience, and
if this a priori character were to vanish when
these concepts are given a concrete denotation,
then the significance of the a priori for the nat-
ural sciences and for common practice would be
largely, if not completely, lost.

250 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

But there is an a priori truth of concepts which
have concrete denotation. Let us consider the ex-
ample of arithmetic. Arithmetic depends In toto
upon the operation of counting or correlating, a
procedure which can be carried out in any world
containing identifiable things, regardless of the
further characters of experience. Mill challenged
this a priori character of arithmetic. He asked us
to suppose a demon sufficiently powerful and
maleficent so that every time two things were
brought together with two other things, this
demon should always introduce a fifth. The con-
clusion which he supposed to follow is that under
such circumstances 2 -f 2 = 5 would be a univer-
sal law of arithmetic. But Mill was quite mis-
taken. In such a world we should be obliged to
become a little clearer than is usual about the
distinction between arithmetic and physics, that
is all. If two black marbles were put in the same
box with two white ones, the demon could take his
choice of colors, but it would be evident that there
were more black marbles or more white ones than
were put in. The same would be true of all ob-
jects in any wise identifiable. We should simply
find ourselves in the presence of an extraordinary
physical law, which we should recognize as uni-
versal in our world, that whenever two things were
brought into proximity with two others, an addi-
tional and similar thing was always created by
the process. Mill's world would be physically most

THE NATURE OF THE A PRIORI 251

extraordinary. The world's work would be enor-
mously facilitated if hats or locomotives or tons
of coal could be thus multiplied by anyone pos-
sessed originally of two pairs. But the laws of
mathematics would not be affected- It is because
this is true that arithmetic is a priori. Its laws
prevent nothing; they are compatible with any-
thing which happens or could conceivably happen
in nature. They are true in any possible world.
Mathematical addition is not a physical trans-
formation. The only bringing together it implies
is in the mind; if translation in general affected
numerical alteration, we should always count
things in $itu y but we should count and add as
usual. Physical changes which result in an in-
crease or decrease of the countable things involved
are matters of everyday occurrence. Such physi-
cal processes present us with phenomena in which
the purely mathematical has to be separated out
by analysis. It is because we shall always separate
out that part of the phenomenon not in conf ormi-
ity with arithmetic and designate it by some other
category physical change, chemical reaction, op-
tical illusion that arithmetic is a priori. Its laws
constitute criteria of our categorial classification
and interpretation. As this example serves to
illustrate, such categorial interpretation of the
concrete and empirical throws out of court what-
ever would otherwise violate the a priori princi-
ples which embody the category, but it does not

252 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

thereby legislate anything phenomenal out of ex-
istence.

Perhaps, however, we have gone too far. Mill's
illustration is of an alteration of experience in
general which is too simple and too poorly car-
ried out to make it plausible that our categorial
interpretation would be different in such a world.
But if translation in general affected numerical
alteration then an entirely different mode of cate-
gorial interpretation might better serve the pur-
poses. Our present categories would not could
not be prohibited but other modes might more
simply reduce the phenomenal to order and facili-
tate control. Or in such a world, arithmetic might
be confined to mental phenomena since these
would be exempt from the effects of change of
place and numerical principles would be laws of
psychology. If we were jelly-fish in a liquid world,
we should probably not add at all, because the
useful purposes served by such conceptions would
be so slight. Still if some super-jelly-fish should
invent arithmetic by a jeu d'esprit (as Hamilton
invented quaternions) he would find nothing in
any possible experience to controvert it, and he
might with some profit apply it to his own dis-
tinct ideas.

The ideal illustration of the a priori in applied
geometry would be a consideration of physical
relativity, showing how geometrical truth may
turn upon the place where the dividing line is

THE NATURE OF THE A PRIORI 253

drawn between the properties of space and those
of matter. Applied geometrical principles are a
priori true of all space-filling things. But this
a priori truth has its pragmatic aspect since there
are these alternatives about the manner in which
the category of "the spatial 55 shall be bounded.
But to carry out this illustration in detail would
be beyond my competence,*

Incidentally it may be pointed out that the
ideas which have gained currency through rela-
tivity-theory make clear the nature of Kant's mis-
takes in the supposition of a limited form of
spatial intuition. For Kant, the spatial or geomet-
rical has to do with relations of the simultaneous ;
the shape of a triangle, for example, is something
instantaneously imaginable. But for celestial tri-
angles, such instantaneous intuition has no mean-
ing; what exists or happens at a distance is not
directly verifiable here and now; a passage of
something through time, as well as space, is inex-
tricably bound up with the determintion of the
distant fact* Hence the imagination of a "curved-
space*' need not mean something like flattening
out a hemisphere without disturbing the relations
of great circles on its surface. It means only im-
agining certain uniform sequences to characterize
our experience of the spatial under certain condi-
tions. The "unimaginable 55 character of curved-

*The reader may also be referred to Poincare's " Science and Hypo-
thesis," the section on " Space and Geometry/*

254 MESD AND THE WORLD-ORDER

space In the sense that we cannot visualize a non-
Euclidean triangle on the blackboard, has noth-
ing to do with the matter. Triangles on different
scales have different "shapes" in non-Euclidean
space, and triangles big enough to "verify" the
nature of space are too big to "imagine." Our an-
cestors who believed the earth was flat could cer-
tainly "imagine" a non-Eucidean space, in the
only sense which is required, since the geometry
of the earth's surface is (in an obvious sense)
Riemannian.

The a priori element in natural sciences goes
much deeper than might be supposed. All order
of sufficient importance to be worthy of the name
of law depends eventually upon some ordering by
mind. Without initial principles by which we guide
our attack upon the welter of experience, it would
remain forever chaotic and refractory. In every
science there are fundamental laws wiiicli are a
priori because they formulate just such definitive
concepts or categorial tests by which alone inves-
tigation becomes possible.

A good example of this is to be found in Ein-
stein's little book "Relativity."* The question un-
der discussion is the criteria of simultaneity for
events at a distance. Suppose the lightning strikes
a railroad track at two places, A and B. How
shall we tell whether these events happen at the
same time? "We . . . require a definition of simul-
taneity such that this definition supplies us with

*Pp. 26-28: italics axe the author's.

THE NATURE OF THE A PRIORI 255

a method by which ... we can decide whether or
not the lightning strokes occurred simultaneously-
As long as this requirement is not satisfied, I allow
myself to be deceived as a physicist (and of course
the same applies if I am not a physicist) when I
imagine that I am able to attach a meaning to the
statement of simultaneity* . . .

"After thinking the matter over for some time
3 T ou then offer the following suggestion with which
to test simultaneity. By measuring along the rails,
the connecting line A B should be measured up
and an observer placed at the mid-point M of the
distance A B. This observer should be supplied
with an arrangement (e. g., two mirrors inclined
at 90) which allows him visually to observe both
places A and B at the same time. If the observer
perceives the two flashes at the same time, they are
simultaneous.

"I am very pleased with this suggestion, but
for all that I cannot regard the matter as quite
settled, because I feel constrained to raise the fol-
lowing objection: Tour definition would certainly
be right, if I only knew that the light by means
of which the observer at M perceives the lighting
flashes travels along the length A-M with the
same velocity as along the length B M . But an
examination of this supposition would only be pos-
sible if we already had at our disposal the means
of measuring time. It would thus appear as though
we were moving here in a logical circle**

"After further consideration you cast a some-

256 MEtt) AND THE WORLD-ORDER

what disdainful glance at me and rightly so
and you declare: *I maintain my previous defini-
tion nevertheless because in reality it assumes
nothing whatever about light. There is only one
demand to be made of the definition of simultane-
ity, namely, that in every real case it must supply
us with an empirical decision as to whether or not
the conception which has to be defined is fulfilled.
That light requires the same time to traverse the
path AM. as for the path BM is in reality
neither a supposition nor a hypothesis about the
physical nature of light, but a stipulation which
I can make of my own free-will in order to arrive
at a definition of simultaneity.' . . . We are thus
led to a definition of *time ? in physics."

As this example well illustrates, we cannot even
ask the questions which discovered law would an-
swer until we have first by a priori stipulation
formulated definitive criteria. Such concepts are
not verbal definitions nor classifications merely;
they are themselves laws which prescribe a certain
behavior to whatever is thus named. Such defini-
tive laws are a priori ; only so can we enter upon
the investigation by which further laws are
sought. Yet it should also be pointed out that such
a priori laws are subject to abandonment if the
structure which is built upon them does not suc-
ceed in simplifying our interpretation of phe-*
nomena. If, in the illustration given, the relation
"simultaneous with*" as defined, should not prove

THE NATURE OF THE A PRIORI 257

transitive if event A should prove simultaneous
with B and B with C, but not A with C this defi-
nition would certainly be rejected.

Indeed all definitions and all concepts exercise
this function of prescribing fundamental law to
whatever they denote, because everything which
has a name is to be identified with certainty only
over some stretch of time. The definition provides
criteria of the thing defined which, in application,
become necessary or essential laws of its behavior.
This is especially evident in the case of scientific
definitions because the "things" of science are of
a deep-lying sort, representing uniformities of be-
havior of a high order.* If definition is unsuccess-
ful, as early scientific definitions mostly have been,
it is because the classification thus set up corre-
sponds with no natural cleavage and does not cor-
relate with sufficiently important uniformities of
behavior. Early attempts to reduce phenomena to
law are based upon the "things" of common-sense
which represent classification according to proper-
ties which are relatively easy of direct observation
and impressive to the senses. When such attempts
fail, it is largely because of this superficiality of
initial classification. The alchemist's definitions of
the elements, for example, are the clue to his in-
different success ; the definitive properties pick out
amorphous groups which have little significance
of further uniformity. Not until such crucial

*See Appendix A.

258 MIXD AXD THE WORLD-ORDER

properties as combining weights become the basis
of classification is it possible to arrive at satisfac-
tory laws of chemistry. The earlier definitions can
not be said to have been false; they were merely
useless, or insufficient to the purposes in hand. A
large part of the scientific search is, thus, for
things wortJi naming.

We have reached a point today where we un-
derstand that the typical procedure of science is
neither deduction from what is self-evident nor
relatively certain nor direct generalization from
experience. If any one method is more charac-
teristic of science than another it is that of hy-
pothesis and verification. But we seem still to over-
look the fact that the terms in which "hypothesis
and law are framed themselves represent a scien-
tific achievement. We still suffer from the delusion
that fixed and eternal categories of human thought
on the one side are confronted with equally fixed
and given "things*' on the other. Is it not obvious,
to dispassionate observation, that scientific cate-
gories and classifications are subject to progres-
sive modification or even abrupt alteration, and
that these have a directive and controlling influ-
ence upon the other phases of scientific research?
And here too, as in hypothesis and verification, the
development takes place, not by logical derivation
from antecedent principles nor by direct formula-
tion of empirical content, but by the hazarding of
something by the mind and Its retention or re-

THE NATURE OF THE A PRIORI 259

pudiation according to the success or non-success
of what is based upon it. The test of success here
is not, however, simple conformity with experi-
ences as in the testing of hypothesis, but is the
achievement of intelligible order amongst the phe-
nomena in question, and responds also to such
criteria as intellectual simplicity, economy, and
comprehensiveness of principle.

The reader will perhaps feel that, in so far as
this is true, what is here represented as a priori
is nothing of the sort but is merely something that
we learn from experience. But if so, I hope that
he will reread the illustration from Einstein, with
due regard for the logic of it. However much the
give and take between the purposes of science and
discovered fact may contribute to alter the pro-
cedure by which those aims are sought, and may
induce new basic principles and categories, still
the naming, classifying, defining activity is at
each step prior to the investigation. We cannot
even interrogate experience without a network of
categories and definitive concepts. Until our mean-
ings are definite and our classifications are fixed,
experience cannot conceivably determine anything.
We must first be in possession of criteria which
tell us what experience would answer what ques-
tions, and how, before observation or experiment
could tell us anything.

The uniformities which science seeks are of a
high order and represent a further reach of those

260 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

same purposes exhibited on a humbler scale by the
uniformities of common sense comprehension. The
categorizing and classifying activity of thought
is, thus, more deliberate and self-conscious in the
case of science and, by comparison, easier to ob-
serve than in the case of common sense. Because
scientific categories are in some part built upon
more basic distinction, the functioning of them as
criteria of the real is less frequent and perhaps
less important. It is, nevertheless, sometimes to be
observed in the interplay between new principles
of scientific interpretation and residual phenomena
which are unexplained or reports of observation
which are regarded as possibly involving error.
If Rontgen had been unable to repeat the experi-
ence in which he first saw the bones of his hand,
that perception would have been discredited. Be-
cause no one but their discoverer could see the
"N-rays" with any assurance, and it was found
that he saw them when the refracting prism was
removed as well as with it, they were discarded as
illusory. The phenomena of hypnotism remained
for a long time in the limbo of the dubious, and
even today offer a difficult problem of separation
of veridical phenomenon from illusion, self-decep-
tion and the like. The phenomena of "dual per-
sonality" would challenge a very fundamental
category if only there were not so much doubt
about what it is that is "dual** and whether it is
genuinely dual. To choose a different sort of ex-

THE NATURE OF THE A PRIORI 261

ample, when the eclipse-photographs which fig-
ured in the discussion of relativity were examined*
the question was raised whether the star-displace-
ments as measured on them represented simply
the bending of light-rays or were due in part to
halation of the sensitive film. Thus, for a moment
at least, so fundamental a problem as that of
abandoning the categories of independent space
and time was intertwined with the question whether
the position of dots on a photographic plate rep-
resented authentic star-photographs or was due to
something which took place inside the camera.

What needs to be observed here is at once the
continuity of scientific problems of a high order
with the apparently simple and fundamental cri-
teria of the real, and the fact that such decisions
of reality or unreality are themselves interpreta-
tions involving principles of the same order as
scientific law. They are such as forbid, for ex-
ample, the non-biological transformations and
non-physical successions which occur in dreams.
A mouse which disappears where there is no hole,
is no real mouse ; a landscape which recedes as we
approach, is but illusion. The reality of an object
of a particular sort is determined by a certain
uniformity of its behavior in experience. The for-
mulation of this uniformity is of the type of natu-
ral law. So far, such laws are a priori f or this
particular sort of thing; the experience which fails
to conform to the law is repudiated as non-veridi-
cal.

262 MIXD AND THE WORLD-ORDER

This situation is most paradoxical; principles
of the order of natural law are reached by some
generalization from experience that is, from ve-
ridical experience; there are no generalizations
whatever to be had from the unsorted experience
of real and unreal both. But what experience is
veridical, is determined by the criterion of law.
Which is first, then; does the content of experi-
ence validate the law or does the law validate the
experience in attesting its veridical character?
The answer is that the law is first precisely so long
as and so far as we are prepared to maintain it
as criterion of the real. But the "reality" which
is in question is likely to be of a highly specific
sort. The authentic photograph of stars and the
picture affected by halation, for example, are both
real, both physically real, both photographs even,
in a certain sense. What is an "authentic photo-
graph;" has to be very precisely defined in the
case in point and is so defined as to exclude the
effect of light reflection from the back of the
glass of the photographic plate. The manner of
this definition or classification obviously will re-
quire a correlation of photograph and thing
photographed of the type set forth in certain
physical laws. In the particular case, failure to
exhibit such lawful relationship condemns the phe-
nomenon as not authentic or not jeal that is, not
really this very specific sort of thing.

Thus all concepts, and not simply those we

THE NATURE OF THE A PRIORI 263

should call "categories,'* function as criteria of
reality. Every criterion of classification is cri-
terion of reality of some particular sort. There is
no such thing as reality in general; to be real, a
thing must be a particular sort of real. Further-
more, what is a priori criterion of reality in one
connection may be merely empirical law in some
other for example, the law correlating photo-
graph and thing photographed, or the law of the
behavior of solid bodies in translation which con-
demns the mouse that disappears without a hole,
or the laws of perspective which exclude a land-
scape which recedes as we approach it. The de-
termination of reality, ike classification of phe-
nomena, and the discovery of law, all grow up
together. I will not repeat what has already been
said so often about the logical priority of criteria ;
but it should be observed that this is entirely com-
patible with the shift of categories and classifica-
tions with the widening of human experience. If
the criteria of the real are a priori, that is not to
say that no conceivable character of experience
would lead to alteration of them.

For example, spirits cannot be photographed.
But if photographs of spiritistic phenomena,
taken under properly guarded conditions, should
become sufficiently frequent, this a priori dictum
would be called in question. What we should do
would be to redefine our terms. Whether "spook"
was spirit or matter, whether the definition of

264 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

"spirit 55 or of "matter" should be changed; all
this would constitute one interrelated problem.

What would prove to you that the relative mo-
tion of a body effected a foreshortening of it and
altered its mass? If the answer is "no conceivable
experience'* and you are able to formulate a defi-
nition of "mass," a conception of motion, and of
ideally exact measurement in terms that do not
conflict with one another and with your other
physical conceptions, there is no possible ground
on which you could be proven wrong. To a mind
sufficiently resolute for an independent space and
time, no possible experience could prove the prin-
ciples of relativity. The question, "How long shall
we persist in holding to our previous categories,
when confronted with star-photographs and the
displacement of spectrum-lines (or with spiritistic
phenomena or evidence of telepathy)?" is one
which has no general answer. A stubborn con-
servatism can be proved unreasonable only on the
pragmatic ground that another method of cate-
gorial analysis more successfully reduces all ex-
perience of the type in question to order and law.
Confronting such a problem, we should reopen to-
gether the question of definition or classification,
of criteria for this sort of real, and of natural
law. And the solution of one of these would prob-
ably mean the solution of all. Nothing could force
a redefinition of "spirit" or of "matter." A suf-
ficiently fundamental relation to human bent or

THE NATURE OF THE A PRIORI 265

to human interests would guarantee continuance
unaltered even in the face of unintelligible and
baffling experience. And no equipment of cate-
gories and concepts which the mind is likely to
achieve will enable us to understand experience
completely and in every respect. In such problems,
the mind finds itself uncompelled save by its own
purposes and needs. What is fixed datum and must
be conformed to, is only that welter of the given
in which not even the distinction of real and un-
real is yet made. The rest is completely and ex-
clusively our problem of interpretation, I may
categorize experience as I will; but what cate-
gorial distinctions will best serve my interests and
objectify my own intelligence? What the mixed
and troubled experience will be that is beyond
me. But what I shall do with it that is my own
question, when the character of experience is be*
fore me. I am coerced only by my own need to
understand.

It would indeed be inappropriate to charac-
terize as a priori a law which we are prepared to
alter in the light of further experience even
though in an isolated case we should discard as
non-veridical any experience which failed to con-
form. But the crux of the matter lies in this; be-
yond such principles as those of logic and pure
mathematics whose permanent stability seems at-
tested, there must be further and more particular
criteria of the real prior to any investigation of

266 MDsD AND THE WORLD-ORDER

nature. Such definitions, fundamental principles
and criteria the mind itself must supply before
experience can even begin to be intelligible. These
represent more or less deep-lying attitudes, which
the human mind has taken in the light of its total
experience up to date. But a newer and wider
experience may bring about some alteration of
these attitudes even though by themselves they
dictate nothing as to the content of experience,
and no experience can conceivably prove them in-
valid*

It is the a priori element in knowledge which is
thus pragmatic, not the empirical. The pragma-
tists generally have neglected to make the sepa-
ration of concept and immediacy, with the result
that they seem to put all truth at once at the
mercy of experience and within the power of hu-
man decision or in a relation of dependence upon
the human mind. But this would be an attempt to
have it both ways. The sense in which facts are
brute and given cannot be the sense in which the
truth about them is made by mind or alterable to
human needs. To be sure, this a priori element in
knowledge runs very deep ; it is present whenever
there is classification, interpretation, or the dis-
tinction of real from unreal which means that
it is present in all knowledge. So I suppose it must
be admitted, in the last analysis, that there can
be no more fundamental ground than the prag-
matic for a truth of any sort. Nothing not even

THE NATURE OF THE A PRIORI 267

direct perception can force the abandonment of
an interpretive attitude, nor indeed should move
us to such abandonment (since illusion or mistake
is always possible) except some demand or pur-
pose of the mind itself. But certain important
ends, such as intellectual consistency and econ-
omy, completeness of comprehension, and simplic-
ity of interpretation, occupy a place so much
higher, for the long-run satisfaction of our needs
in general, that they rightfully take precedence
over any purpose which is merely personal or
transitory. In the popular mind especially, prag-
matism too often seems to connote the validity of
rather superficial and capricious attitudes for
instance, the justification of belief from no deeper
ground than personal desire. It is this insufficient
regard for intellectual integrity, this tendency
to trench upon high-plane purposes from low-
plane motives which marks the kind of "pragma-
tism" which is to be eschewed. We must all be
pragmatists, but pragmatists in Ihe end, not in
the beginning.

In another respect also, there is a connotation
of "pragmatism" which more or less prevails,
which is inapplicable to the theory here presented.
Concepts and principles of interpretation are sub-
ject to historical alteration and in terms of them
there may be "new truth." But the situation in
which this happens needs analysis. It does not
mean the possibility of new truth in any sense in

268 MIXD AXD THE WORLD-ORDER

which new truth can genuinely contradict old
truth. Tills may not at first be clear. New ranges
of experience such as those due to the invention
of the telescope and microscope have actually led
to alteration of our categories in historic time.
The same thing may happen through more pene-
trating or adequate analysis of old types of ex-
perience witness Virchow's redefinition of dis-
ease. What was previously regarded as real e. g. 9
disease entities may come to be looked upon as
unreal, and what was previously taken to be un-
real e. g., curved space may be admitted to
reality. But when this happens the truth remains
unaltered and new truth and old truth do not
contradict. Categories and concepts do not liter-
ally change; they are simply given, up and re-
placed by new ones. When disease entities give
place to mere adjectival states of the organism
induced by changed conditions such as bacteria,
the old description of the phenomena of disease
does not become false in any sense in which it was
not always false* All objects are abstractions of
one sort or another; a disease entity is found to
be a relatively poor kind of abstraction for the
understanding and control of the phenomena in
question. But in terms of this abstraction any in-
terpretation of experience which ever was cor-
rectly made will still remain true. Any contradic-
tion between the old truth and the new is 'verbal
only, because the old word "disease" has a new

THE NATURE OF THE A PRIORI 26D

meaning. The old word is retained but the old
concept is discarded as a poor intellectual instru-
ment and replaced by a better one. Categories
and precise concepts are logical structures, Pla-
tonic Ideas; the implications of them are eternal
and the empirical truth about anything given, ex-
pressed in terms of them, is likewise through all
time unalterable.

In the typical case in which old methods of in-
terpretation are discarded in favor of new ones,
it requires new empirical data, which offer some
difficulty of interpretation in the old terms, to
bring about the change- Any set of basic concepts
has vested interests in the whole body of truth
expressed in terms of them, and the social prac-
tices based upon them. The advantage of the
change must be considerable and fairly clear in
order to overcome human inertia and the prestige
of old habits of thought. Such new and recalci-
trant data, which bring about the change, com-
plicate the problem of comparing the "new truth"
with the old. The factors which need to be con-
sidered are: (1) the two sets of concepts, old and
new, (2) the expanding bounds of experience in
which what is novel has come to light, (3) the
conditions of the application of the concepts to
this new body of total relevant experience.

In the case of the Copernican revolution, for
example, it was the invention of the telescope and
the increasing accuracy of observation which

270 MEND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

mainly provided the impetus to reinterpretation.
But these new data were decisive only in the prag-
matic sense. Those who argued the issue supposed
that they were discussing a question of empirical
fact. But since there is no absolute motion, the
question what moves and what is motionless in the
heavens is one which cannot be settled by experi-
ence alone- The fixed stars prove to be a highly
convenient frame of refer ence 5 resulting in rela-
tively simple generalizations for the celestial mo-
tions, and enabling celestial and sublunary phe-
nomena to be reduced to the same equations, while
almost insurmountable complexity and difficulty
attend the choice of axes through the earth. Theo-
retically, however, if any system of motions is
describable with respect to one set of axes, it is
also describable in terms of any other set which
moves with reference to the first according to any
general rule. Let us imagine for a moment that
this theoretically possible description of astro-
nomical and physical phenomena in terms of a
motionless earth had been worked out for all the
data now at hand. In terms of which set of con-
cepts, old or new, should we have the truth? Ob-
viously in both. The one would be comprehension
and simple truth; the other so complex as to be
almost or quite unworkable. But they would no
more contradict each other than a measurement
in pounds and feet contradicts one in grams and
meters.

THE NATURE OF THE A PRIORI 271

This situation is not altered by any thought
that newly discovered fact may play another than
the pragmatic role and be decisive of truth in a
deeper sense. Nobody has ever supposed that what
were only hypotheses or empirical generalization
of a high degree of probability were incapable of
being disproven by new facts. To the extent that
newly discovered empirical evidence may render
old principles theoretically impossible, the old
truth never was anything but hypothesis and is
now proved flatly false. It is not, I hope, the point
of the pragmatic theory of knowledge to reduce
all truth thus to hypothesis. That would be noth-
ing but a cheerful form of skepticism.

Rather the point of the pragmatic theory is, I
take it, the responsiveness of truth to human bent
or need, and the fact that in some sense it is made
by mind. From the point of view here presented,
this is valid, because the interpretation of experi-
ence must always be in terms of categories and
concepts which the mind itself determines. There
may be alternative conceptual systems, giving rise
to alternative descriptions of experience, which
are equally objective and equally valid, if there
be not some purely logical defect in these cate-
gorial conceptions. When this is so, choice will
be determined, consciously or unconsciously, on
pragmatic grounds. New facts may cause a shift-
ing of such grounds. When historically such
change of interpretation takes place we shall gen-

272 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

uinely have new truth, whose newness represents
the creative power of human thought and the
ruling consideration of human purpose.

The separation of the factors, however, reveals
the fact that the pragmatic element in knowledge
concerns the choice in application of conceptual
modes of interpretation. On the one side, we have
the abstract concepts themselves, with their purely
logical implications. The truth about these is ab-
solute, in the fashion in which pure mathematics
offers the typical illustration. Such purely ab-
stract a priori truth answers only to the criteria
of consistency and adequacy. It is absolute and
eternal. On the other side, there is the absolute
brute-fact of given experience. Though in one
sense ineffable, yet the given is its own fashion
determinate ; once the categorial system, in terms
of which it is to be interpreted, is fixed, and con-
cepts have been assigned a denotation in terms
of sensation and imagery, it is this given experi-
ence which determines the truths of nature. It
is between these two, in the choice of conceptual
system for application and in the assigning of
sensuous denotation to the abstract concept, that
there is a pragmatic element in truth and knowl-
edge. In this middle ground of trial and error, of
expanding experience and the continual shift and
modification of conception in our effort to cope
with it, the drama of human interpretation and
the control of nature is forever being played. That

THE NATURE OF THE A PRIORI 273

the issues here are pragmatic; that they do not
touch that truth which still is absolute and eter-
nal this is the only thing that would save those
who appreciate the continually changing char-
acter of this spectacle from skepticism.

CHAPTER IX
THE A PRIORI AND THE EMPIRICAL

So far, various aspects of, and elements in,
knowledge have been considered, for the most part
separately. The results may now be brought to-
gether, and the relation of the various factors
considered with more care. Quite commonly, the
different types or phases of knowledge of pre-
sented objects, of a priori principles, of empirical
generalizations are all lumped together, and
either what is true of one type only is applied to
all, or in some other fashion an omnibus explana-
tion is attempted which will include them all under
one formula. No theory devised by such procedure
can ever be more than partially successful.

The following need to be distinguished: (1) the
immediate awareness of the given, such as might
be supposed to be reported in statements like
"This looks round," "This feels hard," "This
tastes sweet"; (2) knowledge of presented ob-
jects, such as is expressed by, "This is hard,"
"This is a sweet apple," "This penny is round" ;
(3) the a priori elaboration of wholly abstract
concepts, like the formulations of pure mathe-
matics, apart from any question of possible ap-
plications; (4) the categorial knowledge of inter-

A PRIORI AND EMPIRICAL 275

pretative principles and criteria of reality, which
is that form of a priori knowledge which arises
when concepts have a fixed denotation and are ap-
plied to the given; (5) empirical generalizations,
which are universal but not a priori.

The difference of the first two is especially easy
to overlook; the first "This looks round" is a
direct report of the momentarily given; the sec-
ond "This penny is round" represents the con-
ceptual interpretation of this given, and implies
much which is not given.

As has been made clear in preceding chapters,
the term "knowledge" is here restricted in a man-
ner which may seem arbitrary but at least answers
to definite criteria; that only is called "knowl-
edge" which is verifiable and has a significant op-
posite "error," There is, in the knowledge of pre-
sented objects and of objective properties, a
distinguishable element of awareness which is in-
dispensable to this knowledge but which, by itself,
cannot be knowledge in the meaning here as-
signed. It is this awareness of immediate and rec-
ognizable qualia which may be supposed to be
expressed by "This looks round," etc. So far as
such a statement is merely a report of the immedi-
ately given, it is neither verifiable nor stands in
any need of verification. Nor is it subject to any
possible error. If the subject of the report is the
immediate feeling itself, there is no possibility of
being mistaken about it, though all sorts of mis-

276 MDvD AND THE WORLD-ORDER

apprehension about the experience reported might
arise in the mind of another person to whom the
report might be addressed, due to poor choice of
language or to the ineffable character of individ-
ual immediate experience.

It has also been pointed out that such immedi-
ate awareness is an element in knowledge rather
than a state of mind occurring by itself or pre-
ceding conceptual interpretation. Without the re-
lational element which conception introduces, im-
mediacy is inarticulate. It is questionable whether
a state of pure esthesis is a genuine mental pos-
sibility. In any case, it is not necessary to assume
its existence. The sense in which such immediacy
is prior to its interpretation is the sense in which
interpretation is subject to change. Cognition of
the external world is active just so far as con-
ceptual interpretation is subject to correction and
alteration, on occasion. In the case of such a new
interpretation, the immediate awareness is liter-
ally and temporally antecedent ; but that there is
a first moment of such apprehension, in which
there is such awareness and no interpretation, it
is not necessary to believe. In all cases, however,
it is the content of the given which determines (in
part) the interpretation, not the interpretation
which determines the immediate to fit it. In that
sense also the awareness of the given is prior to
its interpretation.

Predications of the second sort "This is hard,"

A PRIORI AND EMPIRICAL 277

"This penny is round" express something much
more complex than the immediate feeling of pres-
sure or the givenness of a "round" or "elliptical"
presentation. As predications of objective prop-
erties, these represent an interpretation put upon
the content of immediate awareness which im-
plicitly predicts further experience. Being thus
predictive, they are judgments which are subject
to verification and liable to error.

Strictly, the nature of the judgment as inter-
pretation of the given is more complex than the
statement of it. This is obvious in the case of the
example, "This penny is round**; calling what is
presented "a penny* 5 is interpretive to at least the
same degree as judging it to be round. What the
subject expresses is an interpretation as much as
the predicate. A similar thing is true of all predi-
cations in which the subject is something named;
the distinction between subject and predicate is
merely one of emphasis or nuance it reflects a
difference between what is already granted or ob-
vious and what needs explicit assertion. The two
statements, "This penny is round" and "This is
a round penny/* do not represent materially dif-
ferent interpretations of what is given.

Similar considerations hold for all predications
of objective character to anything given, except
those in which the subject is mere demonstrative
like "this" which supposedly serves merely to
point to the given. Even such demonstratives,

278 MIND AXD THE WORLD-ORDER

moreover, attribute to the "this" which is indi-
cated that kind of continuance and lawful rela-
tion to other things which is the mark of the ob-
jective* The point of using the demonstrative lies
in its indication of a reality which is not subjec-
tive but whose existence and asserted character is
verifiable, by ourselves and other persons, over a
stretch of time. Hence the difference between as-
sertions about a "this" and predications about
something named lies only in the more extended
and more definite character of the interpretation
which the use of a name as the subject term im-
plicitly takes for granted. And in all such predi-
cation the application of the subject term, as of
the predicate, is an interpretation of given ex-
perience.

The fact that the denotation of a demonstrative
is, in all ordinary parlance, "this (thing or ob-
jective property) which is presented," and not
"this presentation^ draws our attention to the
fact that the attempt to exemplify the mere re-
port of immediate awareness as by the illustra-
tions, "This tastes sweet," etc. can be only ap-
proximately successful. Here also the demonstra-
tive denotes an object, not the presentation itself.
Otherwise there would be no predication, because
subject and predicate would coincide and what we
are trying to express would take the form "Sweet
taste tastes sweet" or simply the ejaculation
"Sweet taste!" The use of predication is com-

A PRIORI AXD EMPIRICAL 279

pletely pre-empted to the conveying of the objec-
tive, and there is no language whatever, unless of
primitive cries, which expresses awareness of the
given as such. The expressive ejaculation or cry
is, so to speak, the salutation of the real or the ac-
knowledgment of an existent. Such salutation
or acknowledgment, however, represents an essen-
tial element in knowledge that which distin-
guishes the truth from lies ; that fact of presenta-
tion which is our confrontation with reality.

Concerning our knowledge of presented objects,
it may be noted further that there is no difference
which is important in the present connection be-
tween the predication of an objective property
and the predication of substantive character or
thinghood. So much is evident from the practical
equivalence of "This penny is round" and "This
is a round penny." The kind of interpretation in-
volved and the general manner of its verification
is the same whether it is a property like round-
ness or a substantive character such as being a
penny which is in question.

By how much does the interpretation which
characterizes our knowledge of objects transcend
what is given? What is involved in its complete
verification? Obviously in the statement "This
penny is round" I assert implicitly everytlwng the
failure of which would 'falsify the statement. The
implicit prediction of aU experience which is es-
sential to its truth must be contained in the origi-

280 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

nal judgment. Otherwise such experience would
be irrelevant to it. All that further experience the
failure of which would lead to the repudiation of
the apprehension as illusory or mistaken is pre-
dicted in the judgment made. Now suppose we ask :
How long will it be possible to verify in some man-
ner the fact that this penny is round? What total-
ity of experience would verify it completely,
beyond the possibility of necessary reconsidera-
tion? I have here no theoretical axe to grind, but
it seems to be the fact that no verification would
be absolutely complete ; that all verification is par-
tial and a matter of degree. Even after the penny
itself has ceased to exist, a sufficiently important
connection with other matters might still lead to
a revival of the question whether it is really true
that a round penny lay before me on my desk on
the twenty-ninth of January, 1926, at four
o'clock And however difficult it might be at such
later time to gain new and decisive evidence, theo-
retical tests of what would increase or decrease
the probability would be capable of formulation,
Is it not the case that the simplest statement of
objective particular fact implicitly asserts some-
thing about possible experience throughout all
future time; that theoretically every objective
fact is capable of some (partial) verification at
any later date, and that no totality of such ex-
perience is absolutely and completely sufficient to
put our knowledge of such particulars beyond all

A PRIORI AND EMPIRICAL 281

possibility of turning out to be in error? So far
as this is true, all interpretation of particulars
and all knowledge of objects is probable only,
however high the degree of its probability. Every
such judgment about the real external world re-
mains forever at the mercy of future possible ex-
perience. Between the immediate awareness, "This
looks round, 5 ' and the objective interpretation,
"This is round," there lies all the difference be-
tween this present moment and all time; between
an experience which is now complete and Tiad, and
a totality of possible experience which is unlim-
ited and inexhaustible.

Perhaps this conclusion that the verification of
empirical particulars is always partial, will be
more evident if we investigate the alternative.
Let us suppose that, for some interpretation of a
particular given experience, there is some finite
and limited totality of later experience which, to-
gether with the presentation itself, will absolutely
and finally verify our interpretation as an em-
pirical fact so that nothing further could possibly
require the retraction of it. Let us suppose the
presentation to be given and interpreted at time
*Q. And let us imagine the verification to be com-
plete at time t. Now let us ask: Will the total
significance of this empirical fact be exhausted
at time t 9 so that consideration of it will enable
no further prediction of anything which would be
discoverable at some still later time, t%? We shall

282 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

hardly be inclined to answer in the affirmative,
since such an answer would mean that, after the
date ti 9 the fact would have no further conse-
quences and its existence or historical verity
would be no longer determinable. Because if at
time t% there should be no consequences of this
fact, which would be lacking if the event had not
taken place, then there will be absolutely no
means, at time t^ whereby it may be discovered
whether there was any such fact or not. Hence
there can be no such time, t 9 after which no con-
sequences predictable from the interpretation of
the presentation at *o will accrue. The verifiable
consequences of any fact last as long as time
itself. Now suppose further that at some date, t^
we put ourselves in position to meet the conse-
quences of this fact, which was accepted as com-
pletely established at t. And suppose that these
consequences fail to appear, or are not what the
nature of the accepted fact requires? In that case,
will there still be no doubt about the accepted
fact? Or will what was supposedly established at
i be subject to doubt at 2 ? And in the latter
case can we suppose it was absolutely verified at
time #1? Since no single experience can be abso-
lutely guaranteed to be veridical, no limited col-
lection or succession of experiences can absolutely
guarantee an empirical fact as certain beyond the
possibility of reconsideration.

This is not an argument; as argument, it would

A PRIORI AND EMPIRICAL 283

be petitio principiL But I believe that, having
followed out these consequences, the reader will
be inclined to repudiate the supposed alternative
and to grant the thesis that the interpretation
put upon the empirically given is always some-
thing temporally Inexhaustible, hence never com-
pletely verified, and is always probable only.

Incidentally this conclusion serves to answer a
question which may have occurred to the reader
in an earlier chapter: If knowledge is knowledge
only as it is predictive and verifiable, does it cease
to be knowledge when it is completely verified?
We now see the answer to be that knowledge the
knowledge of empirical particulars at least never
is completely verified. This also throws light upon
the nature of the concepts of things and of ob-
jective properties, which are applied to the given
in interpreting it. It has been noted that what
any concept denotes has always a temporal spread.
In appealing to the reader to grant the consid-
erations of the preceding paragraphs, I likewise
ask him to grant, by implication, that this tem-
poral spread is unlimited and that the existence
of things and properties has a sort of unlimited
duration, as was suggested in Chapter IV in the
reference to the "fallacy of simple location" in
time.

The empirical knowledge of particular objects
is probable only, Yet underlying it there is and
must be an element of the a priori, else there

284 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

would be no criteria of its empirical truth and not
even a valid probability. When we make the judg-
ment, "This penny is round, 55 the subject "penny"
and the predicate "round" both express implicitly
certain a priori criteria which are definitive of
the meaning of these terms in application. Being
a penny, or being round, means a hundred and
one various sequences in further possible experi-
ence. That these sequences would actually accrue
under suitable conditions is implicitly predicted
in applying these concepts to the given presen-
tation. To be really round, this presented object
must alter in appearance in certain characteristic
ways with change of perspective; it must feel in
certain ways if handled; and if it be measured
with precision instruments, the results must be
thus and so. Furthermore, it must not alter in cer-
tain other ways which would oblige us to explain
that the angle of vision or some trick of eyesight,
etc., had led us into error. Such explication of
what is implicit in the concept sets the criteria by
which further experience will verify (or falsify)
the present judgment. If this setting of criteria
were not a priori and incapable of being over-
turned by the eventualities of experience, then
such experience would not be a test of the truth
of the predication, or even establish a probability
of it. That is to say, when we make the judgment,
"This is round," what we suppose ourselves to
know requires two propositions to express it fully :

A PRIORI AND EMPIRICAL 285

(1) "If this is round, then further experience of
it will be thus and so (the empirical criteria of
objective roundness)" and (2) "This present
given is such that further experience (probably)
will be thus and so." The first of these is a priori ;
the second is our statement of the probable em-
pirical truth about the given object.

Unfortunately, I must ask the reader to go
with me a little further in this analysis of the
knowledge of empirical particulars. There is no
escape for us, because the truth about it happens
to be quite complex. Certain further considera-
tions have, in all probability, already suggested
themselves to the reader. First, in the light of pre-
ceding paragraphs it is evident that the empirical
criteria of, let us say, roundness which we can
have explicitly in mind at any one moment, will
not be the completely sufficient criteria because
the empirical eventualities which would completely
verify the roundness of the given thing are too
utterly complex and extended to be thus explicit*
When we actually define "roundness" in words,
we refer the meaning of one term to others, and
(supposing the definition to be well-made and ade-
quate) both the subject term defined and the
predicate which defines it have a meaning which,
in application, are of this complex sort which it
is not possible to express completely, or have ex-
plicitly in mind, at any one moment. So to speak,
the terms of a definition are all in one plane, in

286 MIND AXD THE WORLD-ORDER

which the definitive relations are finitely specifi-
able. But each term is a point of reference in an-
other dimension (that of denotation) and its
meaning in this dimension is not thus exhaustively
expressible in a few words. That a meaning in
denotation must have this complex character is
due in part to the fact that no object can be ap-
prehended in isolation. Any appearance of an ob-
ject is conditioned also by other objects, particu-
larly by my own body. It is such conditions which
are expressed in the "if" clause of those "If
then 55 propositions in which the predictions im-
plicit in an interpretation may be made explicit.

That such complexity of consequences is always
implicit in every concept, may be more evident if
we reflect upon the example of some mathematical
concept. For instance, the analytic consequences
of the definition of "triangle" are as numerous as
the geometrical theorems concerning triangles
that is, unlimited in number.

We may further note that we may indeed
must have this unlimited meaning in denotation
in mind in a figurative sense, when we do not have
it in mind explicitly. The possession of the con-
cept or meaning is utterly irrelevant to any ex-
perience whatever, unless we could with sufficient
time and attention at least say whether certain
eventualities of experience would or would not be
compatible with its application. For example, the
detective who should be assigned the problem

A PRIORI AXD EMPIRICAL 287

whether I did or did not have a round penny be-
fore me at a certain time, could not possibly ex-
haust in any statement all the evidence which
would, if discovered, be pertinent to it. But if he
did not have it in mind in the figurative sense, all
the Sherlock Holmesing in the world would not
help him a bit because he would not be able to
recognize evidence when he found it. We are, even
the best of us, more or less stupid and might not
be capable of specifying whether a given eventu-
ality is or is not pertinent to our problem. That
is to say, it may be true in some degree that we do
not have the meaning of our concepts in mind
even in the figurative sense* But so far as we are
thus stupid, we simply do not know what we mean
when we use the terms; that part of the (ideal)
meaning of the language we apply to our pre-
sented experience is simply erased in our case;
and we are condemned by our lack of intelligence
not to understand what we are trying to think and
talk about.

However, this stupidity which in some degree is
inevitable to all of us, and this fact that much of
our meaning., when we interpret given experience,
is in mind only in the figurative sense, is not par-
ticularly embarrassing, either theoretically or
practically. Because while the empirical eventual-
ities which would exhaust the denotative meaning
of our interpretative concept are too numerous to
state or have in mind explicitly, those which we

288 MINT) AND THE WORLD-ORDER

shall be called upon to meet in any brief period
are not. And we can with wit and luck keep
ahead of experience and be explicitly prepared to
interpret it by the time the evidence is presented.
Furthermore, such explicit eventualities as we do
have in mind represent knowledge which is a pri-
ori, however far they fall short of exhausting our
interpretive meaning,

A second point which needs at least passing
mention is the fact that the a priori element in
our knowledge of particulars is complex in an-
other fashion also. This element has been ex-
pressed above by the proposition "If this is round,
then , . ." So far we have observed that the
"then" clause is compounded of empirical eventu-
alities apparently unlimited in number. We must
now observe, further, that each one of these is
conditional. "If this is round, then if I take two
steps to the right, it will look more elliptical." "If
this is round, then if it be measured with precision
instruments, the result will be thus and so. 55 "If
this is round, then it will not look elliptical if it is
viewed from directly in front* This conditional
character of the propositions expressing the pre-
dictions implicit in the interpretation of the given,
has already been discussed in Chapter IV; and
hence need not detain us longer here.

These first two points may be schematically
summed up by saying that the a priori element
which must underlie the empirical knowledge of

A PRIORI AND EMPIRICAL 289

particulars is expressible by some set of proposi-
tions of the form: If this is round, then condition
A being provided, empirical eventuality M will
accrue. If this is round, then condition B being
provided, empirical eventuality N will accrue. And
so on. The totality of the complex "then" classes
expresses the complete and a priori meaning of
the concept "round" in denotation. Some of these
we have explicitly in mind granted intelligence,
we shall be prepared with those with respect to
which experience will shortly present us pertinent
evidence. Others we have in mind in the figurative
sense that we should be explicitly prepared if
called upon to include them in, or exclude them
from, what we mean by "being round." Still
others, perhaps, which belong to an ideal denota-
tion of "roundness" we may not have in mind at
all. So far as this last is true, we are stupid and
are unprepared to understand experience.

There is still one most important point about
our knowledge of empirical particulars which re-
mains to be observed. It has been said that what
we must know, for example, in order to interpret
a given presentation as that of a round object is
(1) the a priori proposition, "If this is round,
then further experience of it will be thus and so, 5 '
and (2) "This present given is such that further
experience (probably) mil be thus and so. 5 * It will
have occurred to the reader that we could not pos-
sibly know anything like the second proposition

290 UEKD AND THE WORLD-ORDER

except by a generalization from previous experi-
ence "Things which look as this does, under con-
ditions like the present, usually turn out to satisfy
the criteria of roundness in further experience."
In general, we must rely upon past experience for
our knowledge of what empirical eventualities are
likely to be connected with any given type of ap-
pearance that is, for our knowledge as to what
presentations are appearances of what objects. In
every case, interpretation of the given requires
empirical generalization.

But it is particularly necessary to recognize
that the subject of this type of generalization
from experience is not the object presented (or
the class of such objects) but the presentation it-
self (or the class of such). Our recognition of the
object "This is a round penny" is the inter-
pretation itself. But the recognition of the pres-
entation is simply the classification of it with other
qualitatively similar appearances. The basis of
our interpretive judgment is the fact that, in past
experience, what appeared as this does, under cir-
cumstances like the present, has turned out to be,
for example, a round penny in a sufficiently
large proportion of cases to warrant probable
judgment.

This kind of generalization is seldom explicit.
Our collation of the given with similar appear-
ances in the past is too swift and instinctive for
that. This is presumably the element in human

A PRIORI AND EMPIRICAL 291

knowledge which is evolutionally basic and is
shared bv us with the other animals. But occasion-

r

ally at least it needs to be explicit; and there is
one familiar example which may serve as illustra-
tion. The physician is often called upon to diag-
nose a case, not by some decisive test, but by "the
picture*' which the case presents. (A clinical pic-
ture is, of course, much more complex than any
single presentation, but it is, so to speak, preemi-
nently presentational in character, requiring to
be identified by direct inspection and difficult or
impossible to put in words.) If the physician de-
cides, "This is measles," he does so by means of a
generalization from past experience. The subject
of this generalization is the class of clinical pic-
tures like the present one. The basis of the judg-
ment is the frequency with which such appearances
in the past have been followed by a later case-
development which answers to the elaborated med-
ical concept "measles." The ascription of this
concept is an interpretation, whose main signifi-
cance is that of prognosis.

Our knowledge of objects in general is such a
diagnosis of appearances. Without our recogni-
tion of the presentation by its classification with
qualitatively similar ones in the past, and our
recollection of the further eventualities in these
cases, no interpretation would be possible. That
such recognition is ordinarily spontaneous and
unconsidered, does not alter the logical character
of it as a generalization.

292 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

In empirical knowledge there are, thus, two ele-
ments concerning which we have certainty; the
recognized qualitative character of the given pres-
entation is one and the a priori elaboration of
some concept (or the partial elaboration which is
explicit with us) is the other. But the applicabil-
ity of the concept to the presentation is probable
only, because such application is an interpreta-
tion which is predictive. The probability, or degree
of assurance of such interpretation, reflects a gen-
eralization from experience. It is an argument
from past to future or from the uniformity of
experience. In short, in spite of the elements of
certainty underlying it, which have been pointed
out, the validity of our knowledge of presented
objects depends upon the same general considera-
tions that govern empirical generalizations of the
types more frequently recognized. Oftentimes it
has been supposed that we have a kind of cer-
tainty in our recognition of objects, and this has
been designated as "knowledge by acquaintance."
But such is not the case. What we are directly
"acquainted with" are not objects but presenta-
tions. Seeing is believing, but quite often the be-
lief based on seeing turns out to be a false one.

Thus there are, on the theory here presented,
very much the same problems to be met concern-
ing empirical knowledge, as on various other the-
ories* But the incidence of those problems is dif-
ferent; and this, as we shall discover in later

A PRIORI AND EMPIRICAL 293

chapters, makes a difference in the manner in
which they can be met. A brief comparison, even
though inadequate, may be of assistance here.
Ordinarily the problem of empirical knowledge in
general, when phrased by reference to usual forms
of predication, is viewed as the problem how we
can know with certainty that what is denoted by
the subject of the proposition whose truth is in
question will also have the properties denoted by
the predicate. How may we be assured that all
JST's are F's; that all masses obey Newton's law;
that all events have causes, that the sum of the
angles of a triangle will be 180 degrees? The prob-
lem is that of the necessary connection of what is
denoted by two concepts.

Now I believe it should be obvious, no matter
what theory of knowledge is held, that there is
only one ground on which the necessary connec-
tion of X and F, such that all X*s will certainly
be F ? s can be known ; that is, that if we find that
the concept F is inapplicable to any particular,
then the concept X will be retracted as likewise
inapplicable. If we know with certainty in advance
that all men are mortal, we know it because if we
discover any being not to be subject to the acci-
dent of death, then, however like a man. he may
appear, we shall refuse to recognize him as hu-
man. We can know that the sum of the angles of
a triangle must be 180 degrees only if in case we
find this not so in a particular instance, we shall

294 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

retract the concept "Euclidean triangle 55 as in-
applicable to the thing in question. Whenever this
is so, the subject concept implies or includes the
predicate concept and the proposition is a priori
because the judgment is analytic.

If the problem of empirical knowledge is sup-
posed to be "How can we be assured that objects
met with in experience and identified as JST's will
never turn out not to be F*s?" then, again, I be-
lieve it should be clear on any theory of knowledge
that we can never have such, assurance, especially
if it is remembered that there is no a priori cer-
tainty that perception in any particular case is
not illusory or subject to the accident of mistaken
identification* That is to say, it should always have
been clear, if we remember that "experience" as
we are confronted with it includes the non-veridi-
cal, that the application of concepts in naming
and recognizing objects, itself implies characters
of the object which are not now presented but
wait upon further experience to be revealed.

Remembering this, it will be evident that the
only kind of a priori knowledge of the empirical
for which there is room in a consistent theory is
that kind which consists in knowing the empirical
eventualities, implicit in the application of our
subject-concept, which are indispensable to the
correctness of such application. We do not need
any limitation of possible experience to be assured
of this. If a thing is not an X unless further ex-

A PRIORI AND EMPIRICAL 295

perience will corroborate a certain F-character of
it, then, let experience be what it will, all JST's must
be F's. It is true that this leaves all empirical
knowledge except the hypothetical subject to
the tests of later experience, in the sense that such
future experience may invalidate our identifica-
tion and naming of objects. But my point is that
no theory ever presented can do more, unless we
can be absolutely certain of our recognitions of
objects in momentary experience. Such certainty
of momentary identification is something which no
theory has ever claimed explicitly, though most
theories have, as a matter of fact, proceeded as if
it were possible.

Take, for example, geometrical knowledge.
Kant claimed a synthetic ground of our knowl-
edge of the necessary connection between "the
triangular" and "figures having interior angles
which sum up to 180 degrees." This synthetic
ground was supplied by the limitation of possible
human experience to the Euclidean space-form.
But did Kant suppose that this limitation of pos-
sible experience enabled us to glance at a plot of
ground and say with a priori certainty that the
sum of its angles was exactly 180 degrees? If not,
could one claim accepting Kant's theory that
this a priori limitation of experience in any fash-
ion assured to our knowledge of this particular
plot of ground (or of any other particular) a
certainty which future experience might not

296 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

trench upon? There can be no doubt that the an-
swer must be negative. What, then, as regards our
knowledge of the empirical, is the supposed ad-
vantage of this synthetic element supplied by the
limitation of possible experience? Absolutely all
that it assures us, about any empirically given
object, is that, if it be truly triangular, then the
sum of its angles will be 180 degrees ; and whether
this condition is satisfied in any particular case,
it leaves subject to the test of future and more
exact determination.

One may further inquire: If we can never, in
a momentary apprehension of anything, be abso-
lutely certain that it is a real Euclidean triangle,
how are we to know that the class of objects actu-
ally identifiable as triangles have this further
property of the sum of their angles, unless by the
fact that if they do not have it, then we shall re-
tract the ascription of real triangularity as in-
applicable to them? We now see this plot of
ground: it looks triangular. In this momentary
experience, there is absolutely no way in which we
can tell that it is not. Suppose we proceed to mea-
sure its angles with a theodolite, and find that the
sum is 181 degrees. Does the Kantian, or any
other, theory deny this possibility? If not, then
the only ground on which we can know that what
is actually identifiable as triangle will have the
further property in question is, in the last anal-
ysis, some ground which will lead to the repudia-

A PRIORI AND EMPIRICAL 297

tion as **not-triangular" of that which fails, in
further experience, to give the required measure
of its interior angles^ even though, as presented
at a certain moment, it was indistinguishable from
a real triangle.

Let us take one step further. If a good Kantian
must still grant, in the interests of veracity, that
the generalization "All figures which are momen-
tarily indistinguishable from the triangular have
angles which sum up to 180 degrees" would be
false, then how can it be claimed with plausibility
that experience of a world in which the laws of
Euclid do not hold would be impossible to human
beings? If in one case we can see as triangular a
figure the measure of whose angles exceeds 180
degrees, in what sense would it be impossible that
this should be universally true? How would a
form of intuition prevent us from seeing just as
we now do a space whose properties would be Rie-
mannian?

Is it not fairly obvious that the real question
about the applicability of Euclid to our space
is not the question of what we can imagine or
could conceivably experience; but is the question
whether the character of experience in general is
such that the procedure by which the failure of
any spatial object to verify the Euclidean prop-
erties is put down to mistaken apprehension is one
which gets on better (L e., better serves our inter-
ests of reducing experience to order and securing

298 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

control) than would any general revision of our
whole system of geometrical conceptions?

The situation in which we find ourselves as a
result of modern developments in geometry is in
accord with this conception of a priori knowledge
and its relation to the empirical. As modern
mathematics discovers, the concept "triangle"
(and the other basic concepts of geometry) in-
clude a logically sufficient ground for all the
properties of triangles, without any synthetic ele-
ment which is supposed to limit experience. To
be sure, this means entire separation of the ques-
tion of abstract geometrical truth from the truth
of experience. This last becomes a question of
empirical generalization or more accurately, it
is the complex question: Which of the alternative
systems of geometrical concepts will best succeed
in its application to experience; it being remem-
bered that what such application requires is that
any geometrical concept will be retracted as in-
applicable when experience fails to verify the es-
sential geometrical properties L e.> that all di-
vergence of experience from our chosen geometry
is to be explained on other grounds, or relegated
to the status of mistaken apprehension?

From this point of view, the development of
the conceptual system in the abstract is a priori ;
the question of the applicability of one of its con-
stituent concepts to any single particular is a
matter of probability ; and the question of appli-

A PRIORI AND EMPIRICAL 299

cation in general is the question of the choice of
an abstract conceptual system, determined by
pragmatic considerations.

We find that there is much more in the ab-
stract concepts than Kant thought that as a
fact the whole geometrical system can be drawn
from them by purely logical analysis ; and we find
that in any case the application to particulars is
no better than probable. Under these circum-
stances, it is extremely dubious what advantage
would accrue if we could find a ground for a priori
truth which was synthetic and consisted in some
limitation of the possibilities of intuition. And we
find the supposition that there is limitation and
that we can know it, vitiated by the fact that we
most certainly could have an experience in which
Euclidean-appearing 1 things should, upon fur-
ther examination, turn out to have non-Euclidean
properties. The only question about a priori truth
in application which is left to be determined is
the question what shall be accepted as the em-
pirical criteria of triangularity, straightness, and
so on. This is at once the question what kinds of
sequences in experience are to be regarded as
ground for attributing mistake to previous identi-
fications of spatial characters in things, and the
question what abstract system shall be our choice
for application to experience in general. The
chosen system becomes criterion of the veridical
in experience, that is, its concepts become criteria

300 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

of reality of a certain, sort- It is this question of
the choice of conceptual systems for the inter-
pretation of experience which, on the view here
presented, is a matter of pragmatic choice,
whether that choice be made deliberately, or un-
consciously and without recognition of its real
grounds.

If, now, the reader will generalize from this
illustration in terms of the geometrical, he will
have before him the distinguishing characteristics
of the present theory of the relation between a
priori truth and the content of experience. While
other concepts than the mathematical do not usu-
ally have their consequences so systematically
worked out, nevertheless all concepts give rise to
an a priori truth which is purely analytic and in-
dependent of any application to experience. Such
analytic consequences of a single concept, in iso-
lation, will be relatively meager and relatively
trivial. But how complex, far-reaching, and im-
portant the analytic consequences may be when
three or four such abstract concepts are con-
joined, modern systems of mathematics serve to
illustrate. That which any such concept denotes
is always something which, in terms of experience,
must have a temporal spread. What is required to
determine its applicability, is some orderly se-
quence in experience, or some set of such. At any
given moment, such applicability is verifiable
only approximately or in degree. It is thus that

A PRIORI AND EMPIRICAL 301

the application of the concept to experience may
be secured without loss of its a priori character:
its logical consequences, which time alone can
verify, become criteria of its applicability. Later
experience which does not accord will lead to the
retraction of the concept as inapplicable to the
particular to which it was assigned by previous
interpretation. Thus the logical requisites a pri-
ori of the concept become, in its application to
experience, the criteria of reality of a certain sort.
The application a priori of Euclidean geometry
to nature means, for example, that whatever ap-
prehended particular turns out, in the course of
experience, not to have the properties logically
implied by the concept "Euclidean triangle" will
be condemned as not a real triangle^ however much
it may have looked like one.*

Up to this point, there has been no considera-
tion of the last of the five distinct kinds of ap-
prehension or knowledge mentioned at the begin-
ning of the chapter, L e. 9 empirical generaliza-
tions, ordinarily so-called. We have found that a
certain kind of empirical generalization enters
into the judgment of truth about empirical par-
ticulars. But these are not of the type ordinarily
called "generalizations" since the subject of them
is the presentation itself; they are usually not
expressed at all and are indeed, as we found, dif-

*For a note concerning a further problem about the application of
abstract conceptual systems to experience, see Appendix E.

302 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

ficult to express in language without including
reference beyond themselves to objective and en-
during things. Customarily what is meant by "em-
pirical generalization" is a universal proposition
the subject of which denotes a class of objects. It
is distinguished from the a priori in application
by the fact that the connection between subject
and predicate is not necessary but contingent.*
A simple illustration may be here of service. The
proposition "All swans are birds" is a priori be-
cause if any creature originally designated as a
"swan" should be discovered to lack some dis-
tinguishing character of birds, the name "swan"
would be withdrawn. The applicability of the
predicate term is logically requisite to the ap-
plicability of the subject. But the proposition
"All swans are white" is an empirical generaliza-
tion because white color is not included as essen-
tial in the denotation assigned to "swan." The
former proposition can not be falsified by any
possible experience because its truth has a purely
logical warrant; it represents the implication of
a concept. But the latter proposition has no such
logical warrant and may be falsified by experi-
ence ; black creatures having all the essential prop-
erties of swans may be discovered. It is to be noted
that any universal proposition asserts the non-
existence of some class of things: that all swans
are birds requires that there be no non-bird swans ;
*See Appendix F.

A PRIORI AND EMPIRICAL 303

that all swans are white, asserts that the class of
swans of different color is a class which has no
members. But the proposition which is a priori
does not assert any limitation of experience; it
asserts only that whatever lacks some essential
property, J5T, is not to be classified under some
concept, A. That all swans must be birds, does
not legislate out of existence any possible crea-
ture. The empirical generalization, however, does
require for its truth a limitation of nature and of
experience : that all swans are white, excludes cer-
tain conceivable creatures from existence. It is
thus that the a priori proposition is assured with
certainty in advance, while the empirical general-
ization requires for its theoretical certitude a
verification which extends to all reality.

The empirical generalization is forever at the
mercy of future experience, and hence probable
only, while the a priori proposition is forever cer-
tain* But as the above example points out, this
does not represent any greater assurance about
the content of future experience, or of nature, in
the one case than in the other ; it represents only
an intention of interpretation or classification
which maintains a connection between two con-
cepts regardless of experience in the one case but
not in the other. Since the a priori in general is
definitive and analytic, not synthetic, the case is
the same for all a priori propositions.

This particular example is trivial because the

304 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

classification "swan" is not a very comprehensive
one; its systematic interconnection with other
classes and categories is relatively slight and un-
important. But more impressive examples can be
given to illustrate the same point that the a
priori does not dictate to nature but concerns our
interpretation of empirical facts. For example,
the law of gravitation is a posteriori because, if
it fails of verification, we shall still not abandon
the concept "mass," or any of the other terms,
but only the relation between them stated by the
law. By contrast, geometry is a priori because if
the sum of the angles of what is identified as a
Euclidean triangle turn out to be other than 180,
we shall condemn the experience as "mistake";
and if a sufficient number of such attempted veri-
fications have, without exception, the same result,
we shall abandon the Euclidean character of our
space but not the meaning of "Euclidean trian-
gle." I should suppose that the probability of
Newton's laws and of those theorems of celestial
mechanics which are purely geometrical is of the
same order of magnitude. Certainly there is noth-
ing in the a priori character of geometry to give
us any superior assurance that experience will
conform to it. In so far as certain principles op-
erate as criteria of reality and apparent excep-
tion to them condemns the experience as illusory,
the a priori may seem to have another significance.
But this is only because "nature" is itself a cote-

A PRIORI AND EMPIRICAL 305

gory the very fundamental and important cate-
gory of the physical: what is extruded from it is
still an absolutely given and un-get-overable fact
of experience, requiring to be dealt with in some
other way if we are to understand it at all. It is,
in fact, easy to exaggerate the cleavage between
the physical and the merely mental or psychologi-
cal, such as the illusory, as one may observe by
a serious consideration of the question whether
mirages and mirror-images belong to nature or
are merely mental.

The facts which I should like here to emphasize
are mainly two* In the first place, that no sub-
stantive conception, determined a priori, is able
to confine particular experiences within its con-
ceptual embrace with absolute assurance ; that all
identifications of objects and all material truth
about future experience remains probable only.
The supposition that any theory may secure for
the a priori a different significance than this, is
a delusion. The impossibility of it will become ap-
parent if we remember two things: that experi-
ence includes dream, illusion, and mistake as much
as "the physical 55 ; and that no theory, even on its
own showing, can attribute an a priori certainty
which is not hypothetical to predications about the
particular presented thing. In the second place,
I would emphasize the fact that the whole body of
our conceptual interpretations form a sort of
hierarchy or pyramid with the most comprehen-

306 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

sive, such as those of logic, at the top, and the
least general, such as "swans," etc., at the bot-
tom ; that with this complex system of interrelated
concepts, we approach particular experiences and
attempt to fit them, somewhere and somehow, into
its preformed patterns. Persistent failure leads to
readjustment; the applicability of certain con-
cepts to experiences of some particular sort is
abandoned, and some other conceptual pattern is
brought forward for application. The higher up
a concept stands in our pyramid, the more reluc-
tant we are to disturb it, because the more radical
and far-reaching the results will be if we abandon
the application of it in some particular fashion.
The decision that there are no such creatures as
have been defined as "swans," would be unimpor-
tant. The conclusion that there are no such things
as Euclidean triangles, would be immensely dis-
turbing. And if we should be forced to realize that
nothing in experience possesses any stability
that our principle, "Nothing can both be and not
be/ 5 was merely a verbalism, applying to nothing
more than momentarily that denouement would
rock our world to its foundations.

On the one hand, every concept, however un-
important, gives rise to a formal truth exhibiting
its structure, which it is beyond experience to in-
validate and which in its own little way is a cri-
terion of reality. The concept "swan" determines
what is, and what is not, a real swan; though what

A PRIORI AND EMPIRICAL 307

is not a swan is, perhaps, some other kind of bird.
And on the other hand, 710 concept or principle,
however basic, can be guaranteed to bring lucidity
and comprehension by being applied to particu-
lar experiences in a predetermined way. Even the
laws of logic prescribe only what is real thing, or
properly determined event, and do not prevent
those evanescent appearances and puzzling tran-
sitions of experience which it baffles us to under-
stand. On the one side, there is the Platonic heaven
of our concepts, with the beautiful clarity of their
patterned interrelations, and their absolute truth.
On the other side there is the chaos of given ex-
perience. The bringing of these two together is
a matter of trial and error ; is that empirical and
material truth which is never more than probable,
and is subject to continual revision in the process
of our learning. That kind of revision which
means the abandonment of certain concepts as not
truly applicable to certain areas of experience is
more fundamental and important than the mere
giving up of empirical generalizations previously
held. But it is only a deeper-lying phase of that
process which the progress of our understanding
may necessitate.

The truth of the a priori is formal only; but
we cannot capture the truth of experience if we
have no net to catch it in that is its immense
importance. But so far as the validity of all ma-
terial truth depends upon the predictability of

308 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

particular experience, the problem of our knowl-
edge of it is that of the validity of our prob-
ability-judgments. That there may be no such
valid knowledge because "there are no necessary
connections of matters of f act," represents a prob-
lem which is still to be met.

CHAPTER X
THE EMPIRICAL AND PROBABLE

The only knowledge a priori is purely analytic ;
all empirical knowledge is probable only. In af-
firming such a view, one assumes a heavy burden
of proof ; the whole history of the theory of knowl-
edge (unless we go back to Plato) seems to en-
force the conclusion that such a conception must
inevitably lead to skepticism. The presumption
would seem to be that if the only general proposi-
tions which are absolutely certain are of the con-
ceptual, and if all empirical truth, including that
about particular objects, is only probable, then
there can be no genuine knowledge of nature at
all; even genuine probability will be lacking, for
probability itself must rest upon some antecedent
certainty. More particularly, it may be felt that
the knowledge of nature requires some ground of
order in reality, or in the content of experience,
which assures its consonance with our modes of
conception ; that is, that there must be knowledge
a priori of some "metaphysical" and synthetic
truth, as contrasted with the merely logical truth
of the analysis of concepts, in order to bridge the
gap between abstract ideas in the mind and the
reality presented in experience. Lacking this,
knowledge of nature, since it is predictive, will
find no basis for its validity.

309

310 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

At once, it should be remarked that there is an
absolute certainty of the empirical which has been
recognized the immediate apprehension of the
given. Such direct awareness is hot indubitable
knowledge of an object, but the content of it is
an absolutely given fact. This immediate presen-
tation is our confrontation with reality and is
requisite to the distinction of particular empirical
truths from falsehood* Immediate qualia consti-
tute the ultimate denotation in experience of our
concepts, and the specific character of the given
plays its indispensable part in any verification.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to express the con-
tent of the given without importing what is not
given ; and our awareness of it has not been called
tftf knowledge," because with respect to it there
can be no error. Nevertheless, it functions as an
absolute mv <rra> for the knowledge of nature,

For the rest, as I shall hope to show, the con-
ception that our knowledge of nature is a knowl-
edge of probabilities, is the only one, compatible
with demonstrable facts, which can save it from
reduction in the end to mere "animal faith. 3 ' And
furthermore, for the validity of empirical gen-
eralizations as probable knowledge or more ac-
curately, as knowledge of probabilities no a
priori truth other than the merely analytic is re-
quired.

It is true that, in order that the difficulties
posed by skepticism may be met, it is essential

THE EMPIRICAL AND PROBABLE 311

that there be some knowledge which is more than
probable, and that such knowledge should be per-
tinent to nature and experience. But as has been
pointed out in the last two chapters, this is se-
cure: there is in all science, and in common-sense
knowledge, an element which is absolute and cer-
tain because it is a priori. The determination of
the criteria of reality, in its various categories,
and of principles of interpretation, antecedent to
particular experiences, is purely analytic. Our
concepts in general, without which no knowledge
would be expressible and nothing in experience
would be thinkable, give rise to such analytic and
certain truth* As the matter is usually conceived,
this knowledge which we find to be a priori would
be included in what is meant by "knowledge of
nature,*' since it delimits, for example, the physi-
cal and prescribes basic laws which must be true
of all physical reality. So far the point to be noted
is, that there is a knowledge of nature which is
more than probable because it is not merely em-
pirical, or dependent on the content of the given*
This is important because, as has been noted, one
form which the skeptical difficulty takes is that
empirical knowledge cannot be even probable un-
less some knowledge is more than probable. The
validity of probability- judgments rests upon an-
tecedent general truths which must be certain. If
all knowledge should be empirical and such prin-
ciples therefore mere generalizations from ex*

312 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

periences, then these principles would be only
probable ; with the result that the knowledge which
depends on them and is ordinarily called "proba-
ble" would be only probably probable. Hence in
ways which are obvious, any statement which we
could make would require the qualification "prob-
able," and knowledge would disappear in an in-
finite regress of such qualification. It is the
thorough-paced empiricism of a position such as
Hume's which leads to this difficulty. Or to put it
in another way, Hume's skepticism results, not
from the absence of necessary connections of em-
pirical particulars, but from failure to observe the
ways in which the necessary connections of ideas
are pertinent to the interpretation of the em-
pirically given and hence are antecedent deter-
minations of reality.

Nevertheless, it is true that when our a priori
conceptions are applied to given particulars, the
truth to which they give rise is only hypotheti-
cal, or if stated categorically, is probable only.
Amongst universal propositions which refer to
nature, we must distinguish between empirical
generalizations which are synthetic such as the
law of gravitation, for example and analytic
principles which exhibit the consequences of our
concepts, such as those of geometry* The former
are probable only. The latter are a priori and cer-
tain ; but their a priori certainty is either that of
abstract conceptual systems, or when they are

THE EMPIRICAL AND PROBABLE 313

given denotation and application, it is hypotheti-
cal, and when mention of the hypothesis is omitted,
they are not certain but are merely probable.
Thus a geometrical principle, when applied to a
concrete presented object, is a priori and certain
in the form, "If this plot of ground is triangular
and our space is Euclidean, then the sum of these
angles is 180 degrees.'* But when the hypothesis
is dropped and we assert, "The sum of these angles
is 180 degrees," the judgment is probable only,
because there is no a priori and complete assur-
ance that the concept "Euclidean triangle" is
genuinely applicable to this plot. Likewise if the
judgment is empirical but general such as "The
sum of the angles of any plane triangle is 180 de-
grees," it is probable only, because there is no
complete assurance of the Euclidean character of
space. Or if Euclidean conceptions are made defin-
itive of space and hence criteria of "the spatial"
as they might be then such an a priori de-
termination must be accompanied by our pre-
paredness to relegate any divergence of presented
phenomena from Euclid to some other category
to interpret them, for example, as physical re-
fraction of light or as optical illusion* But the
presence or absence of such divergent characters
in some set of phenomena would not be determina-
ble a priori or with absolute certainty. For exam-
ple, there still could be no complete assurance
that what are designated as "celestial triangles"

314 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

bounded by light rays, were purely spatial phe-
nomena, unaffected by some physical law of the
bending of the rays. Hence any general empirical
proposition about the set of actual phenomena,
meant to be denoted by "celestial triangles/ 5 will
still be probable only, because there will be no
complete assurance that they have a right to the
name and conform in all respects to what the a
priori laws of space require of real triangles.

As has been pointed out, every concept is cri-
terion of some restricted kind of reality and, on
the other hand, even basic or categorial concepts
are not criteria of reality in general but only of
reality within that category. Every presentation
is an absolute fact; is the presentation of reality
of some sort or other. But it does not follow that
what is presented is classifiable in some particular
category, such as the spatial or the physical, with-
out mistake. Identification of what is presented
as an object of a certain type, or a particular
kind of reality, is an interpretation put upon the
presentation, which is implicitly predictive and
hence transcends the given and is subject to veri-
fication or falsification by further possible expe-
rience. If we know the properties of triangles or
of space a priori, still the empirical judgment,
"This is a Euclidean triangle," is no more than
probable. Therefore the necessary connection be-
tween "Euclidean triangle" and certain geomet-
rical properties does not assure the geometrical

THE EMPIRICAL AND PROBABLE 315

truth about any particular presented object or
any collection of such.

Our subsumption of the given under concepts
is, thus, always contingent upon future experi-
ence, and the a priori knowledge of universal
principles does not secure any a priori knowledge
of empirical particulars. I think it will be clear
that the connection between universal principles
and empirical particulars has frequently, if not
generally, been left a little vague, and open to the
unwarranted inference that the certainty of the
universal means an equal certainty about the par-
ticulars, because the particular follows from the
universal. It is true that "All triangles are thus
and so" implies "This triangle is thus and so' 5
(provided "this triangle" exists). But the point
is, of course, that any presented this may not be a
triangle but only an approximation to, or slight
deformation of, a triangle, or something whose
difference from the triangular is momentarily
or for a thousand years incapable of detec-
tion.*

It has likewise been, most frequently, left a lit-
tle vague just what is meant by "knowledge of
nature" or "empirical knowledge," And this
vagueness also is probably traceable to a failure
of logical precision. Propositions of the general

*We may remind ourselves that the Platonic distinction between
knowledge which is a priori and of the idea, and opinion, which is
probable and of the empirical, is based precisely upon the point that
no sense-particular is exactly subsumable under any concept.

316 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

form "All A Is J5" may have either of two mean-
ings but not both at once.* They may mean (1)
"The concept A includes or implies the concept
jB" or (2) "The class, or collection, of A's is in-
cluded in the class of JB's." In the first (the in-
tensional) meaning, such a proposition is a priori
true or a priori false ; there need be no appeal to
experience to determine the implications of con-
cepts. The second meaning is still not quite pre-
cise until it is clear how membership in the class
of A 9 s is to be determined. If it is determined by
ideal conformity to the concept A, then obviously
it will follow from the fact that this concept im-
plies B 9 that the class of A*s so determined is con-
tained amongst the ITs. But in that case, member-
ship of any given particular in the class is al-
ways subject to possible doubt. If, however, the
term "A 9 s" is used denotatively to specify in ex-
tension a certain group of particulars, then it
does not follow from the fact that the concept A
implies the concept J5, that a group of particulars
called -4 5 s will indubitably have the character of
B's. "Empirical knowledge" usually does and
certainly ought to mean a knowledge of par-
ticular things pointed out or otherwise deter-
mined in extension. With this meaning, the em-
pirical knowledge that a group of objects called
"A's" will have the character of B's does not fol-
low (as anything more than probable) from the

*See Appendk F.

THE EMPIRICAL AND PROBABLE 317

a priori certainty that the concept A implies the
concept B. The difference between the a priori,
analytic, and intensional, on the one hand, and
the empirical and extensional, on the other, is the
difference between "If this is an A, then neces-
sarily it is a jB" and "This is an A; therefore it
is a J5." The former may be certain when the lat-
ter is not. Hence the difficulty that a priori knowl-
edge of universal truths does not lead to any cor-
responding empirical knowledge which is indubi-
table if this is supposed to be a difficulty is not
peculiar to the conception here presented that a
priori truth is analytic. Any theory whatever will
have to meet this point unless the relation of uni-
versal concepts and particular objects is somehow
misconstrued.

There is, to be sure, an important difference be-
tween that knowledge of particulars which would
be subsumable under a priori principles if only
the applicability of the concepts in question were
assured and a knowledge of particulars which is
supported only by inductive generalization for
example, between the inference from observed
triangularity to other geometrical properties (if
applied geometry is a priori) and the inference
from observed physical character to gravitational
behavior (laws of gravitation being inductive
generalizations). In the one case, we know with
certainty that if our identification and naming is
not erroneous then the object will have certain

318 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

further properties ; in the other we know only that
if our identification is correct, it will probably
have certain further properties. But in both cases,
our knowledge of the presented thing is probable
only because there is no complete certainty of its
subsuraption under the concept which is in ques-
tion.

Thus the compatibility of an a priori truth
such as is here maintained with the thesis that em-
pirical knowledge in general is no more than
probable, turns upon the previous point that the
knowledge of individual objects and of particular
occurrences of objective properties always in-
volves the application of a concept to something
presented, and that this identification of the
given as genuinely a case which falls under the
concept is something which immediate experience
does not make absolutely certain. Such identifica-
tion is an interpretation which is essentially
predictive and depends also upon a prior gen-
eralization from experience. The identification is
made on the basis of certain immediately pre-
sented qualia which, in past experience, have
proved more or less reliable clues to those further
characters which are necessary to verification of
the objective nature of the thing presented and
to its valid subsumption under the concept used
to name it. This interpretation reflects a judg-
ment of the form, "That which presents the im-
mediate qualia here given usually (and hence in

THE EMPIRICAL AND PROBABLE 319

a particular case, probably) has the objective
character in question."

This fact about the application of concepts to
presented tilings emphasizes the general likeness
of all empirical knowledge. Knowledge of indi-
vidual objects, as much as of generalizations or
laws, runs beyond what is given and asserts a cer-
tain regularity or predictable interconnection be-
tween experiences. Every objective judgment is
such that it can be verified only by some progres-
sion in experience. Since there is no indubitable
knowledge of objects in direct awareness, the
knowledge of things as much as the knowledge of
laws is at the mercy of the future. Empirical
knowledge depends on prediction, on an argu-
ment from past to future, on the presence of some
particular uniformity in experience ; and the gen-
eral problem of its validity is the same which is
posed by Hume's skepticism. How this validity
can be assured without appeal to the dependence
of the content of experience upon the mind, or to
the limitation of experience in conformity to re-
quirements of intelligibility, or to some other such
metaphysical presumption this is, I should sup-
pose, the outstanding problem which remains to
be considered.

At once, however, it is to be noted that this
problem here assumes a form different from that
in which it has usually been considered, in three
respects.

320 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

In the first place, that part of Hume's skep-
ticism which is concerned with necessary connec-
tions questions the possibility of the knowledge of
laws only and does not (explicitly at least) put in
question the possibility of the identification or
recognition of things. When it is seen that the
validity of both these kinds of knowledge turns,
for the most part, on the same considerations, the
problem is considerably altered. At first glance
it seems to be rendered even more difficult, be-
cause the scope of the skeptical doubt is enlarged.
But, as will appear later, this is not the case. It
means that a world without law must likewise be a
world without recognizable things. The recogni-
tion of objects requires that same kind of order or
reliable relatedness which law also requires.

In a way, this means that the proof which Kant
attempted in his deduction of the categories may
be secured without the Kantian assumption that
experience is limited by modes of intuition and
fixed forms of thought. Because the deduction of
the categories consist at bottom in this : that with-
out the validity of categorial principles no ex-
perience is possible. And a careful examination of
Kant's argument reveals the fact that he uses the
term "experience" to mean "objective experience, 9 *
"valid experience," "experience of actual and
identifiable objects," even though he does not
make this quite explicit. He certainly does not
mean that the categories are requisite to the ex-

THE EMPIRICAL AND PROBABLE 321

perience of a buzzing blooming confusion. In-
deed, in some passages of the "subjective deduc-
tion" the argument turns precisely upon the con-
sideration that the only alternative to a cate-
gorized and orderly experience is a meaningless
flux of mere schwarmerei. Very likely the reader
will incline to be harder upon the present attempt
than upon Kant's famous argument, and to hold
that it may not here be proved that knowledge is
valid by showing that the only alternative is
chaos. However, in advance of the argument, I
think we may see that the question of the validity
of empirical knowledge stands on a different foot-
ing when we recognize that this is its only alterna-
tive than when we suppose, as Hume apparently
does, that we may take our world as a world of
recognizable identifiable things while still doubt-
ing the validity of all generalizations such as nat-
ural law.

The second remark which is in point is that
nothing in the foregoing touches the very impor-
tant fact that the principles of interpretation and
classification and the criteria of the real are a
priori and certain in advance of experience. This
has an important bearing upon the problem of
the validity of empirical knowledge in general,
because it means that experience must, a priori*
conform to certain principles in order to be per-
tinent to any particular investigation or to the
validity of any particular law of nature. Nothing

322 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

is real in all categories ; everything is real in some
category. A set of categories adequate to the un-
derstanding of experience in general must meet
this last requirement. It is not a priori certain that
any given experience is validly interpretable in
a particular category f or example, the physical.
But we do know with certainty and a priori that
if X is a physical thing, then it will conform to
certain general principles which can be laid down
in advance because they constitute criteria of the
physical. When we study the sciences of physical
reality, we have this a priori knowledge of prin-
ciples to which the given must conform if it fall
within the class of those phenomena which are sig-
nificant in this connection. Thus we are provided,
a priori, with a basal minimum of law within the
field, as a sort of Archimedean point for all in-
vestigation. This does not enable us to apply our
basal principles which are a priori to some par-
ticular given without the possibility of mistake.
We may still be in error by confusing a subjec-
tive and psychological phenomenon an after-
image, for example with a physical thing. But it
does enable us to be certain that nothing which
concerns us in the study of physical nature can
violate our fundamental principles. To fail to
Conform is to be repudiated as not pertinent to
our present study.

Furthermore, if we should be possessed of an
adequate.get of categories, then we may be certain

THE EMPIRICAL AND PROBABLE 323

a priori that whatever does not conform to the
principles of a particular category will conform
to the principles of some other which is coordi-
nate. We play a sort of game of "animal, vege-
table, or mineral" with experience, by which it
will be impossible for it to get out of the net of
our understanding, no matter what may be the
content of it*

The third important difference between what
it is necessary here to establish and the problem
as posed by Humian skepticism, is that it is
the validity of empirical knowledge as probable
judgment only which requires to be assured. If
more than this is needed to save us from skep-
ticism, then, once for all, there is no answer to
the skeptic. The particular point of doubt, I
should suppose, is whether probable knowledge
and empirical generalizations can be valid if, as is
here maintained, all necessary connections are
logical only and do not limit the content of expe-
rience. The validity of probability and of induc-
tion is commonly supposed to rest upon some
ground of order and connection beyond the
merely logical some "uniformity of nature"
which could conceivably be absent from our ex-
perience. No such metaphysical presupposition
would be compatible with the account of knowl-
edge here given. For us, then, the validity of em-
pirical knowledge turns upon the nature of the
alternative when all assumption of more than

324 MIND AND THE WOIULD-OKDER

merely logical necessity in nature, or of con-
formity a priori to any order which could con-
ceivably be absent, is dispensed with.

For this, the first essential is an examination of
what is essential to the validity of probable judg-
ment from the purely logical point of view* It is,
fortunately, unnecessary to enter upon a complete
theory of inductive generalization and probabil-
ity. Indeed, examination of this question could be
dismissed altogether were it not that certain errors
about the logical character of probable judgment
have become entangled with the more fundamental
question of the epistemological and metaphysical
foundations of our knowledge of the probable.
We must discuss these merely logical facts not to
get them into the picture but to keep them out.

"Probability" has many different meanings and
the first requisite is to avoid certain verbal con-
fusions which are possible. Ordinarily, we phrase
the empirical generalization, or other statement
which we know or should know to be probable
only, as if it were absolutely certain. As economy
of language, this is excusable and even unavoid-
able. But if we thus state, for example, Newton's
law of gravitation as absolute truth, we must not
confuse what is stated with the judgment of any
informed and intelligent person who makes the
statement. The intent of the judgment is not the
statement judged probable, but that it is prob-
able. If in such a case we assert briefly that A is

THE EMPIRICAL AND PROBABLE 325

B 9 our judgment is, "It is probable that A is J3"
or "that A is B is highly probable," or "A is B
has a probability represented approximately by
the fraction m/n" Now a common supposition
seems to be that our knowledge of the law of
gravitation is invalid if there are facts of nature
which do not conform to the law. But if this is
probable knowledge, it is a very simple and ob-
vious fact that its validity does not require such
conformity. The judgment "A is B is probable"
does not require for its truth that A is B ; it re-
quires only that this should be genuinely proba-
ble. What the genuineness of a probability re-
quires concerning the independent facts to which
it relates, we need not, for the moment, inquire.
But at least it is undeniable that the judgment,
"A is B is probable," may be absolutely true when
the judgment "A is J3" would be absolutely false.
Unless this is the case, there is no real difference
between probable and certain knowledge. No-
body will contest this ; yet I think we may discern
behind a good deal of the questioning about the
validity of probable knowledge, the confused
thought that if what we know is "A is B is proba-
ble" but in fact A is not JB, then such knowledge
is invalid. Certainly it is a question in what its
validity consists, but equally certainly this does
not consist simply in accord between what is prob-
ably true and the objective fact.

Another pertinent consideration has to do with

326 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

the relation between the probable judgment and
those facts which constitute the ground of it and
hence stand to it in the relation of premises to
conclusion* It has always been clear, of course,
that it is impossible to tell whether a given judg-
ment of probability is valid without examining the
data on which the judgment is based. Every text
on the elements of probability-theory contains
some such illustration as the following: Let four
hands of whist be dealt and each player inspect
his hand. Let the quaesitum be the probability of
four aces in one hand. This probability will be
different (1) for A who is not a player and does
not examine any hand (&) for a player 5, who
observes that he holds no aces, and (3) for an-
other player, C, who finds one or more aces in
his hand but not four. If we represent the value
of the probability for each by the letter designa-
ing the person, then B> A > C, though for each it
is the same objective stVte of affairs whose proba-
bility is in question. In other words, a correctly
estimated probability is relative to the data upon
which it is based, or the premises from which it is
drawn. This is frequently phrased by the some-
what dubious formula, "Probability is relative to
our ignorance."

Thus probable knowledge is always relative to
him who has it, in the sense that it depends upon
whatever other relevant knowledge he may pos-
sess. When some proposition or law is adjudged

THE EMPIRICAL AND PROBABLE 327

probable, there is always a tacit qualification
which must be made explicit before the validity
of the judgment can be assessed* For example,
when the law of gravitation is declared to be
probable, the real intention might be formulated
as: "On the basis of what duly qualified persons
who may fairly be presumed to know all the
relevant facts which are available unite in re-
porting, this law is probable. 55 The probability
of the law is, very likely, different for me than
for the scientist who knows the pertinent facts
more directly. For him, the data are, in part at
least, certain laboratory-tested facts. The rest of
us having no such laboratory experience ac-
cept it on authority ; which means that our judg-
ment bears a less direct relation to the premised
facts, and concerns the reliability of a proposi-
tion about which expert investigators agree. For
the scientist something is simply true which for
me is probable because he reports it. Hence for
me, the conclusion about the law represents a com-
pounding of probabilities. (Strictly, of course, the
same thing is true for the scientist also, though
in lesser degree.)

In this last respect, the illustration is typical
of most probability-judgments. Nearly all the ac-
cepted probabilities rest upon more complex evi-
dence than the usual formulations suggest; what
are accepted as premises are themselves not cer-
tain but only highly probable. Thus our judg-

328 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

ment, if made explicit, would take the form. The
probability that A is B is a/b> because if P is Q,
then the probability that A is B is m/n, and the
probability of "P is Q 5? is p/q (where m/n X p/q
= a/b). But this compound character of proba-
able judgment offers no theoretical difficulty for
their validity in general, provided only that the
probability of the premises, when pushed back to
what is more and more ultimate, somewhere comes
to rest in something certain, and provided also
that there are some valid principles of probability
in general whether those commonly accepted or
some others.* These two provisos, just stated,
represent the prime requisites of the validity of
probable judgment, concerning which there may
be doubt.

The validity of the judgment that A is proba-
bly B does not, fits we have just seen, concern any
direct relation between the judgment and the fact
or non-fact, A is -B; it concerns the relation be-
tween the judgment and whatever are the relevant
data upon which it is based. These may be ver-
bally quite remote; the immediate premises are,
very likely, themselves only probable, and per-
haps in turn based upon premises only probable.
Unless this backward-leading chain comes to rest

*StrjetIy r of course, there are theoretical difficulties about the com-
pounding of probabilities, and in fact about almost every point in
probability-theory. Except so far as they bear directly upon episte-
moiogical problems, I have neglected these: short of interpolating
here a complete theoretical analysis of probability, no other course
is possible.

THE EMPIRICAL AND PROBABLE 329

finally in certainty, no probability- judgment can
be valid at all. But if it does thus finally come to
rest, the complexity of it is of no theoretical con-
sequence. Such ultimate premises, however, must
be actual given data for the individual who makes
the judgment, hence the probability of a given
formulation may vary from individual to indi-
vidual, according to our individual knowledge of
a relevant sort.

All these facts are simple and fairly well rec-
ognized; I hope I shall be pardoned for repeat-
ing commonplaces in order to emphasize the fol-
lowing obvious consequences of them: (1) In the
only sense in which we can possibly suppose prob-
able knowledge to exist at all, its validity is un-
affected by the fact that it is subjective (that is,
relative to the data of knowledge possessed by the
individual, and very likely different for each) ;
and () Probable knowledge may be valid in spite
of the fact that what is judged probable may, in
any given case or any number of cases, be false.

There is a further important consequence of
the relativity of probable judgment. Unlike de-
ductive inference, in which the conclusion is as
certain as the premises, the conclusion of a proba-
bility-inference must retain its reference to the
premises. The conclusion "A is probably J?" is
elliptical ; what is validly meant is "On the prem-
ises such and such, A is probably Jff. M This might
easily be overlooked. One might say, "But since

330 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

my premises are true, it is true without qualifica-
tion that A is probably B." So phrased, the con-
clusion "A is probably B" seems to refer directly
to some objective fact. But it is just this over-
sight which must be guarded against. As referring
directly to objective fact, some new bit of evi-
dence or the next moment's experience may com-
pletely alter the probability may turn what was
probable into something certainly true or cer-
tainly false or something more probable or less
probable than before. This is what happens when
we say that the probability of something is in-
creased or descreased. If, in the earlier illustra-
tion, the man who has seen no hand of cards
should be shown a hand with no aces, the probabil-
ity of four aces in one hand "is increased," But
the validity of his previous judgment is un-
touched, and the fact if it be such that there
are not four aces in one hand is unaffected. There
is no such thing as the probability of four aces
in one hand, or the probability of anything else.
Given all the relevant data which there are to be
known, everything is either certainly true or cer-
tainly false. Given anything short of this, what
the value of the probability is, depends upon what
data are thus given. There are always various
probabilities of the same qusesitum, on the basis
of various data or different relevant knowledge.
When the premises contain all the relevant knowl-
edge which is available under certain well-defined

THE EMPIRICAL AND PROBABLE SSI

conditions, then reference to "the probability"
as in actuarial work, etc. has a recognizable sig-
nificance ; it consists in tacit reference to this well-
understood body of data. But clearly, this alters
nothing in what has been said.

A "poor evaluation" of the probability of any-
thing may reflect ignorance of relevant data
which "ought" to be known, or it may reflect logi-
cal error in the relation of the probability con-
clusion to its premises. In the former case, there
will be moral or practical delinquency, perhaps,
but the validity of the conclusion is unaffected. It
is in the latter case only that any probability-
judgment can be genuinely invalid. That the
validity of probability-judgment is thus unaf-
fected by ignorance and is affected only by logi-
cal error, goes along with the fact that the con-
clusion necessarily retains reference to its prem-
ises.

The consequence of this which is most impor-
tant is that the probable judgment, if valid, is
true. There is no difference in the case of prob-
ability-inference between validity and truth. What
the judgment "A is probably JS" asserts is not
that A is B or that any other objective state of
affairs (except what the premises assert) holds
good. It asserts that "A is B" has a certain prob-
ability on the basis of certain data. If the data
are actual the probability is "actual" ; if the data
are merely hypothetical, the assigned probability

332 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

shares this hypothetical character. But unless
there has been logical error, the probable judg-
ment is not only valid but absolutely true. There
is no alternative to this account except that prob-
ability has no kind of truth, no validity, and no
meaning of any sort.

Moreover, a probable judgment, once true, is
always true. A probability cannot change, because
probability has no meaning except by relation to
its premises or ground. New data do not invali-
date the previous judgment, because they consti-
tute a new problem and mark a new probability.
The probable judgment based upon specific data
is not only eternally valid, if it is ever valid, but
if it is valid, it is absolutely and eternally true.

As we have seen, there are two types of empiri-
cal generalizations with which we have to do: (1)
those ordinarily so called, in which it is asserted
that whatever may be validly named by some name
has a certain further property, or properties, not
implied by that name, and (2) those empirical
generalizations of a subtler sort which underlie
the naming of something presented. The first type
include what are ordinarily called "natural laws" ;
what they ostensibly assert is that wherever a cer-
tain order is present in experience, a certain fur-
ther order will accompany it. What those of the
second type assert is that what presents a certain
given appearance will exhibit in further experi-
ence the order requisite to the applicability of a
certain concept.

THE EMPIRICAL AND PROBABLE 333

For both types, the general character of the
judgment is the prediction that something will
hold of future experience because it has held in
past experience. And in both cases, it is the valid-
ity of this as a probability which requires to be
established. One difference between these two
needs to be remarked: "natural laws" must have
held in all past experience and are predicted to
hold universally, while this is not necessary for
our interpretation of presentations. If I assert
"This is a sweet apple," the nature of my judg-
ment might be expressed: "What looks like this,
under these conditions, will probably have the
sweet apple taste, digestibility, etc." This judg-
ment reflects my past experience of appearances
like that now given. But it is neither plausible nor
necessary that what looks like this should have
turned out in all past cases to be a sweet apple. It
is sufficient for probable judgment that this should
have been so in a certain proportion of cases.

The requirement of universality for natural law
is, possibly, a bit artificial. What I mean is : there
are any number of generalizations to be found in
common sense and in practice which have the same
general character as "laws" in other respects but
which have not been universally substantiated in
past experience and would not be regarded as in-
validated by future exception : Potatoes are good
food ; red-cedar shingles will last for twelve years ;
a banker's advice about investments will be safe;

334 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

the theatre-roof won't fall on your head. I think
a little reflection will reveal that by far the greater
part of life is guided by such generalizations
which give rise to a probability in the particular
case but are not without their exceptions. In fact,
if laws of nature should have this character gen*
erally, nobody would be much upset outside of
academic circles. A generalization with very few
exceptions is almost as good as one with none, as
a basis for action. I am not trying to argue that
there are no unexceptionable empirical generaliza-
tions, nor to fudge the difference between cer-
tainty and probability. But I would point out
that, granting all the universal truth and all the
certainty that the most ambitious theory has ever
claimed, if it were not for that more lowly knowl-
edge of probabilities based on generalities which
have their known exceptions, we should most of
us be dead within the week. A theory which ago-
nizes endlessly about certain knowledge of nature
and neglects the probable, represents a somewhat
artificial interest.

Thus we must recognize, alongside of those nat-
ural laws which are based upon past experience
without exceptions and are predicted universally,
empirical generalizations admitting of possible or
actual exception but nevertheless having a certain
probability in the individual case. Let us call
these last "statistical generalizations" since they
are exhibited at their best when supported by

THE EMPIRICAL AND PROBABLE 335

statistical procedures. There are various theoreti-
cal grounds quite apart from the practical con-
siderations urged above on which it may be
doubted whether such statistical generalizations
and universally predicted empirical generaliza-
tions, or "laws," can be distinguished in the end.
But examination of these may be omitted, since
decision of this issue is not of ultimate importance
for us here. In any event, our knowledge of a gen-
eralization is probable only, and the use of it de-
pends simply upon its giving rise to a validly
probable prediction in particular cases*

It is obvious that all empirical knowledge even-
tually goes back to knowledge of empirical par-
ticulars. Generalizations have their ground in the
coincidence of such particulars. Knowledge of the
particular functions also as the basis of the ap-
plicability of general principles which are not em-
pirical but a priori. And knowledge of the par-
ticular is rooted in immediate experience. The first
apprehension, so to speak, is of given appear;
ances, having a specific and later recognizable
character, and of their continuity ; with further
and equally specific experience. Coincidence of
such progressions in immediacy give rise to habits
of action, which may become explicit in general-
izations of the form "What appears like this will
turn out thus and so." Granted that such coin-
cidence in experience can establish probability for
the future, we have in the immediate awareness of

336 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

the given that certainty which becomes the basis
of a probable knowledge of the particular object
or the occurrence of an objective property.

The interpretation of the presentation is the
application of a concept to it. The applicability
of the concept requires, a priori, certain predicta-
ble sequences in experience, continuous with the
given. The application itself is hypothetical ; that
the concept is genuinely applicable is not a priori
but only probable. This probability is supported
by a generalization from direct experience of the
sort which has been pointed out ; a statistical gen-
eralization to the effect that appearances like the
given one, under circumstances like the present,
are, in possible experience, continuous with such
sequences as the applicability of the concept re-
quires, in a certain proportion at least of cases.

This probable knowledge of particulars be-
comes in turn the basis for generalizations of the
type more commonly recognized as such propo-
sitions asserting a universal connection between
what is denoted by some concept and a further
character or property, not implied by that con-
cept. Our knowledge of such generalizations rep-
resents a compounding of probabilities, since its
assumed premises the knowledge of particulars
are only probable, and the passage from these
premises to the generalization itself is inductive
and represents a connection which is not certain
but probable only. But this compound probability

THE EMPIRICAL AND PROBABLE 337

has as its premises the immediate certainty of the
given data in the experience of particular in-
stances.

At this point, the alert reader will douhtless in-
quire if the validity of memory is not here as-
sumed. The answer is, in brief, that this assump-
tion is not necessary. Memory is a form of
empirical knowledge, parallel in most respects to
perception. As in perception, so in the case of
memory, something is absolutely given the pres-
ent recollection. And like perception, memory as
a form of knowledge is an interpretation put upon
this presentation; an interpretation, moreover,
which in the particular case is verifiable, in those
ways in which all knowledge of the past is subject
to verification. Also memories, like perceptions,
may be roughly divided into different types, hav-
ing different degrees of reliability, which we are
able to assess. This, plainly, is the only view con-
sonant with common sense and with obvious char-
acters of experience. Hence we must conclude that
memory in general is probable knowledge, and
that so far as other forms of knowledge are based
on memory, the probability of such knowledge is
compound, to a degree not previously noted. But
that does not introduce any new theoretical dif-
ficulty.

In fact, memory is in this respect like various
other data which enter into the structure of our
knowledge in general particularly the reports of

338 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

other people. Such reports are more or less re-
liable, as past verifications of such have attested.
They enter into the body of data, upon which our
further judgments are based, as more or less prob-
able premises. So far as the experience support-
ing an empirical generalization is thus vicarious,
the probability of that generalization is compound
to an extent which it would not be if the experi-
ence were exclusively our own. Or to put it in an-
other way, reports of others are a particular type
of our own. experience, having a probability which
reflects our past experience of such reports and
of their relation to our further experience perti-
nent to their truth. In various similar ways, our
empirical knowledge is complex and remote from
its bases in immediate experience. The probability
attaching to it has a correspondingly compounded
character.

Some may feel that such an account makes our
empirical knowledge so complex and, when ex-
plicitly analyzed, so remote from its eventual
grounds, that the kind of validity here assigned
is little better than condemnation. But will not
honest examination require the admission that our
empirical judgments cure thus logically complex;
that ordinary statements of them usually proceed
by taking much for granted which is not abso-
lutely certain. Such artificial simplification is ex-
cusable, or even necessary, in the interest of the
separation of problems, or for some other para-

THE EMPIRICAL AND PROBABLE 339

digmatic purpose. But it is in inexcusable in what
purports to be an analysis of knowledge in gen-
eral* If the truth should be complex and some-
what disillusioning, it would still not be a merit
to substitute for it some more dramatic and com-
forting simplicity.

There are, moreover, certain mitigating con-
siderations. In the first place, the complexity of
empirical judgment and its remoteness from com-
pletely certain grounds, does not necessarily mean
that its probability is diminished in like propor-
tion* If the difference between the compounded
probabilities and absolute certainty is slight, the
eventual and resultant probability may likewise
be very close to theoretical certainty. In the sec-
ond place, the practical attitude which is ex-
pressed in ordinary judgment as if it were based
upon some certainty is, in fact, one which is quite
compatible with the failure of what we say to
prove true. Such failure would not prove devastat-
ing to our attitude toward life as if an absolute
truth had been destroyed. For example, if you ask
me, I shall unhesitatingly assert, "This is a good
fountain pen." But if next moment it refuses to
write and thereafter can never be got to work
properly, I shall not lie down and die because my
knowledge is invalid and my universe has come
apart. All my statement really means is that I
have good enough grounds to think it highly prob-
able which is, in fact, the case. If it should be

340 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

pointed out that I am not even certain that this
is the same pen I have used heretof ore, the experi-
ence of which was my basis of judgment, I shall
still not be disturbed in my practical attitude. I
shall say, "Oh, well, what of it? Life is too short
to bother about the difference between probabili-
ties of that order and certainty." Which again is
quite true. My unhesitating practical attitude is
no mere "animal faith" ; it is quite in accord with
the remote possibility that what I assert and act
upon may not be true is logically remote from
ultimate certain grounds and most complex. My
attitude has a complete theoretical justification.
It is precisely the supposition that knowledge re-
quires absolutely certainty about the empirical,
that closes the door to a theoretical justification
of it. Such a supposition has no theoretical sup-
port and no corroboration in our actual practical
attitudes. There is just about enough, chance that
our trusted generalizations may be false to make
the pursuit of science pleasantly exciting. What
a dull business life would be if everything we ven-
tured to act upon should turn out true ! In a world
in which knowledge, as some have portrayed it,
would be valid, intelligence would be unnecessary,
since habit would be a universally safe guide.

If now the analysis of our empirical knowledge
can be supposed to be covered, let us turn to its
general character. It is that of a probability-
judgment which, when explicitly stated, affirms

THE EMPIRICAL AND PROBABLE 341

that something has a certain degree of probability
on the basis of premises which are, eventually, di-
rect individual experience. The validity of such
knowledge does not, of course, require that we
should explicate all its complexity, or even that
we should be able to. The man whose shrewd but
untutored logical sense prevents his believing
what logic would condemn, makes a valid judg-
ment, whether he could provide the logical anal-
ysis of it or not. If our empirical judgments in-
clude only what a just logic would validate, they
are sound. And in so far as we do not offend
against logic, but hold to our empirical knowledge
as probable in a degree which it truly is, the con-
tent of our knowledge is true. Experience next
moment may destroy the generalization judged
probable. But it will remain forever true that it
was probable on the grounds from which we made
our judgment. And that is all that any prob-
ability-judgment can validly mean.

Since valid empirical knowledge means only
such probability, on grounds which genuinely es-
tablish it, and since any other than empirical
knowledge is a priori, we have the important con-
sequence that just m so "far as we are rational,
what we believe is absolutely and eternally true.
What rational men entertain as highly probable
may largely alter with the passage of time. Em-
pirical generalizations, as usually phrased, may
be overturned and others take their place* The

342 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

growth of science may repudiate as "false 35 what,
in its previous stages, was held "true." But a just
appreciation of the nature of such knowledge as
only probable has this consequence : let our igno-
rance be however large, our experience however
circumscribed, we need believe nothing false, ex-
cept as we fail to be rational and believe without
valid grounds. Such avoidance of the unwarranted
will not condemn us to sheer ignorance; we may
at every stage possess a generous body of gen-
eralizations which, correctly assessed, are valid
and are useful guides to practise. Indeed, will not
a survey of the history of human thought compel
the conclusion that only such a conception as this
can save the reasonable-minded man from repu-
diating the attempt at scientific knowledge as
chimerical?

However, it may be said that what the defense
of knowledge requires is not a justification of it
as a logically valid judgment, corroborated by
reference to past experience but doomed perhaps
to repudiation in the light of the future* Empiri-
cal knowledge is essentially predictive and its re-
lation to the future is of the essence of its validity.
There is no attempt to escape this point. I have
so far spoken as if, in general, the argument from
past to future is valid; as if some ground of in-
duction is secure. The fundamental doubts which
may be entertained of this will be the topic of the
concluding chapter.

THE EMPIRICAL AND PROBABLE 343

Two points may be noted here: first, a "law"
having a high degree of probability may have to
be abandoned in the light of future experience as
not universal, and may yet remain a "rule of
thumb" or statistical generalization which is true
in the great proportion of cases and hence gives
rise to a still valid probability in the particular
case. The practical use made of laws which are
superseded may, and often does, stand as still
justified. The "laws" of the ancients are, often-
times, such as would still be useful guides to ac-
tion if we had no better. And second, we need to
ask just what is necessary for the justification of
probability-judgment as a basis for practical ac-
tion. That what is probable must always be true,
is an obviously impossible answer to this question.
It is even impossible to demand that whatever is
probable must in every instance be true in the
majority of cases in spite of some theories to the
contrary. A probability may genuinely be valid
in some instances even though beyond a certain
point no case should be found in accordance with
it. I think reflection will reveal that what is req-
uisite to its justification as a practical attitude
is that action in accordance with probabilities
must in general be more successful than action
which ignores them. In other words, it is essential
that the world be such that probabilities .in gen-
eral are justified by the future that the world
is "orderly"; that there are certain stabilities ex-

344 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

tending through the past and future, and that
the attitude which is based on past coincidence
will in general be safer for the future than a dif-
ferent one. But this question is that same one con-
cerning the existence of some basis for induction,
which the next chapter will discuss.

CHAPTER XI
EXPERIENCE AND ORDER

Since empirical knowledge is exclusively a
knowledge of probabilities, the validity of it in
general depends upon the validity of induction
and probability-judgment. The preceding chap-
ter has been written as if some principles of such
inference may be presumed as valid. That pre-
sumption, however, requires justification, particu-
larly since the grounds upon which it is often
supposed to rest have here been repudiated. Let
us phrase the issue as sharply as possible: Con-
cepts are of the mind* All knowledge is in terms
of concepts, and the possibility of it depends upon
their applicability to experience* The application
of a concept requires always a certain orderly
sequence in experience. But the content of ex-
perience is independent of the mind; that order
is discoverable in possible experience, cannot be
dictated by the knower. If generalization is to be
possible if concepts are to be applicable in dis-
tinguishable classes of cases, and if the connection
of concepts in such generalizations is to find its
application in reality then the givenness of cer-
tain qualia, or complexes of such, must be a clue
to expected sequences, and the occurrence of such

845

346 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

sequences in the past must be a ground of their
valid prediction for the future.

However, it is not requisite that such expecta-
tion and predication should be certain. Knowl-
edge of particular objects is never beyond the
possibility of mistaken apprehension ; and empiri-
cal generalizations are, theoretically, never more
than highly probable* What is requisite, then, in
order that empirical knowledge should be valid, is
that this connection of given qualia with expected
sequences, and the connection between the se-
quences prescribed by one concept and that which
is essential to some other, should be genuinely prob-
able. In general there must be the possibility of
arguing from past to future ; not with certainty,
but with probability.

Concerning probability-judgments, it has been
pointed out, first, that their validity does not re-
quire that what is judged probable should be
true not even that the particular generalization
should be true of any specifiable proportion of
actual cases* Second, the probability- judgment is
relative to the pertinent knowledge of him who
makes it ; and this relativity is no bar to its valid-
ity. Third, this relativity of the probability- judg-
ment to its premises means that its validity, in the
particular instance, consists in a certain relation
between the conclusion and its ground ; and means
also that if it is valid it is true, absolutely and
eternally. These three characters of probability-

EXPERIENCE AND ORDER 347

judgments rest upon obvious facts which cannot
be denied without destroying the distinction be-
tween probability and certainty. It is an im-
mediate consequence of them that a particular
empirical judgment, if it represents a probability-
inference justly drawn from its grounds, is abso-
lutely true knowledge* The one remaining ques-
tion is whether there are any valid principles of
such inference according to which a particular
empirical judgment may be justly drawn. If prob-
ability-judgment m general may be valid then
there is no further ground of doubt that empirical
judgments which are rational are true.

For the ideal completion of the argument, pres-
entation and detailed examination of the princi-
ples of probability-inference and induction as
well as of our categorial concepts would be in
order. But the reader will not ask for that in the
present book another of at least equal length
would be required. The particular ground of pos-
sible doubt is obvious enough: the applicability of
concepts and the argument from past to future,
require the presence of some order and uniform-
ity. In an experience whose content is independent
of the mind, it may be thought that such order
could conceivably be lacking, and that the pre-
sumption of it is, therefore, dogmatic and without
foundation. Pointing out that the validity of
probability consists in a relation between the con-
clusion and its ground, and that the truth of

348 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

what is judged probable is not directly relevant ,
does nothing to meet this present point. Precisely
what is in question is whether a judgment which
is in this sense subjective, confronting an experi-
ence which is independent, can be meaningfully
relevant to the constitution of reality.

Since the applicability of concepts (or recog-
nition of things by their appearances) as well as
the validity of generalizations, is in question, the
issue concerns the intelligibility of experience as
well as the possibility of empirical knowledge.
These two turn, for the most part, upon the same
considerations.

The conclusion of which I shall hope to con-
vince the reader is that no assumption of any-
thing which could conceivably be false is neces-
sary ; that no sort of experience which the wildest
imagination could conjure up could fail to afford
a basis for intelligibility and probable judgment.
The contrary assumption has frequently been due
to the false conception that is certainty of appre-
hension and certainty of generalization which
must be provided for. And some of those same con-
fusions which we have found surrounding previous
issues are involved here also.

I recognize that my burden of proof in this
matter is a heavy one. Belief in something meant
by the "uniformity of nature" is 5 1 think, as natu-
ral to us as belief in an absolute up and down, and
is supported by many habits of thought which are

EXPERIENCE AND ORDER 349

fundamental and pervasive. And so far as I know,
it has never up till now been questioned, except
by those who willingly faced a skeptical alterna-
tive. In a sense, this belief is not to be questioned
here, but rather whether it has any alternative at
all; the precise problem is, perhaps, just what is
involved in the necessary "uniformity." In this
difficult situation, instead of proceeding directly
to the center of the problem, I wish to begin with
a variety of more peripheral considerations. Per-
haps if a sufficient number of external buttresses
are removed, the false conception will fall of its
own weight.

Two points which are immediately relevant to
the question of order in reality can be brought
forward from what precedes; first, that reality
and the content of experience are not directly [
synonymous, and second, that our categories are
so divided that always we play a sort of game
of "animal, vegetable, or mineral" with the given.
It is reality, not experience, which must be or-
derly. Failure of a certain type of order is the
criterion which excludes the given from reality
(of a certain type). Thus so far as any one cate-
gory is in question, our method of understanding
experience is to segregate, as "reality," that part
which is orderly in the required fashion ; the rest
is understood by being labelled "unreal." With
this in mind, our rational demand that reality
shall be orderly somewhat reminds one of the silly

350 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

old story we used to tell as boys of the man who
made a list of those he could whip : when a neigh-
bor whose name was included belligerently af-
firmed, "You can't whip me," the mater of the
list replied, "All right; then I'll just rub your
name off." Experience has not much chance to
thwart our demand for order when the failure to
be orderly in certain ways merely results in its
being rubbed off the list of that which it is de-
manded shall be thus orderly.

To be sure, what is excluded from one category
must be brought under some other if it is to be
intelligible. But any set of coordinate categories
is simply a method for exhausting the possibili-
ties. The "unreal" is a temporary pigeon-hole for
what requires to be sorted or analyzed m some
further fashion. The unsatisfactoriness of such a
scrap-basket category merely reflects this desira-
bility of a further understanding of its content.
But to be able to classify what is presented as
"unreal" or "illusion," though it may represent
only superficial understanding, means neverthe-
less a very important understanding, precisely be-
cause it means that this content of experience is
not relevant in the present connection, that it can-
not figure as a negative instance of an empirical
generalization and so on. So far, then, the reality
presented to us in experience is certain to be in-
telligible and orderly, because the failure to make
a certain kind of sense merely results in its being

EXPERIENCE AND OKDER 351

relegated to the box we keep for pi. The only
question is, how much of experience will be reality,
and how much illusion. It will be obvious that this
depends, in part, at least, upon the intellectual
ingenuity of the knower his power, when some
expected order fails, to discover some other which
is definite to like degree. It is further clear that
to the question, "How much of given experience
will be illusory?" there can he no a priori answer.
In this connection it is well to remark that our
understanding of the given is always a matter of
degree, and that the order demanded of reality
is, similarly, more or less specific. If there is any
sense in which the real must be "through and
through" orderly, at least such through and
through order is an ideal correlated with that
"complete understanding 59 which is impossible to
any but an absolute mind* And there must be some
other sense in which predictable order is not de-
manded of the real. The reasons for this will bear
a little investigation.

I find this morning on my study window a num-
ber of apparently random grayish smudges. The
explanation promptly comes to mind; small chil-
dren played here yesterday. Just this pattern of
smudges probably never occurred before and
never will again. But this failure to exhibit any
definitely anticipatable arrangement excites no
surprise ; it is just what one expects of children's
finger marks. This superficiality of our demand

352 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

for order reflects, in part, the lack of any further
cognitive problem. If my choicest possessions were
all missing this morning, I should ask for some-
thing more. The detective would come in and,
starting from a system which exhausts in certain
ways the possibilities of finger-marks, would seek
to establish a correlation identifying a thief. But
even so, these finger marks would still fail to be
uniform with anything else in some ways in which
order could exist and might be expected. The
phrase "through and through" as applied to the
uniformity or order demanded of reality is rather
vague.

It also suggests itself that, in the process of our
learning the nature of the real, what we do is to
look for some order of a certain general type and,
if we do not find that, to look for some other. The
first attempt at uniformity may be, for example,
that sparks fly upward, water runs down hill and
"Everything seeks its natural level." Balked in
this, a second attempt is, "Bodies fall in propor-
tion to their weight." Finally we have z>=# *. The
point here is not simply that one attempted gen-
eralization having failed, we seek another. It is
that the type of uniformity first sought a cor-
relation-Jbetween gravitational behavior and physi-
cal kinds does not exist. Nor is there any cor-
relation with weight. The correlation found be-
tween velocity and time is of an entirely different
sort. Not order "through and through" but some

EXPERIENCE AND ORDER 353

order is what is requisite to intelligibility. And in
the light of the nature of our learning process,
the dictum "There must be some order in any
given area of reality" takes on the character of
a regulative principle, not particularly different
in significance from, "If at first you don't suc-
ceed; try, try again." More explicitly and ac-
curately, the situation may be stated thus : A cer-
tain minimal order Is prescribed a priori in the
recognition of the reaL It is a regulative maxim
of reason to seek further uniformities which may
be stated in principles finally of maximal compre-
hensiveness and simplicity. But there neither is
nor can be any prescription of the specific type of
uniformity or correlation which is demanded in
this interest of further intelligibility. Moreover,
the particular kind of order discoverable in one
segment of the real may be definitely absent in
some other segment in which it might with equal
reasonableness be anticipated.

The situation is entirely comparable if we turn
from the kind of uniformity necessary for gen-
eralization to the kind which is essential for the
recognition of objects. A certain minimal uni-
formity is prescribed by the categorial classifica-
tion as reality of a certain type. Purther uni-
formity may be sought for the purpose of further
classification. But the manner in which such fur-
ther uniformity shall be f oupd is not determinable
unless by some scheme of subordinate cate-

354 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

gories, exhausting the possibilities in a particular
wa y i n advance of familiarity with the area of
reality which is in question. Nor can it rationally
be "demanded" that any particular degree or kind
of such uniformity shall be always exhibited by
experience which is intelligible. What the recog-
nition of objects requires is some correlation be-
tween given appearance and that sequence with
further experience which is requisite to identi-
fication and to discrimination of veridical from
mistaken apprehension. But it cannot be re-
quired for the intelligibility of experience that
within the limits of the given there must be that
which affords the basis of such uniform correla-
tion. If within every empirical content merely as
given there were that which possessed absolute uni-
form correlation with that further sequence which
is essential to a correct apprehension, then illusion
and mistake would be possible only to the inex-
perienced and the fool. It is true that only the
irrational need be, in the strictest sense, deceived
by appearances; but this is because the rational
must realize that mistaken apprehension is al-
ways possible and identification in general are
only probable. The possibilities of sequence be-
tween the appearance and further experience
must be at least dual wherever the experienced
and intelligent observer finds even the slightest
possibility of mistaken apprehension. Obviously
it is not the case that every given, quale or every

EXPERIENCE AND ORDER 355

complex of such has some uniform correlation
with something else, sufficient to render it intel-
ligible in the manner knowledge seeks, else we
should all of us stand convicted of stupidity to a
degree which is quite implausible.

There is another way in which it can be made
evident that we cannot require that experience,
in order to be intelligible, must be such that
something in the given content of any experi-
ence is uniformly followed by something else in
further experience. If this were the case, then
within every experience merely as given must be
something which determines absolutely this fur-
ther experience which is predictable from it. This
further experience, in turn, would likewise dic-
tate some future experience, and so on. Thus any
given experience would uniquely determine the
course of future experience, or at least of some
endless chain of further experiences. It may seem
that this is precisely what is required for knowl-
edge and prediction. But it is not: in a world so
constituted whatever could be learned would not
be worth knowing, because nothing could be done
about it. It is worth learning that hot stoves burn
precisely because the feeling of radiated heat does
not inevitably determine that further sequence
which we first investigated to our cost, but only
determines it under certain further conditions
which we take care not to allow. There is a uni-
formity in reality hot things burn which is

356 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

definable as a uniformity of possible experience.
But the antecedent in terms of which the conse-
quent, being burned, is determined, is something
much more complex than what is confined within
the given experience of radiated heat. Otherwise
we should fatally go on to be burned every time
we felt it, just as we did at first. Now some things,
which are predictable, are doubtless unavoidable
in experience. But even in these cases ; it does not
necessarily follow that they are determined con-
sequents of given experience. It is possible and
much more likely that here too the antecedent
of which they are uniform consequents is some-
thing much larger and more complex than any
previous given experience. Often our inability to
avoid them is due to our ignorance of the fur-
ther conditions, beyond our experience, upon
which these consequents follow. If we knew
enough, we could still avoid them, and that is the
agony of our situation. And often also if not
universally where some future experience is be-
yond our power to avoid, and would still be be-
yond our power even if our knowledge should be
greater, it is nevertheless the case that the deter-
mining antecedent is not wholly within our expe-
rience but contains further conditions outside it
but also outside our capacity to change. If it were
not for these further conditions, we might still
have precisely this experience and yet escape the
denouement. Quite clearly then, knowledge does

EXPERIENCE AND ORDER 357

not require that kind of uniformity which would
mean that something given in experience is uni-
formly followed by something further in experi-
ence* If this were so, then life so far as we could
know and understand would be merely a fatal
unfolding of the inevitable, and our knowledge
would be a worthless revelation of that fate. Even
those who read life and reality in terms of such
inevitable unfolding, do not condemn us to foresee
it step by step merely through intelligent inspec-
tion of our given experience. As has been pointed
out, those predictions which are the primary con-
stituents of our useful knowledge of nature are
of the form: Since X is given, if condition F
should be supplied, then Z would accrue. Where
F is a condition which I myself fulfill, or refrain
from fulfilling, my knowledge serves to guide my
action to desired ends. The sweetness of the ap-
ple, the hotness of the stove, etc., are known by
means of such truth of hypothetical propositions :
this round, ruddy somewhat being given, if I
should bite, it would taste sweet ; this visual pres-
entation and feeling of warmth, being given, if
I should touch, I should be burned. As has been
pointed out, if I could do nothing about experi-
ence, then since such, hypotheticals would be mean-
ingless, reality would be no thicker than an in-
evitable stream of consciousness that is, I should
not confront reality but at most only a fatally
determined life. Knowledge of reality serves for

358 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

the control of experience: without the possibility
of control., not only would knowledge be worthless ;
there would be for us no reality to know. Both
the usefulness of knowledge and the meaningful-
ness of reality require that the uniformity appre-
hended by knowledge should not be such that the
determining antecedent is completely contained in
the eixperience now fixed by being given. It is re-
quired for the significance of knowledge and the
real that uniformities be specifiable as probable
at least in terms of possible experience. But be-
tween possible and actual experience is the whole
of that which differentiates reality from mere im-
mediacy. Whatever the uniformity of reality re-
quired for knowledge may mean, it cannot mean
a fixed and uniform sequence in which given ex-
perience is one complete term.

It is further to the point that the whole effort
of intelligence and those habits of action which
are presumably its genetic antecedents, are bent
to the apprehension of whatever in the given may
constitute a distinguishing mark and serve the
purpose of prediction. The instant mental reac-
tion to experience, the manner in which we ap-
proach it and the way in which we abstract from
it the presentation of objects, reflect millenia of
nature's work to the end that we may grasp what-
ever in experience is clue to some uniformity of
the sort which intelligibility requires. Such char-
acters of the given arrest the attention and are

EXPERIENCE AND ORDER 359

for us something, while that which does not thus
possess meaning slides off the surface of the mind ;
it requires a reversal of all that is natural and
habitual for us to catch it, and there is no word
by which it may be held. Hence it is almost in-
evitable that the extent to which actually given
experience is uniform or contains clues to uni-
formity, should be exaggerated to our casual in-
spection.

There is another consideration which should
be added to this. It is a rational demand, of at
least as good standing as the demand for uni-
formity, that every individual object shall be
unique. Such uniqueness cannot reside in the
given appearance of the thing: the number of
sensory qualia we can distinguish is finite, and the
number of combinations and arrangements pos-
sible within the mental field of a single experi-
ence, though large, is totally inadequate to
uniqueness. This uniqueness can only reside in the
further specifiability of the object in possible ex-
perience continuous with the appearance of it;
that is, in something which is true about the ob-
ject, though it is not at this moment apparent,
and something which, by appropriately directed
investigation, we could learn. Hence this demand
for uniqueness requires that every recognizable
appearance must be correlated with some further
verifiable specification of the object, in a way
which is different in at least some one respect from

360 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

each and every other. When the multiplicity of
objects, actual and conceivable, is contemplated,
it becomes clear that the extent to which experi-
ence is thus required to be non-uniform is in-
definitely large.

I do not here defend the theoretical consistency
of such conception of uniqueness, and I do not
accuse any one of holding to it in this form;
any more than I would attribute the theory of
"through and through" uniformity to anybody in
particular. My object is to let one shibboleth fight
another, to the end that certain vague and unex-
amined modes of thought may be dragged into the
light and certain superstitious and equally vague
beliefs about experience may be destroyed. The
most that can reasonably be believed is that ex-
perience when caught in the net of our categories,
will always afford some clue to an actually existent
further uniformity of some sort. Identifiable or
recognizable appearances in their continuity with
further experience, must be at least as much non-
uniform as uniform.

A further simple illustration of the way in
which non-uniformity may be remarked and yet
have no significance for knowledge, may be of ser-
vice* There is a popular superstition that no two
snow crystals ever exhibit precisely the same pat-
tern. I have no idea what warrant there is for it,
and perhaps the reader has not either. We can
see that the number of possibilities of such crys-

EXPERIENCE AND ORDER 361

talline forms is indefinitely large, but within the
limits of size and of the smallest discernible ele-
ment, it would be finite. Suppose that neither gen-
eral uniformity nor uniqueness should obtain.
Nothing in this would be baffling to our recogni-
tion of snow or our knowledge about it* Whether
this illustration really serves or not, at least na-
ture is full of such frost-patterns, the leaves of
trees, the structure of growing plants, etc. Yet
those relatively slight and superficial ways in
which two oak-leaves or two frost-patterns are
alike, suffice for our recognition of them and our
generalizations about them. A non-uniformity, to
be significant for knowledge, must be very specific
it must be a negative instance of our predictive
recognition or attempted generalization. And even
when we are thus thwarted, we simply give up our
previously held specific mark or law, and proceed
to understand that kind of object in some other
way.

Quite frequently that order which, intelligibility
and law require has to be sought at some one level
and escapes us at other levels. A general illustra-
tion is the whole body of those phenomena recog-
nized by science in which macroscopic uniformity
is superimposed upon microscopic multifarious-
ness. That law at the macroscopic level may even
be based upon an assumed randomness of the
microscopic, is instanced by the kinetic theory of
gases. As is well known, it may be held that law

362 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

in general has this character. Whether this the-
ory of law as statistical generalization of random
distribution at some lower level is defensible or
not, at least it is of great importance that the ab-
sence of observable order which is called "chance"
itself becomes a kind of uniformity and may give
rise to law.

This type of consideration is, it seems to me, an
observation about our modes of dealing with phe-
nomena rather than about nature or experience.
There are other types of illustration also of the
fact that certain kinds of order are imposed where
none is directly observable. The outstanding ex-
ample is, of course, arithmetical order, which pre-
sumes nothing more than some kind of identifia-
bility. I do not refer here to the counting of as-
semblages; important though that may be, still
it is less important than the serial arrangements
imposed upon intensive (that is, qualitative) dif-
ferences* At least I believe that this is what ex-
amination of our categories would reveal. The
multiple types of such "arrangements" of what is
in no sense arranged in nature or experience
either before or after will need no comment ; nor
will the fact that such imposed order quite gen-
erally provides the basis in terms of which other
types of order are expressed.

At the risk of going beyond what could be
clear without detailed examination of our cate-
gories, I would draw attention to two character-

EXPERIENCE AND ORDER 363

istics of such, imposed order.* In the first place, it
allows an infinite multiplicity to be brought un-
der a finite simplicity of rule. It may seem trivial
to remark that ten characters and a rule of add-
ing 1 give us command of infinity, but without
that, or something similar, there would be no point
in counting though there might be in serial ar-
rangement. And second, correlation between nu-
merical order and an imposed serial arrangement
of qualities extends the power of this type of or-
der to what is in no sense countable. Such imposed
order, which demands no sort of uniformity of
nature beyond the persistence of identifiable char-
acters, is at least a prime constituent of intel-
ligibility, though without some sort of correlation
between it and that further kind of order which
means determinable sequence of experience, it
would not possess the significance which it does.

This type of cor r elation t can be illustrated by
the case of color. The distinguishable color-qualia
are not unlimited in number but are conf usingly
numerous, and also they are subject to the acci-
dent of indiscernible difference; B may be indis-
tinguishable both from A and from B, though A
and C are recognizedly different. We make a vir-
tue of this difficulty by translating the AB-C
qualia as a continuous series. The manner in
which this procedure is systematically carried out,

*It will occur to the reader that, according to Cassirer, such dimen-
sional and serial arrangement is the universal type of conceptual order.

364 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

in the color-pyramid, needs no exposition here. It
should be noted that this arrangement would per-
mit of algebraic treatment, quite independent of
any correlation between color and harmonic mo-
tions, which is a further order, of the type of dis-
covered generalization.

Color also illustrates another common method
of achieving simplicity; that is, by dividing a
whole field of qualia into classes by the use of
names with a qualitative range of denotation.
"Red" or "blue" represents 110 single quale, but
instead a considerable variety of such. That the
mind could hardly make a beginning of bringing
order into given experience without this device,
should be evident. It is made use of wherever it is
the case that no imaginable instance can com-
pletely contain or illustrate the essential denota-
tion of the concept as there can be no image of
triangle in general or dog in general. This as-
signment to a name of a range of denotation
should be sharply distinguished from that ab-
straction of the essential and ignoring of other
characters which is represented by many theories
as the universal basis of general names. Such
theories are, of course, inadequate in several
ways.*

( *The real basis of classification of the kind in question is, of course,
similarity. Similarity is of two types, partial identity and resemblance
proper. A spatial or temporal whole, like a contour or a melody, may
be divisible into parts some of which may be qualitatively identical.
But similar color-qualities are an instance of the other type. Resem-
blance means the possibility of confusion. It is apprehended by con-

EXPERIENCE AND OBDER 365

The substitution of simple classification based
on resemblance for an indeterminately large num-
ber of distinguished qualia, is of considerable im-
portance in connection with probability- judg-
ments. For instance, there is a finite probability
that this book will be bound in red, because it
must be bound in red, orange, yellow, green, blue,
purple, black, white, or gray, if it is bound at all.
The determinable probability arises through the
fact (among others) that, within the universe of
discourse in question, the possibilities are ex*
hausted by a definite number of categories.

It is evident that the last few pages have
touched superficially upon a variety of topics
relative to the categories, each of which is worthy
of extended examination. But as has been said,
these matters are not of central importance to the
main issue. The points which I hope have been
suggested, if not established, are the following:
Reality is more orderly than experience, because
reality is experience categorized. Lack of certain
types of anticipated order leads to repudiation
of the given content as "unreal.' 5 The "unreal"
must be capable of being understood in some
other way but understanding is always a mat-

scious or unconscious recognition of this possibility. A man "looks
like** my brother if, at a quick glance or at a distance, I might mis-
take him for my brother. Things are more or less similar according
as optimimum conditions must be more or less nearly approached
for distinction to be made. Partial identity may also be included
under this rubric. It should be noted that recognition of similarity is
a kind of latent generalization.

366 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

ter of degree, and the designation "unreal" ordi-
narily marks that type of superficial understand-
ing which characterizes the situation in which it is
important only that a particular given experi-
ence be excluded from the field or what is relevant
to the problem in hand. All generalizations are
based upon reality, not upon uncategorized expe-
rience. Neither reality, or nature, nor experience
is orderly in the sense that what is presented may
be taken in any way we please and found to ex-
hibit uniformity with other instances. Intelligibil-
ity does not require such "through and through 55
uniformity but only some uniformity. What such
uniformity shall be, we do not dictate to experi-
ence, save that specific kinds are requisite to sub-
sumption in particular categories. Beyond that,
the rational demand for uniformity wears some-
what the appearance of regulative ideal, or maxim
for the conduct of investigation. Intelligibility
and understanding are not incompatible with irre-
ducible variety; such lack of uniformity may be
irrelevant to the particular mode of cognition.
Further, we seem to have a theoretical interest in
unlimited variety, as is evidenced by our require-
ment of uniqueness in the individual thing. Again,
much of the basic uniformity of various areas of
experience is not discovered but imposed by cate-
gorial procedures which argue nothing intrin-
sically orderly in what is given. Outstanding ex-
amples are the serial and dimensional orderings of

EXPERIENCE AND ORDER 367

qualitative variety, as well as schematic classi-
fications, on the basis of similarity, by which an
indefinitely large range of possible variety is
brought within a definitely limited number of
alternatives.

If now, I may suppose that this inadequate
examination will be sufficient to guard against the
commoner misapprehensions about the "uniform-
ity of nature," I should like to proceed to those
considerations which I believe to be really cen-
tral for our problem. What is required in the way
of order if experience is to be intelligible and
knowledge possible is only that there should be
apprehensible things and objective facts and to
this we can conceive no alternative whatever, un-
less it be the non-existence of everything.

As should now be evident, the existence of an
apprehensible thing is not assured by the mere
givenness of experience, though if there were no
things for us, there would be, in an obvious sense,
no experience. Things exist for our apprehension
as certain sequences of possible experience, of
which given presentations are probable indices.
For this, the sole necessity is that, certain presen-
tations being given, the possibilities of further
experience should not be unlimited; that is, that
it should not be the case that every recognizable
appearance is equally associated with, or followed
by, every other. Let us give this fundamental re-
quirement of knowledge formal statement: Prm-

368 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

ciple A; It must be false, that every identifiable
entity in experience is equally associated with
every other. This principle is what Mr. Keynes
has called the "limitation of independent va-
riety,"* except that it is here applied to the iden-
tifiable constituents in experience, particularly
with reference to their sequence, instead of to the
qualities of objects with reference to their corre-
lation in reality.

What I wish to point out is, first, that this sin-
gle requirement satisfies everything which is nec-
essary, in the way of order in experience or real-
ity, for the validity of empirical generalizations,
based on past experience and applicable to the
future; and second, that although this has the
appearance of a limitation of the possibilities of
experience it has in the end no alternative* To
put it in paradox; every possible experience is
ipso facto a possibility of experience, but it is not
possible that all possibilities should be actual. Any
possibility is a possible actuality, but it is not pos-
sible that all possibilities should be concomitantly
real. The coincident actuality of all possibilities
is impossible* Thus the requirement that actuality
be a limitation of the all-possible, is not itself a
limitation of the possibilities. Instead, it is some-
thing which could not conceivably fail to be the
case ; there is no alternative.

Let us turn first to the requirement that there

*A Treatise on Probability. Ch. XXH.

EXPERIENCE AND ORDER 369

should be apprehensible things and objective facts.
As has been pointed out, the existence of things
and the possibility of our knowing them in the
only sense in which we can know them does not
require that what we attempt to regard as things
should be in each and every case objective reali-
ties. Given appearance is no more than a probable
index of the existence of such a particular reality.
Furthermore, any particular substantive concept,
even though it should be current for a thousand
years, may eventually turn out to represent, not
an objective thing, but a mistaken reification.
The concatenation in experience which the ap-
plicability of the concept requires may not, in
fact, obtain- There may be no unicorns ; there may
be no disease entities ; there may be no such thing
as the soul. If the reality of knowledge required
that every uniformity which we seek, by the in-
vention of a concept to designate it, should be
present in possible experience, or if it required
that every given appearance should be an index
to some uniformity which could be predicated
with certainty, then it would not be plausible that
there is any such thing as knowledge. All that is
required is that given appearances should be
probable indices to such uniformities as may be
designated by concepts. This in turn means that
statistical generalizations from the past sequences
of experience must establish in some measure their
probability for the future. And this, again, de-

370 MINT) AND THE WORLD-ORDER

pends, as has been stated, upon the limitation of
independent variety in the correlation between
given appearances and further possibilities of ex-
perience.

The point may be made clear by an analogy
which, as the reader should be warned, is incom-
plete but may nevertheless be useful. Suppose that
we observe a certain sequence in cards, dealt from
a pack, to be repeated several times. Will this es-
tablish a probability of its future repetition? If
we may suppose some limitation of the possibili-
ties, such as adhering of the cards or trickery in
the deal, it may. But if we suppose no such limi-
tation upon those ideal conditions which packs of
cards and their shuffling are meant to approxi-
mate, then even numerous repetitions of an ob-
served run will not iix the least increase the ante-
cedent probability of its future occurrence. If,
then, we may compare identifiable qualia and com-
plexes of such (recognizable appearances) to the
cards, and experience in general to an ideal pack
under ideal conditions, a statistical generaliza-
tion of past sequences in experience could not es-
tablish that in future one such sequence should be
probable as against others in, which the given ap-
pearance should be the same. That is, no appear-
ance would be probable index to further possible
experience. Since what any substantive concept
denotes in experience is some definite sequence or
set of such, there could be, in an experience which

EXPERIENCE AND ORDER 371

was subject to no limitation upon the all-possible
sequence of given presentations, no recognition of
things by their appearances as even probable.

But to continue our analogy if we can sup-
pose the pack from which cards are dealt to be
defective or the dealing subject to trickery, then
a statistical generalization as to past runs will es-
tablish a genuine probability for the future, and
the continued verification of such a generalization
will continually increase its probability. It will
still be the case that any particular generalization
of this sort may represent "mere coincidence" in
the past and fail in future. But the point which
it is especially important to observe is that if the
assumption that there are limitations which some
uniformity of sequence might reflect is a war-
ranted assumption, then this fact of itself is suffi-
cient to establish the validity of the argument, in
any particular case, from past uniformity to its
probability for the future. If, however, it should
be positively known that the runs of cards are
ideally governed and subject to no such limita-
tion, then there would be no such probability. The
especial point here is that the validity of arguing
from any past coincidence to its probability in the
future does not depend upon our knowing any
particular ground for this particular uniformity
(other than its past occurrence) , but does depend
upon our knowing as at least possible a ground
for such uniformities m general.

37 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

So far the point of our analogy is, that the
validity of arguing from the correlation between
a given presentation and that further experience
which means a particular kind of object denoted
by a particular concept, does not require us to
know any particular reason for that particular
correlation or for the existence of just that sort
of thing (other than the past experience itself).
It requires us to know as possible at least that
such correlations, things m general, exist. If this
assumption is valid, then the prediction (as prob-
able) of that future experience which means the
verification of the presence of an object corre-
sponding to a particular concept, from a given
presentation with which such further experience
has been associated in the past, is valid ; and the
probability is equally genuine when, as a fact, the
past conjunction is a "mere coincidence" which,
future experience will prove not to be valid as a
generalization. That is, mistaken apprehensions,
as probable judgments^ will, if there has been no
logical error in the judgment, be valid, as much
as those which are actually verified by the future.
It is also to be noted that, if the assumption
that things in general exist should be valid, then
the probability for the future of the correlation
between a given presentation and certain further
experience will be increased with each successive
verification of that correlation. The particular
principles of probability upon which this rests

EXPERIENCE AND ORDER 373

need not be examined here;* the reader will per-
haps be satisfied upon the point by consideration
of the analogy: if we have ground for assuming
poor shuffling or interference or some such limi-
tation, the probability for the future of a par-
ticular run which has been repeated will increase
with each repetition of it. At least this will be so
after a certain number of repetitions have al-
ready occurred, if we suppose the conditions un-
altered.

This assumption of the existence of things, that
is, of certain recurrent correlations in the se-
quence of possible experience, is all that is re-
quired for the validity, as probable, of empirical
generalizations or "laws, 5 * and of the argument
from past to future with respect to these. It will
be evident from previous chapters that the ex-
istence of objective properties is conditional upon
precisely this same type of uniform sequence in
experience. The verification of such properties re-
quires precisely the same connection between given
appearances and further possible experience, and
requires nothing more. Obviously the assumption
of objective properties is involved in the assump-
tion of things. Furthermore, if things exist, which
are cognizable and therefore the objects of pos-
sible concepts, it is evident that there must be
laws. Laws prescribe, or describe, precisely such
uniform sequences. In fact, although laws or em-

*On this point, see Keynes, "A Treatise on Probability." Ch. XX.

374 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

pirieal generalizations formulate relations of ob-
jects, or properties of objects, which are non-es-
sential rather than essential, this difference is
irrelevant to the possibility of knowledge. What
is essential in a thing is determined by the par-
ticular concept which it serves our interest to
apply, rather than by anything else. The proper-
ties essential to "a stone" do not include its being
"a freely-falling body," and the essential proper-
ties of a "freely-falling body" do not include its
being a stone. But certain laws or generalizations
must hold of an object in order that it be a stone
and certain others must hold in order that it be
a freely-falling body. The laws which character-
ize or constitute essential properties of freely-fall-
ing bodies are non-essential or merely empirical
generalizations about stones under certain cir-
cumstances. Moreover, not only are all essential
properties capable of representation as laws, but
every empirical generalization is such that some
substantive concept is capable of being framed so
as to require conformity to it as the distinguish-
ing or essential property of a particular kind of
thing. Scientific concepts especially have this
character explicitly; they define or classify ob-
jects on the basis of their conformity to certain
laws, prescribing modes of behavior. Indeed, any
objective fact meaning by this any state of af-
fairs which is describable in conceptual terms is
a property of objects and may be denoted by a

EXPERIENCE AND ORDER 375

substantive concept marking it as essential. In
fact, unless the whole point of the last two chap-
ters has been lost, it will be clear that the differ-
ence between essential and non-essential proper-
ties, and between prescriptive laws and empirical
generalizations, is one determined by pragmatic
considerations of the particular interests our knowl-
edge is to serve which dictate particular modes of
analysis, rather than by any difference in the ob-
jective state of affairs upon which these are di-
rected. What laws must be valid, would depend
upon what things exist; but the general assump-
tion that there are things (of some sort) includes
the assumption that there are valid generaliza-
tions of the type of law. If there could not be a
world without the uniformities of possible experi-
ence requisite to the existence of things, then there
could not be a world without uniformities of the
type of law.

As is the case with things, so too with law, the
validity of the prediction that a particular gen-
eralization which has held in the past will likewise
hold in future, depends upon the general assump-
tion that there are laws. If there are such uniform
sequences as laws describe, then the occurrence of
one such in the past establishes a probability of
it in future, and each successive verification in-
creases that probability. And here, too, the prob-
ability-judgment, if logically drawn, Tpill be valid
even in those particular cases in which future ex-

376 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

perience will prove past instances to have been
"mere coincidences' 5 and the generalization to be
false.

Thus the assumption that things exist that
there are (some) such recurrent sequences as sub-
stantive concepts require for their application
is sufficient to secure the validity of knowledge in
general, when the nature of empirical knowledge
is correctly interpreted as probable judgment. As
has been remarked previously, the form which
skepticism has often taken, of doubting the valid-
ity of all empirical generalizations while leaving
unquestioned the existence of apprehensible things,
in terms of which such dubious generalizations
could at least be intelligibly phrased, represents a
totally impossible position. It could only seem self-
consistent on the assumption that the validity of
knowledge requires the certainty of empirical gen-
eralization and of prediction. Since any reason-
able examination of knowledge must conclude that
the pretense to such certainty is unwarranted and
the ascription of it is a misreading of the actual
nature of science and of common-sense attitudes,
what such skepticism has slain is a man of straw,
though to be sure it is just this scarecrow which
has frightened philosophers out of their wits for
a considerable period.

Before passing on, we should remind ourselves
once more at this point that the assumption of the
existence of apprehensible things does not mean

EXPERIENCE AND ORDER 377

the assumption that experience is uniform in the
sense that certain determined sequences univer-
sally follow upon a given first term (the presenta-
tion). If it meant that, then no apprehension of
a thing would be valid unless the given presenta-
tion should be such as to render mistaken ap-
prehension absolutely impossible. Since errors of
apprehension are possible and identification of ob-
jects are probable, it follows that the prescribed
sequences, requisite to the existence of things, are
such as would be predictable, with certainty, only
in terms of some larger whole of experience than
can be included in a single presentation. Our ac-
tual predictions our actual knowledge of things,
predicated upon given presentations is in terms
of such sequences of experience as admit of ex-
ceptions such as mistake and illusion. Hence as
generalizations about actual experience, the ex-
istence of apprehensible things means only such
uniformity as can be formulated in generaliza-
tions of the statistical type, which admit of excep-
tion. No absolute wniformities of actual experi-
ence are required either for the existence of things
or for the objective character of law. Laws too,
of course, are exempt from being proved false by
mistaken apprehensions of the things or objective
facts with which we suppose ourselves to be deal-
ing.

The examination of the categories, "thing,"
"event," "property," "relation," "law," is a most

378 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

difficult and complex matter. I make no pretense
to have exhausted even the essential considerations
for any one of these. In particular, I should not
like to seem to assert that there is no difference
between what is requisite to the nature of a thing
and to the objectivity of law. The attempt is only
to show that there could not be a world of appre-
hensible things in which empirical generalizations
should fail of valid foundation; that if there are
things then laws of the type which empirical gen-
eralization seeks to grasp must hold; and hence
that such generalizations may be genuinely prob-
able and that empirical knowledge, as the only
sort of thing it can reasonably be supposed to be,
is genuinely possible.

If this point is established, then the only al-
ternative to the conception that our knowledge in
general is valid, is the conception that there are
no things; that nothing exists to be known and
no mind exists to know it. The nearest approxima-
tion we can make to such a conception is, perhaps,
that there might be an experience which is a mere
flitting of meaningless presentations. But for such
experience, if we can conceive it, the distinction
of "real" and "unreal" could have no meaning.
This being so, it is a little obscure just what we
suppose ourselves to be talking about when we try
to frame such a conception; perhaps about the
experience of an oyster with the oyster left out.

I do not mean to take advantage of the fact

EXPERIENCE AND ORDER 379

that skepticism can only make itself intelligible in
terms which render it not self -consistent. This is
a fact, and a most important one. But it might be
claimed though I do not know that it ever has
been that skepticism intends only to exhibit a
reductico ad dbsurdum of the pretense to knowl-
edge, by beginning with definite assumptions
about the mind, etc., and on that basis proving the
invalidity of these assumptions along with every
other.

This possible intent of skepticism seems the
more important to examine because it would ap-
pear, in the above, that the account of knowledge
here given avoids skepticism only by an assump-
tion which has a conceivable alternative ; and that
this alternative is precisely the absence from ex-
perience of all order of the kind which means sig-
nificance and intelligibility. In this situation, it
might be said: "It is not humanly possible to di-
vest ourselves of assumptions such as the exist-
ence of definitely conceivable things which have
no rational foundation, and still talk or think, but
it is possible to be sufficiently self -critical to real-
ize that such unavoidable assumptions are non-
rational and mere 'animal f aith.* "

I believe this to be demonstrably false, and shall
attempt to make this fact clear. But before ap-
proaching that topic, there are two points about
skepticism, with the above meaning, which it may
be well to observe.

380 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

Historically there have been two main grounds
of skeptical conceptions, the relativity of sense-
perception and the absence of "necessary connec-
tions" in experience. Quite often these are con-
fused together and results appropriate only to the
first are added to the second. It is the first of these
only which gives plausibility to the conception
that there is a reality which is unknowable to us
because we are separated from it by the manner
of our apprehension. This ground of skepticism
has, I hope, been dispelled by the considerations
of previous chapters. It neglects the fact that
"real" is systematically ambiguous ; that "appear-
ances" themselves must constitute one kind of re-
ality. It also neglects the further facts that reality
of any sort is definable and meaningful only in
terms of some experience, actual or hypothetical,
and that regardless of the relativity of percep-
tion, appearances inevitably are, for a rational
understanding, a ground of true knowledge of the
reality which appears even though that knowledge
should be incomplete. As a result, it is impossible
to conceive "reality" as completely unknowable;
and since it is not plausible that, under actual or
realizable conditions, reality can be completely
known to us, the significance of the "unknowable"
dwindles to the commonplace fact that humans
are not omniscient. Nothing in the train of thought
which starts from the relativity of perception can
in any way vitiate such knowledge as we have or

EXPERIENCE AND ORDER S81

seem to have. The ground of this sort of skepti-
cism is the false conception of knowledge as rep-
resentation.

The other type of skepticism turns upon a cor-
rect conception of knowledge as predictive judg-
ment. Its particular ground is the absence of "nec-
essary connections of matters of fact." This may
well be equivalent to the falsity of the assumption
which has here been shown requisite to the exist-
ence of apprehensible things. Actually, of course,
Hume supposed that necessary connections must
mean such iron-clad uniformities in experience as
would enable certainty of prediction, whereas it
is only genuine probability which is requisite. But
I hope it will be clear that if this is the ground of
skepticism, it is quite unwarranted to supplement
this conception by a notion of a reality somehow
concealed from us by the chaotic character of ex-
perience. The logical conclusion would be that of
Gorgias, "Nothing is," or at least the admission
that we can have no rational ground for asserting
a reality of any sort. If we cannot humanly avoid
this, that is merely to observe the fundamentally
irrational character of our "animal faith" and the
reductio ad dbsurdum of all attempts at consistent
belief.

The second point to be observed before we pass
on, is that we must not confuse such irrational
"animal faith" with that wholly rational attitude
of him who, acting on the basis of a probable

382 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

judgment, confronts the future he predicts with
the realization that the possibility of his heing
disappointed is a real one. In both cases, one would
face the future with an attitude determined by
past experience but one which, in the particular
instance, the future might prove to be fruitless.
But in the one case, this attitude has no rational
ground and incorporates no truth; in the other,
it represents a knowledge of probability which
is not only rational but absolutely true, whatever
the denouement. If one should ask, "But what,
practically, would be the difference?" that is a
point which we shall reach shortly*

We come now to the main point: it is impossi-
ble to imagine any sort of experience which would
not present such statistical stabilities as would
validate probable prediction, and such as would
represent the experience of things- Our analogy
of experience to runs of cards is, on this point, as
unfavorable as could easily be devised, because
packs of cards and their manipulation are intelli-
gently directed to the end of minimizing the pos-
sibilities of prediction in those respects which de-
termine the outcome of the game. But it is worth
remarking at the outset that the point of card-
games, except for children, is to pit our wits
against this maximal uncertainty and determine
a long-run outcome favorable to ourselves in spite
of it. If the sequence in experience should be as
independent and lacking in "necessary connec-

EXPERIENCE AND ORDER S83

tion" as the sequence of cards, that could not frus-
trate prediction or destroy the practical value of
probability- judgments. Indeed if cards should
represent, in the analogy, recognizable qualia or
complexes of such in presentations, our attention
should be drawn to the fact that, on this point,
the analogy is better than might be supposed.
There are no sequences in experience which are
determinable with certainty by a given presenta-
tion alone. Real things represent stabilities of a
type which enormously transcend what can be
given in any one experience. If the reality of
things required the presence in experience of se-
quences absolutely determined by a first term, then
we should have no reason to believe in their ex-
istence. As has been pointed out too often already,
what is required is only that a given presentation
determine a probability of future possible experi-
ence.

The reason why Principle A imposes no actual
limitation upon the possibilities of experience may
be formulated in a second dictum: Principle B; In
any situation (if sufficiently extended) in which
there are identifiable entities which fail to satisfy
Principle A i. e., whose association is "random"
there will be other entities, systematically con-
nected with the former or specifiable in terms of
them, which do satisfy Principle A. The principal
methods by which we determine "orderly" con-
stituents of experience in terms of "random" ones

384 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

are by proceeding to simpler elements through
analysis, by taking a larger whole into which the
primary constituents may be organized, or by con-
fining attention to abstracted elements, and dis-
regarding the remainder of the given as irrelevant.

To revert to our analogy, if the sequences of
cards are purely random or subject to no laws but
those of chance, then the stable entities of card-
games, comparable to things, will be something
such as tricks-taken, or suits, or kinds of hands
such as full-houses, straights, etc. Or they will be
entities of a lower order such as the pips on the
cards. As is obvious, the chance character in the
sequence of dealt cards does not frustrate the at-
tempt at statistical generalizations which give
guidance for successful play. Even with entities
thus deliberately devised to approximate pure
chance in certain ways, there are certain wholes
which, neglecting the "non-esential," give rise to
generalizations. In fact, no better basis for sta-
tistical generalization could be devised than the
known fact that certain constituents of the situa-
tion are distributed in genuinely "random 35 fash-
ion* Since any departure from "pure chance" is
itself subject to generalization of some sort, a sta-
tistical basis for probable judgment cannot con-
ceivably fail to be afforded.*

What particular stabilities, and what types, are

*In this connection, the analogy will be improved if we think of our
predictions about runs of cards as based on past runs (as they might
be), not upon prior knowledge of the constitution of the pack.

EXPERIENCE AND ORDER 385

to be found, cannot be prescribed to experience or
reality. The particular order discoverable in re-
ality, the extent of it, and the degree of its con-
ceptual simplicity, are of course, absolute data.
The supposition that we may always find law in
terms of any experimental entities we please and
with predetermination of the type of the uni-
formity to be found, is totally unwarranted and is
unnecessary to the validity of knowledge. Our con-
cepts are devised with purpose to catch the sig-
nificant, the subject of meaningful generalization,
at whatever level and in whatever way we may.
When particular concepts fail, we merely abandon
them through analysis or organization or ab-
straction, and so on in favor of corrected ones,
which take cognizance of, and include the ground
of, our previous failure. That conception in gen-
eral should be invalid, is quite impossible. The at-
tempt to envisage an experience or state of affairs
such that every attempt to discover stabilities must
fail, is the attempt to conceive the inconceivable
to conceive what would not be things or objec-
tive facts nor subject to any generalization which
makes what is denoted conformable to concepts.
The experience or reality which should be incom-
patible with conception, ipso facto cannot be con-
ceived.

It may seem that there is one aspect of the mat-
ter not yet covered ; the validity of the argument
from past to future. It may appear that it would

386 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

be possible, not only that particular predictions
based upon the past should be useless as anticipa-
tion of the future which their character as prob-
able allows but that in general the anticipation
of the future in the light of the past is without
theoretical warrant. This point really is covered
by Principle A, when we remember that the kind
of association of constituents in experience which
is essential to their comprehension in things is se-
quence in possible experience. But when we re-
member that it is the validity of probable predic-
tion only which is required, the matter can be
more explicitly stated, and quite simply : Principle
C; the statistical prediction of the future from the
past cannot be generally invalid, because what-
ever is future to any given past, is in turn past
for some future. That is, whoever continually re-
vises his judgment of the probability of a statisti-
cal generalization by its successively observed veri-
fications and failures, cannot fail to make more
successful predictions than if he should disregard
the past in his anticipations of the future. This
might be called the "Principle of statistical ac-
cumulation." It is quite evident that it holds even
with respect to what is determined only by "pure
chance" in the only sense that we can conceive
anything such. This is what is meant by saying
that probability or chance is measured by that
fraction which is approximated "in the long run."
Though the attempt to envisage what would

EXPERIENCE AND ORDER 387

frustrate conception and knowledge is, in the na-
ture of the case, futile, it may be worth while to
conceive the worst possible experience, from that
point of view, by a somewhat fantastic illustration.
Let us think of our experience as constituted by
complexes or patterns of qualia which come to us
in sequence, and let us suppose that this experi-
ence is given to us, not by a Berkeleian God who
in his goodness preserves certain uniform sequences
in order that we may predict experience accord-
ing to natural law, but by a perverse demon whose
sole purpose is to mislead us and render knowl-
edge impossible* If the distinguishable sensory
qualia should be finite in number, as they are in
actual experience, this demon must necessarily re-
peat, but he might repeat identifiable complexes
and previous sequences to as small a degree as pos-
sible. However, if, as a result, these presented pat-
terns did not afford a sufficiently good basis for
conception, we should analyze them into sub-pat-
terns or other constituents which would be of more
frequent appearance, or should classify them ac-
cording to some simplified schematism based on
similarity, or give them dimensional or serial ar-
rangement approximating to an ideal continuum,
or in some other fashion proceed by abstraction or
reorganization or a combination of the two to cir-
cumvent the multifarious variety of the given. For
the rest, the character of it would be relegated to
the "non-essential" and merely mark the relative

388 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

uniqueness of particular moments of experience;
it would be non-significant, like the particular
character of frost-patterns and snow crystals.
We should be inattentive to such non-significant
features of the given; and if any one should call
our attention to their comparative frequency, we
might regard his observation as a foolish remark
about the obvious but unimportant. If the demon
should likewise minimize the extent to which par-
ticular sequences should be repeated, he might
make knowledge difficult to a degree. But at least
we should presumably come to possess the very
important generalization that the maximum of
novelty may confidently be expected. We should
organize all our conduct on the principle that
"lightning seldom strikes twice in the same place"
and "history never repeats," with consequent ad-
vantage to ourselves. As a fact, however, we should
circumvent the demon on this point at the same
time that we attained relative simplicity of recog-
nition, and should carry out similar procedures
with reference to sequence. We should analyze,
abstract, and relegate what we could not find
somehow significant to the status of "irrelevant
concomitants of significant 'causal* sequences."
By ignoring a sufficient proportion of the charac-
teristics of experience as it came to us, we should
arrive at such simplicity that, in terms of it, even
the most disadvantageous sequence of the primary
constituents e. gr., a "random" order must af-

EXPERIENCE AND ORDER 389

ford some repetition and uniforgtiity. Knowledge
might be made difficult, but could not be made im-
possible.

This would be something as if we were required
to play a game with cards dealt from a pack we
never saw and could only infer from the hands
dealt us, and as if these cards were dealt with
trickery and malice something worse than a
good decent game of chance. But even in such
circumstances, the principle of statistical accu-
mulation would operate. If we were required to
bet on this game, we might be unequal to our
demon antagonist to any degree you please; our
ignorance might be great, and our failures and
loss correspondingly large. But by nothing which
he could do could be so devise it that we should
not lose less of our money if we intelligently ob-
served past dealings and continually revised our
betting on the basis of accumulated experience.

Indeed we need only to prod our imaginations
to remark that this actual experience of ours fits
the illustration better than one might suppose*
Most of the pattern and sequence of our experi-
ence is non-significant ; those characters which by
our practical attitude we single out and remark
and make prediction in terms of, are inordinately
meager as compared with the total of presented
distinguishable pattern and sequence of qualia.
Most of experience is as non-significant as the in-
tricate pattern of the rug I have been gazing at

390 MIND AND THE WORLD-ORDER

is to me now. Beyond a few details which, suffice
for recognition, this intricacy does not even draw
attention, and if attended, it hardly functions as
knowledge. It neither verifies anything nor baffles
knowledge, because it arouses no anticipatory at-
titude. Confronting any given experience, the first
act of intelligent cognition is to discard all but a
few items of what is presented as excess mental
baggage irrelevant from the point of view of our
predictive purpose. It is the relatively meager re-
mainder which constitutes the clue to expected
uniformity.

Even if the hypothetical demon should have an
infinite number of qualia and complexities at his
disposal, instead of a finite number, it is doubtful
if we should be worse off. We should merely dis-
card more of our experience, as marking that
uniqueness of each moment and each thing which
is irrelevant to knowledge; we should frame our
concepts and make our predictions in terms of the
remainder, or of abstractions and other such im-
posed simplifications. On any hypothesis which
can be framed about experience, however per-
verse, I think it will be clear that a similar thing
would hold, or else that the fantasy is not even im-
aginable but would merely mean the elimination
of reality, of significance, of all questions and the
mind itself.

In any experience such as we can, even at the
worst, suppose our own to be, conception will be

EXPERIENCE AND ORDER 391

valid and knowledge will be possible. The three
principles which have been stated will hold, and
generalization will be subject to genuine proba-
bility. No further and avoidable metaphysical as-
sumption is required* The mind will always be
capable of discovering that order which is requisite
to knowledge, because a mind such as ours, set
down in any chaos that can be conjured up, would
proceed to elicit significance by abstraction, analy-
sis and organization, to introduce order by con-
ceptual classification and categorial delimitation
of the real, and would, through learning from
accumulated experience, anticipate the future in
ways which increasingly satisfy its practical in-
tent.

APPENDIX A

NATURAL SCIENCE AND ABSTRACT
CONCEPTS

In his introductory chapter to "Einstein's The-
ory of Relativity/ 5 Max Born has written:* "The
development of the exact sciences leads along a path
to a goal which, even if far from being attained, yet
lies clearly exposed before us : it is that of creating
a picture of nature which, confined within no limits
of possible perception or intuition, represents a pure
structure of conception, conceived for the purpose
of depicting the sum of all experiences uniformly
and without inconsistencies/* And he goes on to
characterize this world of "inaudible tones, invisible
light, imperceptible heat, 5 * in which the limited range
of the human senses is ignored, as a "sum of ab-
stractions** and "subtle logical configurations.**

It may well be that the inevitable movement of
the exact sciences is in this direction in which mathe-
matics has preceded them; toward the deductive
mode of development and toward concepts which
are laid down less in terms of those sense-qualities
by which we directly identify empirical objects and
more in terms of those systematic correlations
which figure in natural law. The physical definition
of sound or color in terms of wave-lengths or rates
of vibration, serve as simple illustrations of the sort
which Born has in mind. Concepts which are ab-
stract to a degree, and remote from the merely ap-
parent or directly discriminable, are dictated by
interest in that uniformity and comprehensiveness
which are essential to intellectual economy and ex-

*English. translation, p. 2.

393

394 APPENDIX A

actness. And the deductive method of presentation
as we are beginning to understand is not a
method of proof at all (since the "first principles' 5
are as much corroborated by their consequences as
the consequences are by their deducibility) but is
simply the most compendious and economical method
of tying up an enormous multiplicity of facts in a
relatively small number of bundles* It is a method
which becomes possible only when a high degree of
precision has been attained and the interrelations
of different classes of phenomena are quite thor-
oughly understood. But when these requirements are
met, the power of deductive order to summarize
great masses of facts, while still preserving their
relations to one another, is an advantage almost
compelling.

Abstractness in the concepts, and that systematic
order which reaches its highest degree in the deduc-
tive system, go hand in hand. The reason is one
which is inherent in the nature of the problem which
science undertakes to solve* The conceived "things'*
of the unsophisticated consciousness are, relatively
speaking, coagulations of sense-qualities; they are
such as are identifiable, with a minimum of risk, by
their momentary appearance. But thinghood must
also include objective change, since the purpose of
such abstractions, or excisions, from the immediately
presented is the possibility of prediction. Science
but seeks to raise to a higher power this possibility
of correlating identifiable "thing" and predictable
change. In so doing, however, it is obliged to aban-
don, in some measure, the things of common sense,
relatively identifiable by their appearances, and to
substitute therefor things which are conceived in
terms of correlations less directly observable. In its
basic and defining concepts, it moves away from
sense-appearance and in the direction of law. Those
systematic correlations, for example, which are first
painfully established as the uniform behavior of

SCIENCE AND ABSTRACT CONCEPTS 395

gravitating objects a law of change later become
the defining characteristics of "mass," which in turn
becomes the essential property of matter. Or those
uniformities which chemistry pursues are finally at-
tained in terms of atoms or electrons (which are es-
sentially imperceptible, and in that sense purely con-
ceptual entities). Such ultimate things, identifiable
by sense only through uniformity of behavior and
correlation, displace the tastes and odors and other
sensible qualities by which salts and acids, gold and
air and water, are identified. And then, perhaps, we
mystify ourselves because we have a world of "in-
audible tones, invisible light," and matter that we
cannot imagine!

This regress of science from the directly percep-
tible may be phrased in another way. Any "thing"
is a bridge between given experience and predictable
change* A thing of any sort must always be such
that it is identifiable directly or indirectly, with
easy assurance or with difficulty by something
which is the "appearance" of it. Else the concept
would meet with no clue to its application, and the
purpose of it would be lost. But thinghood must also
include objective change; otherwise the identifica-
tion of it in direct experience would enable no pre-
diction and, once again, the purpose of the concept
would be lost. The difference between the concepts
of unsophisticated common sense and those of sci-
ence is that common-sense things are relatively easy
to identify but relatively unreliable guides to pre-
diction, whereas the things of science are relatively
safe guides to prediction but correspondingly diffi-
cult of immediate identification. This is because the
scientific concept takes that correlation and uni-
formity which may be formulated as law and makes
it the essence of the thing.

I should not like to become entangled with the
ancient and honorable notion of "substance," but it
is evident that we may find here a clue to some of

396 APPENDIX A

the problems concerning this. Since a concept of
that which is merely momentary would serve no pur-
pose, the "thing itself" (for any grade of thing) is
always conceived by means of those properties which
persist through the process of experience or objec-
tive change. These are its essential properties. When-
ever this relatively stable complex of properties is
altered, the thing in question goes out of existence
e. g. 9 the wood is burned, leaving ashes. But the
extreme antithesis of being a "thing" is not being
an objective change which is subject to law since
what is predictable may be brought within the con-
cept and made essential but is merely such change
as should be unpredictable, uncontrollable, and
hence baffling to the understanding. Thus when the
change is predictable or controllable, it is not a
"disappearance" but a "transformation," internal
to the nature of some conceivable "thing." The
predictable transformation from liquid to solid at
32 F. is an essential property of water. It is not a
property of that potable liquid which precedes the
freezing, and is annihilated and replaced by ice. (At
least it is not such for an unsophisticated tropic-
dweller, whose concept cannot include prediction of
it.) It is a property of that thing whose concept is
satisfied both before and after the freezing; hence
of that which persists and is the subject of the trans-
formation.

Thus in every transformation that is, in every
process of objective change which is predictable and
hence intelligible there are two layers of things.
The lumber disappears, the desk comes into being;
but it is the same wood. Some of the essential prop-
erties of lumber have disappeared, some of the es-
sential properties of a desk have come into being;
but all those of wood have persisted. When our last
word is "It disappeared" or "It came into being,"
we cannot predict or control change, which is what
we mean when we say that we cannot understand it.

SCIENCE AND ABSTRACT CONCEPTS 397

Destruction and creation are, thus, unscientific cate-
gories. The methodological postulate of all science
is that the problem of understanding the process of
reality, to which it addresses itself, is essentially ca-
pable of solution; and hence, that all change is
transformation. Thus the ultimate things of science
must, in the nature of its ideal, be eternal; and it
cannot stop until it has disclosed them. That in its
attempt to conceive what is eternally persistent, it
must import into its concept as essential the law
which anticipates transformation in general, and
that the ideatum of such a concept will be remote
from what can be directly identified in sense-experi-
ence, and perhaps will not be imaginable at all, be-
longs to the nature of the case.

Nevertheless it remains true that the difference
between the substantive concepts of science and
those of common sense can only be one of degree.
As has been pointed out, all conception of things is
predictive; and on the other hand no concept of
science would be significant if the thing denoted
could not be indirectly identified in experience
through its manifestations, correlations, or effects.
The point to be noted is only that the relative ab-
stractness of scientific concepts is an inevitable
concomitant of its greater comprehensiveness and
power of accurate prediction. Increasing abstract-
ness and an increased satisfaction of the ends pro-
jected by "exactness," "order," "system," go to-
gether. Both are consequences of that formulation
of comprehensive key-conceptions in which basic
things and fundamental laws are no longer distinct
ideas, because the substantive concepts are them-
selves framed in terms of those correlations of phe-
nomena exhibited in law.

In the march toward these ideals, there comes a
stage when it is no longer easily possible to say
whether concepts are devised, and laws discovered,
to fit phenomenal facts, or whether the conceptual

398 APPENDIX A

system itself rules and facts are reconceived in con-
formity to it. At least the give and take between
these two is on approximately equal terms. Whether,
for example, the devising of such concepts as "en-
ergy of position" and "curvature of space" repre-
sents a modification of system or law to fit facts, or
an alteration in the manner of conceiving facts so
as to fit an a priori comprehensive schema of inter-
terpretation, seems to be a question only of that
aspect of the procedure which shall be emphasized.

With exact natural science, as with mathematics,
a stage is possible, if it is not already reached, in
which the problem of scientific truth can be phrased
equally well as the discovery of empirical laws suffi-
ciently comprehensive to constitute a systematic
whole, or as the selection of an abstract system
which will be applicable to the facts. Just as the
problem of space may be envisaged either as that of
discovering the system of laws governing certain re-
lations of ideally rigid bodies, or as that of selecting
an abstract geometry which accords with observed
phenomena, so perhaps the issues between a New-
tonian and a relativity kinematics may be phrased
equally well as questions of the correct generaliza-
tion of certain physical phenomena or as the ques-
tion of choice in application between the two ab-
stract systems, both of which have that logical in-
tegrity which comes from strict adherence to their
fundamental concepts. It would be but a short step,
if it is not already possible, to viewing such alterna-
tive systems as strictly deductive elaborations of
purely abstract concepts and postulated relations.
So viewed, such systems would have the same kind
of truth, and be objects of the same kind of knowl-
edge, which characterize a pure geometry apart
from its applications.

But if we thus extrapolate along the line of de-
velopment which exact science seems to follow, and
assign to it the highest degree of independence of

SCIENCE AND ABSTRACT CONCEPTS 399

directly given data of sense, it still remains true that
the truth about nature cannot have such indepen-
dence. When we inquire upon what ground the se-
lection of an abstract system to be applied to con-
crete physical phenomena would be determined, it
becomes clear that, directly or indirectly, sense-data
must necessarily figure in such a decision. The logi-
cal integrity of an abstract system is no guarantee
of applicability. Let the connection between what is
presented in sense and the idealized abstractions of
the system be as remote as you please, this connec-
tion is of the essence of any truth about phenomenal
nature-
Scientific concepts import into themselves, and
make essential to the scientific thing, more of what
belongs to the systematic interconnections of phe-
nomena ; and by way of compensation, they extrude,
as non-essential, something of what is more apparent
or easily observed. Now whatever is of the essence
of a thing need not be established by induction or
vested in empirical generalization. If, for example,
possible resolution into hydrogen and oxygen is of
the essense of water, there is no problem of induc-
tion to establish this property. That something
which, in ancient Greece, would have been classified
under water,* as one of the four elements, might not
be thus decomposable, has nothing to do with the
matter, except as it marks the fact that we repudiate
this ancient concept.

If we reflect a little upon the history of chemis-
try, or any other of the older sciences, will it not be
obvious that the determination of what belongs to
the deductive elaboration of concepts and what to
empirical generalization from experience, depends
rather simply upon our modes of conception them-
selves? And further, that the manner in which sci-
ence departs from common sense is characteris-
tically one which enlarges the scope of deduction by
the direction in which it modifies its concepts ? That

400 APPENDIX A

such scientific concepts are built upon inductive
generalization in earlier stages, is obvious enough.
And that we cannot lift ourselves by our scientific
bootstraps and enlarge our understanding of nature
by altering definitions, will likewise need no com-
ment. But it would be a misunderstanding to sup-
pose that established principles of science begin as
hypotheses or tentative generalizations and are, by
continued inductive verification, finally made cer-
tain, so that we dare embody them in definitions.
More accurately, the process is one in which what
we call induction enlarges the scope of experience,
so that those correlations which are most useful for
knitting together the facts of nature in a compre-
hensive network are gradually revealed and con-
firmed. Thus a more judicious ground of conception
is reached. But the principles made definitive by
such pragmatically superior conception neither wait
upon any novel certainty to be established by induc-
tion nor do they acquire such certainty when made
definitive. As applicable to certain phenomena of
nature, they are not completely certain either be-
fore or after. When this potable liquid called water
has been decomposed into hydrogen and oxygen a
certain number of times without exception, the
probability that this will always happen reaches
such a pitch that this property may reasonably be
adopted as the essential mark of a new concept.
That another such experiment still might fail, is as
possible after that as before. But it is now the pos-
sibility that the (new) concept water will prove in-
applicable to some tasteless liquid, instead of the
possibility that water (as previously conceived) may
fail to have this property universally.

If we follow this process to the limit, we find that
by gradual transition that stage of systematic cor-
relation may be reached in which we have all the
major principles of some science embraced in a de-
ductive system. But this means no absolute cer-

SCIENCE AND ABSTRACT CONCEPTS 401

tainty about nature which did not previously exist.
The problem now becomes whether, or how far, this
deductive system is applicable to empirical facts.

APPENDIX B
ESTHESIS AND ESTHETICS

The nearest approach to pure givenness is doubt-
less the esthetic experience. Cognition is always in
part instrumental or pragmatic, but so far as an
experience is esthetic, it constitutes an end in itself.
Or if we use the word "esthetic" more widely, so as
to include negative as well as positive values, at least
the esthetic aspect of experience concerns its quality
as end.

There are any number of questions of esthetic
theory which might be raised here: whether intrin-
sic value is always a dimension of the immediate;
whether esthetic "form** is given or is in part con-
struction; whether the value-quality of the experi-
ence should be regarded as intrinsic to the content
or as a function of the mind or as a relation of the
two. I beg leave to avoid such controversial ques-
tions, so far as possible. It would seem that the
facts with which we are concerned are fairly clear,
and that such questions are, in part at least, such
as will be settled by determining the field of esthetics
rather than by answering questions about the na-
ture of experience. It is obvious that the instrumen-
tal sign-function of a presentation and its sig-
nificance as immediate felt quale are cognate aspects
of experience. These two cannot be separated in
their temporal existence; every presentation has
both at once. But the value of it as a cognitive sign
and its value as esthetic are (presumably) inde-
pendent. The former is extrinsic; the latter intrin-
sic. Not only does all experience possess an intrinsic
value-aspect a positive or negative value as an end
in itself but "there is one glory of the sun and an-

402

ESTHESIS AND ESTHETICS 403

other glory of the moon": esthetic apprehension is
not exhausted by placing the experience in a one-
dimensional scale of immediate values.

There is such a thing as direct appreciation of
the given, and such immediate apprehension of the
quality of what is presented must figure in all em-
pirical cognition. Nevertheless the object of es-
thetic judgment must always transcend the merely
given. Given experience would need no appraisal,
nor could the assessment of value exercise any help-
ful function, if the object of it were simply and
solely this experience itself. Experience wears its
own intrinsic value-aspect on its face, and no ap-
praisal of it as just this unique and given experi-
ence is necessary. The object of appraisal is (usu-
ally at least) to connect this quality with some
thing or context as a matrix of further such expe-
rience.* A judgment of value has direct relation to
our action. That whose value is positive is to be
sought ; that whose value is negative is to be avoided.
But experiences having a certain quality can be
sought or avoided only through just such prediction
as is involved in empirical cognition in general.

The most primitive of esthetic apprehensions are
those expansive movements and approaches toward
the stimulus, or that quiescence, which mark our
hope that the present enjoyment will continue, and
those contractions, withdrawals, or merely random
movements, by which we attempt to avoid or alter
the unpleasant experience. Such primitive attitudes
are hardly judgments; they are, rather, unconsid-
ered responses. Yet already they concern relation of
the present to a possible future as much as the qual-
ity of the present itself. Such primitive attitudes are
replaced by more complex ones, deliberate seeking
and intelligent avoiding, only when the immediate
apprehension of value is coupled with an instru-
mental cognition which penetrates the temporal

*Sec p. 13, footnote.

404 APPENDIX B

processus of experience and consciously predicts. It
is the residence of value in certain experiential con-
texts, and the relation between the supervenience of
such experiences and the modes of our possible ac-
tivity, which is the object of the judgment.

It may be said that there are two questions : What
is the value of the experience? and How is such ex-
perience to be got or avoided? But if it be claimed
that only the former is a question of esthetics, I
shall beg leave to differ. The former question is
hardly a real one, because it answers itself. For
given experience, there can be no doubt about it;
and for any other experience the question of value
is the question whether some immediately apprehen-
sible (value) quale will accrue in a certain empirical
context. The object of appraisal is some thing or
situation as a matrix for experience of a certain
quality. It is only so that the esthetic judgment can
have significance for practice, and become a guide
to art or life.

In the end, of course, all judgments of value must
depend on some direct intuition of value. And I
should suppose that judgments of comparative value
of belter and worse must depend at bottom upon
some direct comparison of quality as immediate. We
are here at a point where discussion might easily
degenerate into a quarrel about words. All I wish
to point out is that when what is evaluated is pre-
cisely and solely what is immediately intuited some
aspect of this experience itself, or some two items
of experience, both directly given then this evalua-
tion is not a judgment in the sense of being some-
thing which needs verification or could be verified ; it
is no object of learning or of reasonable discussion.
Direct valuing and direct preferring, of the immedi-
ately given as such, are not, I should suppose, mat-
ters concerning which there could be either mistake
or argument, though certainly they are essential.

It may be objected that certain experiences pall

ESTHESIS AND ESTHETICS 405

while others are likely to become increasingly satis-
factory or valuable. But, of course, given unique ex-
perience never becomes anything but past. It is the
continuing object, or certain empirical contexts as
designated by other qualities than value, which may
become altered in their value-aspect, in ways which
the esthetician and the artist are concerned to study.
Esthetics seeks to disclose the enduring values in
terms of those things or contexts in which positive
esthetic quality resides.

Thus so far as esthetic experience is a judgment*
or gives rise to knowledge, in the sense in which the
content of knowledge can be learned or verified, that
judgment is concerned with the same sort of rela-
tions between different "givens" in the process of ex-
perience which figure also in other types of empirical
cognition. There is knowledge here, not so far as the
esthetic experience is pure esthesis or coalesces with
the given, but precisely so far as it transcends the
given and reaches out to further possible experience
related to the present in certain ways.

Nevertheless, the terminus ad quern of the esthetic
judgment is different from that of merely instru-
mental or practical judgments, of the type which
figure in natural science, etc., which are what is more
frequently meant by the word "knowledge." All em-
pirical judgment concerns the processus of experi-
ence. But if I may be permitted the expressions
the practical judgment asks, "Where do we go from
here?" while the esthetic judgment asks, "What is
the use of going ?" There is no such thing as "es-
thetic experience," since all experience has both the
aspect of value and the aspect of sign: it is at once
esthesis and cognitively significant. But there are,
for any presentation, these two questions : "What is
the object which is here presented, and how is it re-
lated to others?" and "What is the value of this
presented object as an enduring matrix of experi-
ence?" So far as these concern some temporal span

406 APPENDIX B

which runs beyond the present, both are questions
the answer to which will be knowledge. For neither,
is this answer to be discovered merely by sinking our-
selves in the presentation itself and putting thought
to sleep. And for neither is it possible to make an
answer without reference to the specific quality of
the given experience as pure esthesis. But so far as
the contrast is between such pure esthesis and con-
struction or relation by thought with what tran-
scends the given, pure esthesis is not knowledge or
judgment. The given as such need not be judged.

If the mystic and the intuitionist are outraged by
the appropriation of the term "knowledge" to such
narrow use, one would gladly give them back their
beloved word, if only they will provide us with some
other which will mark the distinction which is it nec-
essary to make here the distinction between the im-
mediately apprehended and incommunicable "f eel" or
sensuous quality, which may have intrinsic value and
be an end in itself, and the instrumental or prag-
matic significance of other-than-itself which attaches
to this given, and whose importance lies in its ex-
trinsic or leading character (its meaning as a sign)
and in its connection with our possible action.

APPENDIX C

CONCEPTS AND "IDEAS"

It has been pointed out in Chapter III that the
concept, as that term is here used, represents an ab-
straction from the cognitive mental state, which in-
cludes also an element of esthesis representing, for
the individual mind, the denotation or application
of this concept in terms of the given.

It will appear, from Appendix B, that for the sig-
nificance of a particular mental state as apprehen-
sion of value, this element of esthesis may be decisive.
So far as experience can have the aspect of end in
itself, the determination of value cannot be inde-
pendent of the immediately apprehended quality of
the given. But also it will be evident that for evalua-
tive apprehension of what is objective of objects,
situations, and typical configurations of possible
experience the conceptual element is likewise indis-
pensable. If, for example, I wish so to direct my con-
duct as to secure a maximum realization of the posi-
tively esthetic, then I must be regardful not only of
the immediate qualities of such experiences as will be
possible to me, but also of those connections of one
experience with another which constitute the essence
of conceptual understanding and make it predictive
and hence a guide to action.

There are, moreover, interests which transcend
those of knowledge with regard to other people. So
far as I am interested in other persons only to se-
cure their cooperative behavior for purposes of my
own, my interest is purely cognitive. It ends in their
behavior and is regardless of the quality with which
I suppose our common experiences are felt by them.
But so far as I desire, or feel it my duty, to treat
other persons not only as behaving objects present

407

408 APPENDIX C

In my environment but also as ends in themselves, I
have an interest, which cannot be abstracted from,
in the absolute quality of their immediate experience.
The importance of such interests is commensurate
with the significance of love and duty in human life.
So far as we have such social ends and purposes,
in distinction from aims which are exclusively indi-
vidual, we are under the necessity to frame notions,
and to seek truths, with respect to which the quality
of experience in another mind is determinative. The
ethical conception of the good, and the esthetic con-
ception of the beautiful, are such notions, if we take
these to be social categories and suppose that indi-
vidual appreciations ought to be subordinated to, or
at least regardful of, prevailing or general appre-
hensions of the valuable. For instance, it will be of
the essence of the "good" as a predicate of objects
in general that it be a possible matrix of satisfac-
tory experience, not only to me but to the generality
of persons. In this, it stands in contrast to a purely
conceptual community of meaning. As was pointed
out in Chapter II, if I should, by some idiosyncrasy
of sense, apprehend "red" by immediately given
qualia peculiar to me, but should, on account of the
social origins of language, apply this term to the
same objects as other persons that is, find it in the
same patterns of relation then my cognitive con-
cept of red would be identical with that of other
persons, regardless of its peculiar quality as im-
mediately given. But if my meaning of the "good"
should represent a similar idiosyncrasy, then the
purposes for the sake of which I have framed and
use this term would be defeated, whether I should
know it or not. I do not mean to designate as
"good" what other persons merely behave toward in
the same way I do or find in the same contexts as I
do : I intend by it that which affects them with the
same, or similar, qualities of experience with which
I am affected in the presence of it. Notions so

CONCEPTS AND "IDEAS" 409

framed may appropriately be termed "ideas. ** Such
ideas are basic for the sciences of values ; for ethics,
esthetics, and the philosophy of religion. In terms of
them all truths of (social or objective) appreciation
must be framed.

The directly given quality of experience, however,
can never be conveyed or expressed; it is ineffable
and incommunicable. I seek to interpret other minds
by empathy or einfuhlung, and inference from be-
havior. That such sympathetic comprehension is not
pathetic fallacy, there is so far as I can see no
theoretical assurance. It transcends the possibility
of verifiable knowledge, and can be founded only on
a postulate.

If the taxi-man has a proper concept of an hour
and can meet me at the end of that time, we achieve
a perfect practical understanding regardless of the
tedium or vivacity with which the passing time may
differently affect us. The hour we are concerned
about, in our interests of cooperative behavior, is a
purely relational thing, which may be the same for
both of us regardless of the fact that, if I could put
myself inside his experience, this hour might feel
twice as long as to me now. For me to disregard this
immediate quale which the time has for the taxi-
man, is to treat him as a thing and not as a fellow
creature. But I cannot literally Jcnow his experi-
ence : I can only postulate that his behavior is a clue
to it. Upon such postulate, ethics must be founded.

There are many motives among them a powerful
and perhaps central motive of religion which move
us to extend such postulation to reality as a whole.
We are interested not only to manipulate things and
predict their behavior, but to question whether re-
ality is stable in a fashion which is not merely the
reliability of obedience to natural law. Has reality
on the whole a stable relation to our values ? Does it
conserve the humanly ideal, or does it inevitably
frustrate us in the end, or is it "indifferent" to our

410 APPENDIX C

valuings? We inevitably raise this question. To sup-
pose that it means anything or has an answer, is
inevitably to attribute to what we regard as ulti-
mate reality one essential character of persons de-
termination by relation to value. But if "ultimate
reality" means anything; if, further, ultimate real-
ity has an "attitude" toward human ends if it be
"personal" ; still I can only read this mind of God
by a postulate, however much the vehemence of faith
and the yearning to break through that loneliness
which is the fate of self-conscious beings may move
me to affirm it as knowledge.

Apparently it is a native longing of humanity to
transcend the bounds of subjectivity; to know our
object not only in the pragmatic sense of successful
prediction and control but in a deeper sense of
somehow coinciding with its nature. To represent
this coincidence of subject and object as genuinely
possible and as true knowledge, is characteristic of
mysticism, of intuitionism, and of that type of ideal-
ism represented by Schopenhauer and Bergson. The
world is my idea says Schopenhauer but the no-
tion that it is nothing more than my idea is incredi-
ble. That would be the solipsism which is maintained
only in mad-houses. But what more than my idea can
it be, consistently with my genuine knowledge of it?
If it is something more than what it means for me,
something in itself, then it must mean something for
itself ; it must, in this respect, be of a nature funda-
mentally like my own. Insight into the true nature
of a reality which is independent of me which has
more than a "for me" character is possible only if
that nature is spiritual. My immediate experience is
clue to it only because, in its character of will, my
nature coincides with the nature of all reality. The
parallel, for other and similar conceptions, the
reader will be able to draw for himself.

In brief, such idealism, as distinguished from other
types by its admission that reality is independent of

CONCEPTS AND "IDEAS 55 411

the mind which knows it, rests upon a dilemma which
is real and is, by such idealism, correctly understood:
Either knowledge does not mean identity of quality
or nature between subject and object, or the only
intelligible fashion in which reality in general can be
conceived is on some analogy to mind or life, as
spiritual. Such idealism chooses the latter alterna-
tive. As I have tried to argue, the other is the true
one. In the case of other conscious beings, empathy
has a meaning. In the case of the inanimate, it is
dubious whether such meaning is possible at all. But
in any case, knowledge is independent of any sup-
posed identity of quality between subjective know-
ing state and objective thing. Other interests may
concern such identity, but knowledge does not. Gen-
uinely verifiable knowledge cannot, thus, interpret
things on any analogy to spirits* On the contrary,
it can grasp other minds only as things, revealed in
the patterns of behavior of certain physical beings.
The rest is postulate.

APPENDIX D

MIND'S KNOWLEDGE OF ITSELF

It will very likely appear to the reader of Chap-
ter II that the analysis of the cognitive experience
there given leads to a difficulty about our knowledge
of the mind itself. This difficulty is, I think, more
apparent than real, and is mainly due to that back-
ground of our thought for which the history of
modern epistemological developments is responsible.
Perhaps the matter may be briefly put as follows :
Compatible with conceptions here presented, the
ascription of reality to anything as an object of
knowledge must represent an interpretation put upon
some presentation in experience. But the mind, too,
must be knowable. Either that, or it must be ac-
cepted as transcendent of experience, which would
make of it just that kind of dubious and metaphysi-
cal assumption which has here been declared against
in the theory of knowledge. Apparently, then, the
mind itself must somehow be given. Mind, however,
is exactly that to which the element in experience
which is TIG* given has been ascribed. If, then, the
mind and its activity are given, then everything in
cognition is given, and the distinction fails. But if
mind is not given, then how can it be known; how
can it be other than a meaningless fiction of the
transcendent?

The nature of mind in general is a fundamental
and complex problem of metaphysics, including
much with which we are not here concerned. While
it is not possible to avoid such metaphysical prob-
lems altogether, the attempt will be to restrict dis-
cussion directly to the point in hand that is, to

MIND'S KNOWLEDGE OF ITSELF 413

explain the possibility of the mind's knowledge of
itself, compatible with the conception that the knowl-
edge of a real object is through interpretation of
something given in experience, and that the element
of interpretation in knowledge is due to mind.

The key to this problem may be discovered, I
think, by a slightly critical examination of what is
involved in our ordinary ascriptions of reality and
our usual attributions of "responsibility." As was
pointed out in Chapter I, a proper method in phi-
losophy will take it to consist in just such critical
clarification of common modes of predication. What
follows, then, attempts merely to draw attention to
those phases of experience which are what we mean
when we say that thinking qualifies the object of
knowledge, and when we say that the mind itself is
known.

My experience of the pen with which I am writing
has been analyzed into a presentation now before
me and an intellectual construction or interpreta-
tion put upon it. When I say that this given cylin-
drical appearance is due to the real fountain pen in
my hand, I mean that, as I feel assured from past
experience, there are various continuities of this
given presentation with other actual and possible
experience in ways which are characteristic of just
this kind of real physical object. The givenness of
just this kind of appearance, together with just
these specific continuities, constitute the meaning of
"a physically real fountain pen now in my hand."
Similarly when I say that the taking of it as "pen 5 '
and not as "plaything 9 * or merely "cylinder" is due
to my mind, I mean that, as I feel assured from past
experience, if my attitude and purpose were other
than they are, the significant cognitive context of this
presentation would be other than it is. The elucida-
tion of just this correlation between different mental
attitudes and interests, on the one hand, and different
significant contexts of the given on the other, would

414 APPENDIX D

be the explication (or partial explication) of the
meaning of "my thinking mind conditioning the con-
tent of experience. 9 *

It might be said that this is roughly comparable
to a more naive pronouncement, which might be at-
tributed to common sense : There is a brute-fact ele-
ment in knowledge which is distinguished as that
which is due to the presence of the object; and there
is an element of relation, association, or construc-
tion which is distinguished as being due to the mind.
If, however, we should suppose that actually being
"due to the object" and being "due to the mind"
are the criteria which mark this distinction between
elements in cognition, then we should have the cart
before the horse. We should then be committing the
error, which is frequent in naive realism, of sup-
posing that a distinction within knowledge can de-
pend on a prior one outside it. To be sure, any plau-
sible analysis of knowledge must be consistent with
the statement that the veridical perception of the
object in the mind is due (in part) to the presence
of the object to the mind. Even idealism must find
some eventually valid meaning for ordinary pro-
nouncements about the causation of perceptive
states. Still, being due to the object is no criterion
of givenness, because the recognition of the presence
is itself dependent on this givenness of the presenta-
tion. The presentation is due to, or caused by, the
object; but knowledge of the object is due to the
presentation.

An exactly similar difficulty would hold for any
theory which should attempt to delimit or explain
the "formal" element of interpretation by the cri-
terion of its being due to the mind. That such con-
struction is thus due to mind may be accepted as
a fact; obviously something in knowledge will be
due to mind if there is any such thing as a mind.
But just as the object can be known only through
or by means of that presentation which is due to it,

MIND'S KNOWLEDGE OF ITSELF 415

so mind (as cognitive) can only be known through
that "formal" element in experience to which it
gives rise. If we did not find both the given and in-
terpretation in experience, we should have no epis-
temological ground for the distinction of subject
and object. Hence to rest the division of cognitive
experience into "matter" and "form" upon a sup-
posedly prior distinction of mind and independent
object, is to commit an obvious and vicious circle.

It is necessary however undesirable to pause
upon this methodological point, because it is pre-
cisely what lies at the root of the supposed difficulty
about conceiving that a mind which is one of the
conditions of experience in general should be itself
knowable and empirical. The alternative is tran-
scendentalism, which explains knowledge by refer-
ence to a conditioning mind and to avoid the para-
dox of mind conditioning itself posits this mind as
beyond or behind all experience. Such transcenden-
talism vitiates both epistemology and metaphysics.
It vitiates epistemology because to suppose that the
content of knowledge is informed or determined by
some transcendent agent or principle, which is not
to be found in experience, is to substitute a creation-
myth for the analysis of knowledge. And it vitiates
metaphysics by this invention of a transcendent
agent which, on the very account of knowledge
which such a theory gives, it would be impossible
to know. The ascription of the categories to a tran-
scendent mind and of the matter of knowledge to
transcendent things in themselves, are precisely simi-
lar fallacies. Those who hope to avoid the latter
must, in all consistency, give up the former.

It may be said that mind, as that which supplies
the categorial conditions of experience, is something
which, in the nature of the case, must be beyond or
behind experience and cannot be in it, but that the
existence of such a mind is "presupposed" by ex-
perience in general. If this vague word "presuppose"

416 APPENDIX D

has any real and pertinent meaning, I should sup-
pose its connotation would be of an hypothesis or
assumption which is logically necessary to explain
the facts in question. But the difference between an
hypothesis which is absolutely required in order to
explain a fact, and direct experience of the thing
hypostatized, is a wholly imaginary difference. To
see this, we should begin, not with hypotheses which
are required or necessary but with such as are only
more or less probable. That which explains experi-
ence is always something which the experience in
question gives us some reason (some partial ground)
for assuming. So put, this may seem a commonplace.
But if this point be fully grasped, it will throw much
light upon the connection between the probability
of hypotheses and the "perception" of "empirical
facts." It will also do much to resolve such difficul-
ties in the theory of knowledge as the one with which
we are here concerned.

Let us return to our illustration. At the moment,
the content of this present experience leads me to
say that I have a fountain pen in my hand. That is,
I explain or interpret certain data of sense by the
hypothesis of the fountain pen. This hypothesis is
partially verified by the presented data of sense
themselves. For the rest, it depends upon the verifi-
able truth of certain implicit predictions which con-
stitute my interpretation or explanation of these
sense-data. For instance, I expect it to continue to
write at my will, or if it does not, then I expect it
to begin again after I dip it in the ink-bottle and
manipulate the lever. These implicit predictions
too numerous and complex to mention are all of
them about further possible experience. If experience
could exhaust all such prediction, what I mean by
"the fountain pen in my hand" would completely
coincide with what this totality of experience would
include. When I say\that this present content of my
experience is "due to" the fountain pen, I state a

MIND'S KNOWLEDGE OF ITSELF 417

highly probable fact. When I say that the fountain
pen as a real and knowable object is an interpreta-
tion that I put upon my present experience by
framing this supposedly verifiable hypothesis about
further possible experience I state the same fact
in another way.

Between the fountain pen in my hand, the dis-
tant star, and an alpha-particle or electron, there
is no difference in type, from the point of view of
my knowledge, but only a difference of degree in
the probability of my interpretation, or the possible
discrepancy between it and what further experience
might disclose. And whatever, in my interpretation,
is thus probable only, is intrinsically capable of
being verified or falsified in such possible experi-
ence. There is nothing in it which is beyond the pos-
sibility of experience altogether. If there were, it
would also be beyond all meaning. The difference of
these examples is in the extent to which what is
meant by "the pen," "the star," "the electron," is
verified in the presently given sense-data, or con-
versely, in the degree to which what is meant is not
thus immediately verified and hence is only more or
less probable. The pen is "directly," though only
partially, given at the moment. The star of alpha-
particle is "indirectly" given; that is to say, be-
tween the immediately presented point of light or
the track in the photograph and the full meaning
of "a star" or "an alpha-particle," there is a more
obvious or greater interval. The electron, I may be
tempted to say, nobody can perceive. But in experi-
encing those laboratory phenomena which oblige us
if they do to believe in the existence of elec-
trons, the electron is partially given. This behavior
of the oil droplet, or whatever, requires the exist-
ence of electrons to explain or interpret it. And the
only kind of reality I can ascribe to the electron, is
the nature I attribute to it in explaining this and
other pertinent experience. As Charles Peirce has

418 APPENDIX D

phrased it: "Consider what effects that might con-
ceivably have practical bearings you conceive the
objects of your conception to have. Then, your con-
ception of those effects is the whole of your concep-
tion of the object."*

Apply these considerations to the conception of
a supposedly transcendent mind or agent which cate-
gorizes experience. If there were nothing in experi-
ence which was the datum of mind, there would be
no possible ground for assuming the existence of
any. If, on the other hand, the only rational ex-
planation of certain features of experience is the
hypothesis of mind having a certain character or
exercising certain functions, then this logically ne-
cessitated explanation of such experience would
constitute our knowledge of such mind. A mind
which is "presupposed" or necessarily assumed in
order to account for experience is partially revealed
in every experience which thus "presupposes" it,
and the whole meaning of it would be exhausted in
the totality of such experience. There is nothing in
the nature of it which can be meaningfully asserted
beyond what such experience, actual and possible,
would exhibit. So far as it is beyond all possible
experience, it is not a conceivable explanation of
anything. So far as it is even a possible explanation
of experience, it is not transcendent of experience
in general. The possible transcendence of mind, ex-
actly like the transcendence o the real object, is the
interval between what in our conception of this
mind present experience verifies and what nothing
short of the totality of pertinent experience would
verify.

We are now in position to approach the heart of
the difficulty about the "givenness" of mind. Two
elements have been distinguished in the cognitive ex-
perience; the given, which is characterized by our
inability to remove or alter it merely by an activity

""Chance, Love, and Logic.** p. 45-

MIND'S KNOWLEDGE OF ITSELF 419

of thought, and a construction or interpretation
which is attributed to the activity of mind. But this
mind must be identifiable through some sort of datum
of experience and must have its meaning in the em-
pirical in general.

The activity of mind is evidenced, first, in the
feeling of such activity. We should most of us have
difficulty in describing this feeling, because we are
normally inattentive to those correlates of it which
can be stated otherwise than in terms of its effects
outside the body. Thus we may be quite unable to
say whether what we call the feeling of thinking is
a feeling of innervation or certain specific cona-
tions or only a warmth of the jaw. But though we are
not here concerned with the psychological descrip-
tion of the thought process, it may be well to point
out that the possibility of such description, or even
of the problem, depends upon the identification -first
of that whose correlations, or "description" or
"analysis," is to be given. If, then, the traditional
difficulty of this psychological problem should tempt
any one to deny the existence of any mental phe-
nomenon truly describable as thinking, it may be
that he commits a fallacy of oversophistication, and
is looking under the table for what is on it. Let him
describe what happens when we think we think, and
if his description is a true one, then what he de-
scribes is what ought to be called thinking. But
whoever should be unacquainted with the feeling of
thinking would automatically be precluded from at-
taching any meaning to the term at all.

The effect of thinking, we learn as we learn the
effect of flexing our muscles or of any other activ-
ity. When I interpret this thing in my hand as "a
cylinder,' 5 its shape forthwith stands out in the field
of attention and other aspects of it relatively fall
away; the relation of it to one set of other things
(seen or imaged) rise before me, and other such re-
lations may lapse. The image of it rolling off my

420 APPENDIX D

desk may come into consciousness, whereas the mem-
ory of paying money on receiving it probably will
not. I learn that what is thus classed under the head
of construction or interpretation is due to my ac-
tivity much as I learn that the shape of these
scratches on the paper is due to my activity. If I
purpose to write, the scratches come; if I purpose
to wait until I am clearer what I want to say, then
for a time no more scratches. In general, I learn
my own activity through the correlation between
certain directly observable feelings, classed by com-
mon sense as desire, interest, purpose, etc. 5 and cer-
tain externally observable happenings, (These feel-
ings are as much given items of experience as the
feeling of presented red or soft. The correlation of
them with such further items as the externally ob-
servable happenings is not, In the same sense, given
but is a generalization the truth of which we learn
by an induction from many such experiences. The
feelings are conceived or named 9 as things in gen-
eral are conceived and named, in the light of such
learned stable relationships* Thus such a category
as "purpose" or even "attention" may be psycho-
logically inept, because it may be the case that a
correlation between these feelings and sufficiently
specific or fundamental neuroses is difficulty or im-
possible to discover. But if this should be so, still
it would be no criticism of common sense nor of
the use of such categories in epistemology, because
both common sense and the analysis of cognition
are relatively little concerned with brain and ner-
vous processes, or even with those relatively slight
and subtle bodily happenings frequently connoted
in psychology by "behavior," For example, I am
familiar with the feeling of intending to write. The
correlation between this and the scratches on the
paper is likewise familiar. But I do not know what
muscles I use when I write, to say nothing of in-
tervening processes less easily observed. Nor does

MIND'S KNOWLEDGE OF ITSELF 421

an interest in epistemology dictate that I should be-
come specially interested in them.)

In the course of experience, I learn the correla-
tion which exists between such feelings as attending,
concentrating on a given item, being interested, and
the further associations or configurations which
then accrue or stand out in consciousness. If it be
asked, "How do I know that it is the mind to which
such characteristic alterations are due? 55 the an-
swer is that I learn what is due to the mind by the
difference which it makes if I refuse to attend or
am differently interested in the given. For the rest,
the answer is indicated by the above observations
concerning the relation between the phenomena ex-
plained and that which they are explained as "due
to.' 5 What I mean by the mind is partially revealed
in just such feelings of purpose, desire, interest, and
the like, and these other alterations in the proc-
ess of experience which are attendant upon them.
Whether this mind is an immaterial agent, or a
Democritean complexus of smooth round atoms, is
simply a further question with which we are not
here concerned. "The mind 55 in general includes very
many other kinds of phenomena beside those of cog-
nition. To characterize the mind as a whole is a
metaphysical problem of the first magnitude. But
on any metaphysical account which should be even
conceivably correct, what we mean by mind must
be just what is revealed in the totality of those
phenomena which are ascribed to mind. To try to
find the mind in any other sense, is the counterpart
of the fallacy of attempting to discover the sub-
stance of the physical object apart from all its
qualities, relations, and effects. What is meant by
"the activity of thinking" is precisely such correla-
tion between attending, reflecting, etc., and those
alterations of context of the thing attended which
experience shows will ordinarily and normally be
induced by these. We learn the existence and nature

422 APPENDIX D

of thought, as we learn the nature and existence of
anything else, through the difference that it makes
in experience. The mind and its activity transcend,
of course, what is revealed in any particular case.
Ascribing the particular phenomenon to mind is an
interpretation; the significance of what is predi-
cated is not exhausted by this phenomenon itself
but includes a relation of this to a multitude of
others, which the predication implicitly asserts to
be intrinsically possible of experience. Such a predi-
cation, being interpretive, can be mistaken in the
particular instance. But the totality of such valid
interpretations or attributions, exhibit the mean-
ing of "the cognitive activity of mind."

I believe that we may now remove the last major
difficulty about our knowledge of the mind if we
observe that although the activity of mind is a
datum of experience, it is not the kind of datum to
which the word "given" has been applied in the jpre-
ceding. A comparison may be helpful here. It is a
datum of experience that I can move my arm, or
that I can twitch a certain muscle at will. But this
fact is something which I have learned; it repre-
sents a generalization from experience, not the mere
givenness of the twitch. This fact or generalization
is the correlation between the twitch and my inten-
tion. That this correlation exists, is a datum of ex-
perience an unalterable fact but this general or
stable fact is not given with the twitch. It is because
of this reliable correlation, which I have learned,
that I call the muscle-twitch something that I do.

Similarly, the ascription of certain phases of the
cognitive experience, here called "interpretation," to
the mind, represents the empirical generalization
that between this element in experience and our at-
titudes of attending and reflecting there is a reliable
correlation. The existence of this correlation is an
absolute datum; but it is not the kind of datum
which "given" is defined to mean. This datum is the

MIND'S KNOWLEDGE OF ITSELF 423

fact that when we thus think, then certain contexts
of the thing thought about accrue, in ways in which
they do not accrue when we think to some different
purpose or fail to attend or reflect. When I think
this in my hand as "cylinder," the image of rolling
adds itself: when I think it as "a poor buy," or
when I am thinking what I want to write and so
ignore this item in my field of vision, the image of
rolling is absent. This Image, taken by itself, would
be homogeneous with "the given," just a voluntary
muscle-twitch, by itself, is homogeneous with an in-
voluntary twitch. But the one twitch as I have
learned is correlated with my intention, while the
other is independent of it. Similarly, the visual pat-
tern of the pen in my hand and the image of it roll-
ing are both data of experience, under certain cir-
cumstances. But it is. the circumstances which mat-
ter. Whether I choose to find this visual pattern as
it now is or some other shape, it remains just this.
That item answers to the criterion of givenness: it
is independent of my attitude of thought. But the
accrual or non-accrual of the image of rolling and
other such context is as I have also learned not
thus independent, but is correlated with my attitude
of thought. This context, then, answers to the cri-
terion of construction or interpretation, of being
"due to the mind," To say that the activity of mind
is "given," would thus be subtly incorrect. But to
say that the activity of mind is something known
through certain data of experience data which
are in one sense homogeneous with those designated
as "given" is no paradox but, I should suppose, a
more or less obvious fact. The mind, as known, rep-
resents our interpretation of such data; their pro-
jected relation to a multitude of other such instances
and to further experience which we take to be intrin-
sically possible.

The paradox of mind knowing itself is merely one
of language. If it appears to be comparable to the

424 APPENDIX D

puppy trying to turn around fast enough to catch
his own tail, that is because it is falsely supposed
that the thing to be known is identical with this act
of knowing. The mind which is known transcends
the momentary knowing just as the external object
known transcends its instantaneous phenomenal ap-
pearance. I know my mind by means of generaliza-
tion from certain phases and aspects of past experi-
ence which are, by construction, added as context to
similar phases of my present experience; just as I
know the object by means of generalization from
past experience which, by interpretation, is added
as context to the present phenomenal appearance
of it. And that present datum of experience which is
interpreted as "activity of thought" is just as ob-
jective and intrinsically observable a kind of datum
as is the phenomenal appearance of an external ob-
ject.

The mind and particularly its purpose and ac-
tivity is, of course, ultimately mysterious, just as
concentration upon the presentation of the starry
heaven reveals it as something ultimately mysterious,
when all those prosaic and familiar correlations of
this and that, which constitute its explanation, are
shorn away, and we stand before it in its pristine
glory. But the mind is mysterious in no specially
different sense than this one in which reality alto-
gether is ultimately mysterious.

The conception of any esoteric or peculiar type
of knowledge by which we grasp the nature of our
own minds, is both implausible and unnecessary.
That the mind is at once that to which interpreta-
tion of the given in experience is due, and something
itself known by interpretation of certain characteris-
tics or data of experience, is as has often been ob-
served no more paradoxical than that we should
be able to change our own position as well as the
position of other things, or direct any other activ-
ity upon ourselves.

MIND'S KNOWLEDGE OF ITSELF 425

The feeling of paradox which may persist here is
a legacy of the transcendentalist mode of thought.
If mind he conceived as an ultimate reality, while
that which results from the interpretation or con-
struction by mind is conceived to have a merely
apparent or lower order of existence, then obviously
the real mind cannot know itself. It is for just this
reason that the transcendentalisms elaborate story
of the categorizing of experience by the mind is in-
consistent with itself, since if this account of knowl-
edge should be true it could not be known to be true.
Similarly if what is "known as" an interpretation
by the mind is created by or "constituted" by that
interpretation, then the mind cannot know itself,
since we can hardly imagine what we should mean
by saying that it created itself or constituted itself.
Fichte, of course, is driven to just this desperate
strait; the mind "posits itself, and this is the first
act of positing." Thus mind becomes the ultimate
and hopelessly esoteric mystery*

In any discussion of mind in the theory of knowl-
edge, it is particularly desirable to observe that
there are two characteristic modes of "explanation"
by the ratio essendi and by the ratio cognoscendi
and that these two run in opposite directions. In
the case of the external object, this is clear enough
and prosaic enough. The ratio essendi of the sense-
data is the presence of the real object; and the ratio
cognoscendi of the object is the sense-data them-
selves. Likewise in the case of the mind; the real
mind is the ratio essendi (the cause of) the inter-
pretational or "formal" aspects of cognitive expe-
rience, and these aspects are themselves the ratio
cognoscendi (the clue to) the cognizing mind. The
case is not fundamentally different than for real
things and their appearances or phenomenal effects
in general. The star is the cause of the light and the
light is evidence of the star ; the electron is cause of

426 APPENDIX D

the motion of the oil-droplet and this motion is evi-
dence of the electron. At the limit, the nature of the
real cause coincides with the totality of its conceiv-
ably experienceable effects. But this does not remove
the disparity between the real nature of the cause
and the presently observed and meager revelation
of it. Nor does it invalidate the different significance
of the two opposed directions which our characteris-
tic modes of understanding may take. The causal or
"cosmic" explanation, of science and common sense,
runs from cause to effect, from hypostatized thing
to observable evidence. The analysis and verification
of knowledge runs from effect to cause, from evi-
dence to the thing evidenced. Perhaps it needs to be
emphasized that one type of explanation or analysis,
satisfying certain purposes, does not exclude or
make superfluous other types of explanation,, insti-
gated by a different interest or made from some
other point of view that one analysis may be
wholly true without being the whole of the truth.

Epistemological investigation is, naturally, by
way of the ratio cognoscendi; that is its peculiar
task. Those "theories of knowledge" which reverse
the direction of explanation and give a causal, nat-
ural-scientific account, merely substitute a more or
less uncritical and psychological methodology, based
upon dubious assumptions, for their proper business.
Transcendentalism is, in general, the result of the
opposite fallacy of attempting to base everything
on the theory of knowledge. It tries to suppress, as
superfluous or merely secondary, all natural-scien-
tific explanation of those phenomena of which it
takes cognizance, and to substitute for it an analy-
sis of our knowledge of these phemonena. Thus it
ends by identifying cognition and creation, by af-
firming that there is no ratio essendi save the ratio
cognoscendi, the content of knowledge or the mind.
The characteristic result is the reduction of the

MIND'S KNOWLEDGE OF ITSELF 427

reality which appears to the appearance itself, and
the elevation of the mind above appearance to a
realm in which it is not knowable as other things are
known.

APPENDIX E

THE APPLICABILITY OF ABSTRACT CON-
CEPTUAL SYSTEMS TO EXPERIENCE

There is one problem about the application of ab-
stract conceptual systems to experience, not men-
tioned in Chapter IX, which merits a little atten-
tion. That is the question: How far does the char-
acter of given experience determine the applicabil-
ity or inapplicability of concepts, when these con-
cepts are first envisaged as abstract patterns of
purely logical relations? In the first place, it is ob-
vious that if we take a conceptual system com-
pletely in the abstract, as is done in the case of pure
mathematics, there is no indication in the system
itself of its applicability or inapplicability to any-
thing. It may be remarked, however, that the very
fact of its being developed at all is evidence of its
applicability to something. I do not mean by this
that such systems of mathematics originate as ap-
plied or empirical truth, and are later abstracted
from such application. That is true, in general,
though there are such exceptions as quaternions and
the non-Euclidean geometries. What I mean is, that
whether "imageless thought" is psychologically pos-
sible at all or not, no human being has, or ever will
have, logical powers sufficient to enable him to elabo-
rate the analysis of concepts in systematic fashion
without reliance upon imagery. If the mathemati-
cal system applies to nothing else, it will apply to a
set of distinguishable arrangements of symbols used
according to certain rules. This is a relatively trivial
application to experience, but it is an application to
something empirical nevertheless. In fact, we might
well ask if the designation "abstract*' as applied to

428

ABSTRACT SYSTEMS 429

mathematics is not a figure of speech, since no sys-
tem is to be discovered, in the mathematician's mind
or elsewhere, in complete isolation from denotations.
The point is, however, that such denotations may be
"accidental" ; and there is no such denotation from
which the system cannot be separated (and trans-
ferred to some other) while retaining its intended
identity as a system of abstract concepts.

The well-known practices of mathematics, in de-
vising tests of consistency and independence, will at
once confirm in the reader's mind the fact that any
abstract conceptual system, however elaborate, will
be such that more than one empirical denotation
could be found for it. It represents a type of order
which is exhibited by more than one kind of empiri-
cal things. Since this is true of mathematical sys-
tems, which are relatively complex, it is fairly
evident without further corroboration that it will
also be true of concepts in general.

It is not quite so clear whether the same empirical
content may be denoted by different conceptual sys-
tems different not in name simply but in that pat-
tern of logical order which is the essence of the ab-
stract concept. Out of hand, one might suppose that
this will not be possible unless comparing two sys-
tems of concepts to be applied to the same content
the application of one set of concepts neglects
certain items of the empirical which the other set in-
cludes in its denotation. In general, that is probably
true. If two conceptual interpretations should both
be applicable to the same content, the one will be
more abstract or general than the other, or will be
abstract in a different way. In that sense, the appli-
cability of different concepts to the same empirical
thing or situation is a commonplace, since there is
nothing which can be named by one name which can
not also be named by some other desk, furniture,
convenience, wood, antique, expensive, ugly! It is
more to the point to observe that different abstract

430 APPENDIX E

conceptual systems which are quite complex and are
of the same order of structural complication may
be applied to the same empirical content and include
in their denotation the same empirical characters,
though they are quite different conceptual systems
as types of logical order. A good illustration is that
kind of point-for-point correlation in denotation by
which it may be proved that if Euclidean geometry
is free from inconsistency, then some non-Euclidean
system say Riemann's is so also. One may apply
Riemannian plane geometry to the surface of a
hemisphere by letting Riemannian "straight" denote
Euclidean "great-circle cut orthogonally by a
plane," etc. An even more illuminating illustration
would be the systematic reinterpretation of New-
tonian-Euclidean facts in the kinematics of relativ-
ity theory.

Envisaging the abstractly conceptual as a type
of order or pure pattern of logical relationships, one
might say that at least the given character of the
empirical imposes certain limits upon the concepts
which can be applied to it; that a conceptual sys-
tem cannot be imposed if it requires distinction
where no distinction in the given can be marked, or
relation where no conjunction in the given can be
found. Such a statement would at least draw atten-
tion to an important consideration which seems to
limit the usefulness of applying a conceptual inter-
pretation to a given content. In general, a con-
ceptual interpretation which makes distinctions or
relations where, in experience, none are to be discov-
ered, will be a poor intellectual instrument for deal-
ing with that phenomenal content. And yet, there is
abundant evidence that we not only can but do apply
concepts to the given where this involves making
distinctions and relations which empirically cannot
be discovered. Not only that, but often such inter-
pretation serves a useful purpose and is highly sci-
entific. For instance, the array of color-qualities is

ABSTRACT SYSTEMS 431

interpreted as a continuum, by correlation with vi-
bration-frequencies, etc., although the directly dis-
criminable color-qualities are certainly neither in-
finite in number nor such that between any two
another can be found- The same is true of pitches ;
and exactly this procedure is frequent in the sci-
entific interpretation of sense-qualities. In fact, one
might say that arrangement in a one-, two- 5 or n-
dimensional continuum is the scientific way of at-
tacking all sorts of areas of experience, though
no type of the empirical, as given, is genuinely con-
tinuous in the sense required by such mathematico-
scientific analysis. Absolutely never is it capable of
direct differentiation into the infinity of distinct gra-
dations which characterize the order of the mathe-
matical continuum. It is for this reason (amongst
others) that Bergson repudiates such scientific in-
terpretation as misrepresentative of reality. And
Professor Whitehead, by his <c method of exten-
sive abstraction," has shown us how situations of
this sort can (ideally) be reinterpreted so as to dis-
close the order which is conceptually required as
genuinely present, not as an order of the directly
given but as an order of our own ways of ordering
it. In fact, although consideration of space and of
the reader's interest forbid extended illustration, a
little attention to scientific procedure makes it clear
that one could pile Ossa upon Pelion of evidence that
conceptual systems may usefully and validly be ap-
plied to given content although they involve making
distinctions which are not given and establishing re-
lations where none are found.

To the question, "What abstract concepts or sys-
tems could be applied to what given content?" the
only answer which seems possible is: It is unsafe to
say that any concept could not be applied to any
empirical content. In this, as in other respects, it is
hazardous to set bounds to human ingenuity* or
even to delimit a priori what could be made useful.

432 APPENDIX E

To the question, "What will determine such applica-
tion?" the answer seems to be: Complex considera-
tions, in which the purposes to be served, the type of
order of the concepts, and the general character of
the given, will all be important, but in which, ap-
parently, no one of these factors by itself is capable
of being decisive. This, as it seems to me, but serves
to emphasize the fact that the conceptual interpreta-
tion of experience is, at bottom, something concern-
ing which rationalistic accounts and empiricistic
theories are, in their opposite ways, both false, and
the pragmatic is the true one.

APPENDIX F

THE LOGICAL CORRELATES OF THE A
PRIORI AND THE A POSTERIORI

The theory of the a priori set forth in Chapter
VIII contains two main theses: (1) All a priori
truths are definitive; they explicate criteria of clas-
sification, including the criteria of reality in its va-
rious categories; and conversely, all criteria of
reality are a priori and independent of experience
because they concern the classification or interpreta-
tion of empirical given content and do not indicate
or determine that content itself. (2) The choice of
concepts and systems of such for application to ex-
perience is pragmatically determined.

Another way of expressing the first of these two
would be to say that a priori propositions coincide
with the class of truths which are analytically de-
termined and with propositions true in intension;
what is a posteriori coincides with the logically syn-
thetic and with propositions true in extension. The
equivalence of the a priori, the analytic, and the in*
tensional, on the one hand, of the a posteriori, the
synthetic, and the extensional, on the other, has fre-
quently been denied. Failure to observe these equiva-
lences has led to extreme confusion in logic, much
of which persists at the present time. The most im-
portant topic in this connection would be the mean-
ing of implication and the nature of inference. But
examination of that question would of necessity be
too long and complex for inclusion here. What can
be offered in brief space is a sketch of the distinc-
tion between propositions in intension and in exten-
sion.

483

434 APPENDIX F

The a priori proposition and the empirical gen-
eralization are usually indistinguishable by their
form. Both are universal in intent, and are normally
expressed by an "all" proposition or by one in which
the "all" though unexpressed is obviously under-
stood. The difference between these two is that be-
tween the intensional and the extensional "all." If I
say, "Parrots are birds," I am correctly understood
as meaning that any creature not a bird could not
be a parrot. But if I assert, "Parrots have a raucous
cry," I should not be correctly interpreted if I were
taken to mean that a bird with a melodious note
could not belong to the genus "parrot." The first
proposition is a priori; the second, an empirical
generalization*

The difference between the two may be expressed
in various equivalent ways. The first explicates the
intension or essence of the subject-term "parrot";
the second asserts only the inclusion of the class of
actually existing creatures which come under the
definition of "parrot" in another class, "creatures
with a raucous cry," The first expresses in the predi-
cate something logically contained in the subject;
the subject-concept implies the predicate-concept.
The second states a factual connection of two classes
of objects. The first can be transformed into a strict
hypothetical proposition, "For any X you please, if
X is a parrot, then necessarily X is a bird.'* But
if we similarly transform the second, "If X is a par-
rot, then X has a raucous cry," we must recognize
that we have here a different meaning of "If . . .,
then . . ." ; that it does not state a logically neces-
sary but only a material or factual relation what
is called by Mr. Russell a "formal implication,"
which holds only of the materially existent, not of
the all-possible. (Incidentally, this name is highly
inappropriate.) Finally, we can exhibit this differ-
ence in unambiguous and decisive fashion if we ex-
press the meaning of each of these propositions as

CORRELATES OF THE A PRIORI 435

a negation* The first means, "A parrot which is not
a bird is logically inconceivable" ; the second means
only, "A parrot without a raucous cry does not ex-
ist. 5 * Propositions in intension concern what is pos-
sible, impossible, or necessary; an affirmative uni-
versal in intension states a necessity and negates a
possibility. Propositions in extension concern only
what does or does not exist. It is obvious that a uni-
versal in intension implies the corresponding uni-
versal in extension: what is impossible cannot exist.
But the reverse does not hold. Knowledge a priori
is knowledge applicable to existence; but knowledge
of the existent merely as such is not a priori.

The significance of the theory of the a priori here
presented may be brought out by considering the
different ground of our knowledge in these two cases.
We know that all parrots are birds without any ex-
tended examination of parrots, or without any ex-
perience of them at all, provided only we are clear
about the concept which the term expresses. A par- '
rot which is not a bird is impossible because no mat-
ter what characteristics any living creature might
present, if it lacked the essential properties of a bird
it would not properly be classifiable as a parrot.
This a priori knowledge of parrots does not preclude
the existence of any imaginable creature or limit in
any way the possibilities of future experience. Liv-
ing creatures not yet discovered, or not yet evolved,
may be anything you please; but they cannot be
parrots if they are not birds. It is for this reason
and as is here maintained for this reason alone,
that the proposition can be known true a priori.
The illustration chosen is trivial ; but it will never-
theless be typical provided only we remember that
the distinction of real from unreal is a classifica-
tion, and that what is designated as '^unreal" as well
as the "real" is given in experience. Knowledge a
priori is knowledge of our own concepts. It is also
knowledge of reality in the sense that certain kinds

436 APPENDIX F

of realities must exhibit certain categorial charac-
teristics ; their failure to do so rules them out of the
category in question.

Since adequate examination of the distinction
between propositions in intension and propositions
in extension is nowhere to be found in the literature
of logic, it may be of assistance to present here
briefly the application of this distinction to the tra-
ditional forms.

The universal "All X is Y" in intension means,
"If anything is an J5T, then necessarily it is a Y ; all
possible JS?s are Y's." The universal in extension
means, "All actual X*s are Y 9 s." It is particularly
illuminating to consider the special case in which no
X 9 s exist. Contrast "All trespassers on this prop-
erty are liable to arrest" with "All trespassers on
this property are minors," Suppose that nobody
trespasses. The truth of the former is unaffected.
If certain conditions designated by law have been
met, trespass implies liability to arrest. The latter
proposition, one might say, becomes insignificant.
But every proposition ought to be true or false un-
der all circumstances; and logicians have had to be
precise about this matter because of certain prob-
lems, some of which will be mentioned in what fol-
lows. According to the dictum now commonly ac-
cepted, if nobody trespasses, then the proposition,
"All trespassers are Y" is true, whatever Y may be ;
or in general, if the subject-term denotes an empty
class, every universal proposition about that sub-
ject is true in extension. (Many logicians neglect the
distinction of extension and intension, and so apply
this dictum to all universal propositions, with con-
sequent difficulties to their theories.) If nobody tres-
passes, then in extension any proposition whatever
is true about all trespassers ; all the trespassers that
exist are minors, red devils, pink elephants, or what
you will.

The case of the universal negative is somewhat

CORRELATES OF THE A PRIORI 437

more obvious. In intension, "No X is Y" means,
"The concept X excludes the concept Y\ no pos-
sible X is a Y." In extension, it means simply, "The
class of things which are both X and Y is an empty
class ; no such exist." Thus if nobody trespasses,
"No trespasser is liable to arrest" would be true if
meant in extension; but it is false in intension. In
extension, .no trespasser is anything, because there
are none. In intension, the question is whether the
concept of trespass excludes liability to arrest, and
that question is entirely independent of the exist-
ence or non-existence of trespassers.

Though the distinction of extensional from inten-
sional meanings commonly passes unnoticed, it may
be remarked for universal propositions in the case of
definitions and legal principles. For particular
propsitions, the distinction is even less familiar. But
the ground of it is the same. In extension, "Some X
is Y" means, "Members of the class *both X and Y 9
exist." In intension it means the contradiction of the
universal negative, "The concept X does not ex-
clude the concept Y ; the logical species 'both X and
Y 9 is possible or conceivable." Similarly, the par-
ticular negative, "Some X is not Y 9 " means in ex-
tension, "Members of the class 'X but not Y* exist'* ;
while in intension it means, "The concept X does not
imply the concept Y ; the logical species *X but not
Y 9 is conceivable*"

Though as has been said, particular propositions
which are intensional in meaning are relatively in-
frequent, still examples may be found. For instance,
if a professor of jurisprudence should say, "Some
grounds of civil suit are torts and some are not,"
and should be asked for demonstration, he might
give it without any recourse to actual breaches of
contract, conspiracies to defraud, etc., merely by
pointing out the implications of legal concepts. His
meaning is that, under the law, there are two species
of possible action for which a remedy may be sought

438 APPENDIX F

by civil suit. Or again, he might prove his point by
purely hypothetical cases ; that they never occurred
would be irrelevant.

The case of the singular proposition is especially
interesting. Mr. Russell has propounded the theory
that a proposition about a singular subject (de-
scribed by some phrase) is true if and only if (1)
everything to which the subject-term applies has
the predicated character, (2) the subject-term ap-
plies to one existent thing, (3) it applies to only
one. This has gained wide currency among logicians.
It is a doubtful interpretation of the singular propo-
sition in extension, and a perfectly impossible one
of the singular in intension.

The doubt as to its correctness in extension is un-
important for us but may be noted in passing.* If
a boastful friend asserts, "All the fish I catch will
be big ones," we might rally him by rejoining, "All
the fish you catch you can put in your eye." This
answer, in the form of a universal proposition, is
meant in extension. The point of making it is that
we assert, by implication, that he will not catch any
fish, because otherwise our proposition would be
false. Thus we illustrate the fact that common-sense
recognizes that the universal proposition in exten-
sion is true when the subject denotes an empty class.
But if our friend should say instead, "The first fish
I catch will be a big one" (a singular proposition),
we might similarly rejoin, "The first fish you catch
will be a whale," meaning that this is true because
there will not be any first fish. Thus if the inter-
pretation of the singular proposition is to accord
with some current usages, it must, like the univer-
sal, be true whenever the subject denotes the non-
existent, instead of false as Mr. Russell's theory re-
quires.

The singular in intension, while infrequent, is of

pretty clear interpretation. If I say, "The President

*I mention only one ground of doubt; others have been put forward.

CORRELATES OF THE A PRIORI 439

of the United States must be native-born," my ob-
vious meaning is to assert that the concept "Presi-
dent," as delimited by the Constitution, has this im-
plication. If it should happen that the incumbent of
the office had died and no successor had been in-
ducted, that would be irrelevant to my intended
assertion. Similarly, a lawyer might state, "The
residuary legatee under this will, is entitled to
. . .," meaning to explicate the terms of the will
under the law, and meaning nothing whatever about
the existence or non-existence of a party answering
to the designation of residuary legatee under the ,
will. The singular proposition in intension, like the
universal, states that the subject-concept implies
(or does not imply) the predicate. The difference is
only that the subject of the singular in intension is
a concept such that it applies to one, and to only one,
possible object.

Thus, throughout, the proposition in intension is
true if it correctly states a relation of concepts, and
is entirely independent of considerations of existence
or non-existence. Propositions in extension, on the
contrary, are dependent on facts of existence. Thus
propositions in intension are analytically determin-
able and a priori ; propositions in extension are syn-
thetic and a posteriori.

In conclusion, some of the logical difficulties which
traditional logical precepts encounter in the case of
extensional propositions the subject of which denotes
an empty class, may be briefly noted. According to
tradition, the relations of the four typical proposi-
tions, (A) "All X is F," (J5) "No X is F, (I)
"Some X is F," and (0) "Some X is not F," are as
follows : A and E are contraries, that is, such that
they cannot both be true but both may be false. I
and O are subcontraries, that is, they may both be
true but cannot both be false. A and 0, E and /,
are contradictories, that is, they cannot both be

440 APPENDIX F

true and cannot both be false. / follows from A,
and O from E 9 but the reverse implications do not
hold. Let "-5T is Y" be "trespassers will be prose-
cuted," and suppose nobody trespasses. "Some tres-
passers will be prosecuted" and "Some trespassers
will not be prosecuted" are then both false. If it
should be said that "All trespassers will be prose-
cuted" is false because there are none, then A and O
will not be contradictory, since O is false also. E is
obviously true ; hence E and / may be contradictory,
But O does not follow from E 9 since E is true but O
is false. For uniformity of relation between univer-
sals and particulars, it is necessary to accept the
current dictum, that A> like E 9 is true when the sub-
ject denotes an empty class. This makes A and O y E
and /, contradictory. But A and E are not con-
trary, being both true ; / and O are not subcontrary,
both being false. And J does not follow from A 9 nor
O from -E, because A and E are both true, / and O
both false.

The traditional relations of the "square of oppo-
sition" hold of propositions in intension, that is, of
propositions about the all-possible. The relation of
contradiction holds in extension on the current in-
terpretation of A as always true when the subject
denotes an empty class. The other traditional rela-
tions all fail concerning propositions in extension.

Traditional logical doctrines will uniformly be
found to have been worked out for intension, and to
be commonly applied as if all propositions stated re-
lations of intension. Current revisions of tradition
will all too frequently be found to have been formu-
lated with an opposite oversight as if all proposi-
tions had their meaning in extension.

INDEX

INDEX

(Where references under an entry are numerous, the most impor-
it or decisive is sometimes indicated by "esp.")

tant or

Abstraction, 47 jf., 54 jf., 66, 71,

80, 89, 91, 101, 115, 184, 249.

358, App. A passim, and App.

E passim.
Acquaintance, knowledge by.

118 jf., esp. 183, 188, 292.
Activity, 34, 41, 46, 50, 117, 119,

136, esp. 140 jf., 403, 407, esp.

419-425.
Analysis, 5, 30, 33 jf ., 55 /., 78,

81,99, esp. 106 Jf.
Analytic proposition, 37, 231,

237, esp. 240 /., 245, 303 ff. 9

312, App. F passim.
Animal faith, 310, 340, 379, 381.
Appearance, 9, 134, 137, 152,

290 jf., 338, 336, 348, 354, 359

/., 369 jf., 424 Jf.
ARISTOTLE, 27, 41.
Art (see also Esthetic), 53.
Attention, 59.
Awareness, 37, Ch. II passim,

120, 124, 135, Ch. IX passim,

810.

Beautiful, see Esthetic.
Behavior, 20, 78 f 85 ff ., Ch. IV

passim, 117, 239, 409, 420.
BERGSON, H., 39, 41, 58, 147 /.,

410, 431.
BERKELEY, G., 28 /., 81, 39, 44,

91, 133, 165, 170. 190.
BERNAYS, N., 244.
Body, 234 ff.
BORN, M., 893.

"BOSANQUET, B., 81, 198.

BROAD, C, D., 15. 31, 61 jf.

Cause. 100, 234 /., 888, 426.
Certainty, Ch. X passim, 847 /.,

369, 377.
Change, 137 jf.. 141, 396 jf.

443

Circularity, 82, 209 /.

Classification, 4, 12, 49, 134, 237,
247, 256, 268, 321.

Clearness, 3, 86 Jf.

Color, 171 /., 363 Jf., 430.

Common sense, esp. 2, 18 /.

Connotation, see Meaning.

Consistency, 18, 22, 34, 85, 208
jf., 237, 245 jf.

Context, 144 /., 405, 413; the-
ory of meaning, 69 /.

Cosmology, see Metaphysics.

Critical realism, 60, 155 /.

Datum, 29/., 33, 39, 45 Jf., esp.

53 ff., 190, 217. 831 /., 337 /^

418 jf.
Deduction, 23, 202, 258, 394;

of the categories, 38, 320.
Deductive system, 105 jf., 249.

397 jf., App. E passim.
Definition, 12/., 16, 37, 67, esp.

79 /., 231, 247, 256, 263 /., 437.
Denotation, 78, 84, 121, 131, 249,

407, 429 /.
DESCARTES, B., 1, 154 /., 166,

205, 235.

Dialectical method, 20^.
Ding an sich, see Things in them-
selves.

Dream, see Illusion.
Duration (see also Time), 41, 74.

Effect, 127, 133 /., 152, 418, 426.
Einfvhlung, see Empathy.
EINSTEIN, A*, 254 if., 393.
Empathy, 41, 409, 411.
EMPEDOCLES, 156.
Empirical, 34, 37, 223, 263 jf .,

Chs. IX and X passim, 416,

App. E passim*
Empiricism, 27 jf., 432.

444

INDEX

End, 2, 145, 410.

Enjoyment, 120, 135.

Error, 39, 42J\, 121, 131 /., esp.

157-165, 176 jf.

Essence, 60, 62, 72, 120 /., 130.
Essential (see also Definition),

374 /.
Esthesis, 53 /., 75, 275 /., App.

B passim t 407.
Esthetic 27, 112, 118, 120, 135,

147, App. B passim, 407.
Esthetics, 29, App. B passim, 409.
Ethics, 3, 14, 17, 112, 409 ff.
Event, 59 /., 152 /., 307.
Experience, esp, 59 ff.
Explicative, see Analytic.
Extension (see also Denotation) ;

proposition in , App. F

passim.

Falsity, see Truth and Error.
FICHTE, J. G., 46, 190, 236, 425.
Function, 170, 175, 186 ff.

Generalization, 29, 134, 137 ff. .,
292, Ch. X passim, 346 jf., 361,
370 jf., 422, 434.

Good, 2, 36, 408.

GOBGIAS, 881.

GREEN, T. H., 45,

Hallucination, see Illusion.
HAMILTON, W. R., 252.
History, 67/., 152, 228, 267 ff. t

342.

HOLT, E. B., 43.
HUME, D., 1, 28, 44, 195, 213,

312, 319 Jf., 381.
Hypothesis, 131 /., 142, 256 jf.,

3S6> 357, 4Z6jf.

Idea, 9, 96, App. C passim.
Idealism, 39, 45 Jf., 91, 149, 155,

167, esp. 180 Jf., 410 /., 414.
Identity, 125 /., 137, 411.
Ignorance, 176 jf.
Illusion (see also Error), 28, 57,

138, 143, 225, 261, 299. 350 /.
Image, 78, 81, 177.
Imagination, 26, 162.
Immediacy, 39 /., 44, 46, Ch* II

passim, 91, 120, 147, 275 /.,

338, 358, App. B passim, 407,

417.

Inconsistency, see Consistency.
Independent object, see under

Reality.

Induction, 23, 204, 323, 345, 400.
Ineffable, 53, 112, 123, 126 /.,

144, 147 /.

Intelligence, 110, 113 jf.
Intelligibility, 144^., 222/., 348,

Ch. XI passim, 396.
Intention (see also Meaning);

propositions in , App. F

passim.
Interest, 51, 91, 110, 112 ff., 128,

159, 265, 374, 407, 413.
Interpretation, 5, 12, 14, 18, 27,

30, esp. 48 jf., 58, 60, 268 Jf.
Introspection, 73.
Intuition, 41, 47, 66, 75 jf., Ill,

121, 147 /., 198, 231, 241 Jf.,

297, 320, 404.

JAMES, W., 65.

Judgment (see also Prediction),
46, 157-165, 245, Chs. IX and
X passim. 408.

KANT, I., 1, 8, 9, 55, 139, 149,
151, 154, 214 /., 241, 295 jf.

Language, 31, 33, 84, 87, 102,

110.jf., 117 /., 123.
LAPLACE, P. S., 32.
Law (see also Generalization)*

130, 254, 258, 262 jf., 321, 332

jf.,S43, 373 jf.
LEIBNITZ, G. W. v., 113.
Like-minded, 21, 113 /.
Limitations, 74 jf., 158, 176 if.,

319, 368, 373 J.
LOCKE, J., 1, 31.

LOEWENBERG, J., 54.

Logic, 8, 14, 17, 69, 71, esp. 207
jf., 245 jf., 306 /., App. F
passim.

Mathematics, 95, 99, 104 /., 107,
203, esp. 243 jf., App. E passim.

Meaning, 40 jf., Chs. HI and IV
passim, esp. 67-72, 197, 268 /.,
287, 408; of presentations,
135 / 144.

INDEX

445

Memory, 51, 53, 125, 141.
Metaphysics, Ch. I passim, 65,

412.

MILL, J.S., 250 Jf.
Mistake, see Error.
MONTAGUE, W. P., 43.
Moral (see also Ethics), 3, 147.
Mysticism, 40 jf., 47, 146, 406.

Name, 121 jf., 132, 134 jf., 278

jf., 294 /., 318.
Natural light, 25, 198.
Necessary, 195 /., Ch. VD1 pas-

sim, 293, 324.
Need, see Interest.
New realism, 89, 42, 71 Jf., 135.

Order, 107 /., 130, 143, 254, 341,
Ch. XI passim, 397.

Paradox, 149 jf., 424.
Particular, 223, 283 jf., 301, 315

jf., 336, 388.
Passive consciousness, 30, 41 1

137, esp. 141 Jf., 214 /.
PEIBCE, C. S., 65, 133, 417 /.
Perception, 42/., 73 jf., 134, 414.
Permanence (see also Time), 33,

153.

PERBT, R. B., 149.
Personality, 229, 410.
Phenomenalism, 154 /., 165,

174J.
Physical, 27, 161, 235, 252, 305,

322, 393.

PLATO, 21, 45, 70, 241, 309, 315.
Postulate, 105, 243 jf., 409 ff.
Practical, 18, 21, 31, 85, 119,

123, 147, 343, 405.
Pragmatic, 31, 34 /., 145 /., Ch.

VTII passim, 300, 375, 410,

432.
Predication, Ch. IX passim, esp.

278 ff,
Prediction, 37, 44, Ch. V passim,

277 Jf., 335, 375, 382 jf., 407.
Present (see also Time); specious

, 58, 61, 141.
Presentation, 44, 46, 49, 58, esp.

59 /., 63, 120, 134 /., 158, 278

ff., 292, 310, 372, 413 /.
Presupposition, 1, 198 ff., 415 Jf.

Principia Mathematica, 95, 101,

107, 244, 248.
Property, 121 Jf., 130, 171, 234

f., 283 Jf., 373 Jf., 396.
Psychology, 6, 35, 55 Jf., 62, 68

jf., 87, 160, 420.
Purpose, 51, 93, 111, 119, 228,

265 /., 272, 420.

Quale, esp. 60 ff. and 121 /., 310,
383, 887 Jf.

Ratio cognoscendi, 149, 425 /.

Rational, 22, 341 /., 347, 381 /.

Rationalism, 24 ff., 33, 92, 202
ff., 211 /., 233, 237, 432.

Real, 8, 10, 16, 27, 36, 279, 413,

Realism (see also New realism.
Critical realism, and Represen-
tationalism), 154 /., 166, 414.

Reality, Ch. I passim, 112> 321,
358, 366, 381, 390; indepen-
dent . , 47, 64, 192 ff., 410.

Reason (see also Rational), 20,
92 jf., 99, 101, 233, 237.

Receptivity (see also Intuition),
42, 47, 217 Jf.

Recognition, 134 Jf., 291, 294,
353.

Reflective method, 22 Jf., 56.

Regulative principle, 353, 366.

Relations, 40, 82, 91, 98.

Religion, 112, 147, 409 Jf.

Representationalism, 43, 135,
Ch. VI passim.

Right (see also Ethics), , 27, 36.

ROYCE, J., 86, 101.

RUSSELL, B. A. W., 15, 64, 95,
181, 206, 244, 438.

SCHOPENHAOTB, A., 410,

Science, 2, 6, 32, 56, 70, 99, 147,
235 /., 249, 254, 311, 342, 374

J., App. A passim.
conscious, 10, 18, 88.
Self-contradictory, 205 Jf.
Sensum, 81, 61 ff.
Shape, 172 /.
SHEFFER, H. M., 244.
Sign (cognitive), 44, 119 ff., 144,

192, 402, 405 /.
Similarity, 92, 364 /.

446

INDEX

Size, 168 jf.

Skepticism, 24, 44, 72 /., 116,

155 /., 195, 213, 215 ff n Miff.,

311 /., 819 jf., Ch. XI passim.
Social, 21, 25, Ch. IV passim,

117, 147, 228, 268 /.. 408 /.
Solipsism, 183, 410.
Sophists, 156.
Space, 82/., 140, 148, 234 /., 241

/, 297 fa SIS ff.i Non-
Euclidean , 253 JT.
Speculation, 6/
Speech, see Language.
Stream of consciousness, 58 /.,

141, 357.

Subject (of knowledge), 47, 164.
Subjective, 112, 116, 121, 147,

329, 348, 410.
Substance, 5, 100, 395 /.
Substantive, 67, 70, 99, 106, 369,

374, 397.
Synthetic proposition, 245, 303

ff., 312, App. F passim; a

priori, 1, 245.

Thing, 58, 136 ff.. 234 /., 283 /.,
307, 320, 348, 366 ff., 372 jf .,
App. A passim.

Things in themselves, 64, 156,
179 jf., 214JF..415.

Time, 51, 60/.. 130, 140 /,. esp.

148 #, 234 /., 255 #, 281.
Transcendent, 20, 25, 30, 34 /.,

40, 45, 71, 93, 176, 183, 223,

228, 231 Jf., 412 /., 418, 425.
Truth, 25, 39, 157-165, 206 /.,

231, 240 / esp. 267 ff., 330

Jf. 9 341, 346 /., 382.

Uniformity, 137, 257, 261, Ch.
XI passim, App. A passim.

Universal; concepts, 61, 121
Jf.; propositions, 199, 231,
315 ff. f 336, 436 J.; abstract
, 10; concrete , 9, 55.

Validity (see also Judgment), 2,

11, 36, 325, 331, 338 ff., 346,

376, 886.
Value, 18, 51, 71, 89, 145, 248,

App. B passim, 407.
Veridical, 28, 42/., 282.
Verification, 124 Jf., 130 JF., 149

jf ., 58.

WHITEHEAD, A, N., 15, 95, 152,

244, 431.
Will, see Purpose.

ZENO, 148.